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German Politics and the 'Jewish Question', 1914-1919 
 
Lucia Juliette Linares  
 
The First World War confronted German politicians with a range of unprecedented, vital 
questions in the spheres of domestic as well as foreign policy. As the fortunes of war shifted, 
so did borders, populations and national allegiances. In a period of acute and almost constant 
political crisis, the German government faced issues concerning citizenship, minority rights, 
religious identity, nationhood and statehood. My dissertation analyses these issues through 
the prism of the so-called 'Jewish Question'. The Jewish Question, I contend, casts important 
new light on Germany’s difficult path towards a new democratic and pluralistic constitution 
in 1919. Jewish questions revealed the paradoxes of German state-building and the difficulties 
of breaking down older forms of corporate identity for the sake of national-cultural 
homogeneity. My principal aim in this dissertation is to offer a novel interpretation of the role 
that the 'problem' of German Jewry played in the political debates and decisions that paved 
the way for the Weimar Republic. The relevant historiography still tends to read the Jewish 
Question with hindsight, that is, in the context of the Holocaust and from a social or cultural 
historical perspective. While it does not ignore the short- and long-term effects the Jewish 
Question had on the rise of German antisemitism, my dissertation stresses its contingency 
and ambivalence. It offers the first sustained examination of the ways in which questions about 
German-Jewish citizenship and religious as well as national identity shaped the politics of the 
last Imperial government and influenced the processes of parliamentarisation and 
democratisation in the final years of the war. The Jewish Question, I argue, affords revealing 
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Everybody is talking about the "Jewish Question". But if you ask what the Jewish 
question really is, then out of a hundred respondents fifty will awkwardly remain silent 
or stammer something insufficient, and from the other fifty you will hear different 
answers.1  
 
With this remark Sigbert Feuchtwanger2, the lawyer and Vice President of the Jewish 
Cultural Community of Munich, captured a quintessential problem of the so-called 'Jewish 
Question' (Judenfrage)3 as it was debated in Germany in the early twentieth century. His 
comments suggested the multitude of issues at stake. What seems most revealing about 
Feuchtwanger's statement, published in July 1917, is that in an Empire faced with famine, the 
burden of total war and a government in crisis, the Jewish Question was on the public agenda 
at all. In this thesis, I examine how the Jewish Question functioned in German political 
discourse and German politics. Focusing on the years of the First World War, I explore the 
ways in which the Jewish Question sheds light on Germany's liminal period between its 
autocratic-militaristic past and parliamentary-republican future. Jewish questions revealed the 
paradoxes of German state-building and the difficulties of breaking down older forms of 
corporate identity for the sake of national-cultural homogeneity. Using the Jewish Question, 
I aim to reassess the difficult birth of the Weimar Republic.   
 In what follows, I will begin by outlining the origins of the Jewish Question in German 
states in order to argue that the term was not, as is commonly assumed, solely an antisemitic 
trope imposed on the Jews. Rather, I contend, it was a multivalent and contingent term, which 
was also invoked frequently by Jews. The intractability of the Jewish Question, I argue is 
reflected in the modern scholarly literature where different interpretations of the Jewish 
Question abound. More often, it is referenced in connection with the rise of Nazism, or in the 
debate on the German-Jewish symbiosis without a detailed analysis of what the term meant, 
or how it functioned. Addressing this omission by analysing the function of the Jewish 
Question in German politics, I focus on political ideas and practices in their cultural context. 
 
1 'Die "Judenfrage" führt jeder im Munde. Aber fragst du, was eigentlich die Judenfrage ist, so werden von 
hundert Befragten fünfzig verlegen schweigen oder Unzulängliches stammeln, von den anderen fünfzig wirst 
du verschiedene Antworten hören'. Sigbert Feuchtwanger, ‘Grundsätzliches zur deutschen Judenfrage’, Neue 
jüdische Monatshefte 1, no. 19 (10 Juli 1917): 543. 
2 Sigbert Feuchtwanger (1886-1956) lawyer in Munich, editor of Jüdischen Echo and Vice President of the 
Jewish Cultural Community of Munich (Israelitische Kultusgemeinde München, IKG), emigrated to Palestine in 
1937. For Feuchtwanger's profile see Deutsche Biographie [https://bit.ly/2LVUgXx, accessed 18/05/18].  
3 In order to demonstrate the complexity of the term, its associated meanings and how it was used by various 
agents, the Jewish Question and Jewish questions will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. When 
denoting the plural form, the q will not be capitalised.  
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Lastly, I explain the scope selected for this thesis from the outbreak of the First World War 
in August 1914 to the ratification of the Weimar constitution in August 1919. In these seminal 
years the Jewish Question was no longer confined to public intellectual debates (see chapter 
one) but became a practical concern in German domestic and foreign policy (see chapters two 
to five). These discussions on practical Jewish questions in the Foreign Ministry and 
Reichstag, I argue, became de facto debates about the future of the German state. They revealed 
the hopes, fears and preoccupations in Germany's path from Empire to Republic.  
 
In principle, the Jewish Question should have ended with Jewish emancipation, that is, when 
the civil and political rights of German Jews were enshrined within the 1871 constitution, 
which founded the German Empire.4 Whilst Jewish emancipation began even earlier in 
German states, it was a long and gradual process. Westphalia was the first German state to 
issue a royal decree to abolish taxes imposed on Jews in 1808. In 1811, a Jewish emancipation 
edict was issued in the Grand Duchy of Frankfurt. The following year, Prussian Jews were 
granted civil and (limited) political rights. After 1848, however, the suppression of the 
revolutions brought a series of reactionary measures which included revoking or limiting 
Jewish rights.5 When the Jewish Question (Judenfrage) first appeared in print in 1838 and 
reached prominence as a popular catchword in 1842, it concerned the question of the legal 
equality of Jews in the Prussian state.6 By 1871, after years of advances and set-backs in the 
struggle for emancipation, the Jewish Question in Germany, had effectively been resolved. 
The term should have lost its momentum and eventually faded from public discourse entirely. 
Yet quite the opposite occurred. Following Jewish emancipation, the term was no longer used 
to discuss Jewish political and civic rights de jure, however it was frequently tied into debates 
about de facto Jewish equality.  
 After ceasing to be a political-constitutional question about emancipation, the Jewish 
Question moved into what Peter Pulzer has termed the 'unofficial sphere'.7 Institutional 
discrimination continued against Jews in spite of legal equality. They were barred from 
entering the officer corps in the military, professions in politics, the civil service and public 
 
4 The emancipation of the Jews in the 1871 constitution was a principle adopted from the 1869 North German 
Confederation constitution. On the 22 April 1871 Jews in all of Germany were emancipated when the 
constitution was extended to Bavaria.     
5 For a list of these emancipation edicts and which German states later rescinded these rights see Raphael 
Mahler, Jewish Emancipation: A Selection of Documents, Pamphlet Series Jews and the Post-War World 1 (New 
York: American Jewish Committee, 1942). 
6 Jacob Toury, ‘“The Jewish Question” A Semantic Approach’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 11, no. 1 (1 
January 1966): 92. 
7 Peter Pulzer, Jews and the German State: The Political History of a Minority, 1848-1933 (Detroit, Michigan: 
Wayne State University Press, 2003), 19.  
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universities.8 Where the Jewish Question no longer focused on the legal equality of the civil 
and political rights of Jews, it became about their place and social equality within German 
society. Antisemites picked up on the Jewish Question, framing it in cultural language and as 
a question of race.9 The suggestion that Jews were of a different race undermined the 
Enlightenment model according to which Jews had become members of the state on the basis 
of religious equality.10 Moreover, it challenged the trend amongst the majority of German 
Jews towards conversion and mixed marriages.11 Around the same time, Zionists also began 
to invoke the Jewish Question as a catchword. Zionists turned an externally imposed question 
into an internal one and used it to question the Jewish diaspora and advocate for a Jewish 
state.12 By the turn of the century, the term was re-defined within Zionist circles as the quest 
for a Jewish homeland and the revival of a Jewish national and cultural identity.13 
 Lacking any concrete practical political meaning since emancipation, the Jewish 
Question became a multivalent term appropriated by a multitude of agents for different 
purposes. With the outbreak of the First World War, the term altered as the singular 
Judenfrage was often replaced by its plural form, Judenfragen. 'Does a Jewish Question exist? 
Strange question! We see it everywhere! One almost wants to say: there are just so many 
Jewish questions' wrote Arthur Cohen, Professor of Economics and Finance at the Technical 
University of Munich.14 The prominence of Jewish questions after the outbreak of the war was 
further illustrated by the publication of a three-part series in July 1919 on the theme of the 
Jewish Question in the future Europe in the German-Jewish magazine, Ost und West.15 
 Rather than speaking to Jewish particularity, the Jewish Question began to be 
recognised as an expression of larger contemporary political issues, tied into questions 
pertaining to minority rights, national autonomy and homogeneity. Arthur Cohen argued that 
 
8 Ibid.  
9 See for example Dühring Eugen, Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage. Mit einer weltgeschichtlichen 
Antwort, 1st ed. (Karlsruhe und Leipzig: Verlag von H. Reuther, 1881). 
10 For a useful transnational analysis of Jewish emancipation and its relationship with Enlightenment values 
see Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson, Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
11 Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 98. 
12 Leon Pinsker was the first to suggest that the 'Jewish Question' could only be resolved through the founding 
of a Jewish homeland in Autoemancipation! Mahnruf an seine Stammesgenossen von einem russischen Juden (1882). 
However, his pamphlet forms one of three seminal works in the development of the Jewish national homeland 
movement. Moses Hess's Rom and Jerusalem (1862) proposed that Jews should sacrifice emancipation over 
nationality and return to Palestine. In 1896, Theodor Herzl's Judenstaat more fully developed a plan for the 
founding of a Jewish homeland as a solution to the Jewish Question. 
13 Buber was a seminal figure in the Zionist movement who advocated for a cultural, national, Jewish revival. 
See Martin Buber, Drei Reden über das Judentum (Frankfurt am Main: Rütten & Loening, 1911). 
14 Arthur Cohen, ‘Die Judenfrage – Eine Minoritätenfrage’, Neue jüdische Monatshefte 3, no. 7/8 (19 Januar 
1919): 164. 
15 Leo Winz, ‘Die Judenfrage im künftigen Europa, I: Anschwellen die judenfeindlichen Strömungen’, Ost und 
West: Illustrierte Monatsschrift für das gesamte Judentum XIX, no. 7/8 (Juli 1919): 162–66. 
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the Jewish Question was not unique to the Jews but present in other social and national 
groups. He equated it with the 'minority question',  
 
The Jewish Question is only an example of the heterogeneity of the masses. The 
antagonism between Jews and non-Jews is not special: everywhere, where two 
diverse groups co-exist, the same phenomenon of antagonism appears.16  
 
Written at the end of the war, Cohen invoked the Jewish Question to expose the limits of the 
modern state and the increasing desire for greater homogeneity. In another article, Helene 
Hanna Cohen, a journalist based in Munich and close friend of Julius Berger,17 opined that the 
Jewish Question related more broadly to the concept of the nationality principle, defined as 
groups without states.18 Ludwig Quessel, a representative of the Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) in the Reichstag, considered how the encounter 
with the masses of Eastern European Jews during the war revealed that the Jewish Question 
had 'always' been 'not only a social, but also a national problem'.19 He re-framed the term as a 
question of the emancipation of Eastern European Jews and the rights of Jews to Palestine. 
The work of Quessel and his contemporaries illustrated the multivalence of the Jewish 
Question in Germany.   
 
The First World War marked a pivotal moment in German history, raising vital new 
questions in the spheres of domestic as well as foreign policy. As the fortunes of war shifted, 
so did borders, populations and national allegiances. In a period of acute and almost constant 
political crisis, the German government faced issues concerning citizenship, minority rights 
and religious as well as national identity. I will analyse these concerns through the lens of the 
Jewish Question, that is, on-going debates about the status of the German-Jewish population 
in German politics and society. From a term on the margins of public discourse, the Jewish 
Question in the course of World War One re-entered the realm of mainstream parliamentary 
politics shaping domestic and foreign political theory and praxis.  
 
16 Cohen, ‘Die Judenfrage – Eine Minoritätenfrage’, 165. 
17 Julius Berger founded a successful construction firm, Julius Berger Tiefbau AG. In the 1970s it merged with 
Bilfinger, one of the largest construction companies in Germany. Berger also participated in the Paris Peace 
Conference as an Industrial representative. Less is known about Helene Hanna Cohen. Evidence of their 
relationship can be found in Seymour Drescher and Allan Sharlin, eds., Political Symbolism in Modern Europe: 
Essays in Honor of George L. Mosse (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Books, 1982), 94. 
18 Helene Hanna Cohen, ‘Die Judenfrage in Der Internationale’, Neue jüdische Monatshefte 2, no. 6 (25 December 
1917): 136. 




 The Jewish Question, I contend, casts important new light on Germany’s difficult path 
towards a new democratic and pluralistic constitution in 1919. One of my principal aims in 
this dissertation is to offer a novel interpretation of the role that the much discussed 'problem' 
of German Jewry played in the political debates and decisions that paved the way for the 
Weimar Republic. The significance of the Jewish Question, as one of many questions that 
arose in the formation of the modern state in Germany, is that it provides an understanding 
of the complex political processes that developed throughout the First World War. The 
Jewish minority was a unique group that grappled with its place in the German polity. They 
were members of a community that transcended national boundaries whilst being, at the same 
time, citizens of Germany. The Jewish Question provides unique insights into German 
political debates about the fraught relationship between the nation and the state.   
 The core of the dissertation focuses on three distinct moments, between 1914 and 
1919, when the Jewish Question catalysed a debate on the German nation-state. These 
moments are: the involvement of Zionists in German foreign policy, the 'Jew census' 
(Judenzählung) and the debate on minority rights in the Weimar constitution and at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Taken as a whole, they reveal the struggles and preoccupations of Germany 
in its transition towards a pluralistic, democratic Republic. Whilst events tend to be recorded 
and remembered based upon the final outcome, often to the detriment of history, my 
dissertation shifts away from the final outcome and turns to hidden processes. These 
distinctive moments may not have fundamentally altered the status quo, nor did they lead to 
any specific legislative changes. However, they shed light on three possible roads which 
Germany could have taken in its political development. From the potential of Imperial 
Germany as a greater colonial power in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, to a country 
institutionalising antisemitic20 policies to, alternatively, a multi-ethnic Republic recognising 
the rights of national minorities.  
 German states have had an enduring presence of Jewish communities since the fourth 
century.21 This language, but also cultural, affinity of (Ashkenazi) Jews to Germany, in spite 
of their mass emigration east in the tenth century, arose time again binding the Jewish 
Question intimately to the German Question. It explains why in a country where the Jewish 
minority represented approximately 1% of the German population, at the time of unification 
in 1871, Jewish questions became a part of the political agenda. The Jewish Question can 
 
20 I spell antisemitism without a hyphen to denote a modern form of Jew-hatred. See Shmuel Almog, ‘What’s in 
a Hyphen?’, SICSA Report: Newsletter of the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism 
2 (1989): 1–2 [https://bit.ly/2SjROvf, accessed 16/07/19]. 
21 David Levinson, Jewish Germany: An Enduring Presence from the Fourth to the Twenty-First Century (Portland, 
Oregon: Vallentine Mitchell, 2018). 
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provide an insight into the distinctive anxieties, expectations and concerns shaping German 
politics. As Peter Gay noted, 'the so-called Jewish Question had no reality in isolation. It was 
part of, and a clue to, the larger question: the German Question'.22  
 
The Jewish Question was certainly not the only issue framed as a question within Germany. 
Others included the soziale Frage, Bauernfrage, Frauenfrage, Arbeiterfrage, Polenfrage.23 The 
Jewish community was not the only minority group to receive attention in parliamentary 
debates. Poles were in fact the largest national minority group in Germany.24 In addition, 
there were Alsatians, Danes, Wends, Sorbs. As the largest religious minority, the Catholics 
also featured prominently in these discussions. The period of the Kulturkampf against the 
Catholic, and by association the Polish minority under Bismarck, testifies to the centrality of 
other minority concerns in German politics as does the Zabern Affair in 1913 in Alsace-
Lorraine.25  
 What made the Jewish Question unique, however, was that the identity of the Jewish 
population was far more complex than these other groups. Not always mutually exclusively, 
Jews saw themselves as a religious community, a community of kinship (Stamm), an ethnic 
community and national community, which spanned across geographic boundaries. Unlike the 
Polish,26 Danish and Alsatian minorities in Germany, Jews identified as Germans, as 'insiders' 
and whenever permitted, acted as such.27  
 The insider status of Jews was also reflected in their engagement with German politics. 
Unlike the other religious and national minorities such as the Catholics, the Danes, Poles and 
 
22 Peter Gay, Freud, Jews and Other Germans. Masters and Victims in Modernist Culture (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 19.  
23 On the shift towards thinking in questions in the nineteenth century see Holly Case The Age of Questions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Holly Case, ‘The “Social Question,” 1820-1920’, Modern 
Intellectual History 13, no. 3 (2016): 747–75. For a contemporary account on the difference between these 
questions and the Jewish Question see Winz, ‘Die Judenfrage im künftigen Europa’, 164. 
24 The Polish minority numbered just over three million, meaning in 1871 they represented approximately 8% 
of the total German population. See Volker R. Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 1871-1914: Economy, Society, Culture 
and Politics (Providence, RI and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1994), 111.  
25 On Bismarck's Kulturkampf and the role it played in German unification see Eley Geoff, 'Bismarckian 
Germany' in Modern Germany Reconsidered, 1870-1945, ed. Gordon Mantel (London: Routledge, 1992), 1-32, 
especially 20-25. On the Zabern Affair and the political outcry see David Schoenbaum, Zabern 1913: Consensus 
Politics in Imperial Germany, 1st ed. (London: Harper Collins, 1982).  
26 The Polish minority sat in between the Jewish and Danish minority. They were neither stateless nor did 
they have a nation. Polish labourers and land-owners, like Jews attempted a 'cultural synthesis' in Germany. 
This however was different for Polish aristocrats who maintained a strong Polish national identity. See 
Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 110-118.  
27 Anthony McElligot writes, 'The Jews of Weimar, then [...] felt German, which is all we need to know'. 
Anthony McElligott, Rethinking the Weimar Republic: Authority and Authoritarianism, 1916-1936 (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014), 238. See also Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider, 1st ed. (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1968), i-viii. 
 7 
 
Alsatians, the Jewish community was not represented by a single political party.28 Since 
unification, the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein were represented by the Danish Party and 
consistently held one seat in the Reichstag. Poles living to the east of Germany, despite being 
a Catholic majority, were represented by a separate party, the Polish Party, which never held 
less than thirteen seats in the Reichstag. To the west, the French-speaking minority in Alsace-
Lorraine had political representation in the Reichstag, numbering never less than ten seats. 
Germany's largest religious minority, Catholics, were represented by the Catholic Centre 
Party, which continued even after the war to consistently and successfully secure 
representation in the Reichstag.29 At the end of the war, as German territory in the north, east 
and west was ceded to Denmark, Poland and France respectively these parties disbanded, no 
longer deemed necessary. In contrast, the Jewish community, due to a lack of consensus, was 
unable to form a united political party despite several attempts.30  
 Unlike other minority groups, the Jewish minority did not have a distinct 
representation in parliament. Politicians of Jewish descent did not act more generally on 
behalf of Jewish sectional interests. However, as most were representatives in the Liberal 
parties (the National Liberal Party and the Progressive Party), Jews tended to vote for these 
parties.31 Following a nadir in Jewish politics (starting around 1880) marked by the end of the 
dominance by Liberal parties,32 Bismarck's shift in political alliances towards the Catholic 
Centre Party and the growth of organised political antisemitism, a number of Jewish 
politicians began to alter their focus. Jewish politicians engaged in Jewish affairs and held 
political positions alongside acting as representatives of newly founded Jewish defence 
 
28 On the attempts by the Jewish community to form a political party see Jacob Toury, ‘Organizational 
Problems of German Jewry: Steps towards the Establishment of a Central Organization (1893-1920)’, The Leo 
Baeck Institute Year Book 13, no. 1 (1968): 57–90. For Zionists efforts at political representation in German 
politics see Yehuda Eloni, ‘The Zionist Movement and the German Social Democratic Party, 1897–1918’, 
Studies in Zionism 5, no. 2 (1984): 181–199.  
29 On pre-1945 political parties in Germany see Vincent E. McHale, ed., Political Parties of Europe, vol. 1 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 400–438.  
30 In December 1900 the attempt to form a 'general Jewish Diet' failed miserably due to a lack of consensus. See 
Toury, ‘Organizational Problems of German Jewry’, 64. See also Marjorie Lamberti, ‘The Attempt to Form a 
Jewish Bloc: Jewish Notables and Politics in Wilhelmian Germany’, Central European History 3, no. 1–2 (1970): 
73–93. 
31 On Jewish voting behaviour and political participation in Germany see Pulzer, Jews and the German State; 
Ernest Hamburger, Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands: Regierungsmitglieder, Beamte und Parlamentarier in 
der monarchischen Zeit, 1848-1918, Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 19 
(Tübingen: JCB Mohr Paul Siebeck, 1968); Jacob Toury, Die politischen Orientierungen der Juden in Deutschland: 
von Jena bis Weimar, Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 15 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1966). On how Jews in the latter years of the Weimar Republic used their votes strategically in 
an effort to save the Republic see Anthony D. Kauders, ‘Weimar Jewry’, in Weimar Germany, ed. Anthony 
McElligott, Short Oxford History of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 234–59. 
32 In 1880 the National Liberal Party split. The left-wing fraction of the party joined the Progressive Party to 
form the German Free-minded Party.  
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organisations such as the Central Association for German citizens of the Jewish faith, 
(Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, CV) founded in 1893.33 
 Compared to their relative size in the population, Jewish politicians were well-
represented in the Reichstag during the Wilhelmine period.34 Between 1867 to 1916 
approximately 1.73% of all delegates in the Reichstag were of Jewish descent, this included 
Jews that were baptised.35 Deputies of Jewish descent sat in political parties from the right to 
the left of the political spectrum.36 However, the majority sat in the Liberal parties.37 This 
changed in the Reichstag in 1893 when the Social Democratic Party held the highest 
membership figures of Jewish deputies.38 The concentration of Jews within these left-leaning 
parties was largely due to the willingness of these parties to allow Jews to stand as candidates. 
This, however, varied considerably in each state where the system of franchise differed.39 
Throughout the Wilhelmine period Jewish representation in the Reichstag and State Diet 
gradually increased. As this dissertation traces Germany's transition towards a parliamentary 
democracy it also reflects on the participation of German Jews in politics. It illustrates the 
influence they were able to exert over domestic and foreign policy during the war culminating 
with the birth of the Weimar Republic which heralded a new era for German Jewish political 
participation as they took a dynamic role in the life of the Republic.  
 
 
I. Historiography  
The five years that this dissertation covers have attracted much scholarly attention, not least 
in the past few years. With the recent centenaries of the beginning and end of the First World 
War, research on this period has been given renewed significance.40 Moreover, with the global 
 
33 Other organisations included the Kartell-Convent of German Students of the Jewish Faith (Der Kartell-
Convent der Verbindungen deutscher Studenten jüdischen Glaubens, KC) founded in 1896 and the Alliance of German 
Jews (Verband der deutschen Juden, VdJ) founded in 1904. On other forms of Jewish defence see Ann Goldberg, 
Honor, Politics and the Law in Imperial Germany, 1871-1914. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
34 In 1871, the Jewish share in the total population was 1.25%. It declined to 0.95% by 1914. Berghahn, Imperial 
Germany, 102.  
35 Out of 3000 deputies, 52 were of Jewish descent. On the distribution of these deputies in political parties see 
Hamburger, Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands, 250–54. 
36 These parties included the Conservatives (Konservative), German Imperial Party 
(Reichspartei/Freikonservative), National Liberals (Nationalliberale), German Progress Party 
(Fortschrittspartei/Freisinnige) and the German People's Party (Süddeutsche Volkspartei/Deutsche Volkspartei). See 
ibid, 252–53. 
37 These Liberal parties included the National Liberals and the Free-minded Union (Freisinnige Vereinigung) 
and the Free-minded People's Party (Freisinnige Volkspartei), which having split, reunified in 1910.  
38 Whilst this figure applies to the overall majority, most baptised Jews sat in the National Liberal Party. 
Amongst professing Jews, most were Social Democrats. See ibid, 254.  
39 Pulzer, Jews and the German State, 106–48. 
40 Christopher M. Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, 1st ed. (New York: Harper, 2013); 
Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (New York: Random House Trade 
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rise of populist movements and, in particular, the support for right-wing parties, there has 
also been a recent international interest in German history, especially the years of the Weimar 
Republic.41 Both of these topics - the First World War and the Weimar Republic - have their 
own historiographical debates. Recent scholarship on the First World War, for example, 
continues to engage with the causes of the outbreak of the war and the parties responsible.42 
Research on the Weimar Republic is often guided by its weaknesses that led to the rise of 
Nazism.43 These are not, however, the questions asked within my dissertation. I instead 
investigate how practical Jewish questions shaped Germany's geopolitical aims during the 
First World War. And rather than studying the Weimar constitution with an aim to assessing 
why the Republic failed, I examine what Jewish questions in the constitutional debates 
revealed about Germany's political development.  
 Each individual chapter engages with distinct moments that have their separate 
historiographical debates including the involvement of Zionists in German foreign policy,44 
the 'Jew census' (Judenzählung)45 and the debate on minority rights in the Weimar constitution 
and at the Paris Peace Conference,46 respectively. I, however, bring these distinct moments 
together through the perspective of the Jewish Question to analyse Germany's political 
development in a period of momentous change.  
 
Paperbacks, 2014); Margaret MacMillan, Anand Menon, and Patrick Quinton-Brown, ‘Introduction: World 
Politics 100 years after the Paris Peace Conference’, International Affairs 95, no. 1 (2019): 1–5. 
41 Martin Kettle, ‘The Political Landscapes of Brexit Britain and Weimar Germany Are Scarily Similar’, The 
Guardian, 16 May 2019 [https://bit.ly/2JmvrDT, accessed 15/07/19]; Dominik Peters, ‘Was Weimar für den 
umgang mit der AfD lehrt’, Spiegel, 6 February 2019 [https://bit.ly/2JxwPm2, accessed 15/07/19]. 
42 Andreas Gestrich and H. Pogge von Strandmann, Bid for World Power? New research on the outbreak of the 
First World War, Studies of the German Historical Institute London (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
43 For a comprehensive review of this scholarship see Peter C. Weber, ‘The Paradoxical Modernity of Civil 
Society: The Weimar Republic, Democracy and Social Homogeneity’, Voluntas 26 (2015): 629-648.    
44 Isaiah Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism 1897-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Zosa 
Szajkowski, ‘The Komitee für den Osten and Zionism’, in Herzl Year Book, ed. Raphael Patai (New York: Herzl 
Press, 1971), 199–240. 
45 Michael Geheran, ‘Rethinking Jewish Front Experiences’, in Beyond Inclusion and Exclusion: Jewish Experiences 
of the First World War in Central Europe, ed. Jason Crouthamel, Tim Grady, and Julia Barbara Köhne (New 
York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 111–43; Timothy L. Grady, A Deadly Legacy: German Jews and the 
Great War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017); Peter Appelbaum, Loyal Sons: Jews in the 
German Army in the Great War (London and Portland: Valentine Mitchell, 2015); David J. Fine, ‘Jewish 
Integration in the German Army in the First World War’ (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012); 
Derek Penslar, ‘The German-Jewish Soldier: From Participant to Victim’, German History 29, no. 3 (2011): 
423–44; Jacob Rosenthal, Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten: Die Judenzählung im Ersten Weltkrieg und ihre Folgen 
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007); Werner T. Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916: 
Genesis – Consequences – Significance’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 23, no. 1 (1978): 117–38. 
46 Karen Schönwälder, ‘The Constitutional Protection of Minorities in Germany: Weimar Revisited’, The 
Slavonic and East European Review 74, no. 1 (1996): 38–65; Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great 
Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004); David Engel, ‘Perceptions of Power - Poland and World Jewry’, in Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook, 1st 
ed. (Stuttgart und München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002), 17–29; Erwin Viefhaus, Die Minderheitenfrage 




 Although the period of 1914 to 1919 in German history features several mature 
historiographical debates, they have all contributed to one of the most controversial and 
significant scholarly debates of the twentieth century, the Sonderweg thesis. The 
historiographical debate, which is nearing its sixtieth anniversary, is based on the notion that 
Germany followed a peculiar (Sonder) path (weg) towards modernity. Starting in the 1960s, 
Fritz Fischer argued that the aggressive war-aims of German decision-makers testified to 
Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. Contributing to this 
debate, historians of the ‘Bielefeld School’ began to assess when Germany's peculiar 
development began. They studied the failure of the 1848 revolution and the delayed 
modernisation of Germany's political structures.47 British historians David Blackbourn, Geoff 
Eley and Richard Evans subsequently criticised the Sonderweg thesis for being ahistorical. 
They found evidence that a 'silent bourgeois revolution' had taken place in Germany and 
argued that the country was not unique in experiencing dynamic capitalism, materialism and 
cultural despair.48 
 Against the determinism of Fischer and Wehler that Germany was on a special path 
(Sonderweg) towards authoritarian governance and following the work of Eley and 
Blackbourn, my dissertation refutes the argument of German exceptionalism. By illustrating 
the multivalence of the Jewish Question, especially its invocation by Jews, I contend that one 
cannot trace a linear development of the Jewish Question in Germany that culminates in the 
Holocaust. The antisemitic strain of the German right in Wilhelmine Germany was not more 
visceral than in the Russian Empire or the Habsburg lands. Moreover, the Dreyfus Affair 
(1984-1906) and the Leo Franks Affair (1913-1915) illustrate that antisemitism was rife and 
could have vicious consequences in the democratic Republics of France and America.49 
 More often, however, the Jewish Question in Germany is viewed in hindsight, through 
this lens of the Holocaust. This obscures the contingency of the term, the manifold agents that 
appropriated it, its various meanings and how it functioned. I argue that Jewish questions 
reveal the silent, or what I term, hidden processes of Germany's democratic, and progressive, 
 
47 Robert Moeller, ‘The Kaiserreich Recast? Continuity and Change in Modern German Historiography’, 
Journal of Social History 17, no. 4 (1984): 655; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973); Jurgen Kocka, ‘German History before Hitler: The Debate about 
the German Sonderweg’, Journal of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16. 
48 David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Richard J. Evans, Society and Politics in 
Wilhelmine Germany (London and New York: Croom Helm; Barnes and Noble, 1978). 
49 Both affairs divided their respective publics. During the Dreyfuss Affair in France, a Jewish Alsatian Officer 
was accused of treason and falsely convicted. In America, Leo Franks, a Jewish factory worker, was sentenced 
to death for a murder he did not commit. When his sentence was overturned, despite his innocence, he was 
lynched. See Ruth Harris, The Man on Devil's Island (London: Allen Lane, 2010); Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo 
Franks case, revised ed. (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2008).   
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development. By using the Jewish Question to investigate the changing character of German 
political discourse and practice, I offer the first sustained examination of the ways in which 
questions about German-Jewish citizenship, minority rights and religious, national identity 
shaped the politics of the last Imperial government and influenced the processes of 
parliamentarisation and democratisation in the final years of the war.  
 In recent years there has been a growing interest in silent parliamentarisation and 
German exceptionalism amongst scholars of Wilhelmine Germany.50 The debate centres on 
where power and authority were concentrated, in either the democratically elected Reichstag 
or unilaterally in the hands of the Kaiser and the chancellor. Pace the narrative that the 
German Empire was an 'autocratic-democratic' state with a static political development 
advanced by Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Volker Berghahn, scholars such as Manfred Rauh, 
Thomas Nipperdey and Wolfgang Böckenförde have suggested that starting in around 1890, 
parliament began gaining increasing influence in shaping political decisions.51 As a 
consequence of this, they date Germany's transformation into a 'full democracy' earlier than 
1919 when the Weimar Republic was established.52  
 Although in formal constitutional clauses parliament had little control or influence 
over government formation and legislative power, Nipperdey, Böckenförde, Frauendienst 
have studied the informal ways in which the Reichstag wielded power.53 Following scholars 
such as Rauh, Schönberger, Nipperdey, I illustrate the informal, normative powers of 
parliament. Jewish questions, I argue, punctuated attempts to enforce constitutional checks 
and balances. They exposed the inconsistencies within the Empire between de jure and de facto 
Jewish civil and political equality. Ministers recognised the importance of their platform in 
the Reichstag and used it to highlight the injustices of constitutional transgressions. They 
petitioned not for legislative changes but for the principles of the 1871 constitution to be 
upheld and respected. Resolving these constitutional transgressions was instrumental to 
 
50 This discussion began in the 1970s see Manfred Rauh, Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus im Wilhelminischen 
Reich, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien; Band 47 (Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 1973); Manfred Rauh, Die Parlamentarisierung des Deutschen Reiches, Beiträge zur Geschichte des 
Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien; Band 60 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977). For a recent book which 
engages with this scholarship see Mark Hewitson, Germany and the Modern World, 1880-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
51 Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich; Berghahn, Imperial Germany; Rauh, Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus im 
Wilhelminischen Reich; Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, vol. II, Machstaat vor der Demokratie 
(Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1992); Wolfgang Ernst Böckenförde, ‘Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen 
Monarchie im 19. Jahrhundert’, in Recht, Staat, Freiheit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 112–45. 
52 For a useful overview of this debate see Marcus Kreuzer, ‘Parliamentarization and the Question of German 
Exceptionalism: 1867-1918’, Central European History 36, no. 3 (2003): 327–57. 
53 Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte; Werner Frauendienst, ‘Demokratisierung des deutschen konstitutionalismus 
in der Zeit Wilhelms II’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 113, no. 4 (1957): 721–24; Böckenförde, 
‘Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie’; Kreuzer, ‘Parliamentarization and the Question of 
German Exceptionalism’, 335–48. 
 12 
 
Germany's development towards a secular, tolerant, inclusive and pluralist democracy. Jewish 
questions exposed problems in the accountability of the government and its ministries for its 
(unconstitutional) actions which parliament ensured were redressed.  
 
The historiography on the Jewish Question can be divided into two bodies of scholarship. In 
the first category are works that, I suggest, make implicit references to the Jewish Question. 
The second category consists of authors that explicitly analyse the character and dynamics of 
the Jewish Question. In the case of the former, I identify two sub-genres that fall into this 
category, the scholarship on the Third Reich, in particular the rise of Nazism and the 
Holocaust, and German-Jewish relations, specifically the literature on the German-Jewish 
negative symbiosis. In viewing the Jewish Question ahistorically, that is, in light of the 
Holocaust, I argue that these two literatures reinforce a teleological and anachronistic reading 
of the Jewish Question. Of the scholarship that falls into the latter category, what I term the 
explicit historiography on the Jewish Question, I contend that its overarching feature is that 
it is a reflection of the multivalence of the Jewish Question in the primary sources. As a result, 
these works have little in common, beyond a consideration of the Jewish Question, as they 
each establish different temporal and geospatial parameters to the study of the Jewish 
Question.  
 A common feature in the scholarly literature on German-Jewish history is the casual 
reference to the Jewish Question, without any detailed consideration of the author's intention 
in using the term and what, in the given context, it meant. I call this the implicit 
historiography on the Jewish Question. Historians writing about either the rise of Nazism or 
German-Jewish relations often show this tendency. The vast amount of literature on the 
Jewish Question and antisemitism as it played out in modern Germany still tends to treat the 
phenomenon anachronistically with hindsight, that is, from the vantage point of the Holocaust 
and from a largely social or cultural historical perspective.54 As the Jewish Question was 
appropriated by antisemites and tied into several myths that became relevant during the 
Weimar Republic, but which emerged in the First World War, the term features frequently 
 
54 Philip Spencer and Robert Fine, Antisemitism and the Left: On the Return of the Jewish Question (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2017); Élisabeth Roudinesco, Revisiting the Jewish Question, trans. Andrew Brown 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2013); David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2013); Helmut W. Smith, The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the 
Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Michael Mack, German Idealism and 
the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philosophy and German Jewish Responses (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003); Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer, Antisemitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the 
Present (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Paul Lawrence Rose, German Question/Jewish Question: Revolutionary 
Antisemitism in Germany from Kant to Wagner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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in the scholarship on the völkisch movement, the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust.55 While 
it does not ignore the short- and long-term effects the Jewish Question had on the rise of 
German antisemitism, I stress the contingency and ambivalence of the term. Moreover, I am 
neither interested in social or cultural aspects to the Jewish Question but rather political 
aspects. This I define as the relationship between Jews and the modern nation-state, including 
questions of citizenship rights, secularism and nationhood.  
 A consequence of the association between the Jewish Question and antisemitism is that 
outside of academic circles the term has become almost synonymous with antisemitism.56 Not 
only has this connection obscured the manifold meanings of the term historically, overlooking 
its contingency, it has also perpetuated a narrative of Jewish victimhood, removing Jewish 
agency from German history. This dissertation extracts the Jewish Question from 
antisemitism by emphasising the engagement by Jews in German politics as active subjects 
and not passive objects, which I will explain in more detail below.57 
 Alongside the literature on Nazism, the Jewish Question is also frequently referenced 
in the scholarship on German-Jewish relations, including before and after the period of the 
Third Reich (1933-1945). The central question of this scholarship, which was asked by 
Gershom Scholem in his 1962 essay, was whether or not a German-Jewish dialogue ever 
existed.58 He argued it had not and sparked an extended discussion that was termed the 
‘German-Jewish negative symbiosis’, a phrase coined by Hannah Arendt.59  
 In line with Scholem, historians including Dan Diner and Jack Zipes argued that a 
two-sided German-Jewish dialogue did not exist prior to 1933 and that from this date forth, 
it could only be described in negative terms.60 George Mosse and Amos Elon subsequently 
looked back to the German Enlightenment and argued that Jews embraced the notion of 
Bildung, acculturating not because they were expected to, but because they wanted to integrate 
into German culture and society.61 This scholarship is predominantly concerned with cultural 
 
55 See, for example, Guy Tourlamain, Völkisch Writers and National Socialism: A Study of Right-Wing Political 
Culture in Germany, 1890–1960, Cultural History and Literary Imagination (Oxford and Bern: Peter Lang, 
2014), 25–34. 
56 The Alt-Right movement continues to use the term to promote antisemitism, abbreviating it to 'JQ'. See 
Emma Green, ‘Paul Nehlen’s Fringe Anti-Semitism’, The Atlantic, 24 January 2018 [https://bit.ly/2DxbFPx, 
accessed 31/07/19].  
57 Peter Pulzer stresses the importance of drawing a distinction between the Jewish Question and antisemitism. 
Pulzer, Jews and the German State, 14. 
58 Gershom Scholem, ‘Wider den Mythos vom deutsch-judischen Gespräch’, in Auf Gespaltenem Pfad: Für 
Margarete Susman, ed. Manfred Schlösser (Darmstadt: Erato-Presse Verlag, 1964), 229–33. 
59 Dan Diner, ‘Negative Symbiose: Deutsche und Juden nach Auschwitz’, Babylon 1 (1986): 11. 
60 Diner, ‘Negative Symbiose’; Jack Zipes, ‘The Negative German-Jewish Symbiosis’, in Insiders and Outsider: 
Jewish and Gentile Culture in Germany and Austria, ed. Lorenz Dagmar and Gabriele Weinberger (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), 31–45. 
61 George Mosse, German Jews beyond Judaism (Illinois: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985); George L. Mosse 
and Klaus L. Berghahn, The German-Jewish Dialogue Reconsidered: A Symposium in Honor of George L. Mosse, vol. 
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and social questions: Jewish communal identity, acculturation, the Jewish experience of 
Bildung, their engagement in popular culture and the everyday dynamics of German-Jewish 
life.62 Lars Fischer has considered the wealth of literature on this subject to amount to a 
historiography on the Jewish Question.63 
 My dissertation contributes to this scholarly debate to the extent that I argue that 
Jews both engaged with and exerted an influence on German domestic and foreign policy. 
They were not passive bystanders but influenced political decision-making. Beyond this claim, 
I do not situate my dissertation within this literature. Not only because I do not focus on the 
social or cultural dynamics of German-Jewish relations but also, because the scholarship on 
the 'German-Jewish negative symbiosis', I argue, examines only one of the facets of the Jewish 
Question, the societal relations between Jews and Gentiles, but not the term in its entirety. I 
suggest this also involves examining the relationship between the Jews and the nation-state 
on a national as well as international level.  
 Alongside the body of indirect scholarly work on the Jewish Question there exists a 
more specific historiography on the Jewish Question. This literature attempts to understand 
the temporal and spatial limits of the term, and the agents that employed it. Two distinctive 
characteristics of this literature stand out. Firstly, there are far fewer works that analyse the 
Jewish Question. Secondly, beyond a focus on the term, they often share little else in common. 
This is a consequence of the primary sources on the Jewish Question, which vary considerably 
and featured in the economic, cultural, social and political sphere.64 Alex Bein, who wrote the 
first book dedicated to the Jewish Question, recognised this issue writing, 'the Jewish Question 
is a problem that encompasses all areas of life and transcends the boundaries of specialised 
fields'.65  
 As a term without a fixed meaning, and chronology, scholars have tended to devise 
their own temporal and spatial parameters to the Jewish Question. Whilst Jacob Toury's often 
cited article on the semantics of the Jewish Question dated its first usage in Europe to the 
eighteenth century, both Élisabeth Roudinesco and Alex Bein trace the antecedents of the 
 
20, German Life and Civilization, (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Amos Elon, The Pity of It All: A Portrait of 
Jews in Germany 1743-1933 (New York: Picador, 2002). 
62 Steven E. Aschheim and Vivian Liska, eds., The German-Jewish Experience Revisited, Perspectives on Jewish 
Texts and Contexts (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015). 
63 Lars Fischer, ‘The Non-Jewish Question and Other “Jewish Questions” in Modern Germany (and Austria)’, 
The Journal of Modern History 82, no. 4 (2010): 876–901. 
64 Different approaches to the Jewish Question in the secondary literature abound. For a Marxist perspective 
see Enzo Traverso, The Jewish Question: History of a Marxist Debate, trans. Bernard Gibbons, Historical 
Materialism Book Series; 178 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019). For an sociological and anthropological 
approach to the Jewish Question see Spencer and Fine, Antisemitism and the Left.  
65 Alex Bein, The Jewish Question: Biography of a World Problem, trans. Harry Zohn (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1990), 57. 
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Jewish Question back to medieval Christian-European anti-Judaism.66 They also widen the 
temporal parameters of the Jewish Question to the establishment of the State of Israel. 
Roudinesco even suggests that the Jewish Question remains part of the challenge faced by 
Israelis to either 'turn their state into an even more secular and more egalitarian democracy' 
or to 'affirm the Jewish character of their state, thereby accepting that it will cease to be Israeli 
and democratic, becoming instead religious and racist'.67 These works differ, however, in their 
geographical parameters to the Jewish Question. Roudinesco, for example, concentrates on 
French intellectual and political history whilst Bein examines the Jewish Question from a 
global perspective. Given the presence of the Jewish diaspora scattered around the globe, this 
is a common feature of research on the Jewish Question which extends beyond national 
histories.68 
 Historians such as Reinhard Rürup and Peter Pulzer have taken the opposite approach 
to the Jewish Question by focusing on the term in a specific time period (c.1850-1870) and 
country (Germany) to make inferences about what it meant and how it functioned. Both 
authors contributed to the debate on the Jewish Question by clearly separating it into two 
principle aspects: emancipation and modern antisemitism.69 Moreover, they both argue that 
the Jewish Question was a result of political structures and the development of German 
society. Rürup suggests that the slow and difficult development of modern bourgeois society, 
enabled the Jewish Question to remain a constant feature of political life in Germany.70 
Similarly, Pulzer argues that the Jewish Question persisted in Germany owing to the 
incomplete transition from a feudal absolutist to bourgeois-capitalist order as well as the 
continued governance by member-states, not the Reich, even  after unification.71 By examining 
the Jewish Question in relation to Germany's political development, the work of Reinhard 
Rürup and Peter Pulzer more closely aligns with my dissertation. I, however, extend the 
temporal parameters of analysis beyond those of Rürup and Pulzer whose studies end in 1871 
when, they contend, the constitutional Jewish Question disappeared. Moreover, rather than 
concentrating on what changes in German society shaped the Jewish Question, I shift the 
 
66 Roudinesco, Revisiting the Jewish Question; Bein, The Jewish Question. 
67 Roudinesco, Revisiting the Jewish Question, 185.  
68 See Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed., Auschwitz and After: Race, Culture and ‘the Jewish Question’ in France (Oxford, 
New York: Routledge, 1995); John Doyle Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the ‘Jewish Question’ in 
Russia, 1772-1825 (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986). 
69 Reinhard Rürup, ‘Emancipation and Crisis: The “Jewish Question” in Germany, 1850-1890’, Leo Baeck 
Institute Year Book 20 (1975): 13–25; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, 28–43. 
70 Reinhard Rürup, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus: Studien zur ‘Judenfrage’ der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975). 
71 Pulzer, Jews and the German State, 34–37. 
 16 
 
focus to instead asking what the Jewish Question reveals about the dynamics of German 
politics.  
 
In order to study how the Jewish Question functioned in German politics, I examine two levels 
of political discourse: one at the level of government and the other at the political cultural 
level. With regard to the former, I rely on an array of printed and manuscript sources, from 
the minutes of parliamentary sessions and committees to internal correspondence from the 
Foreign Ministry, War Ministry and Ministry of the Interior, which I collected through 
archival visits to the Federal, Foreign Ministry and War Ministry archives.  
 Although my dissertation concerns the Reichstag, Supreme Army Command, Foreign 
Ministry and War Ministry it does not follow the traditional study of political or military 
history.72 Extending beyond the traditional objects of analysis in political history, I situate 
political events and ideas within their cultural context in line with the method of 'new political 
history'.73 I examine the influence of lesser-known individuals such as lawyers and journalists 
in German politics through their engagement with German diplomats, the submission of 
memorandums and the publication of political commentaries in popular newspapers. Rather 
than studying political structures, I investigate Germany's political culture by looking at the 
role of ideas in politics as well as the informal behaviours that lead to political action.74 The 
lesser-known individuals of this dissertation, though not involved in the inner circles of 
political decision-making, wielded significant influence in domestic and foreign affairs. They 
include Max Bodenheimer, Franz Oppenheimer, Oskar Cohn, Richard Lichtheim, Oskar 
Cassel and Hugo Preuss. Their political actions testify to the different manifestations of power 
in Wilhelmine Germany.  
 Whilst the focus of this dissertation is on political theory and praxis, I do not intend 
to provide an exhaustive examination of the Jewish Question as a political term. Rather I use 
the Jewish Question as an analytical tool to investigate German politics. Exploring a series of 
moments when Jewish questions catalysed debates about the German nation-state, I study 
these ideas on rights, religion and nationhood in their particularised and changing forms, not 
as abstract or perennial concepts.75  
 
72 See Geoffrey R. Elton, Political History: Principles and Practice (London: Allen Lane, 1970). 
73 See David M. Craig, ‘“High Politics” and the “New Political History”’, The Historical Journal 53, no. 2 (2010): 
453–75. 
74 See Ronald P. Formisano, ‘The Concept of Political Culture’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 31, no. 3 
(2001): 393–426. 
75 McCormick and Gordon stress the importance of not conflating ‘continuity with teleology’. Peter Eli 
Gordon and John P. McCormick, Weimar Thought: A Contested Legacy (Princeton: University Press, 2013), 4.  
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 The Jewish Question distils otherwise overwhelming and complicated political ideas 
and practices in the German state and nationalism. The term itself speaks to the relationship 
between society and the individual, minority groups and the state. As a minority group living 
within a relatively homogenous nation, German Jews both had to confront and were 
frequently confronted by questions relating to the extent of their acculturation, (legal) 
integration and identity formation.  
 Alex Bein writes that 'three factors combined in the consciousness of the Jews from 
the beginning: the one God as the God of Israel, the people of Israel and the land of Israel'.76 
This eternal covenant with its inseparable parts became the basis of Jewish consciousness, a 
people, linked by a monolithic religion to the land of Israel. This union of people, religion and 
territory, offers an insight into the complex interrelationship between political and communal 
structures in the modern nation-state. Examining how politicians and political commentators 
approached the discussion on the place of the Jews in German society enables an assessment 
not only of the unique attributes associated with German Jewry, but more importantly what 
it meant to belong to the German Empire.  
 In as much as German Jews had to decide on the extent of their acculturation into 
German society, in line with the nineteenth century Self-Other dialectic the Jews became a 
subject against which to define the parameters of German nationhood and statehood. The 
Jewish Question exposed the hypocrisies and disparities within the nation-state model 
whereby Jews held the rights of German citizens but were often denied their status as fellow 
nationals.  
 Given that from its genesis the Jewish Question was riddled with contradictions, using 
it as a prism is not without its difficulties. Whilst broadly speaking, the term was used in the 
context of judgments on the place of Jews in the modern European polity it could concern 
questions of the law, society, culture, politics such that any discussion of the Jewish Question 
could at once refer to all or one of these aspects. As a result, the Jewish Question was used to 
discuss, sometimes simultaneously, race, religion, identity, demographics, citizenship and 
sovereignty.  
 The purpose behind using the term also varied considerably. On the whole, the Jewish 
Question was invoked to problematise Jewish existence in German society, and thus was often 
associated with antisemitism. And yet, the Jewish Question was also instrumentalised as a 
means to a strategic end. For example, the German Foreign Office used it during the Paris 
 
76 Bein, The Jewish Question, 52. 
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Peace Conference to juxtapose the barbarity of the Poles to the civility of the Germans and, 
on this basis, demand minority protections in the peace treaty with Poland.77 
 The existence of so many appropriations of the term had to do with the phrase itself. 
Often, whilst worded in the singular, the Jewish Question was used to describe a host of issues. 
In turn, related Jewish questions were frequently discussed without the explicit invocation of 
the term itself. In 1981 Robert Weltsch, Editor-in-Chief of the Jüdische Rundschau, reflected 
on the German Jewish Question in his book of the same name. Having lived in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, the Weimar Republic, and the National Socialist Dictatorship, Weltsch 
described the ubiquity of the term and its flexibility according to the context and agent. He 
wrote,  
 
it should be evident that throughout the stormy history of the Jewish people in recent 
centuries hardly any domain has been left untouched, directly or indirectly, by the 




The years of the First World War and its immediate aftermath offer a convenient timespan 
to investigate the dynamics of political processes including constitutional transgressions 
within Germany. Jewish questions as they arose in 1914, 1916 and 1919 exposed the Empire 
at crucial transitional periods on the path towards the Republic. They provide an insight into 
a country caught between its past and future. 1919 marks the end of this dissertation as 
following the ratification of a pluralistic democratic constitution, the replacement of an 
Empire with a Republic and as Germany negotiated its new place in the world, a different set 
of problems, questions and debates emerged.  
 Examining the shifts in the frequency of the use of the term Judenfrage in German 
publications illustrates that in the years proceeding, and during the First World War there 
was a steady increase in German publications referencing the Jewish Question.79 From the 
first German Reich to the Third Reich, the use of the term Judenfrage increased in frequency 
in three periods, between 1876-1884 and 1912-1919 and again after 1926.  
 
77 'Document 57: German Counterproposals of May 29, 1919' in Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the 
Paris Peace Conference, 2nd ed. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), 306-405, especially, 338. 
78 Quoted in Otto Kulka, 'Introduction' in Rena R. Auerbach, The “Jewish Question” in German-speaking 
Countries, 1848-1914: A bibliography, Vidal Sassoon International Centre for the Study of Antisemitism (New 
York; London: Garland, 1994), x. Within the parameters of a German Jewish Question from 1848 to 1914, 
Auerbach lists over 2, 000 documents (articles, essays, books, pamphlets) dealing with the subject.  
79 This information was collected using the digital tool, Google N-gram. This tool searches all German 




 The first period coincides with the infamous 'Antisemitism Dispute' in Berlin (starting 
in 1879), which saw the publication of over four hundred pamphlets relating to Jewish 
questions.80 The 1870s were overshadowed by the gradual rise of political antisemitism, which 
found institutional manifestation in the 1887 Reichstag elections when, for the first time ever, 
an openly antisemitic party won a seat.81 And yet despite this rising political antisemitism the 
number of publications concerning the Judenfrage did not increase, suggesting that the term 
did not only feature in antisemitic pamphlets.   
 The frequency increased once again from 1912 to 1919, coinciding with the 1912 
Reichstag elections, when for the first time ever, the Social Democratic Party won the highest 
number of seats, the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference. Waning in the period 
of the early Weimar Republic, the term became popular once again in the latter half of the 
1920s when the National Socialist Party was beginning its political ascent. Notably, there are 
several limitations to using digital tools to assess the frequency of the term, Jewish Question, 
in German publications. The data is compiled only from digitised publications and therefore 
excludes any manuscripts that have not yet been digitised. Moreover, the data does not reveal 
the details of each publication whether they are fiction or non-fiction, literary or academic. It 
is also not possible to infer if only documents with Judenfrage in the title have been included 
or also those referencing the word in the text.  
 
Tracing the occurrences of the phrase Judenfrage in the stenographic reports of parliamentary 
sessions,82 reveals that the phrase was used a total of ninety-nine times over this seventy-year 
period. There was a notable absence of the term in the parliamentary debates of the Third 
Reich suggesting that either separate meetings on the Jewish Question were held (such as the 
Wannsee Conference) or, more generally, the period saw the gradual erosion of all 
parliamentary authority.  
 The term appeared frequently throughout this seventy-year period in reference to 
antisemitism. Either it was invoked by antisemites wishing to rescind Jewish emancipation or 
by individuals countering these demands. The term was also used frequently to condemn the 
 
80 Smith, The Continuities of German History, 173. See also chapter one for the Antisemitismusstreit.   
81 Several parties campaigned on antisemitic platforms including the Christian-Socialist Party (Christlich-
Soziale Partei), German Reform Party (Deutsche Reformpartei), German-Socialist Reform Party (Deutsch-Soziale 
Reformpartei), German-Socialist Party (Deutsch-Soziale Partei) and as of 1907, the Economic Union 
(Wirtschaftliche Vereinigung). See Gerhard A. Ritter and Merith Niehuss, Wahlgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch. 
Materialien zur Statistik des Kaiserreichs 1871-1918 (München: C.H. Beck, 1980), 38–43. For a translated table of 
these results see [https://bit.ly/2Jba9cW, accessed 13/03/19].  
82 I traced the term using the database of the Verhandlung des deutschen Reichstags. The files end in 1941 and thus 
I could not trace the term any further than this. Whilst the database brought up all files containing the term 
(e.g. indexes, biographical reports on ministers who might have written on the 'Jewish Question'), I focused my 
research specifically on the use of the term in parliamentary sessions.  
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immigration of foreign, mostly Russian, Jews into Germany, often following violent pogroms. 
This accounts for the increased use of the term in the 1890s (the Pale Settlement pogroms), 
1905 (Kiev and Odessa pogrom), and, in part, from 1917 to 1925 (collapse of the Russian 
Empire). Germany was not often the final destination but rather an important transit zone for 
Eastern European Jews escaping violence in the Russian Empire. This did not stop the fear 
that Ostjuden (as they were often referred to) would settle in Germany.  
 The second discussion in which the Jewish Question featured prominently was in 
reference to the exclusivity of promotions in the (Prussian) army. These discussions were 
mostly raised by Jewish politicians in left-wing parties (Social Democratic Party, Progressive 
Party) and Catholic Centre Party politicians who argued against denominational 
discrimination in the Officer Corps in the years leading up to the outbreak of war in 1914. The 
re-emergence of these debates in the aftermath of a census authorised to count Jews serving 
on the front lines, is the subject of chapter three. The link between the Jewish Question and 
discussions on secularism within the German state can also be located in parliamentary 
sittings concerning primary and secondary education. These discussions, however, are not the 
focus of chapter three as they were not overtly political but also delved into the social sphere. 
Moreover, education was regulated at the state level, whereas I am interested in federal, high-
level political debates on the Jewish Question.  
 Nearing the end of the war and into the first years of the Weimar Republic, the 
frequency of the Judenfrage increased again. It mostly was used in reference to (Jewish) 
minority rights, both within Germany and Romania where guarantees, enshrined in the 
Treaty of Berlin in 1878, had been violated and as aforementioned, with regard to the 
immigration of Eastern European Jews into Germany. Chapter four focuses on the discussion 
of (Jewish) minority rights in Germany specifically with regard to the Weimar constitution. 
However, as a result of the scarcity of discussions on Jewish rights in Romania these are not 
the focus of the chapter. Neither is the subject of Eastern European immigration into Germany 
as this became an issue in the first years of the Weimar Republic (c.1921), which is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  
 I focus on the years 1914 to 1919 in order to analyse this crucial period of transition 
in Germany history where I argue Jewish questions had practical implications. Whilst the 
Jewish Question was invoked more frequently in parliament in the period preceding the war 
(eighty-six times) it was often either in the context of antisemitism or protesting 
discrimination against Jews. During the First World War, when discriminations against Jews 
were removed, these protests took on a new meaning. They concerned preserving legal and 
social equality and not reverting back to former discriminations. During the Weimar Republic 
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the Jewish Question was only raised four times, the last time in 1923. This testifies to the 
distinctive political change that took place in Germany whereby the Jewish Question was not 
invoked in parliamentary sessions to make antisemitic comments or raised in order to protest 
continued discriminations against Jews. The four times it was used, once concerned the debate 
on minority rights - see chapter four - whilst the other three times was in reference to the 
immigration of Eastern European Jews into Germany.  
 
 
III. Chapter structure  
Chapter one offers a genealogy of the Jewish Question tracing the intellectual antecedents of 
the term prior to World War One. In historicising the Jewish Question, chapter one provides 
clarification on who utilised the term and what it meant for individual agents. Rather than 
following a linear trajectory, chapter one reveals that at particular moments in time between 
1842 (when the term took hold as a popular catchword) and 1914, a discussion on the Jewish 
Question sparked a larger debate on the modern state and the place of Jews within it. Several 
themes pertaining to the Jewish Question emerged out of these debates and resurfaced during 
the First World War. These included the role of religion in the state, the relationship between 
nationality, patriotism, citizenship and the divided Eastern-Western Jewish experience.  
 Chapter two examines the first years of World War One when the Axis powers 
(Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) occupied West Russian territory (an area which 
came to be known as Ober-Ost) and were confronted with governing a population of 
approximately six million Jews. Responding to the politically opportune moment, 
representatives of the Committee for the East (Max Bodenheimer and Richard Lichtheim) 
submitted memoranda outlining the benefits of collaboration between the German 
government and Jews who, they argued, spoke a dialect of German, Yiddish. In return for 
protection, Russian Jews were offered as mediators of German interests in Eastern Europe 
and Palestine which would help secure Germany's colonial and Great Power ambitions. 
Whilst neither of these plans came to fruition - both petered out in the winter of 1916 due to 
several developments in the war - the discussions demonstrated how the German army was 
confronted with a practical Jewish Question in its foreign policy objectives. The important 
legacy of this relationship was evidenced when after the war a Jewish Affairs department was 
established in the German Foreign Ministry.  
 Chapter three focuses on the year 1916, specifically on an event in domestic politics, 
the authorisation by the War Ministry of a decree to count the number of Jews serving on the 
front lines. The 'Jew census' (Judenzählung), as it was termed, revealed the fault lines in the 
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Empire as it was trapped in its past prejudices and future as a modern state. Whilst in principle 
the constitution and Kaiser Wilhelm II advocated religious tolerance and unity, the disconnect 
between law and reality exposed the Empire as a state wishing to exert control and single out 
one of its minority groups. Paying lip service to the civic truce (Burgfrieden) declared by the 
Kaiser, the Minister of War's announcement of the census sparked a debate in parliament and 
in public on the place of religion within Germany and the possibility of a post-war de facto 
modern secular state. Whilst the decree was rescinded after a few months and Germany did 
not descend down the path of government sanctioned antisemitism the event had a lasting 
legacy within far-right circles as it was instrumentalised to blame Germany's defeat in the war 
on the Jews.   
 Chapter four turns to the end of the war when Hugo Preuss was authorised to draft a 
constitution for the new Republic. As the wording of the constitution was being finalised, a 
Jewish Question emerged out of a discussion on the wording of Article 113, the policy on 
minority rights. Ultimately, the wording of the article saw only minor changes from the initial 
draft and yet focusing on the end result would ignore the process. In the course of events a 
series of discussions unfolded in parliament and sub-committees on how to categorise minority 
rights. It invoked a discussion on how to define the majority and exposed the complex 
understandings of rights, citizenship and the concept of nationality within Germany.  
 Chapter five builds on chapter four by contextualising constitutional debates within 
Germany in light of emerging international principles on minority rights as discussed at the 
Paris Peace Conference in 1919. It focuses on the preparations for peace by the German 
delegation who organised a meeting on the Jewish Question in the Office for the Peace 
Negotiations. Despite these provisions, the German delegation was not invited into 
negotiations with the Allies and had little influence over minority rights. During the Paris 
Peace Conference, minority rights in the Treaty of Versailles became a German, not Jewish, 
Question. The discussion concerned Germany's future borders and the rights of German 
minorities living abroad.  
 In the conclusion I summarise how Jewish questions exposed a series of critical 
junctures in the political development of the German Empire. Turning to Jewish questions 
during the inter-war years, I trace both its positive bifurcation in the Weimar constitution as 
well as its negative bifurcation in the antisemitic tropes of Judeo-Bolshevism and the 
Dolchstoßlegende, suggesting further avenues of research. Finally, I reflect on my findings 
against the backdrop of political developments in the Federal Republic. I analyse the 
pertinence of Jewish questions in Germany's process of coming to terms with its past and 
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show how the discussions which Jewish questions catalysed on the German state in 










A genealogy of the Jewish Question 
 
'What once again has been called the Jewish Question is merely a German Question'1 declared 
Moritz Lazarus, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, to an auditorium of 
students at the Academy for the Science of Judaism (Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des 
Judenthums) in December 1879. In his lecture entitled Was heißt national? Lazarus was 
responding to a wave of renewed anti-Jewish agitation in Germany. Disputing the claims of a 
separate Jewish and German nationality; Lazarus argued that the German nation was 
heterogeneous. The idea of the 'will', he suggested, enabled distinct and formally hostile tribes 
(Stämme) to unite to form the German Reich and it was this concept of the will (the willingness 
to form a community of national spirit) that defined the nation. Lazarus explored the Jewish 
Question in order to expose the fault lines of the German Question, namely upon what criteria 
the German nation-state was based: language, descent, religion, geography or culture?  
 Lazarus identified a relationship between the Jewish Question and the German state. 
He suggested that it had not been recognised despite existing for years prior to 1879. 
Lazarus's lecture reveals that the Jewish Question did not emerge in 1914 but had intellectual 
antecedents. In what follows, I trace a series of episodes from 1842 to 1912 when the Jewish 
Question was debated and revealed the hopes and fears of the German state and its Jewish 
minority. I investigate why the Jewish Question became an ubiquitous term, who employed 
it, what vocabulary they used, and how it was understood. Examining the pre-history of the 
Jewish Question is crucial to understanding the ideas and discourse concurrent with the term, 
including investigating which concepts changed, which remained constant, and why. The 
Jewish questions which arose in parliamentary debates during and after the First World War, 
which became practically relevant for German domestic and foreign policy, did not operate in 
a vacuum. They invoked concepts that had a longer legacy associated with the Jewish 
Question, tracing back to earlier debates on religious equality, cultural homogeneity, 
nationhood and citizenship.  
 
1 Moritz Lazarus, Was heißt national? Ein Vortrag von Moritz Lazarus (Berlin: Dümmlers Verlag, 1880), 5 
[https://bit.ly/2VqUbRV, accessed 19/03/19]. For a translated English version see Moritz Lazarus, ‘What 
Does National Mean? A Lecture’, [2 December 1879] in The State, the Nation, and the Jews: Liberalism and the 
Antisemitism Dispute in Bismarck’s Germany, trans. Marcel Stoetzler (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2008), 317-359.  
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 From 1842 until 1912, several publications concerning the so-called Jewish Question 
written by Gentile and Jewish authors sparked heated debates on secularism in the German 
state, the Kulturnation versus the Staatsnation, the relationship between nation and state, 
nationality and citizenship, and the divide between the lived experience of Western and 
Eastern Jews. These authors and their works were characterised by a shared vocabulary and 
semantic consideration of the Jewish Question and betrayed a similar approach to Jewish 
questions by considering them not in isolation but as a window into political questions. 
 Bruno Bauer (1809-1882), Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), Franz Oppenheimer 
(1864-1943) and Werner Sombart (1863-1941), were all prominent public intellectuals who 
made crucial contributions to the discussion on the Jewish Question. Of the various notable 
publications by the aforementioned authors, the following section will focus in-depth on 
publications which triggered debates on the Jewish Question including, Bruno Bauer's, Die 
Judenfrage (1843), Unsere Aussichten (1879) by Heinrich von Treitschke, Franz Oppenheimer's 
Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein (1910) and Die Zukunft der Juden (1911) by Werner 
Sombart. Alongside these more well-known publications and debates, there existed lesser-
known ones that also sparked heated debates on the Jewish Question. This chapter will focus 
on two pamphlets written by Zionists that crucially presented different answers to similar 
questions. The first was published anonymously, entitled Der Nationaljude als Staatsbürger 
(1897), the second by Moritz Goldstein (1880-1977) who made his name publicly known 
through his article Der deutsch-jüdische Parnass (1912). Focusing on these six publications and 
the debates they generated on the Jewish Question I will examine the concepts, ideas, and 
frames of references that emerged in order to demonstrate their later relevance to practical 
Jewish questions during the First World War.  
 These publications indicate that the cultural sphere was the site where political ideas 
were rehearsed and refined before they were deployed in institutional settings. This, however, 
is not to say that the Jewish Question was not discussed in parliament before 1914. Several 
historians have shown how the Jewish Question was a feature of parliamentary debates 
preceding unification, embedded within discussions about the constitution.2 Notably, however, 
a political-constitutional Jewish Question was thought to have ended when unification 
brought the emancipation of Jews in all German states. Taking this as my departure point, I 
demonstrate that the Jewish Question continued as a prominent feature of German politics. 
Firstly, however, this chapter will survey the intellectual precedents of the debates considered 
in chapters two to four.   
 
2 See, for example, Rürup, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus; Pulzer, Jews and the German State. 
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I. Reform in the Prussian state: Bruno Bauer's Die Judenfrage (1842)  
In 1842 Bruno Bauer, the left Hegelian philosopher, published a pamphlet entitled, Die 
Judenfrage, in which he famously developed his critique of the concept of emancipation and 
religion in the state.3 Bauer was responding to a draft law which began circulating in 1841 
which proposed standardising the legal status of Jews in Prussia. Those of the 'Jewish faith' 
in Prussia had first been granted civil rights and limited political rights in March 1812. They 
were declared 'natives' (Einländer) and Prussian citizens.4 Under Section 9, on the admission 
of Jews into public service and government office, the edict intimated the future promise of 
regulation by law, although this was not granted until the constitutional charter of Prussia in 
1848.5 Thus, in 1842, the subject of full Jewish emancipation had not yet been concluded.  
 In the 1841 draft law, rather than granting Prussian Jews the rights which they had 
been afforded under Napoleonic occupation, the law proposed the reinstatement of medieval 
laws, recognising the Jews as a corporation, which were still being applied to Jewish 
communities in eastern Prussia. Facing strong opposition, the draft law, also known as the 
Judengesetz never came to fruition.6 Nonetheless, its circulation triggered an animated debate 
on 'the meaning of Jewish history, the meaning of Jewish law, and the relationship of Jews to 
the state'.7  
 
The subject of Bauer's pamphlet had a longer legacy than the 1841 draft law and earlier 
debates informed Bauer's thinking. Specifically, in the 1780s the archivist of the Prussian War 
Office, Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, and the Enlightenment philosopher, Moses 
Mendelssohn had debated Jewish emancipation. Dohm was the first Prussian official to 
advocate for the immediate unconditional granting of almost full equality to the Jews.8 To be 
worthy of these rights Dohm demanded Jewish regeneration and rehabilitation, a position that 
though one of the first of its kind, would become a common trait of German liberals.9 
 
3 Bruno Bauer developed this critique over two articles, Die Judenfrage (Braunschweig: Verlag von Friedrich 
Otto, 1843) [https://bit.ly/2H1qMn2, accessed 08/05/19] and 'Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und 
Christen, frei zu werden' in Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, ed. Georg Herwegh (Zürich und Winterthur, 
1843), 56–71. 
4 Mahler, Jewish Emancipation, 32–35. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Toury, ‘“The Jewish Question” A Semantic Approach’, 93. 
7 Julius Carlebach, Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism (London, 1978), 68. Quoted in Yoav Peled, 
‘From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Question of Jewish Emancipation’, History of 
Political Thought 13, no. 3 (1992): 466. 
8 Ismar Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism, 1870-1914, (New York and London: Columbia 
University Press, 1972), 2. 
9 Wilhelm von Humboldt also supported emancipation in the hope that it would precipitate the dissolution of 
organised Jewry. This view was similarly expressed by Heinrich von Treitschke as well as Theodor Mommsen. 




Responding to Dohm, Mendelssohn argued that the improvement of the civil status of the 
Jews was dependent on the modernisation of the Prussian Monarchy.10 The question of Jewish 
emancipation according to Mendelssohn had exposed the limits of state reform. Influenced by 
the work of Mendelssohn,11 Bauer framed his response to the subject of the 1841 Judengesetz 
as a response to the Judenfrage.12 Bauer's article prompted a number of responses and helped 
propel the term Judenfrage into mainstream discourse, initially in Germany, and subsequently 
abroad.13  
 Bauer criticised the allegiance to religion by the state and Jewry. For Bauer only once 
all religious privileges were abolished could Jews and Christians be 'emancipated' in the state. 
Rather than equality, Bauer saw power and privilege as the principle governing the Prussian 
Christian Monarchy. Religion was merely instrumentalised to uphold subordination. Thus, 
only with state reform, specifically the abolition of religion, could Jews be integrated into the 
national community, according to Bauer. Elevating the importance of the secular state to 
international proportions Bauer created the dichotomy of the 'chimera' nation (governed by 
religious adherence) to the 'real' nation (based on universal human rights). 'Not the Jews only, 
we, too, are no longer content with the chimera. We want to be real nations', wrote Bauer.14 
He elevated the Jewish Question from a particular concern about the status of Jews, to 
advocating more generally for religious and political reform.  
 
Following the publication of several articles on the Judengesetz in 1842, including Bauer's 
radical thesis on the emancipation of the state from religion, a public debate about the Jewish 
Question unfolded. The debate primarily concerned Jewish legal equality in Prussia. However, 
it also opened up the question of the possibilities and constraints of political reform in Prussia. 
Bauer's publication elicited several responses, most famously by his own pupil and fellow 
young left Hegelian, Karl Marx who published his reply in 1844, Zur Judenfrage.15 Marx 
criticised Bauer's definition of emancipation distinguishing between emancipation in the state, 
 
10 Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden, (Berlin, Stettin: Friedrich Nicolai, 
1781). Moses Mendelssohn Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum (Berlin: Friedrich Maurer, 1783).  
11 On Mendelsohn's influence on Bauer see Peled, ‘From Theology to Sociology’, 467–68. 
12 Bruno Bauer is associated with first using the term the Jewish Question in the German context. See Anne 
Purschwitz, ‘Von der “bürgerlichen Verbesserung” zur “Judenfrage”: die Formierung eines Begriffs zwischen 
1781 und 1843’, in Die ‘Judenfrage’: ein Europäisches Phänomen? (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2013), 23–53. 
Although a series of articles, employing the latter term were published in 1842, Bauer's article was one of two 
articles that was re-edited and issued as a booklet the following year. For a list of these pamphlets see, Toury, 
‘“The Jewish Question” A Semantic Approach’, 93.  
13 Toury, ‘“The Jewish Question” A Semantic Approach’, 93. 
14 Bauer, Die Judenfrage, 61. 
15 Marx also criticised Bauer's argument on emancipation in Die heilige Familie (1845) written with Friedrich 
Engels. On the so-called 'Marx-Bauer debate' see Peled, ‘From Theology to Sociology’. 
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the granting of citizenship rights ('political emancipation'), and emancipation from the state, 
from 'commerce and money' ('human emancipation'), the latter of which Marx associated with 
Judaism.16 Thus emancipation could only occur for Marx once Christians and Jews were 
liberated from the 'empirical nature of Judaism', that was 'commerce and its presuppositions'.17 
Whilst Marx would retrospectively come to be known as Bauer's most famous respondent,18 
Bauer's article elicited numerous responses from well-known figures including the socialist 
Karl Grün, the theologian Friedrich Wilhelm Ghillany and several responses from Jewish 
authors such as Gabriel Reisser, Sammuel Hirsch, Abraham Geiger.19 
 The Jewish respondents to Bauer refuted his explanation of the economic activities of 
Jews as well as his ahistorical analysis of Judaism. They also condemned Bauer for claiming 
that Jews were not a legitimate part of the modern state. 20 Of the two most famous Gentile 
contemporaries to reply to Bauer, Ghillany utilised Bauer's position to provide further support 
for his own view on emancipation, namely that Judaism needed to reform.21 Grün, on the other 
hand, took issue with Bauer's position on the modern era. For Grün in the modern state 
religion could continue to exist in the private sphere as in the United States of America where 
Judaism had already reformed. It was society that was at fault for separating the Jews, 
according to Grün. He argued that equality must come through a single constitution for all 
religious denominations.22  
 
Bauer's article and the subsequent public debate embedded the Jewish Question within the 
discussion of reform in the Prussian state. Moreover, the term, Judenfrage, which had 
previously been used sparingly, caught on as a political catchword in reference to the subject 
of Jewish legal equality. The Jews were described as a religion and it was on this basis that 
proponents argued for their equality within the state. They sought to uphold the rights that 
 
16 Karl Marx, 'Zur Judenfrage', vol. 1 (Paris: Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1844) in Karl Marx/Friedrich 
Engels Werke, Band 1 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1976), 347. 
17 It is in this latter point that one can see the origins of Marx's critique on capitalism Karl Marx, ‘On the 
Jewish Problem (1844)’, in The Jew in the Modern World, A Documentary History, ed. Paul Mendes-Flohr and 
Jehuda Reinharz, 2nd ed., (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 327. 
18 For recent accounts which place prominence on Marx's essay see Robert Fine and Philip Spencer, ‘Marx’s 
Defence of Jewish Emancipation and Critique of the Jewish Question’, in Antisemitism and the Left (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2018), 30–43; Roland Boer, ‘Friends, Radical and Estranged: Bruno Bauer and 
Karl Marx’, Religion and Theology 17, no. 3–4 (2010): 358–401; Peled, ‘From Theology to Sociology’.  
19 For a detailed analysis of the responses to Bauer see Nathan Rotenstreich, ‘For and against Emancipation: 
The Bruno Bauer Controversy’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 4, no. 1 (1959): 3–36; Toury, ‘“The Jewish 
Question” A Semantic Approach’, 102–5. Leopold acknowledges Bauer's numerous respondents but does not 
dedicate any space to discussing their views on his article, David Leopold, ‘The Hegelian Antisemitism of 
Bruno Bauer’, History of European Ideas 25, no. 4 (July 1999): 180. 
20 Rotenstreich, ‘For and against Emancipation’, 12–18. 
21 For Ghillany the historical conditions that Judaism needed to overcome included praying for the resumption 
of sacrifices, the abasement of women and circumcision. Ibid, 18–21. 
22 Ibid, 21–23. 
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had been granted to Jews in Prussia under Napoleonic rule. Opponents, however, restricting 
liberal and constitutional reforms in neighbouring European countries, held onto the medieval 
system of assigning Jews limited rights as a corporation and upheld Prussia as a Christian 
state, thus making the argument for granting emancipation based on individual rights futile.  
 The 1842 debate revealed that the Jewish Question not only concerned Jewish 
emancipation, but also the modernising potential of the Prussian state. For Bauer, the Jewish 
Question was merely the symptom of a greater underlying cause: the freeing of humanity from 
religious prejudice. And yet, with the failure to establish a constitutional state in the 1848 
revolutions, and the disbanding of the Young Hegelians, the hopes for the establishment of a 
modern secular nation-state dissipated and with it erstwhile, the Jewish Question.  
 
 
II. Race and the nation: Heinrich von Treitschke's Unsere Aussichten (1879) 
When in 1842 the Jewish Question emerged as a popular catchword it concerned the practical 
question of Jewish emancipation in Prussia. Whilst equal rights for all religions was enshrined 
in the 1849 St Paul's Church constitution and constitutional charter of Prussia, with the 
repression of the revolutionary wave, it was only in 1869 when this provision was preserved 
within the constitution of the North German Confederation. On this basis, Jews as members 
of a community of faith, were granted full rights in North German Confederation and by 1871 
in all German states acceding to the German Empire.23  
 Eight years after Jews had been granted full legal rights in the German Empire, a 
flurry of publications deploying the term, Judenfrage appeared in print. Although the term 
remained the same, its subject had changed. Under scrutiny was not the topic of Jewish 
emancipation but the necessity of Jewish assimilation for the unity of the German Empire. At 
the time of unification 1.25% of the German population was Jewish (512, 153).24 Jews were 
one of the smallest minority groups in Imperial Germany compared to the Catholics (36%), 
Poles (8%), Alsatians (3.6%) and Danes (0.97%).25 Conversions to Christianity were gaining 
in popularity and between 1871 to 1909 around 3% of the Jewish population had been 
baptised.26 Mixed marriages were also on the rise and some contemporaries began to predict 
the disappearance of the Jewish minority within a few generations.27 
 
23 Mahler, Jewish Emancipation, 57-58. 
24 Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 102. 
25 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume II: The Period of Consolidation, 1871-1880 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 114–17; Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 96–123. 
26 Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 102. 
27 Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, 98. 
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 In spite of these 'assimilationist' trends amongst the German Jewish minority, when 
the Jewish Question arose once again in public debate, unlike in 1842 it did not concern 
religion in Prussian state, but rather cultural homogeneity in the German nation. The article 
which sparked this discussion was written by the National Liberal political commentator and 
Professor of History at the University of Berlin, Heinrich von Treitschke. Published in 
November 1879 in the popular journal the Prussian Yearbook, his article was entitled Unsere 
Aussichten, 'Our Prospects'.  
 
The 'German Jewish Question' for Heinrich von Treitschke was how to amalgamate the 
Jewish people into the German nation and avoid a German-Jewish mixed culture. According 
to Treitschke, a homogeneous, unified culture (Einheitskultur) was imperative for the unity of 
the German nation, which was still at an embryonic stage. The necessity of this question was 
precipitated for Treitschke by the mass immigration of an 'alien people' (Eastern European 
Jews) into Germany.28 The answer he offered was simple. Treitschke implored Jews to become 
German 'without qualification'. By suggesting the answer to the Jewish Question was 
assimilation, Treitschke engaged with a traditionally liberal argument.29 The paradox in 
Treitschke's argument was that whilst promoting assimilation, he described Jews using 
racialised language, affording them peculiar ethnic, national, traits. In doing so, Treitschke 
distanced himself from the liberal premise that Judaism was a religion and undermined his 
own argument.  
 Over three articles Treitschke refined his position on the Jewish Question. These were 
collectively published as a brochure entitled Ein Wort über unser Judenthum. The brochure 
reached a wide audience, and as a result of its popularity was printed in four editions. Between 
the winter of 1879 to the summer of 1881 a heated public debate on the Jewish Question, 
producing at times violent outbreaks, erupted.30 This debate sparked by Treitschke's article 
and which over the years has received extensive scholarly attention came to be known as the 
'Berlin Antisemitism Dispute' (Berliner Antisemitismusstreit).31   
 
28 In 1880, 10, 000 Eastern European Jews were expelled from Germany. Marion A. Kaplan, The Making of the 
Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany (Oxford University Press, 1991), 14. 
29 Liberals favoured assimilation as they perceived Jewish particularities to be based on Jewish tradition rather 
than biological differences. By emphasising blood differences antisemites removed any 'hope of assimilation 
through the adoption of German customs and the Christian religion'. Tourlamain, Völkisch Writers and National 
Socialism, 26. 
30 The most comprehensive sourcebook on the 'Berlin Antisemitism Dispute' is a two volume publication by the 
Centre for Antisemitism Research, Karsten Krieger, Der ‘Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,’ 1879-1881: eine 
Kontroverse um die Zugehörigkeit der deutschen Juden zur Nation, Kommentierte Quellenedition, 2 vols (München: 
K.G. Saur, 2003). 
31 See Walter Boehlich, Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, Sammlung Insel; 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 
1965); Michael Meyer, ‘Great Debate on Antisemitism - Jewish Reaction to New Hostility in Germany 1879-
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  Treitschke's Unsere Aussichten began as a review of the eleventh volume of Heinrich 
Graetz's Geschichte der Juden (1870). Heinrich Graetz was one of the first historians to write 
on the history of the Jewish people from a Jewish perspective. Graetz dedicated over half of 
his eleventh volume to the history of Jews in Germany, despite German Jews representing 
less than a tenth of the world Jewish population.32 Departing from the traditional theological 
narrative on Judaism, Graetz described a people with national characteristics including a 
unique history and politics and used the words Stamm, Volk and Rasse interchangeably to 
describe the Jews.33 Treitschke who had begun engaging with Graetz's eleventh volume to 
write his own multi-volume, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert (1878-1894) was 
infuriated by Graetz's historiography. Graetz had praised Jews who sought to integrate 
modernity into Judaism, paving the way for Jewish revival and rejuvenation, over Jews that 
assimilated.34 For Treitschke, Graetz's narrative evidenced that some Jews were not 
upholding their side of the emancipation contract, the elimination of all national elements. It 
was against this backdrop that Treitschke framed his understanding of the Jewish Question.  
 Treitschke recognised that whilst the 'influence of Jewry on our national life [...] 
created much good in earlier times, nowadays [it] shows itself in many ways harmful', 
terming it a 'serious danger' and 'critical defect [Schaden] in the new German life'.35 
Treitschke's answer to this German Jewish Question was simple, assimilation. 'They should 
become Germans. They should feel themselves, modestly and properly, Germans - and this 
without prejudicing their faith and their ancient, holy memories, which we all hold in 
reverence' wrote Treitschke.36 For Treitschke these 'ancient and holy memories' stemmed 
from the religion of Judaism. In accordance with the 1871 constitution, Treitschke suggested 
that Jews could continue to practice their faith as long as this did not infringe on their public 
life and participation within the German nation-state. He described any discussion of the 
revocation of Jewish emancipation an 'open injustice', distancing himself from this common 
antisemitic argument.37  
 
1881’, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 11, no. 1 (1966): 137–70; Marcel Stoetzler, The State, the Nation, and the 
Jews: Liberalism and the Antisemitism Dispute in Bismarck’s Germany (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2008).  
32 Michael A. Meyer, ‘Heinrich Graetz and Heinrich von Treitschke: A Comparison of Their Historical Images 
of the Modern Jew’, Modern Judaism 6, no. 1 (1986): 1. 
33 On Graetz's work see Stephen L. Sniderman, ‘Bibliography of Works about Heinrich Graetz’, Studies in 
Bibliography and Booklore 14 (1982): 41–49. 
34 For a detailed account on how Graetz's historiography angered Treitschke see Meyer, ‘Heinrich Graetz and 
Heinrich von Treitschke’. 
35 Heinrich von Treitschke, ‘Unsere Aussichten’, Preußische Jahrbücher 44 (15 November 1879): 572. 
36 Ibid, 573. 
37 Ibid, 575. 
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 The contradiction in Treitschke's article was that in making a liberal argument in 
favour of assimilation, he used language describing the Jews as a 'race', 'civilisation', 'Israelites', 
'Semitic', 'people of such pure blood' to suggest that they exhibited distinct and collective 
differences to other Germans. Despite despising Graetz's recognition of the unique attributes 
of Jews as a nation and not a religion, Treitschke employed similar language. In doing so, he 
undermined his own answer to the German Jewish Question. The significance of Treitschke's 
article was that he used the language of race in the context of a liberal response to the Jewish 
Question, providing this discourse with an unprecedented credibility.  
 Underpinning Treitschke's article was the necessity he saw in an Einheitskultur. It was 
on this basis that he voiced his fear of an 'era of a German-Jewish mixed culture' (deutsch-
jüdische Mischcultur).38 The root cause of the German Jewish Question for Treitschke was 
Germany's struggle for national unity. Given that German culture 'lack[ed] a national style, 
an instinctive pride, a thoroughly imprinted character' Treitschke opined that it had 'stood 
defenceless against alien essences' (fremdes Wesen).39 For Treitschke, resolving the German 
Jewish Question was bound to the 'rise of the German state'. He praised Jews 'who understand 
that their racial brothers must adapt to the morality and ideas of their Christian fellow 
citizens'.40 
 Treitschke's article embodied liberal ambivalence. Whilst he suggested that there was 
a place for Jews in the German nation-state and offered them a path to become 'German 
without qualification', he left no room for an alternative route. Although Treitschke advocated 
a liberal pro-assimilation argument, which stemmed from the position that Jewish 
characteristics were not biological but lay in Jewish tradition he employed language to 
suggest the contrary. As Meyer writes, 'for Treitschke this was a liberal, and certainly a non-
racist position. But, of course, it left no room for dialogue'.41 Liberal ambivalence was 
demonstrated throughout Treitschke's article which was riddled with incompatible dualisms 
that suggested the impossibility of assimilation.42  
 The significance of Treitschke's article was that it shifted the parameters of the 
discussion on the Jewish Question. In 1842, the public debate on the Jewish Question 
considered Jews to be a confessional group and concentrated on their legal equality within the 
 
38 Ibid, 573. 
39 Ibid, 575. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Meyer, ‘Heinrich Graetz and Heinrich von Treitschke’, 4. 
42 Some of these dualisms included Treitschke's praise of Jews who embodied the 'good traits of the German 
spirit' including Mendelssohn, Veit, Riesser, whilst stressing that numerous other Jews lacked the 'goodwill' to 
become thoroughly German. He also outlined that most German cities have respectable Jewish firms, but that 




state. In 1879, Treitschke introduced the language of race into the Jewish Question and offered 
an answer on how to integrate the Jews into the German nation in order to create a singularly 
German Einheitskultur. The importance of Treitschke's article for the Jewish Question was 
that it revealed the ambivalence of term, evidenced by the inconsistencies in Treitschke's 
argument. This inconsistency in the Jewish Question only became apparent after 1871 when 
emancipation had effectively resolved the Jewish Question and yet the term re-surfaced in 
public discourse. It was further substantiated in how the discussants approached the term, 
including Treitschke, whereby it was possible to advance a liberal argument whilst employing 
illiberal language.  
 
Of the many respondents to Treitschke, one in particular stood out, the Jewish Professor of 
Philosophy at the University of Berlin, Moritz Lazarus. Lazarus argued that the German 
Empire was heterogenous and that the concept of the nation in Germany was based on the 
willingness to be part of the nation, an idea associated with the Staatsnation promulgated by 
the French academic Ernest Renan.43 Lazarus's response deserves particular attention as both 
the ideas he formulated, and the language utilised continuously resurfaced in subsequent 
debates on the Jewish Question. 
 Moritz Lazarus criticised the importance of homogeneity in the nation in a lecture to 
the Academy for the Science of Judaism44 held three weeks after the publication of Treitschke's 
article.45 Attempting to answer the question posed by the title of his lecture, 'What does it 
mean to be national?', Lazarus concluded that the nation rested on subjective conditions, the 
self-understanding of a communal equality and belonging together (Gleichheit) and the 
individual will to be part of it.46 
 Lazarus began his lecture by surveying the work of his colleague Richard Boeckh47 
who dismissed all common 'misconceptions' on the foundations of nationality to conclude that 
 
43 Ernest Renan, 'What is a nation?' [Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? Paris: Sorbonne, 11 March 1882], in Becoming 
National: A Reader, ed. trans. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 41–55. 
44 Founded in 1819, the Wissenschaft des Judentums recognised Jews as a Volk but disputed the idea that nations 
needed an ethnic core.  
45 Unlike Lazarus, Hermann Cohen agreed with Treitschke on the importance of a homogenous population. He 
saw religious unity as pivotal for German unity and the development of a modern Kulturvolk. Cohen's criticism 
of Treitschke was that he saw no glaring religious differences between Jews and Christians. Instead, Cohen 
argued that the Jewish religion had already begun to merge with Protestantism in historical and cultural 
terms. See Herman Cohen, 'Ein Bekenntniß in der Judenfrage' (1880), in Krieger, Der ‘Berliner 
Antisemitismusstreit’, 337–60.  
46 Lazarus, Was heißt national? 13.  
47 Richard Boeckh (1894-1907) was a well-known demographer who worked for the Prussian Statistical Office. 
He developed a statistical method termed the 'B. method' which was later employed in all statistical offices of 
the Empire. Boeckh also published on the statistical significance of the language as a signifier of nationality.  
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language was the defining characteristic.48 Lazarus expanded on the relevance of language 
and irrelevance of descent distinguishing between the objective (language) elements of 
national unity which alone cannot define the nation without its subjective (spirit) counterpart. 
Setting out his definition Lazarus outlined that  
 
the concept of the nation arises out of the interventions by spiritual and historical 
conditions into naturally given differences; and a nation becomes a nation not 
according to objective criteria such as descent, language, etc. but rather the 
subjective view of all those who together consider themselves a nation.49  
 
Distinguishing between 'the people' and 'the nation' Lazarus argued that 'the nation' was 
created by individuals coming together to overcome their isolation. This awareness of the 
'spiritual creation' of a 'national spirit' in turn was expressed by the 'notion of the people'.50  
 Lazarus recognised that each nation would have a different self-consciousness based 
on objective elements such as 'descent, language, political life and so on' but that these 
attributes were only experienced through the 'subjective free act of self-realisation as a whole 
and as a people'.51 He stressed that 'common destiny' united a nation more than language.52 'It 
has been proven that will alone has formed unity within the German Empire among those 
who, less than a decade ago, had fought each other as blood enemies'.53  
 Appreciating the 'still somewhat problematic conception of the pure subjectivity of the 
national spirit', Lazarus dedicated a section of his lecture to disputing Treitschke's definition 
of nationality by illustrating the irrelevance of descent and rejecting the language of blood as 
materialist. Moreover, given that nationality was based on language, Lazarus declared that 
this made Jews, German. Deploying language utilised in descriptions of the German cultural 
 
48 For Boeckh, as for Lazarus, morals, customs, religion could not define the nation as differences in these could 
be found both within and across nations. Neither could territorial unity or state citizenship given the shifting 
of borders, the expansion of territory into colonies, leaving people of the same nationality distributed across 
different territories and states. Making a subtle stab at the 'facilely taken as synonymous' connection between 
nationality and descent, Lazarus pointed to the absence of any nationality of 'pure unmixed descent'. Left, like 
Boeckh, with language as a central component of national identity, Lazarus concluded it was the 'most essential 
category after all others have been refuted'. Ibid. 
49 'Auf diesem Eingriff nun der geistigen, geschitchtlichen Verhältnisse in die natürlich gegebenen 
Unterschiede beruht der Begriff Volk; und das, was ein Volk zu eben diesem macht, liegt wesentlich nicht 
sowohl in gewissen objektiven Verhältnissen wie Abstammung, Sprache u.s.w. an sich als solchen, als vielmehr 
bloß in der subjektiven Ansicht der Glieder des Volks, welche sich alle zusammen als ein Volk ansehen'. Ibid, 
12-13. 
50 Ibid, 13-14.  
51 Ibid, 14. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, 15.  
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nation, Lazarus professed that 'mother tongue and Fatherland are German, the two sources 
of our inner life'.54  
 On the subject of descent Lazarus acknowledged that German Jews were Semitic but 
dismissed that all Germans were necessarily Germanic by descent, arguing that Germany was 
heterogenous. Just as a Swiss or American could descend from Germanic lines but not belong 
to the German nation, Lazarus illustrated how similarly Slavs from the Elbe region, or 
Prussians had become Germans.55 'Blood-and-race theory' for Lazarus was simply a 'product 
of a general coarsely sensualist-materialist worldview', and in polemical flourish declared that 
'blood means bloody little to me' (das Blut bedeutet mir blutwenig).56  
 The significance of Lazarus' lecture was that even before Ernest Renan's famous 
lecture 'What is a nation?' in 1881, Lazarus had already linked the idea of the will, a shared 
history and fate to his definition of the nation. Whilst employing the language and ideas of 
the Kulturnation revealing his understanding of traditions of German nationalism, Lazarus 
offered a different narrative on the German nation, one that was pluralistic, consisting of 
people from varying lines of descent, different religions, with different morals and customs 
that could be united through the will to belong to the German nation and over generations 
participate in its objective elements, the German language, a shared education, art, service to 
the state, and a common fate. In contrast to Treitschke, Lazarus envisioned a national 
principle where difference was accepted and existed alongside a shared German national unity.  
 Although Lazarus was the first, he was not the only thinker to believe in a pluralistic 
German nation. Gabriel Riesser and Ludwig Bamberger similarly envisioned this possibility.57 
Similarly, Lazarus was not the only respondent to recognise that at the core of the debate was 
the misunderstanding of the principle of nationality. Ludwig Philippson and Harry Breslau 
similarly identified this as a problem in their responses to Treitschke. Yet, Lazarus was unique 
for not only recognising this problem, but setting out an alternative definition of the concept 
of German nationality. The theoretical statements Lazarus made about the nation that 
challenged concepts related to the Kulturnation in favour of ideas associated with the 
Staatsnation (without employing these terms) resurfaced in later parliamentary debates.  
 
 
54 Ibid, 19. On the use of paternal language and the perpetuation of Germany as a cultural nation see Arndt 
Kremer, ‘Transitions of a Myth? The Idea of a Language-Defined Kulturnation in Germany’, New German 
Review: A Journal of Germanic Studies 27, no. 1 (2016): 53–75. 
55 Lazarus, Was heißt national? 19.  
56 Ibid, 22. 
57 For an account of this vein of thought amongst Jewish intellectuals see Mathias Berek, ‘Neglected German-
Jewish Visions for a Pluralistic Society: Moritz Lazarus’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 60 (2015): 45–59. 
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While the majority of critics were of Jewish descent,58 Treitschke's article received a wave of 
support from anti-Jewish sympathisers. The first newspaper to come out in public support was 
the semi-official organ of the Catholic Centre Party, Germania.59 The article expressed that 
finally a 'hyper-Prussian-historian' had both recognised the 'existence of the Jewish Question' 
and expressed views on it that Germania had been discussing for years.60 Hopefully the debate 
would demonstrate the need for 'serious measures to protect the Germans against the taking-
over of the Jewish nationality', the article concluded.61 The short article at once encapsulated 
the support that Treitschke's position on the Jewish Question gave to those holding anti-
Jewish views. It illustrated how Treitschke moved the Jewish Question from a taboo subject, 
into one that could, in the eyes of the public, credibly be discussed using the language of race.  
 Treitschke published his article in the midst of a wave of antisemitism in Berlin.62 The 
League of Antisemites (Antisemiten Liga) was founded in September 1879, Adolf Stöcker 
founder of the Christian conservative, openly antisemitic, Christian Social Worker's Party 
(Christlich-soziale Partei, CSP) managed to secure a seat in the Reichstag, and the following 
year the first ever large-scale antisemitic student demonstrations took place in Berlin.63 The 
significance of Treitschke’s article was that his reputation, as one of the most prominent 
contemporary historians in Germany, lent his work an unprecedented credibility and his 
pronouncements struck a chord with the student fraternities (Burschenschaften) and 
antisemites.64 As such Treitschke's article was seized upon by antisemites who extracted 
 
58 These included, in order of their replies, Moritz Lazarus (December 1879), Seligmann Meyer (December 
1879), Heinrich Graetz (December 1879), Ludwig Philippson (December 1879), Harry Breßlau (January 1880), 
Ludwig Bamberger (January 1879) and Hermann Cohen (March 1880). See Krieger, Der ‘Berliner 
Antisemitismusstreit’. 
59 The leading Catholic newspaper in Germany was the Kölnische Volkszeitung, founded in 1860 by Josef 
Bachem. Germania was founded around the same time as the Catholic Centre Party (1871) and was referred to 
as the semi-official organ of the party, despite the fact that it often was in conflict with more moderate Catholic 
leaders of the party. It was known for its militant attacks on liberals, Jews and Bismarck. See Barnet P. 
Hartston, Sensationalizing the Jewish Question: Anti-Semitic Trials and the Press in the Early German Empire, 
Studies in Central European Histories; vol. 39 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 289–90. 
60 Anonymous, 'Heinrich von Treitschke über die Judenfrage', Germania, Nr. 275, (28.11.1879) in Krieger, Der 
‘Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,’ 1879-1881, 20. The Catholic Centre Party traditionally adopted the position that 
the Jews had supported the Kulturkampf, which helped legitimise antisemitic utterances.  For more on the 
Catholic Centre Party's position on the Jewish Question see Uwe Mazura, Zentrumspartei und Judenfrage, 
1870/1933: Verfassungsstaat und Minderheitenschutz (Mainz: Mathias Grünewald Verlag, 1994). 
61 Anon., 'Heinrich von Treitschke über die Judenfrage', 20.  
62 In the same year before Treitschke's pamphlet, Wilhelm Marr published the twelfth edition of Der Sieg des 
Judenthums über das Germanenthum in which he argued that the social structure of Germany was 'Judaised'. 
Wilhelm Marr, Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum. Vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet 
(Bern: Rudolph Costenoble, 1879).  
63 The first antisemitic student demonstrations took place in Berlin in early September, coinciding with 
lectures by Eugen Dühring. The second demonstration followed in mid-November when 600 students showed 
their support for Treitschke after the publication of the manifesto against antisemitism see Krieger, Der 
‘Berliner Antisemitismusstreit’, 875. 
64 Student fraternities became a hotbed of antisemitism. Herzl's rejection from fraternities became one factor 
that awoke him to the reality that he would never be fully accepted in society as a Jew. See Theodor Herzl, The 
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sections of his article using it to confirm their fears that Germany was becoming verjudet and 
that Jewish rights needed to be rescinded (which Treitschke had explicitly dismissed). 65  
 In August 1880 an 'Antisemitic Petition', addressed to Reich Chancellor Bismarck 
began to circulate. It outlined four measures to guarantee the safety of the nation including 
the prohibition or limitation of Jewish immigration to Germany, a census of Jews living in 
Germany, and the exclusion of Jews from positions of government authority and from 
teaching positions in public schools.66 The significance of the petition was that it became one 
of the first steps towards the development of political antisemitism. Conceived by a school 
teacher Bernhard Förster, the petition was intended as a 'plebiscite of the German people on 
the Jewish Question' and by October had amassed 265, 000 signatures.67 Inspired by the 
popularity of the petition, another school teacher Ernst Henrici, disillusioned by the policies 
of the German Progress Party (Deutsche Fortschrittspartei, DFP) where he began his political 
career, founded the first openly antisemitic party, the Social Imperial Party (Soziale 
Reichspartei).68 
 The support that the petition was able to garner was evidenced when on the 13 
November an inquiry was submitted by a representative of the Progressive Party Albert Hänel 
to the Prussian Chamber of Deputies requesting the government take an official position on 
the 'Antisemitic Petition'.69 The aim of the inquiry was to try and force the government to 
oppose the petition, and discredit public assertions that it had the full support of the Reich 
Chancellor. In what came to be known as the Judendebatte70 over the course of two sessions on 
the 20 November and 23 November, the petition was debated by ministers across the political 
 
Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, ed. Raphael Patai, trans. Harry Zohn, I–V vols (New York and London: 
Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, 1960). 
65 Antisemites argued that emancipation was a contract that the Jews had failed to comply to. Rather than 
assimilating, Jews had retained their particular cultural and religious differences. As emancipation had not been 
realised, they concluded it should be revoked. For an example of this argument written by the former private 
secretary of Bismarck see Anon. [Moritz Busch], 'Die deutschen Juden in der Gegenwart, und was nun?', Die 
Grenzboten, 39, (1880), 177-194, in Krieger, Der ‘Berliner Antisemitismusstreit’, 458–85. 
66 The full text of the petition can be found in Schmeitzner Internationale Monatsschrift: Zeitung für die Allegemeine 
Vereinigung zur Bekämpfung des Judentums (Chemnitz und Dresden, 1883), 314-16.  
67 Of these signatures, over half came from Prussia, and just under 5% from Berlin. Quoted in Richard S. Levy, 
The Downfall of the Anti-Semitic Political Parties in Imperial Germany (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1975), 21. 
68 Henrici wanted to challenge Stöcker's hold over the antisemitism movement. The party was short-lived as in 
the parliamentary elections of 1881 it was unable to win electoral support beyond Berlin. See Christian Davis, 
Colonialism, Antisemitism, and Germans of Jewish Descent in Imperial Germany (Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press, 2012), 32. At the first of several meetings held by Henrici outlining the party's new programme, the 
event at the Berliner Reichshallen drew 3,000 attendees. Krieger, Der ‘Berliner Antisemitismusstreit', 874. 
69 'Interpellation des Abgeordneten Dr Hänel im preußischen Abgeordnetenhause betreffend die Agitation 
gegen die jüdischen Staatsbürger', in ibid, 555–68.  
70 Hartston, Sensationalizing the Jewish Question, 43. 
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spectrum.71 For opponents of the petition, the debate was a pyrrhic victory. On the one hand, 
the Prussian government asserted that it had no intention to change the equal treatment of 
citizens along religious lines, and yet, reassurances extended no further.  Although individual 
ministers condemned the recent antisemitic activities in Berlin, voicing support for 
Kantorowitcz,72 the official government representative at the session did not comment on anti-
Jewish agitation, or single out instigators of antisemitic acts. 'On a higher social and political 
level, [...] a "Jewish Question" once again existed in Germany'.73 
 The turning point in the Antisemitism Dispute came in November 1880 when a 
number of prominent Berlin Notables in politics, industry, and academia signed a manifesto 
concerning the 'Jewish Question',74 in which they protested against the wave of antisemitism.75 
The denial of the equal rights and duties of all Germans was equated to breaking the rule of 
law and honour. The only liberal Gentile76 to publicly condemn Treitschke's article, was the 
famous scholar of classical antiquity, Theodor Mommsen who published his response a month 
later, in December 1880.77 Unlike Lazarus, Mommsen did not take issue with Treitschke's 
premises but rather with the consequences of his article.78 Mommsen thought Treitschke's 
publications had incited a civil war of the majority against the minority endangering not only 
 
71 The debate was reported in the Allegemeine Zeitung des Judentums on the 7 December. See Anon., 'Die 
Verhandlung des preußischen Abgeordnetenhauses', Allegemeine Zeitung des Judentums, 49 (7 Dezember 1880), 
769-776, in Krieger, Der ‘Berliner Antisemitismusstreit’, 676–94. 
72 The 'Kantorowitcz Affair' erupted on the 8 November when a Jewish business man, Ernst Kantorowitcz 
slapped a school teacher Carl Jungfer when he and his colleague, Bernhard Förster, made antisemitic remarks. 
The event took place in the midst of the Antisemitism Dispute, and, as with Treitschke's article, polarised the 
public. For an account of the affair see Hartston, Sensationalizing the Jewish Question, 37–51. 
73 Norbert Kampe, Studenten und ‘Judenfrage’ im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1988), 28. Quoted in Krieger, Der ‘Berliner Antisemitismusstreit,’ 1879-1881, 555. 
74 In his letter to the Notables, Theodor Mommsen described the situation as die Judenfrage. See Theodor 
Mommsen an Emil du Bois-Reymond, [Sonntag, dem 14.11.1880] in ibid, 569. 
75 It featured in the Sunday supplement of several liberal Berlin newspapers. For the manifesto and list of 
signatories see 'Manifest der Berliner Notablen gegen den Antisemitismus', (12 November 1880) in ibid, 151-
154.  
76 Other Gentiles that publicly criticised Treitschke were lesser-known antisemites who thought the article too 
liberal. These included Wilhelm Endner's Zur Judenfrage, which responded to Harry Breßlau's (a historian and 
Professor in Berlin) pamphlet by the same name, and Johannes Nordmann under the pseudonym H. Naudh 
who criticised Treitschke for his liberalism which clouded his understanding of the present. See Stoetzler, The 
State, the Nation, and the Jews, 21, 42.  
77 Prior to his article, Mommsen had criticised Treitschke indirectly in a lecture given to the Prussian 
Academy of Sciences in March 1880 without mentioning him by name. Mommsen's endorsement of the 
'Declaration against Antisemitism', marked the start of a tense exchange between the colleagues, which played 
out in various private letters and newspaper articles. This came to a head when Mommsen published his article 
entitled Auch ein Wort über unser Judentum. For the text of the article see Krieger, Der ‘Berliner 
Antisemitismusstreit’, 695–709. 
78 Like Treitschke, Mommsen defended legal emancipation and demanded that the Jews, not the state, resolve 
the Jewish Question by 'becoming German'. Mommsen was not concerned with Treitschke's article but its 
effect stating, 'in issues like this one, everything depends on how one says something, not what one says'. See 
Stoetzler, The State, the Nation, and the Jews, 25. 
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the Jews, but also the German nation.79 He defended Jews as citizens of the state, but like 
Treitschke, offered no suggestion as to how they could viably become members of the nation, 
given the 'sentiment of strangeness and difference still held today by the Christian German 
against the Jewish German'.80 Of Treitschke's critics, Lazarus stood alone in suggesting how 
to reform ways of thinking about the German nation rather than demanding Jews to change.  
 
When in 1879 a Jewish Question arose once again in public discourse the parameters had 
shifted significantly from 1842. As Jewish emancipation had been granted in 1871, the debate 
focused not on the law, but on culture; not on the Prussian state, but on the German nation. 
Where in 1842 the answer to the Jewish Question demanded state reform, in 1879 the onus 
lay on the Jews to assimilate into German Christian culture. Most importantly, however, 
where the German constitution granted Jews political and civic rights on the basis of full 
religious equality for all individuals, in 1879 Treitschke recognised Jews once again as a 
collective group, bound not only by faith but by their race, an immutable characteristic.  
 Whilst Treitschke suggested Jews could become part of the German nation through 
assimilation, he identified a Jewish characteristic that could never be renounced, not even 
through baptism. For the majority of German Jews who conceived of their identity in religious 
terms, Treitschke's argument was perceived as purposefully exclusionary. However, for a 
small but vocal minority of Jews, Treitschke brought to a public audience their own 
understanding of their community identity as a nation. And rather than seeing this as 
incompatible with the German nation-state, they revised the concept of nationality, separating 
their national loyalty towards Judaism from their patriotic loyalty towards Germany.  
 
 
III. Nationalism and patriotism: Nationaljude als Staatsbürger (1897)  
Contrary to the common misconception which views the Jewish Question as a purely 
antisemitic construct, as a result of reading German Jewish history in hindsight, the Jewish 
Question was employed extensively by Jews who began using the term in parallel to its 
appropriation by antisemites. When the Zionist Federation for Germany (Zionistische 
Vereinigung für Deutschland, ZVfD) was founded in 1897, its genesis was framed not as a 
 
79 Theodor Mommsen, Auch ein Wort über unser Judentum, (Berlin, 1880) in Krieger, Der ‘Berliner 
Antisemitismusstreit’, 695–715. 
80 Ibid. Mommsen was the subject of antisemitic attacks in newspaper articles, brochures and the speeches of 
Henrici. Mommsen once again became the Gentile face of the fight against antisemitism by helping to establish 
the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus in 1890. Although defending antisemitism, the league supported the 
'full amalgamation' of Jews, which was not supported by many Jews. 
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reaction to antisemitism but rather as a response to the Jewish Question, specifically the failure 
of emancipation.81 Whilst for the majority of German Jews, the Jewish Question was rarely 
employed as a term, existing often only in their 'imagination',82 Zionists transformed this state 
of affairs as they took control of the phrase. In the first Zionist publication to employ the term 
in 1882, Leon Pinsker wrote 'only [...] when the equality of the Jews with the other nations 
becomes a fact, can the problem presented by the Jewish Question be considered solved'.83 
Zionists presented the Jewish Question as a political question concerning not only the 
acknowledgment of a national Jewish identity but also changes in the international sphere. 
 In 1842 and 1879 the Jewish Question was posed as an external question about the 
Jews, their legal equality in the state and cultural assimilation into the nation. Conversely, in 
1879 the Jewish Question concerned whether or not it was possible to retain a Jewish national 
identity within the German nation-state. For Zionists, the language of race was not the 
greatest danger. Rather it was assimilation, leading to the erosion of a Jewish identity.84  
 The debate pitted the Zionist Federation against the Central Association of German 
Citizens of the Jewish Faith. Building on the premise of Treitschke's argument that the Jews 
were a nation, the Zionists criticised assimilation and offered an alternative vision of German-
Jewish nationhood. Decoupling the concept of nation and state, the Zionists demonstrated 
how it was possible to be loyal to the Jewish nation whilst remaining a German patriot and 
abiding German citizen.85 Investigating these German Zionist debates illustrates how these 
political concepts were conflicted, continuously rehearsed and had lasting political effect. In 
the First World War these questions and concepts came to the fore with practical relevance 
as the Russian, Ottoman, German and Austro-Hungarian Empires were replaced by the new 
'ideal' polity of homogenous nation-states. 
 
The first resistance towards the Zionist Federation in Germany by the German-Jewish 
community came in response to the announcement that the First Zionist Congress would be 
 
81 Erstes Propaganda-Flugblatt der ZVfD [Anfang 1898], CZA, Z 1/433 in Jehuda Reinharz, ed., Dokumente zur 
Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus 1882-1933, Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck 
Instituts; 37 (Tübingen: JCB Mohr Siebeck, 1981), 51–53. See also Alan Levenson who argues that Zionism 
developed not in response to antisemitism but radical assimilation. Alan Levenson, ‘German Zionism and 
Radical Assimilation before 1914’, Studies in Zionism 13, no. 1 (1992): 21–41. 
82 Bein, The Jewish Question, 20. 
83 Leon Pinsker, Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to His People by a Russian Jew (1882) trans. (Masada: Youth 
Zionist Organisation of America, 1935), 5. 
84 Between 1889 and 1910, there were approximately 12, 000 Jewish conversions to Protestant Christianity, 
which did not include those who had converted before this date. This meant around 2% of the Jewish 
population in Germany converted. Tourlamain, Völkisch Writers and National Socialism, 26. 
85 Theodor Herzl did not share this sentiment. He was not concerned with dual loyalty and said life in the 
diaspora was meaningless. On these issues he was opposed by his contemporaries including Bodenheimer and 
other first-generation German Zionists.  
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held in Munich. The protest movement succeeded in halting the congress, which instead was 
held in Basel.86 The objection to the Zionist Congress was on two grounds. Firstly, the Jewish 
community was German in nationality and only separate in religion. Secondly, by demanding 
a Jewish nation-state, the Zionist movement undermined the fight for equal rights within 
Germany. 'What perturbed [the liberal Jewish community] were the disconcerting 
similarities between the anti-Semitic position on the "Jewish Question" and the Zionist 
ideology of national separatism'.87 
 Liberal Jews were anxious that Zionism would undermine the political status of Jews 
and give government officials an excuse for excluding Jews from positions in public office on 
the basis of their separate national identity. Certainly, these views were not without historical 
basis in the German Empire where 'social pluralism and toleration of diversity were not 
widely-respected principles'.88 According to critics of Zionism, even the struggle for equal 
rights in practice did not warrant the Zionist call for mass emigration. A gulf was emerging 
within the German-Jewish community, between those who could turn a blind eye towards 
liberalism's failure to eradicate prejudice and those who believed full emancipation could never 
be achieved.  
 In response to this public outcry in the Jewish community, the Zionist Federation 
published the anonymous pamphlet, Der Nationaljude als Staatsbürger.89 The pamphlet began 
by juxtaposing nationality and religion as defining principles of German Jewry. The Zionists 
argued that where one's faith could change, nationality was given at birth, a matter of chance, 
and could not be renounced. Attacking the liberal Jewish organisation, the Central 
Association, the pamphlet argued that Jews could not be denationalised as they embodied 
particular characteristics unique to Jews, a 'Jewish type', a shared kinship (Stamm) identity. 
Elevating the subject to international proportions, the pamphlet claimed that refusing the 
existence of a Jewish nationality meant denationalising all nations. Unpicking the 
assimilationist argument, the author questioned if by denying Jewish nationality did Jews 
'become a Pole, Russian, Czech or Croat?' The reality the author maintained was that 'I remain 
what I am'.90 
 
86 This movement was led by Rabbi Sigmund Maybaum and Rabbi Heinemann Vogelstein. The initial choice of 
Munich was because the headquarters of the WZO were in Germany. In addition, many of the individuals 
involved in the movement were from German-speaking countries or spoke German.  
87 Marjorie Lamberti, ‘From Coexistence to Conflict - Zionism and the Jewish Community in Germany, 1897-
1914’, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 27 (1982): 55. 
88 Ibid.   
89 Jüdischer Nationalismus und Deutscher Patriotismus, [Juli/August 1897], CZA W 147/1, in Reinharz, 
Dokumente zur Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus, 45–47. 




 Not only on the basis of unique Jewish attributes but also based on the external 
perception of Jews, the author exposed the limits of assimilation. The pamphlet acknowledged 
daily antisemitism and the obsession with the physiognomic characteristics of Jews, and 
Jewish particularities. Judaism 'must be a strange denomination if it can be singled out in a 
nose or face' stated the pamphlet. Yet rather than succumbing to antisemitic tropes, the author 
of the pamphlet flipped these encounters into a message of empowerment of Jewish difference. 
Playing on the different meaning of Glauben (using it as a noun and adjective), the author 
emphasised that 'faith' cannot be singled out as a defining principle of German Jews as few 
have 'faith' in it.91  
 Whilst advocating immigration to a Jewish state, the pamphlet outlined how Jews 
could remain members of the German state. Separating patriotism from nationality, the author 
argued that Jewish nationalism did not negate loyalty, patriotism, to the German state. This 
position was typical of German statist Zionists (including Max Bodenheimer, Franz 
Oppenheimer) who unlike their Eastern European counterparts felt loyalty towards the state 
in which they resided. Framing nationalism in the language of emotions, specifically love, the 
pamphlet suggested that a historical nationalism based on 'an intimate relationship to the Holy 
Land, the memory of its past, and the hope for its future' did not diminish a contemporary 
nationalism to 'their present home' in Germany.92   
 Statist Zionists appreciated that the Jewish people required a place of refuge beyond 
Germany, and yet they believed this did not require immediate immigration. Moreover, a 
commitment to the Jewish state project did not reduce an emotional commitment or present 
patriotism to the German Fatherland. The more Jewish rights were contested within 
Germany, the more precious they became, the pamphlet declared. For statist Zionists their 
mission to establish a Jewish state was seen only as a reality that future generations could 
achieve. They intended for the Jewish diaspora to continue, and thrive, but wanted to avoid 
an overwhelming and unsustainable numbers of Jews in the German diaspora. The Jewish 
state project, as conceived by German statist Zionists, was intended for Eastern European 
Jews to avoid their mass immigration and settlement in Germany.93 On these grounds, the 
statist Zionists shared similar concerns to Heinrich von Treitschke, but they offered a different 
 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid.  
93 It was this mindset that underpinned Bodenheimer's memorandum and guided Sobernheim's strategy in the 
Jewish Affairs section towards Ostjuden. Nicosia writes that 'Sobernheim's strategy was quietly to direct the 
energies of his office to halting Jewish immigration into Germany, to promoting the emigration of as many 
East European Jewish refugees from Germany as possible, and to the effective integration of those who were to 
remain in Germany into the Jewish community'. See Francis Nicosia, ‘Jewish Affairs and German Foreign 
Policy during the Weimar Republic: Moritz Sobernheim and the Referat für jüdische Angelegenheiten’, The 
Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 33, no. 1 (1988): 273. 
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model for solving the issue. Foregrounding emotions, the Zionists circumvented the complex 
terrain of dual nationalism within a traditional model of German nationhood. This involved 
recognising that whilst birth (one's nation) was chance, patriotism was a conscious choice. A 
national loyalty towards Judaism did not negate civic consciousness towards the German 
state.  
 
The most vocal criticism of the pamphlet, unsurprisingly, came from the Central Association, 
which the anonymous author had subtly attacked.94 Whilst the debate unfolded between two 
Jewish organisations on the subject of Jewish nationalism, it opened a discussion about the 
principles of the German state. Moreover, the debate also illustrated the intellectual legacy 
and the practical consequences of the Antisemitismusstreit, specifically the ideas of Treitschke 
and Lazarus, which were referenced, either directly or indirectly, in subsequent debates on the 
Jewish Question.  
 One of the first and the most revealing responses to the Zionist pamphlet came from 
Ludwig Fuld, a Bavarian lawyer, who argued that the Zionists had misunderstood the role of 
religion and nationality in the modern state.95 Fuld began by disentangling the concept of 
nationality, differentiating between 'national Jews' (Nationaljuden) and 'Jewish citizens'  
(jüdische Staatsbürger). Referencing Moritz Lazarus, Fuld similarly argued that whilst there 
was no such thing as a 'German religion', neither could nationality be determined by religion 
as 'today, every nationality includes multiple religions, as every religion includes multiple 
nationalities'.96 Building on Lazarus, Fuld argued that whilst Jews shared a common descent 
(Abstammung), this had 'no significance for nationality'.97  According to Fuld, Jews no longer 
have their own nationality.98 They draw on 'the people's spirit' of the nation of which they 
have become part. Whoever denied this, Fuld concluded, knew nothing about the 'essence of 
the modern state'.99 What Fuld feared most was that 'non-scientific' Zionist assertions on 
nationality were confirming views expressed by intellectual antisemites. 'Now the antisemites 
have received confirmation from Treitschke to Ahlwardt and Lueger that German Jews do 
 
94 Wanting to represent the whole of the German Jewish community, the CV had to play its cards carefully. It 
opposed the Zionist movement and the mass emigration it advertised but did not want to ostracise Zionists. 
The CV desired a united German-Jewish front and, for this reason, held off from denouncing the pamphlet 
until after the Basel Congress. See Lamberti, ‘From Coexistence to Conflict’, 56. 
95 Fuld, Ludwig, 'Der Nationaljude als Staatsbürger', Im deutschen Reich, III (11 November 1897): 531.  
96 Ibid, 532.  
97 Ibid, 533. The author did not employ the terminology of Stamm in the article, presumably as this would have 
conceded to an ethnic identity. Just over a decade later, however, members of the Central Association began to 
use the terminology of Stamm.  
98 Ibid, 532. 
99 Ibid, 533.  
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indeed feel like a particular nationality'.100 In a situation of 'teritus gaudens', Fuld expressed 
his fear that antisemites were revelling in the conflict between the Zionist Federation and the 
Central Association.101 
 Although critical of the Zionist position on Jewish nationality, the official policy that 
the Central Association adopted towards the establishment of the Zionist Federation was 
conciliatory. Under the Presidency of Max Bodenheimer, the Zionist Federation did not 
intend to jeopardise the political status of Jews in Germany and heeding the concern of the 
Central Association, removed nationaljüdisch from its title, replacing it with Zionist to avoid 
the term appearing as an 'antithesis to nationaldeutsch'.102 In conjunction with the name change, 
the programme of the ZVfD was also revised and, mirroring the language of the Central 
Association, declared that 'German citizens of Jewish descent' were a people united by historic 
ties which did not undermine their loyalty as German citizens. This satisfied Eugen Fuchs, 
one of the founders and President of the Central Association, who believed that German 
Zionists would soon realise that social integration and a sense of 'Jewish pride' could be 
achieved without renouncing Judaism as a religion or loyalty to the German Fatherland.103 
Responding to the moderate non-doctrinaire Zionist tone set by Bodenheimer, the Central 
Association agreed the following year to institute a policy of neutrality and withheld from 
criticising Zionism in its official organ.104 
 
The 1897 debate on the Jewish Question reveals the primacy of Jewish voices on the Jewish 
Question and the diverse contexts where these questions were discussed and challenged. The 
debate built on some of the ideas and discourse from the 1879 Antisemitism Dispute and 
applied them to a different context: a German Jewish response to the Jewish Question. Like 
Treitschke, the Zionist Federation similarly argued that Jews were united by peculiar national 
traits. Notably, however, whilst both Treitschke and the ZVfD described the Jews as a Stamm, 
Treitschke also used the language of race (Rasse) to describe the Jews which, in this pamphlet, 
the ZVfD did not employ, but rather termed them a nationality (Nationalität).  
 Building on the 1879 debate, the Zionist Federation started from the same premise as 
Treitschke but reached a different conclusion to Jewish assimilation. For the Zionists, 
 
100 Ibid, 530. 
101 Ibid, 529. Teritus gaudens refers to a situation where one party benefits from conflict between two others. 
The phrase is often attributed to the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel.  
102 CZA, A142/59/2, Arthur Hantke to Alfred Klee, Berlin 25 October 1987. Cited in Lamberti, ‘From 
Coexistence to Conflict’, 57. 
103 See Eugen Fuchs, Um Deutschtum und Judentum, Gesammelte Reden und Aufsätze (1894-1919) (Frankfurt am 
Main: Verlag von J. Kaufmann, 1919).  
104 Lamberti, ‘From Coexistence to Conflict’, 57. 
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assimilation was futile. Instead they proposed two alternative responses to the German Jewish 
Question. Firstly, they negotiated a space within Germany for Jewish nationality by 
separating between the nation and the state. As long as Jews remained patriotic to the German 
state, their civic consciousness could not be undermined by a Jewish nationality. Secondly, 
they advocated for the creation of a Jewish state, which would help mitigate the immigration 
of Eastern European Jews into Germany. In 1897, the leaders of the Zionist Federation faced 
criticism only from the Central Association, which continued to maintain that Jews were 
German nationals and citizens of the Jewish faith. Only a few years later, however, several 
German Zionists began to question their allegiance to the German nation-state and offered a 
more radical response to the German Jewish Question: immigration to Palestine.  
 
 
IV. The question of national consciousness in Franz Oppenheimer's 
Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein (1910)  
Published in February 1910, Franz Oppenheimer's Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein 
created a stir by publicly acknowledging an emerging division within the Zionist Federation 
on the Jewish Question.105 The split was between an older generation of Zionists who 
continued to affirm their loyalty to Germany and a younger generation of Zionists who 
rejected this in favour of settlement in Palestine. Oppenheimer interrogated the concept of 
nationality by distinguishing between types of national consciousness assigning these to an 
East-West divide in the Jewish community. The latter theme was central to the Jewish 
Question and pertinent not only to debates within the Zionist community but also within 
German politics, before, during and after the war.106 Given the language affinity of Yiddish to 
German, the presence of this group within Germany raised several questions about the 
principles of the cultural nation, which became practically relevant in the First World War 
when the Germany army occupied West Russia. These debates provided the conceptual 
foundations that influenced Max Bodenheimer and his interactions with the German Foreign 
Office during the First World War when the German army confronted a practical Jewish 
Question on the Eastern Front.107 
 
105 Franz Oppenheimer, 'Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein', Die Welt, XIV, no. 7 (18 Februar 1910): 
139-143. 
106 Germany was a country of transit for many Jews fleeing the Russian Empire, both in the aftermath of the 
1881 pogroms but also after First World War. In the nineteenth century two-thirds of Russian Jews fleeing 
the pogroms emigrated to America. On this basis, the Jewish Question was closely connected to the Eastern 
European Jewish Question (Ostjudenfrage) in parliamentary debates.   
107 On this subject, see chapter two.  
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 Oppenheimer's article was published at a moment when tensions within the Zionist 
Federation of Germany had reached their zenith. The same year, Arthur Hanke replaced Max 
Bodenheimer as President of the Zionist Federation and began re-structuring the 
organisation, based on a new ideological programme crafted by Kurt Blumenfeld, Party 
Secretary since 1909.108 A policy of 'Palestine-centrism' (Palästinozentrismus), settlement in 
Palestine, was encouraged. The policy was in line with the new approach of the World Zionist 
Organisation, which had begun promoting practical, cultural work in Palestine. It was 
opposed to the tactics of Herzl and statist Zionists who had pursued diplomatic channels with 
the Great Powers in an attempt to garner support for a Jewish state.109   
 Led by Kurt Blumenfeld and Arthur Hanke this younger generation of Zionists 
appealed to the existential crisis of German Jewish youth, who as victims of political 
antisemitism, and dissatisfied with the denial of Jewish nationality, often by their parents, 
began to look for their 'home in the Volkstum'.110 In contrast to the political-statist Zionists, 
for the national-cultural Zionists the focal point of Palestine was not about demanding 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Settlement would be encouraged on the basis of 
rekindling a Jewish national-cultural, spiritual existence. Life in the diaspora was perceived as 
the root cause of Jewish persecution and discrimination and thus was not considered to be an 
existence worth engaging in or fighting for. As such, all participation in the diaspora, 
including any engagement in German public or political life, and the fight against 
antisemitism, was halted.  The Jewish Question was no longer perceived as one externally 
imposed and externally answered. 
 Motivated by external in as much as internal affairs, these young Zionists responded 
to larger social transformations affecting middle-class Central European youth in the pre-war 
era. Many disillusioned with the capitalist industrial society, framed within the confines of 
liberal individual freedom, looked for comradery and a return to nature and simplicity. 
 
108 These changes correlated with the need to increase the membership of the ZVfD. From 1904 to 1908, 
membership had only increased by 239 from 6, 000. In comparison, the CV numbered 100,000 members in 
1903, which had doubled by 1916. As a result of changes in the ZVfD, in 1913, in one year alone, membership 
increased by 9,000 thereby almost doubling the overall representation of Zionists within the German Jewish 
community. Hagit Lavsky, Before Catastrophe: The Distinctive Path of German Zionism (Detroit, Jerusalem: 
Wayne State University Press, Magnes Press, 1996), 29. See also Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German Anti-
Semitism, 1870-1914, 119. 
109 Many of the second-generation Zionists (including Kurt Blumenfeld, Julius Berger, Martin Rosenblüth) had 
close professional links to the WZO having previously worked there. These links had been strengthened since 
1904 when the headquarters of the ZVfD moved from Cologne to Berlin, where the WZO was located. After 
the war, a third generation of Zionists took over, known as the Pioneer Zionists. They continued prioritising 
settlement in Palestine as the mission of the ZVfD. On the different generations of Zionists and their 
programmes see Stefan Vogt, Subalterne Positionierungen: Der deutsche Zionismus im Feld des Nationalismus in 
Deutschland, 1890-1933, 1st ed. (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016). 
110 Der Jüdische Student, 28 Februar 1913, 373. Cited in Lamberti, ‘From Coexistence to Conflict’, 70. 
 47 
 
Although asserting a national-cultural, non-statist consciousness, politics was not wholly 
devoid from this movement. Rather, the young Zionists drew terminology from German 
political thinkers such as Fichte and Herder for their apolitical end betraying their background 
despite seeking to reject it.111 Whilst insisting on an independent, unique Jewish cultural-
nationalism they drew on the language of German Romantic thinkers (Herder, Schiller and 
Novalis), much like völkisch groups, to frame their existence.112 By 1912 the takeover of the 
Federation was complete and as a result, a number of older (political-statist) Zionists, 
including Franz Oppenheimer, temporarily stopped engaging in Zionist activities.113 
 In his article which made explicit this divide within the Federation, Oppenheimer drew 
on the vocabulary of the 1897 debate, when he observed that Zionists employing the term 
Nationaljude, had misunderstood the concept of the nation. Nation, Oppenheimer explained, 
had etymological roots denoting descent. Often Stammesbewusstsein was correlated with 
national consciousness when temporally the two categories differed. Stamm stemmed from 
historical roots, whilst national from contemporary, or present, circumstances. Central to 
Oppenheimer's argument was that these categories emerged from the different experiences of 
Eastern and Western Jews. 'Western Jews' he wrote have a 'Jewish kinship consciousness' 
(Stammesbewusstsein) whereas Eastern Jews (Ostjuden) had a 'Jewish national consciousness' 
(Volksbewusstsein).114 
 Stammesbewusstsein was described as the awareness of coming from 'a shared lineage 
(Abstammung), a shared blood, or at the least a former shared nationhood (Volkstum), [and] a 
shared history'.115 Although writing for a Zionist audience, Oppenheimer by using the 
language of Stamm invoked a longer legacy of conceptualising Jewish identity. Adolf Jellinek, 
a Rabbi from Vienna, was the first to frame Jews as one of many Stämme in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.116 In Germany, Moritz Lazarus ventured that Jews formed one of the 
 
111 On the influence of Fichte on German Zionism see Stefan Vogt, ‘The First World War, German 
Nationalism, and the Transformation of German Zionism’, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 57 (11 July 2012): 271. 
112 Buber emerged as one of the leading intellectuals of this movement and drew on the language of 'blood, 
descent and roots'. See Buber, Drei Reden über das Judentum. On the influence of Romantic thinkers on cultural 
Zionist thought see Vogt, ‘The First World War, German Nationalism, and the Transformation of German 
Zionism’, 271.  
113 At the Zionist convention in Posen, the Palestine centric proposals were unanimously accepted. On the 
relevance of the Posen declaration, see Lavsky, Before Catastrophe, 30–31. See also Jehuda Reinharz, Fatherland 
or Promised Land: The Dilemma of the German Jew, 1893-1914 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 
144–70. In 1914, at the Zionist convention in Leipzig, this Palestine centric policy was re-confirmed. 
114 Oppenheimer, 'Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein', 139. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Till van Rahden, ‘Germans of the Jewish Stamm: Visions of Community between Nationalism and 
Particularism, 1850 to 1933’, in German History from the Margins, ed. Neil Gregor, Nils H. Roemer, and Mark 
Roseman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 31. 
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many religions and Stämme of Germany.117 Moreover, during the Antisemitism Dispute, 
Theodor Mommsen also used the language of Stamm to describe German Jews.118 
 For Oppenheimer, national consciousness, in contrast to kinship consciousness, was a 
product of external circumstances, more specifically the historical development of countries 
in which Jews resided. These differences meant that within the concept of Volksbewußtsein 
(national consciousness) which Oppenheimer defined as sharing similarities in 'language, 
customs, economic and legal relationships and spiritual [geistige] culture',119 two further 
forms of consciousness emerged, Nationalbewußtsein (national consciousness) and 
Kulturbewußtsein (cultural consciousness). Whereas Western Jews belonged to their respective 
cultural communities, for Oppenheimer, the barbarity faced by Eastern Jews meant that 
becoming cultural 'Russians, Romanians or Galicians' was impossible forcing Eastern Jews to 
develop a unique Jewish culture, becoming Kulturjuden.120 Yet rather than disparaging the 
Western Jewish experience, Oppenheimer advised Eastern European Jews to acknowledge 
and forgive Western Jews for having followed a path which internalised the culture of their 
respective countries.   
 For Oppenheimer, the concept of Nationalbewußtsein entailed an inseparable formalised 
political status and cultural belonging. Western Jews belonged to their respective cultures 
(German, American or English) and on this basis were nationals and citizens. Similarly, 
culturally united Eastern Jews had a separate 'national' understanding rooted in Jewishness. 
Eastern Jews were National Jews because they were and saw themselves as 'belonging to a 
foreign people [Fremdvolk] that lives, without a home [Heimat] under foreigners 
[Fremden]'.121 Only in the Zionist state could a Western Jew derive a Jewish Volksbewußtsein 
and be a 'National Jew' and retain instead, a German Stammesbewusstsein. Eastern Jews too 
frequently used the term to denote their status within non-Jewish states because they felt 
compelled to fill the gap in their national consciousness (which denied them a culture or state 
administration they could feel any patriotism towards) with their kinship consciousness, 
according to Oppenheimer.  
 Referencing the 1897 debate once again, Oppenheimer clarified his understanding of 
loyalty to the state and patriotism. Where Romanian and Russian Zionists had to describe 
 
117 Lazarus, Was heißt national?. On the history of the language of Stamm in Germany and its use by German 
Jews see van Rahden, ‘Germans of the Jewish Stamm’, 27-48. 
118 Yfaat Weiss, ‘“Wir Westjuden haben jüdisches Stammesbewußtsein, die Ostjuden jüdisches 
Volksbewußtsein”. Der deutsch-jüdische Blick auf das polnische Judentum in den beiden ersten Jahrzehnten des 
20. Jahrhunderts’, Archiv für Socialgeschichte 37 (1997): 159. 
119 Oppenheimer, 'Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein', 139. 
120 Ibid, 140.  
121 Ibid, 141. 
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themselves as 'loyal citizens', in the West, outlined Oppenheimer, 'we are patriots.122 
Oppenheimer re-iterated the dual loyalty of statist Zionists who retained the 'national 
consciousness of the tradition [Volkstum] which we were born into'. Alluding to one of the 
points of tension within the Zionist Federation, Oppenheimer clearly distinguished between 
the practical Zionist objective (emigration to Palestine), supported by cultural Zionists, and 
the political Zionist objective (establishing a Jewish state), advocated by statist Zionists. A 
disciple of the latter, Oppenheimer suggested that although supportive of the Jewish state, 
this did not necessitate abandoning life in Germany. 'We are not guests that want to move on 
tomorrow, we are citizens in the long run' clarified Oppenheimer.123 Crucial to the statist 
Zionist position was the decoupling of nationhood from statehood, enabling Zionists to be 
Jewish nationals and German citizens.  
 In words that would have sounded alien to a Jew living in the Russian Empire, 
Oppenheimer professed, 'we love our fatherland and its people, its culture and its territory' 
and are committed to 'serve its future that should also be our future'.124  For Oppenheimer, 
and for statist Zionists more generally, the Zionist project focused on freeing Eastern 
European Jews from the shackles of their unequal and restricted existence under the Tsar. 
Revealing his liberal, assimilated, bourgeois upbringing, Oppenheimer had no intention of 
renouncing life in Germany. Statist Zionists envisioned that they were building the Jewish 
state for generations to come. Herzl had even conjectured in Der Judenstaat that those who 
initiated the project of a Jewish state would 'scarcely live to see its glorious completion'.125 As 
such, the statist Zionists believed that their actions did not undermine their standing as 
patriotic Germans. However, an increasing number of younger Zionists saw these 
pronouncements as naive, dangerous, and in complete opposition to what they understood 
Zionism, nationhood and statehood to mean.  
 Whilst Oppenheimer framed his argument around the concept of identity (states of 
consciousness), central to his argument was understanding the political environment within 
which Jewish communities resided. Oppenheimer saw the state based on the rule of law 
(Rechtsstaat) as the ideal polity. Those that 'can live as a citizen in a Rechtsstaat deserve all hate 
if they do not show gratitude'.126 The different political environments of Western and Eastern 
Jews was central to their community identity formation. Unlike Eastern Jews, Western Jews 
historically lived in countries that 'in most cases' had offered Jews full equality and thus there 
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was no reason to 'feel as guests in a country where our ancestors have lived for forty 
generations'.127 Oppenheimer's diagnosis of the two states of (national) consciousness 
explained the internal splintering of Zionist Federation. For him, it was simple. Zionist 
objectives differed substantially because Western Jews were able to derive a national 
consciousness from their surroundings, whilst Eastern Jews were dependent on their 
Jewishness. For the latter, violence and oppression presented an urgency, which could only 
be satisfied by 'practical' solutions; mass emigration and settlement in Palestine. A plan that 
Oppenheimer and other statist Zionists saw as 'idealistic'. 
 Oppenheimer's article unleashed a heated and lengthy debate.128 Responses were 
predominately limited to the pages of the organ of the World Zionist Organisation, Die Welt 
and featured in issues for several months after the article first appeared.129 Neither the organ 
of the Central Association (Im deutschen Reich) nor the mainstream media commented on the 
controversial article.130 However, the memory of the Oppenheimer debate remained in the 
German-Jewish community and the premise that European Jewry had a divided national 
consciousness had a lasting legacy. 131 
 The writer and artist Richard Huldschiner (1872-1931) was the first to reply to 
Oppenheimer. He distinguished between culture and civilisation to argue that culture was not 
learnt or acquired but inherited at birth.132 'Culture is the sum of all spiritual aspirations 
[geistige Strebungen] of a people [Volk] that is held together through objective kinship 
qualities and language'.133 In turn, 'civilisation' is external, not tied to personality, and allows 
for co-habitation. Americans, for example, originated from different European cultures but as 
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a whole formed an American civilisation. For Huldschiner German Jews participated in 
German civilisation but not culture. This Stammeskultur they shared instead with Eastern 
Jews. Speaking candidly, the author highlighted the disconnect in Germany whereby a Jew 
could hold German citizenship but not be fully German. They remained members of an 
uprooted people.134 Employing a two-fold understanding of national identity, the author 
suggested that being a Zionist meant belonging to the Jewish Stamm but also the 'will' to be 
Zionist invoking the language utilised by Lazarus but applying it in a Zionist context.135  
 The first session of the Free Zionist Discussion Club was dedicated to Oppenheimer's 
article. In the discussion Oppenheimer's conceptual definitions were heavily criticised as 
historically oriented and not relevant to the present. Martin Buber declared that Oppenheimer 
was simply providing a historical account of present circumstances and was confusing the true 
purpose of Zionism. He rejected the distinction of an Eastern and Western Jewish experience, 
asserting that assimilation also occurred amongst Eastern Jews. Buber juxtaposed 
assimilation with Zionism maintaining that Oppenheimer misrepresented that Zionism was 
not a practical concern, like assimilation. Rather, Zionism was an idealistic goal that gave Jews 
the power to shape their existence.136  
 Oppenheimer had struck a chord within the Zionist Federation, such that four years 
later, at the fourteenth Zionist Delegation Day, his article was once again debated.137 
However, rather than only being confined to Zionist circles, the debate on a Jewish 
Volksbewußtsein or Stammesbewußtsein resonated within wider Jewish circles.138 When in 1913 
the Central Association announced their official position on Zionism, Oppenheimer's 
argument was used to clearly delineate an opposition towards national Jewish sentiments 
rather than feelings of kinship (Stamm).139 A few years later, in 1917, the Director of the 
Central Association, Eugen Fuchs, described himself as a 'Jew on account of religion and kin' 
(Stamm). For Fuchs, the concept of the nation was 'not a question of being' but reflected 'an 
act of volition'. German Jews were like German Christians, 'just like a Friesian peasant's tribal 
[Stamm] heritage does not separate him from a Rheinish industrial worker or a Berlin 
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proletarian'.140 Walther Rathenau similarly described himself as a 'German of the Jewish kin' 
(Stamm).141 In a distinct shift in discourse, more liberal German Jews began to frame their 
identity by appealing to the vocabulary of the German cultural nation (Stamm, Abstammung) 
to espouse an alternative model of statehood. This was based on volition to the state; a 
tradition associated with French, not German, models of political belonging.  
 
Oppenheimer crucially interrogated the idea of community consciousness. He distinguished 
between being part of a shared history and descent, and engaging with the present condition, 
a shared language, customs, culture. This debate was a Petri dish for ideas that would become 
practically relevant in the First World War when vast swathes of territory with different 
ethnic populations came under the jurisdiction of the Central Powers. As the dormant Polish 
Question resurfaced, the German army also faced the so-called Ostjudenfrage; what to do with 
the population of six million Jews? In an unprecedented situation, 'instead of the ghetto 
coming to Germany, Germany came to the ghetto [as] Prussian soldiers, impoverished 
inhabitants of countless shtetls, and middle-class German Jews were flung together'.142 
Countless German Jews through the encounter with Eastern European Jews, for the first time, 
had to confront their self-understanding of Nationalbewußtsein and Volksbewußtsein. Jews, 
however, were not the only soldiers to be challenged by their ethnic and national 
understandings. Instances abounded of Prussian soldiers being accused of dual loyalty as some 
began to openly identify with the culture of Baltic ethnic groups on the Eastern Front.143  
 When the Russian Empire, and its Entente allies (Britain and France), were declared 
enemies of Germany, many German Zionists saw the war as an auspicious moment, even the 
last hope, for the liberation of Jews from the yoke of Tsarist Russia, thus infusing lingering 
debates over Jewish questions with a renewed practical urgency.144 For statist Zionists such 
as Bodenheimer and Oppenheimer, the war actualised their understanding of dual nationality. 
They embodied this dual loyalty as they lobbied for Jewish nationalist aspirations through 
negotiations with German Foreign Office officials where they offered Jews as guarantors and 
promoters of German colonial interests in Eastern Europe and Palestine. The importance of 
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Bodenheimer was that his ideas indebted to those espoused by Oppenheimer, as will be shown 
in chapter two, had a legacy.  
 The Oppenheimer debate built on earlier discussions on the Jewish Question by 
reaffirming the national characteristics of the Jews. However, where previous debates in 1879 
and 1897 alluded to an East-West divide in the Jewish community, Oppenheimer made this 
the focal point of the Jewish Question. He suggested that, unlike Western Jews, Eastern Jews, 
as a consequence of the violence and inequalities they faced in their respective countries were 
forced to derive their national consciousness from their Jewish culture. Western Jews, instead, 
could claim a historical connection to Jewish nationhood through their Stammesbewusstsein, 
without this undermining their German nationality.  
 Following the position of the Zionist Federation as outlined in their 1897 pamphlet, 
Oppenheimer had decoupled nationhood from statehood. However, the ensuing debate 
revealed another facet to the Jewish Question. A younger generation of Zionists argued 
against the older generation that Jewish nationality and German citizenship were 
incompatible. They suggested that the Jewish Question concerned the national-cultural 
revival of the Jewish people in Palestine. Similar to Treitschke, they insisted on cultural 
homogeneity, their focus however was not on the German but rather the Jewish people. This 
project of promoting an exclusive nationalism based on an incorporated Jewish nationality 
and statehood became formally institutionalised in the Zionist Federation in 1912. The same 
year, however, the prominent sociologist, Werner Sombart, offered a new solution to the 
Jewish Question. He advocated for the toleration of national groups, including Jews, and 
outlined a model for a culturally pluralist Germany.  
 
 
V. Nations in the German state: Werner Sombart's Die Zukunft der Juden (1911)  
Only a year following Oppenheimer's article, in the autumn of 1911 to 1912 a series of 
publications triggered a public discourse on the Jewish Question most of which were 
contributed to or commissioned by the eminent sociologist Werner Sombart.145 The focus of 
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this section, however, will be on Sombart's lesser-known lecture series which was published 
as a brochure entitled, Die Zukunft der Juden.146 Employing similar language to both 
Treitschke and the ZVfD, Sombart offered yet another answer to the Jewish Question. Similar 
to the Zionist position, Sombart also rejected Treitschke's demand for the full assimilation of 
Jews into German culture arguing that it was not only impossible, but also not desirable. 
Although starting from the same premise as Treitschke, by recognising the separate (racial 
and national) characteristics of Jews, Sombart reached a different conclusion. Sombart urged 
Jews to embrace their separate cultural identity and national characteristics, framing these, in 
contrast to Treitschke, as a positive attribute. Rather than demanding change of the Jews, 
Sombart advocated in favour of a pluralist model, the co-existence of separate nations within 
Germany.  
 In Berlin in the closing months of 1911 Werner Sombart was feeling compelled, as an 
expert on capitalism and the Jews, to respond to the 'problem of practical Jewish politics'.147 
He organised a series of lectures on the subject of, 'the future of the Jews', which was published 
as an edited pamphlet the following year. It was in this two-part lecture series that Sombart 
explicitly outlined his view on the Jewish Question. Concerning himself with this subject, 
Sombart was, in his view, responding to the Zeitgeist. 'Once again Israel is on everyone's lips,' 
he wrote, 'once again wider circles of the population in all cultural lands (Kulturländern) are 
concerned with the question of the future of the Jews, because the present brings our 
awareness every day back to "the Jewish Question"'.148 Between 1871 and 1910, the Jewish 
population  in Germany had increased by 100, 000 to 615, 000 of which around 13% included 
newly settled Eastern European Jews.149 Despite this increase in the Jewish population, as the 
German population had expanded by 58%, the Jewish share of the population dropped to 
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0.95%.150 Jews now represented an even smaller share of the population and yet the question 
of their status within Germany remained on the political agenda.  
 
For Sombart, the subject of the Jews in Western Europe was no longer a topic of public 
discussion, partly due, in Sombart's opinion, to the decision by the liberal press to ignore the 
subject.151 These circles held onto the hope that the 'time of the Jewish problem' would soon 
be resolved and that continuous discussions would only hinder the 'healing process of this 
wound'.152 Yet for Sombart this Totschweigepolitik was both 'short-sighted and unwise'. Instead 
he stressed that differences in opinion were only made sharper when one prevented them from 
appearing on a public stage.153   
 Dispelling charges that his lectures promoted antisemitism, Sombart differentiated 
between criticising the political status of Jews and highlighting the problems in German-
Jewish cohabitation. For Sombart the charge of antisemitism belonged to those who sought 
to reverse emancipation and ultimately hated the Jews.154 However, Sombart did not agree it 
was antisemitic to identify that there were certain 'Jewish particularities and bad habits' and 
that living together with Jews was a 'serious problem'.155  
 Much like Oppenheimer's article a central theme of Sombart's lecture was the East 
versus West divide within the Jewish community, which he brought to a much larger and 
more public audience than Oppenheimer had. Sombart began his lecture by highlighting the 
separate existential conditions (Daseinsbedingungen) amongst the European Jewish 
populations, which meant that 'their futures will be (and should be) different'.156 'The problem 
of the Eastern Jews is a problem of their accommodation, persecution and more precisely, 
settlement or resettlement' wrote Sombart.157 Given that the legal and economic situation of 
Eastern Jews would most likely not improve, Sombart concluded that continued colonisation 
of Palestine offered the 'best solution' for Eastern European Jews.158 Making an argument that 
political-statist Zionists had been advocating since the turn of the century, Sombart stressed 
 
150 Kaplan, The Making of the Jewish Middle Class, 5–7. 
151 Sombart, Die Zukunft der Juden, 6. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid.  
154 Sombart wrote that he could not comprehend this hatred for a whole people. Lenger, Werner Sombart, 211. 
155 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, (10 Februar 1912). Quoted in ibid.  
156 Sombart, Die Zukunft der Juden, 10. 
157 Ibid, 27. 
158 Ibid, 32. 
 56 
 
that a large Jewish population in Palestine would serve as a commercial 'asset' for European 
nations.159  
 In 'direct antithesis' to the experience of Eastern Jews, Sombart analysed the 
experience of Jews in Western Europe and America employing racist stereotypes of Jews to 
illustrate the problem of 'assimilationist politics'.160 Charting the influence of Jews in German 
society, Sombart claimed that that they occupied a quarter of all managerial positions in 
German corporations and an eighth of all directorial posts. In economic terms, Jews tended to 
be three to four times wealthier than Christians and in the cultural sphere, Sombart noted that 
whilst Jews did not necessarily always have all cultural industries 'in their grip', still they 
significantly influenced 'our art, our, literature, our music, our theatre and our large press'.161 
According to Sombart, Jews were also politically influential having participated in the genesis 
of liberalism and socialism and dined with 'a golden spoon at the table of the Kaiser'.162  As a 
result of these developments Sombart concluded that Jewish elements existed in the German 
population.  
 For Sombart, 'assimilation politics' were problematic because they eroded a unique 
Jewish culture and were a source of conflict with the Gentile population. Moreover, he 
challenged if full assimilation could ever be possible on the basis that Jews could 'step-out' 
(austreten) of their religious community, but not of their race due to differences in 
physiognomy.163 Whilst starting from the same premise as Treitschke, separating Jews from 
Gentiles on the basis of race, Sombart reached a radically different conclusion. Jews not only 
exhibited differences in their 'attitude and gestures' to Gentiles but juxtaposing the difference 
in blood between Jews and 'Aryan tribes', Sombart concluded that this difference could never 
be overcome.164 Rather than demanding Jews assimilate to become Germans, Sombart urged 
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Jews to maintain the 'purity' of their type (Art). 'Need I say that in the Jewish people [...] we 
see before us one of the most valuable species that the human race has produced?'.165 For 
Sombart Jews and Germans suffered in the mixing of their essences (Wesen) writing, 'I wish 
that the "Judaization" [Verjudung] of broad areas of our public and spiritual life comes to an 
end, to the salvation of German culture, but equally to the Jewish'.166  
 Sombart idealised the purity of species and praised the 'Jewish renaissance' framing it 
as the 'national rebirth' of the Jews.167 Sombart encouraged the colonisation of Palestine by 
Eastern European Jews but not Western European Jews, a view also advocated by statist 
Zionists.168 The departure of Western Jews, according to Sombart, would cause an 
irreconcilable crisis in the economy. Sombart used the example of the expulsion of Jews from 
Spain and Portugal under the Conquistadors to stress the adverse effect the same actions 
would have on Germany.169 Rather than involving Western Jews in the practicalities of 
building the Jewish state, which would be to the detriment of the German economy and 
culture, Sombart held up the Jewish state, with a reference to Kantian philosophy, as a 
'regulative idea'.170 By this he advocated for an internal change, a reform in attitude 
(Gesinnungsreform) within Jewry whereby the will to be Jewish was strengthened for the 
preservation of Jewish culture and tradition.171 The notion of a revival of Jewish identity sat 
uncomfortably with the majority of liberal bourgeois German Jewry but spoke to a younger 
generation of Zionists.  
 Having built a case against assimilation but also Jewish emigration, Sombart outlined 
how Jewish nationals could continue to live in Germany. 'How will, how can, how should 
populations [Völker] live together with Jewish nationals [empfindenen Judenschaft]?'172 
Sombart praised the addition of Jewish elements to the 'colourful mixture that represents "us 
Germans"'. Yet, in the following sentence he criticised (once again) the mixing of Jewish 
physiognomic 'dark features' with 'blond' Germans.173 To improve the co-existence of Jews 
and Germans Sombart encouraged the redistribution of Jews throughout Germany to avoid 
their concentration in large numbers. However, concentration did not correlate with 
communal cohesion. Whilst in 1910, Posen had a low concentration of Jews (1.3% of the 
population) it was the only part of the Empire where Jews were 'sufficiently rooted for them 
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to act as a group', especially in municipal politics.174 Against the charge that his thesis would 
lead to the erection of ghettos, Sombart declared in little else than a rhetorical flare, there will 
be 'no renaissance of the ghetto alongside the renaissance of the Jews'.175  
 For Sombart, the Jewish Question concerned how Jews, as a national group, and 
Gentiles could co-exist within Germany. In order to present a viable programme, Sombart 
delved into the larger challenges brought on by modernity. He envisioned a cosmopolitan and 
globalised existence, rooted in the idea of a homeland. 'When the modern man stands with his 
feet on his homeland, he can project his love into various foreign cultures and can live within 
them'.176 In line with the notion espoused by statist Zionists, Sombart proposed that national 
consciousness and citizenship could, and should, be decoupled he wrote,  
 
What do national consciousness [Volksbewusstsein] and citizenship 
[Staatsbürgertum] have to do with one another? Can one not at the same time be 
a self-conscious Jew and a very good German (in citizenship terms)?177  
 
 Criticising the nation-state model, Sombart described the union of these ideas as a 
negative by-product of the era. 'Our egalitarian time and the lack of talent of our statesmen 
have the same goal: to standardise all citizens in cultural and national terms'.178 As for many 
Germans at the time, Sombart recognised that culture was inseparable from national 
understanding within Germany but condemned ethnically homogenous nations. Sombart 
declared that it would be a 'horrid impoverishment' for a land like Germany if all the various 
ethnic groups (Stammesarten) were extinguished only to be replaced by a singular Prussian 
Stamm and encouraged the promotion of national characteristics, especially language, in 
Germany's minorities including the Poles and French.179 
 Turning to the Jewish minority and the problem of professional discriminations 
against Jews, Sombart missed the essence of the Jewish fight for equality. He did not consider 
the difficulties for Jews to receive a professional appointment as a case of the 'violation of a 
fundamental right'.180 Rather, in instances where Jews were excluded from the Officer Corps, 
Sombart professed it was of benefit for the Jews as this profession should be reserved for 
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military families.181 In a prophetic tone, Sombart affirmed that should 'Jewish elements' start 
entering the Officer Corps the 'antisemitic dynamite' would alight.182 
 Contrary to demanding the full realisation of de facto equality, Sombart postulated that 
the social situation of Jews in Germany was better than in other European countries and 
America,183 because Jews had not 'penetrated' all areas of society, creating fewer areas of 
friction.184 Similarly, denying that full equality could exist between peoples, Sombart 
concluded that certain relationships between people could not be equalised through legal 
measures, such as emancipation, but required changes in individual behaviour. For Sombart 
this epitomised the relationship between Jews and Gentiles in the modern state. 'States give 
their Jewish citizens full equality' and in return, according to Sombart, 'Jews will have the 
wisdom and tact to not utilise this equality to the full and in all settings.'185 
 Sombart concluded by reflecting on the Zeitgeist. First, he interrogated the relationship 
between the collective and the individual, between nationhood (Volkstum) and humanity 
(Menschtum) to explore how politics and culture were inextricably linked.186 Sombart then 
turned to the generational divide in politics and nationalist turn. Where the older generations 
encouraged 'cosmopolitanism' and 'internationalism', the younger generations - described as 
'we' by Sombart - renounced these ideas in favour of focusing on differences in 'blood' and 
'culture'.187 In light of this nationalist turn, Sombart stressed to not lose sight of the individual. 
He encouraged thinking about individuals (Menschen) rather than nations (Völkern). Sombart 
reminded his audience of the humanitarian values espoused in Christianity and the 
Enlightenment, which underscored the obligations towards the individual such as 'love, 
compassion and goodwill'.188  
 Sombart's emphasis on the individual and humanity directly related to the relationship 
between Jews and non-Jews, a subject he thought 'should not be necessary to emphasise'. 
Referencing the 'raw' and 'carnal' persecution of the Jews in the east (most likely the Russian 
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Empire) Sombart challenged manifestations of antisemitism (hatred, distain, sneering, brutal 
treatment of Jews). He did not condemn 'apathetic antisemitism' conceding that it was a 
product of humanity that would last for eternity, 'as long as the Earth exists'. Nonetheless he 
urged that 'despite differences in blood, [...] in countries with a humanity, [...] we have to 
recognise [Jews] as our fellow human brothers'.189  
 In a utopian vision, Sombart projected that at a certain 'height of humanity' one which 
separates the 'masses' from the 'citizens', group instincts and national characteristics would 
cease to exist and 'Germans, English and Russians, Blacks, Jews and the Chinese will find 
themselves in a united community bound by humanity'. Individual friendships would 
transcend national differences.190 Furthermore, he saw no contradiction between Volkstum and 
Menschtum but rather thought together they would lead to 'the richness of our culture'.191  
 
The responses to Sombart's lecture series varied considerably. Whilst Sombart's lecture series 
was reported on extensively in German Jewish liberal and Zionist newspapers, it received far 
less attention in the non-Jewish German press. According to the Jüdische Rundschau, the 
Berliner Tageblatt had not reported a single word on Sombart's two lectures in Berlin.192 In his 
second lecture, Sombart also remarked on the absence of reports on his lectures by the 'liberal 
press'.193 Thus, it is difficult to gauge the public reaction to Sombart's lecture series.194  
 One possible indicator of the significance of Sombart's lecture series was that it 
contributed towards a growing interest in the Zionist movement amongst Gentiles. During 
the First World War Zionism emerged as a 'factor on the international stage'.195 In Germany 
institutional support was given to the movement when in April 1918 the German Committee 
for the Promotion of Jewish Settlement in Palestine (Deutsches Komitee zur Förderung der 
jüdischen Palästinasiedlung) was established.196 The committee was founded by notable Gentiles 
and included prominent individuals such as Hans Delbrück, Major Franz Carl Endres, Gustav 
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Noske and Georg Gothein.197 The extended committee of thirty-four members, included 
Werner Sombart, Alfred and Max Weber, Matthias Erzberger, Philip Scheidemann and 
Börries Freiherr von Münchhausen.198 The 1918 committee was short-lived, ceasing all 
activities the following year. However, coinciding with Germany's entry into the League of 
Nations, the committee was revived with minor changes to the original manifesto. The 
renamed German Pro-Palestine Committee (Deutsches Pro-Palästina Komitee) publicly 
supported Jewish work in Palestine with the aim to expand German economic relations in the 
region.199  
 In contrast to the Gentile reaction to Sombart's lectures, the response from the 
German Jewish community was animated. Within the German Jewish community, Sombart's 
ideas were misread by both Zionists and liberals as promoting a Zionist agenda. Liberal Jews 
were shocked that Sombart supported the Zionist contention that Jews were a nation, a view 
held by less than 1% of the German Jewish community and the Central Association urged its 
members to boycott Sombart's lectures.200 Zionists, in turn, delighted in the platform and 
public attention created by Sombart.201 As the Jüdische Rundschau, the German Zionist organ 
expressed, Sombart's lecture reached a public that otherwise would not have listened, nor 
responded, to the same questions asked by a Jew. Sombart had achieved the first point in 
Herzl's programme, to open a European public discussion on the Jewish Question.202  
 One Zionist commentator, praised Sombart's lecture for its 'objective, unemotional, 
free from academic antisemitism' account on the future of the Jews.203 A highpoint in the 
lecture, was the discussion of the blood differences between Jews and their 'host nations' 
(Wirtsvölkern).204 He praised Sombart for tackling a subject which, in his view, was either 
condemned outright, dismissed as uncomfortable, or labelled antisemitic.  
 
197 Georg Gothein was the only committee member of Jewish descent who sat in the central eight-person 
committee. In the extended committee of thirty-four members, four were of Jewish descent. See Josef Walk, 
‘Das “Deutsche Komitee Pro Palästina” 1926-1933’, Bulletin des Leo Baecks Instituts 15, no. 52 (1976): 163. 
198 The fact that an avowed National Socialist was part of the committee illustrates its broad political spectrum.  
199 Walk, ‘Das “Deutsche Komitee Pro Palästina”’, 164. 
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Zionists represented around 2-3% of the German-Jewish population. See Lavsky, Before Catastrophe, 22-23.  
201 Lenger, Werner Sombart, 213. 
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 Amongst the diverse responses from the German Jewish community on Sombart's 
lecture series, they shared one similarity. They agreed that Sombart was not an expert on 
Jewish issues. One article reported that Sombart's lectures had offered 'nothing new' on the 
subject of the 'Jewish Question’ and had made 'a few incorrect statements'. The article warned 
against thinking that the Zionists had a 'special reason' to appreciate Sombart's lectures, or 
claim him as a 'Zionist-friend'. Rather, what interested the Zionists were not the conclusions 
Sombart drew, but the questions he posed. The future of the Jews was a 'fateful question 
[Schicksalfrage] that only Jewry could give an answer to'. For Zionists, the importance of 
Sombart's lecture series, which drew 1, 500 listeners, was that it evidenced that a large part 
of German society was interested in Jewish affairs.205 
 Liberal Jews agreed with Zionists that Sombart was not an authority on the Jewish 
Question. Eugen Fuchs, President of the Central Association, published a nuanced review on 
the lecture series, which captured the contradictions in Sombart's work. Where Treitschke 
said, 'the Jews are our misfortune', reported Fuchs, Sombart states that they are our 'fate willed 
by god'.206 Rather than trying to categorise Sombart, Fuchs chose to challenge Sombart's 
method and the inconsistencies in his argument which Fuchs described as 'an attempt to 
vindicate the denial of equality'.207 Fuchs illustrated how Sombart described Jews as foreigners 
but stressed they should remain in Germany. He termed them a 'magnificent species' but called 
for an end to Verjudung. Jews had to be given equality, according to Sombart, but they had to 
tactfully not exercise it to the full.208 Fuchs was most concerned with the consequences of 
Sombart's lecture series for the Jewish community especially the delicate relationship between 
the Central Association and the Zionist Federation, which was not defined by Jewish 
nationhood, 'concepts such as völkisch [...] staatlich'. Rather, the organisations were united 
through a commitment to peaceful cultural work for the improvement of the social situation 
of Jews.209  
 
The significance of Sombart's lecture series was bringing the recognition of Jews as a nation 
to a public audience from the perspective of a liberal Gentile public intellectual rather than an 
antisemite or Zionist.  Whilst Sombart described differences in blood and spirit between Jews 
and Aryans, using the language of race was not antisemitic. Race was commonly used as a 
'conceptual framework' by Jewish intellectuals and was regarded as objective academic 
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scholarship. It was for this reason used by antisemites to add rigour and legitimacy to their 
work.210 Whilst not a self-declared Zionist, Sombart did reveal his indebtedness to Zionist 
writings, employing vocabulary and ideas from Zionist debates on the Jewish Question in 
1897 and 1910. Sombart criticised assimilation politics given that Jews could never renounce 
their race and proposed the decoupling of the nation from the state arguing that a Jewish 
nationality did not negate German civic consciousness.  
 Crucially, however, for Sombart the Jewish state was only a regulative idea. For statist 
Zionists, such as Oppenheimer, whilst immigration to Palestine was encouraged for Eastern 
European Jews, they nonetheless envisioned that they were contributing towards the 
establishment of a Jewish state for future generations. For Zionists, the Jewish state was a 
constitutive idea and in this way their response to the Jewish Question differed from Sombart.  
  In contrast to the 1879 public debate on the Jewish Question, which pivoted around 
assimilation and the necessity of an Einheitskultur in Germany, Sombart urged Jews to embrace 
their national and cultural differences, which he argued should be protected within Germany. 
Where the 1879 debate exposed Treitschke's liberal ambivalence towards the Jewish 
Question, Sombart exhibited the position of a diversity liberal by advocating for a culturally 
pluralist Germany.  
 Although in principle inclusive of different nations and cultures Sombart, like 
Treitschke, placed the onus on Jews to change to enable this coexistence to function. 
Specifically, he encouraged Jews to regulate their behaviour in order to not exercise their 
equal rights in all contexts. He also suggested that Jews relocate across Germany to avoid 
their concentration in large numbers. Discrimination against Jews in public professions, for 
Sombart, was not a matter of the violation of a fundamental right. Rather, it had helped avoid 
additional areas of friction in society. Although Sombart promoted an inclusive nationhood, 
peaceful co-existence would be ensured not by the state but by Jews regulating their 
behaviour. The respondents to Sombart's lecture series were predominately Jewish and for 
this reason, it is difficult to gauge Gentile responses to the proposal of multiculturalism in 
Germany. The same year, however, a relatively unknown journalist Moritz Goldstein 
published an article on the existence of a separate Jewish culture in Germany. His article 
triggered a public debate eliciting numerous responses and provides a unique insight into both 
liberal Jewish and Gentile reactions to the idea of a separate national cultural community of 
Jews within Germany.  
 
210 For Jewish intellectuals writing on race see Mitchell Bryan Hart, Jews and Race: Writings on Identity and 
Difference, 1880-1940, The Brandeis Library of Modern Jewish Thought (Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis 
University Press, 2011). 
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VI. Jewish questions, European questions: Moritz Goldstein's Deutsch-Jüdischer 
Parnaß (1912) 
Published shortly after Sombart's lecture series, Moritz Goldstein's article Deutsch-Jüdischer 
Parnaß, featured in the popular cultural magazine (Der Kunstwart) edited by Ferdinand 
Avenarius, similarly addressed the question of the future of Jews in Germany. Whilst it is 
difficult to gauge the extent to which Goldstein was influenced by Sombart, Goldstein was 
living in Berlin at the time of Sombart's lectures. He was a student at Berlin University, active 
in the Zionist student movement and might have attended Sombart's lectures.211 Certainly, 
the editor, Avenarius, was aware of Sombart's lecture series and timed the publication of 
Goldstein's article. In his introduction to Goldstein's article, Avenarius, quoting Sombart, 
agreed with him that the 'Jewish problem' was the 'biggest problem for humanity' which 
should be recognised by 'those who think that everything in Germany is comfortable'. 212  
  Der Kunstwart was known to publish works reflecting Ausdruckskultur,213 the 'genuine 
expression of the characteristics of a nation, and especially of the German nation'.214 It was on 
this basis that having faced rejection from three publishers, including the Berliner Tagesblatt, 
Goldstein submitted his article to the prestigious cultural journal.215 Like Sombart, Goldstein, 
from the outset, had intended to stimulate an open and honest discussion on the characteristics 
of the German nation, and the place of Jews within this, which he argued either often 
descended into allegations of antisemitism when raised by  Christian Gentiles or alternatively 
was outright denied as an issue by liberal Jews.216 Equating 'Jewish questions' with 'European 
questions', Goldstein thought it appropriate to have the 'non-Jewish general public' act as 
witness to the debate. To all intents and purposes, Goldstein's article generated a public 
discussion on the Jewish Question, although it was only six months after it was published, in 
the August issue of Der Kunstwart where the debate was framed as such.217 
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The problem summarised by Goldstein was that 'Jews administer the spiritual possession 
(geistigen Besitz) of a peoples (Volkes)' that denies Jews 'both the right and the ability to do 
so'.218 Whilst addressing the specific topic of Jews in German culture, Goldstein opened a 
much larger debate which challenged the premise of whether Jews could ever fully integrate, 
and be fully accepted, into German society. His thesis conceded that there was an 
interconnection between Judentum and Deutschtum but simultaneously singled out the Jews as 
not really 'German' in all their characteristics and tendencies. 'Just as Sombart had asserted 
that the Jews dominated the economic and political, so Goldstein asserted they monopolised 
the intellectual and cultural life of Germany'.219  
 Tracing the predominance of Jews in the theatre and music scene, in the press and as 
German thinkers, Goldstein questioned their continued foreign status in Germany but in 
doing so, used language separating Jews from Germans.  
 
Are we, as you want it to be, still the strangers [Fremden], the foreigners, that speak 
the German language "as foreigners" as a "learnt language not a mother tongue"? 
We still have one thing in common with you, service to culture, service to 
humanity.220 
 
Goldstein spoke to the essence of the identity crisis sweeping the secular Jewish youth who 
were witness to a rising tide of antisemitism, especially in higher education, and no longer 
accepted the assimilationist narrative of their parents but sought an alternative vision of 
Jewish life in Germany.  
 Goldstein stressed the 'barbarian injustice' shown towards Jews in Europe in order to 
highlight the hypocrisy that Europe could possibly be termed the 'paradise of fairness'. On the 
subject of the Jews, Goldstein asserted, even intelligent, well-educated people misrepresented 
the facts to justify hatred of the Jews.221 Where Sombart had outlined a plan for the separate 
co-existence of Western Jews and Germans, so did Goldstein. This vision, however, left no 
room for an integrated German-Jewish Volk, a fear the Central Association had voiced about 
the Zionist movement as early as 1897.222 Concluding his article Goldstein presented an 
answer to the problem of the Jewish Question that was similar to Sombart. Further 
assimilation was self-denial, he argued, Jews needed to create a separate and specifically 
'Jewish' culture in Germany.  
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Ferdinand Avenarius, a poet and member of the cultural reform movement, who founded and 
edited Der Kunstwart described himself as feeling 'German-national "to his bones" but ... not 
antisemitic'.223 The journal had a conservative leaning and was well-regarded. Yet whilst 
Avenarius officially distanced himself from the antisemites, the journal's literary critic, Adolf 
Bartels had a reputation as a 'notorious antisemite'.224 In the debates which unfolded in the 
wake of Goldstein's article, Der Kunstwart became a platform for several burgeoning 
antisemitic arguments.  
 When the March 1912 issue was published with Goldstein's piece featuring as the first 
in the volume, in the words of the author himself, 'the effect was sensational'.225 For some time, 
Avenarius had wanted to orchestrate a public discussion on the Jewish Question and in his 
reply to Goldstein's submission had written that he thought it 'convenient that a Jew should 
open [this discussion]'.226 To facilitate it, Avenarius increased the visibility of the journal and 
opened its opinion columns to readers' responses. The proceeding discussion developed in 
multiple issues in the form of special sections called Sprechsaal, which were dedicated to 
responses and opinion pieces on Goldstein's article. The first was published a month later in 
the first April issue under the title Deutschtum und Judentum. It was followed by another 
Sprechsaal in August in the second issue entitled, Aussprache zur Judenfrage. 
 In the introduction to the opinion column (Sprechsaal) of the August 1912 issue, 
Avenarius included a lengthy editorial essay which made explicit the subject under discussion, 
namely the Jewish Question.227 Avenarius was careful to outline that his use of the plural 
pronoun referred to individuals that felt as 'national Germans' like himself and not 
'antisemites'. However, the last, and lengthiest, commentary on the debate, penned by a 'Ph. 
Stauff', made a series of questionable claims. While even Avenarius thought 'Ph. Stauff' an 
antisemite, he published the essay, leaving the reader to form an opinion on the view 
expressed.228 The Central Association lamented that Stauff misused the goodwill of Avenarius 
to write antisemitic comments that would otherwise have been unacceptable.229 Avenarius 
also engaged in language that designated Jews as a separate group. He referred to them as a 
'people' (Volk), 'racial community' (Rassengemeinschaft) and 'foreign tribe' (fremde Stamm). As 
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well as suggesting Jews would be able to sympathise with the 'members of the host nation' 
(Angehörigen eines Wirtsvolkes) implying Jews were guests in Germany rather than full 
members of the nation-state. The delicate balance between censorship, freedom of speech and 
libel in the German Empire and how the debate on the Jewish Question wavered between 
these extremes was illustrated by the decision of Der Kunstwart to offer a platform for 
antisemitic views whilst the Berliner Tageblatt rejected the article. 
  The reception of the debate in Der Kunstwart offers an insight into the initial public 
that engaged with the Jewish Question; it was split between antisemites, conservative 
Gentiles, liberal Jews and Zionists.230 What emerged was an ambivalence towards 
exclusionary, verging on antisemitic language, and the engagement with it by Jewish liberals. 
Even amongst the latter there was an acceptance of a 'hypostatised conception of [Jewish] 
essences' that were either visible or invisible.231 Ernst Lissauer, the famous Jewish poet, and 
first respondent to Goldstein, conceded that Jewry exhibited characteristics (both physical 
and mental) that had been acquired through the experience of the ghetto. Whilst he claimed 
that these could be eradicated he acknowledged this would take time.232 The idea of a 'Jewish 
spirit' (which had been written about by antisemites in the nineteenth century) was more 
openly discussed, also amongst Zionists, some of whom constructed a 'German spirit' that 
Jews could not rid themselves of.233 This debate marked the beginning of a turning point in 
the Jewish Question whereby Judaism was not only a religion, a race but also a psychological 
condition affecting every Jew on an intimate, personal level. 
 
With his article Goldstein sought to illustrate a shared German-Jewish history and culture. 
He did not intend to place in doubt the capacity or the right of Jews to engage in German 
cultural activities. He never meant for his article to be a Zionist call to action, or to suggest 
that Jews could not continue living in Germany as Germans. Rather he had written it, to be 
'free of a tormenting trouble by ventilating it'.234 Treitschke and Sombart had similarly given 
this as their motivation for writing on the subject. Like Sombart, Goldstein had brought to a 
wider public a statist Zionist perspective on the Jewish Question, namely that the Jews 
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exhibited separate cultural characteristics. Similar to the 1897 policy of the Zionist 
Federation, Goldstein did not advocate the immigration of Jews to Palestine but rather the 
recognition of these unique characteristics. Fatally, however, Goldstein merely stated the 
problem without suggesting, like Sombart, a future for Jews as a national, not religious, 
community in Germany. He thus left his article open to appropriation by antisemites.235 
 Significantly, the debate triggered by Goldstein's article revealed an eagerness in 
certain sections of German society to discuss the Jewish Question. Goldstein successfully 
brought the issue from a private conversation into a public forum. However, the lack of nuance 
in his argument merely stating a problem, as he retrospectively recognised, meant it 
descended into either rejecting the national characteristics of Jews in favour of religious traits 
or acknowledging them, to argue that German culture had been verjudet. Compared to prior 
debates on the Jewish Question, there was a greater recognition of the peculiar traits of Jews 
in cultural, physiological but also psychological terms. The debate was dominated by 
discussions on the (in)compatibility of Jews in the German cultural nation. The exclusiveness 
of this political model for national minorities within Germany was not challenged.   
 
 
VII. The Jewish Question: emancipation, assimilation, cultural homogeneity 
It is made apparent throughout the course of these debates that the Jewish Question was 
caught in a balancing act between contingency and continuity. Whilst the meaning of the term 
was contingent on the context and agent, its continuity was that it became a litmus test for 
the health of the German nation. Both Gentiles and Jews contributed in equal part to the terms 
of the debate. They used similar vocabulary on the Jewish Question but brought different 
political and ideological agendas to their writings. Examining the place of the Jewish minority 
in Germany enabled discussants to decouple the nation from the state. Where some insisted 
on the importance of a unified, homogenous culture in the German state, others advocated for 
a pluralist, multicultural Germany.  
 The Jewish Question first caught on as a political catchword in 1842 during the public 
debate on the legal rights of Jews in Prussia. Whilst focused on the Jewish minority, the debate 
opened up a discussion on the role of religion in the modern state. The debate took place 
against the backdrop of revolutions and a wave of liberal reforms whereby Jewish populations 
 
235 In 1935 the 'Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question' published an anonymous book entitled 'The Jews 
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in several countries (including America, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada) were 
granted political and civil rights on the basis of full religious equality. Jewish emancipation 
became closely associated with modernising tendencies, progressive politics and the standard 
of democratisation in society. Thus, the 1842 debate established the parameters of the Jewish 
Question. It concerned Jewish emancipation and the necessity of state reform in Prussia. 
Crucially, Jews were described as a confessional group and their equal rights were demanded 
on the basis of religious equality. A few years later, in the year of the 1848 revolutions, Jews 
were granted full rights under the freedom of religion in the constitutional charter of Prussia. 
 Alongside the unification of Germany in 1871, the equality of all confessions was 
enshrined in the constitution signalling an end to the debate on the Jewish Question. As such, 
when in 1879 a public debate erupted on the subject of the Jewish Question, the parameters 
had shifted significantly. The context had moved from a focus on Prussia to the German 
Empire, and away from the state as it turned to the nation. All subsequent debates on the 
Jewish Question hereafter concentrated on the German nation and the compatibility of the 
German Jewish minority within this model. The only commentators to challenge Jewish legal 
rights were antisemites, all other discussants on the Jewish Question did not question the 
state as a neutral arbiter on the Jewish Question. Instead, discussions pivoted around the 
nation, specifically the possibilities of Jewish assimilation, the necessity of an Einheitskultur, 
the difference between national and cultural consciousness, and whether or not nationality 
had to be compatible with citizenship.  
 Significantly, the debates revealed that Jews and Gentiles inhabited the same 
discursive and conceptual world on the Jewish Question. Notably, the language of culture 
featured prominently as the debates and revealed the centrality of conceptions of Germany as 
a cultural nation (Kulturnation). Moritz Lazarus, one of the few discussants to suggest an 
alternative model of national belonging based on the principles of the political nation 
(Staatsnation), by invoking the vocabulary of Stamm and foregrounding the importance of 
language, conceded his indebtedness to the traditional discourse of the German cultural 
nation. Accompanying a discourse of culture in the Jewish Question was a shift towards 
conceiving of the Jews as more than just a religious community but also a race (Rasse), a 
kinship (Stamm) as well as a nation (Volk). In the constitution, Jews had been afforded rights 
as one of several confessional groups and had not been singled out as a distinct group or 
corporation within the Empire. However, unofficially, in the discussion on the Jewish 
Question, beginning with Heinrich von Treitschke's article published in 1879, they were 
publicly conceived of in group terms as a race and nation.  
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 The identification of a Jewish national identity was not, however, only external. A 
small but growing number of German Jews began to identify as Jewish nationals, founding in 
1897 the Zionist Federation of Germany. In the organisations' first pamphlet the Zionist 
stance on the Jewish Question was outlined. Unlike Treitschke, Zionists rejected assimilation, 
disregarded cultural homogeneity and focused instead on decoupling the nation from the state 
by interrogating the relationship between nationality and citizenship. Whilst liberal Jews 
denied a Jewish nationality, Zionists separated the concept into national and patriotic loyalty. 
They argued that Jewish nationality was compatible with German patriotism as they remained 
loyal German citizens. The appropriation of the Jewish Question by Zionists marked a 
significant shift in agency whereby the object became both the subject and object of analysis. 
Moreover, debates on the Jewish Question by the German-Jewish community forces us to 
reorient how we think about the normative Jewish past as one, more often, of victimhood 
rather than agency. 
 Over a decade later from 1910 to 1912, the subject of nationality and the necessity of 
a homogeneous culture in the German nation-state arose, once again, in debates on the Jewish 
Question. During these debates there was a greater public awareness about Jewish nationality. 
Discussants described the potential of a pluralist, multicultural Germany, whilst a growing 
number of Zionists declared that Jewish nationalism was incompatible with the German 
nation-state.  
 Throughout the debates, with every discussion of the Jewish Question certain factors 
remained constant. For Bauer, Treitschke and Sombart, the purpose of their publications 
remained the same: to offer an answer on how to resolve what they observed as the problem 
of Jewish life in German society. The answers also all remained the same: a demand for Jewry 
to change. For Bauer, Jews had to renounce their religion, Treitschke demanded they 
assimilate, and Sombart urged Jews to adapt their behaviour to ensure peaceful co-existence. 
 The most significant common thread throughout the debates was that the Jewish 
Question was symptomatic of an underlying issue in Germany: the need for political and 
national-cultural reform. A homogenous national culture was not necessarily the issue at stake 
but rather how it was being conceived of in Christian terms, excluding both Jewish 
contributions to German culture and hindering their integration. Until this was addressed, as 
the subsequent debates will demonstrate, the Jewish Question remained a feature in German 
public political discourse.   
 Significantly, as the First World War propelled the nation-state ideal into the 
forefront of international affairs, neither could the Jewish Question fully disappear from 
German politics. The malleability of the term testifies to its enduring legacy. This chapter has 
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demonstrated how the Jewish Question erupted at particular moments and prompted 
discussions which concerned the nation-state and its confrontation with the processes of 
modernisation. The following chapters will investigate a series of moments when the Jewish 
Question took a central position in shaping debates on the fears and preoccupations in the 








The Jewish Question in war time: Germany's eastern policy, 1914-1916 
 
Zionism is the 'necessary and only possible solution of the Jewish Question' wrote Max 
Bodenheimer in a memorandum to the German Foreign Office in February 1902.1 President 
of the Zionist Federation for Germany, Bodenheimer outlined a mutually advantageous 
agreement involving the promotion of German foreign policy through collaboration with 
Russian Jews, which, he stressed, would also resolve the problem of East European Jewish 
immigration to Germany. The Germans would help liberate Russian Jews from violent 
persecution under Tsar Alexander III and aid their resettlement in either Syria or Palestine. 
In return, Russian Jews would help secure German influence and colonial ambitions in the 
region by acting as mediators and promotors of German economic and cultural interests. 
Receiving no guarantee from the Foreign Minister Oswald von Richthofen, Bodenheimer 
shelved his 1902 memorandum. Twelve years later, with the outbreak of the First World War, 
Bodenheimer seized the opportunity to return to the ideas of his 1902 memorandum, 
modifying it slightly. With Germany's declaration of war on Russia, Bodenheimer suggested 
collaborating with Russian Jews to secure German dominance over the lands of Western 
Russia. Once secured, as a buffer against future Russian aggression, Bodenheimer proposed 
the establishment of an East European Federation (ein osteuropäischer Staatenbund) of 
autonomous national communities, loyal to Germany.2 As war on the Eastern Front erupted 
and the forces of the Central Powers encountered a population of six million East European 
Jews, unlike in 1902, in the autumn of 1914, Bodenheimer's memorandum piqued the attention 
of the German leadership.  
 Bodenheimer's memorandum prompted several meetings in the Foreign Office in 
Berlin and eventually a meeting in the occupied territory of West Russia (Ober-Ost) with the 
Generals of the High Command, Ludendorff and Hindenburg, who voiced their support for 
 
1 Max Bodenheimer, 'Denkschrift über die gegenwärtig in der deutschen Judenheit herrschenden Zustände und 
die durch den Zionismus angebahnte Lösung der damit im Zusammenhang stehenden Frage, Cöln, Februar 
1902', in Theodor Herzl and Max Bodenheimer, Im Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung: Eine Dokumentation auf 
der Grundlage des Briefwechsels zwischen Theodor Herzl und Max Bodeheimer von 1896 bis 1905, ed. Henriette 
Hannah Bodenheimer (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1965), 219–27. 
2 The original memorandum has been difficult to locate, however, Bodenheimer published a version of it in 
1916. See M. I. Bodmer, ‘Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem' in Der Deutsche Krieg: Politische 
Flugschriften, ed. Ernst Jäckh, Heft 73 (Stuttgart und Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1916), 5-36.  
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Bodenheimer.3 Before the outbreak of war, the Chancellery had devised plans for an expansion 
eastwards in order to establish a 'Frontier Strip' with ethnic-national groups, loyal to 
Germany. 4 This strip was to act as a barrier against Russian aggression, similar in concept to 
the East European Federation proposed by Bodenheimer in his memorandum. Moreover, as 
war on the Eastern Front unfolded, news filtered back from the front lines that Eastern 
European Jews, exhausted by Russian anti-Jewish violence welcomed the Central Powers' 
forces with enthusiasm, as Bodenheimer had predicted.5 However, in 1916, as the German 
army faced staggering losses, the Central Powers adopted a new strategy: promising the 
creation of a Polish nation6 to garner support from Polish volunteer soldiers.7 With this, the 
plans for an East European Federation supported by a German-Jewish alliance, faded into 
oblivion.  
 The sequence of events, and the exchange of ideas during the first two years of World 
War I nonetheless provide a unique insight into the practical manifestation of a Jewish 
Question in German wartime policy. At a time of upheaval and political change, when a 
number of debates crystallised about the understandings of nationhood and statehood, 
Bodenheimer's vision of an East European Federation offers a different perspective on the 
perception of European Jewry. Moreover, given the language affinity of Russian and Polish 
(Yiddish-speaking) Jews to German, this encounter also raised questions pertaining to the 
future of the German polity. This was both in terms of the structure of Germany's external 
borders as well as the categorisation of German nationality, based historically on its 
development as a Kulturnation.  
 As shown in the previous chapter, the divergent lived experience of Russian Jews and 
German Jews was not new to many German Zionists. Nor were discussions on the concept of 
nationality and the idea of dual national loyalty. By the time these debates were catapulted 
into mainstream German foreign policy discussions during the First World War, they had 
already reached maturity within German Zionist circles. These debates, which grew out of the 
 
3 Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, Max Bodenheimer 1865-1940: Political Genius for Zionism, trans. David 
Bourke, (Edinburgh: The Pentland Press, 1990), 75.  
4 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, 113–17. 
5 Tracey Hayes Norrell, For the Honor of Our Fatherland: German Jews on the Eastern Front during the Great War 
(Landham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), 10. See also Alexander Victor Prusin, Nationalizing a 
Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920 (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University 
of Alabama Press, 2005), 68. 
6 This nation would consist of a Polish state, Polish army and self-government. However, this declaration 
breached international law, as the Kingdom of Poland was still legally part of Russia signalling that the 
manifesto was more a signifier of a gesture rather than a fully-fledged programme. For the aforementioned 
reasons, the manifesto elevated the question of the future of Poland to an international issue.  




political Zionist movement, where Bodenheimer was a central figure, reveal an internal 
dynamic to the Jewish Question; one with Jewish agency and a political answer that with the 
outbreak of world war, was deemed achievable.  
 It is crucial to understand these internal Zionist debates as they provided a vocabulary 
for Bodenheimer and formed the basis for the ideas behind his memorandum. More 
significantly, however, the discussions within the German-Jewish community on the 
understanding of concepts related to the modern state became an arena where ideas about 
nationality, statehood, citizenship, secularism were being rehearsed. The debates were unique 
precisely because of the conflicted conceptions between Zionists and liberal Jews on notions 
of dual loyalty, nationalism and patriotism. Whilst these debates were internal to the Zionist 
circles, with the outbreak of world war, they became practically relevant not only for the 
German army, but also globally as the war witnessed the reawakening of historic nations 
demanding self-determination and sovereignty.   
 Where chapter one traced the internal debates in the Jewish community on the Jewish 
Question, as a necessary precursor to understanding the foundational ideas of Bodenheimer's 
memorandum, this chapter focuses on a practical Jewish Question in German war time policy. 
To this end, it turns to the years of 1914 to 1916 tracing Bodenheimer's ideas in the Central 
Powers' eastern policy, to highlight the close relationship between theory and praxis and 
demonstrate the practical relevance of otherwise theoretical Jewish questions.   
 In particular, the chapter will emphasise the role of the prominent political Zionist, 
Max Isidor Bodenheimer, First President of the Zionist Federation and one of the founders of 
the Committee for the East (Komitee für den Osten, KfdO), in proposing a blueprint for German 
foreign policy in West Russian territory. Whilst Bodenheimer appears on the cast list of 
several historians' work, the persistence with which he has been denied the role of the 
protagonist is surprising.8 More often, in the history of Zionism, Bodenheimer has been 
overshadowed by Theodor Herzl. In this chapter I aim to rescue Bodenheimer from obscurity. 
However, rather than concentrating on his work in the Committee for the East, I will 
emphasise the ideas he espoused in his memorandums to the German leadership, tracing their 
intellectual indebtedness to Karl Renner, later Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, in his 
work, Staat und Nation written in 1899.  
 
8 Jay Ticker's research on Bodenheimer's pro-German Zionism advocacy in the First World War is one of the 
few exceptions. To date, the only biography I have been able to locate on Max Bodenheimer remains the one 
written by his daughter Henriette Hannah, relying on his personal documents, published in 1986. Bodenheimer 
also wrote his memoirs, published eighteen years after his death in 1958. Jay Ticker, ‘Max I. Bodenheimer: 
Advocate of Pro-German Zionism at the Beginning of World War I’, Jewish Social Studies 43, no. 1 (1981): 11–
30; Bodenheimer, Max Bodenheimer; Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, ed., Prelude to Israel: The Memoirs of M. I. 
Bodenheimer, trans. Israel Cohen (New York; London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1963). 
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 Bodenheimer's memorandum serves as an ideal case to explore the progression of ideas 
into practice and the development of practical Jewish questions. Briefly sketching the founding 
of the Committee for the East, the organisation through which Bodenheimer sought to enact 
his plan, I subsequently examine the German army's co-operation with Russian Jews who 
became mediators in the occupied territories. Investigating the shifting battle lines on the 
Eastern Front, and the German army's change in tactics to promising a Polish nation, reveals 
that whilst the blueprint for an extended area of German influence using Jews as mediators 
remained unused, ultimately the fight for securing the cultural autonomy of Jews continued. 
Thus, ensuring Bodenheimer's and the KfdO's enduring legacy. 9   
 Bodenheimer was not alone in lobbying the Foreign Office to use Russian Jews as 
mediators of German interests in their place of settlement. Richard Lichtheim, a member of 
the KfdO and the Zionist Organisation (later the World Zionist Organisation, WZO),10 
worked tirelessly in Constantinople in the hope of securing a Jewish homeland in Palestine 
under German protection. Unofficially he secured support from the German Ambassador to 
Constantinople, Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim, and prominent figures in Mitteleuropa11 
circles encouraged cooperation with the Zionist movement in Palestine. Zionists were 
certainly not the only ones to build relationships with the German leadership. Notably, the 
liberal Jewish aid organisation, Aid Association of German Jews (Hilfsverein der deutschen 
Juden), founded by Paul Nathan and James Simon, established several education initiatives in 
Palestine, supported by the German government. However, these were driven by 
philanthropy, whilst the activities of the Zionists were also motivated by a political objective, 
and for this reason will be the focus of the section. Moreover, the Foreign Office was more 
inclined to work with the Zionists because of the influence they were able to exert on Jews 
abroad, particularly those in the United States of America.   
 In 1916 relations deteriorated with Bodenheimer and Oppenheimer on the Eastern 
Front. In the same year, Lichtheim was expelled from Constantinople on suspicion of 
espionage. The British Balfour Declaration recognising a Jewish homeland in Palestine was a 
 
9 This is not to say that Jews were no longer significant in promoting German interests. Bodemann argues that 
in post-war Germany the Jewish population became important mediators in Germany's democratic transition, a 
term he calls performing 'ideological labour'. See, Y. Michal Bodemann, ‘The State in the Construction of 
Ethnicity and Ideological Labor: The Case of German Jewry’, Critical Sociology 17, no. 3 (1 October 1990): 35–
46. 
10 The Zionist Organisation was founded at the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. It was 
renamed the World Zionist Organisation in 1960.  
11 Mitteleuropa was a term that was used in a diverse range of contexts and had varying meanings. In this 
specific case it denoted an economic and cultural union in Central Europe under German dominion. It was also 
used to refer to a larger area of German cooperation in the Middle East. One of the first accounts to explore 
this contested concept was, Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945 (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955). 
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further blow to decades of German Zionist diplomacy. Despite the breakdown of relations and 
the limited practical influence Bodenheimer, Oppenheimer and Lichtheim's diplomatic efforts 
had on official German policy and the outcome of the war, the unofficial assurances and 
support they received from the Foreign Ministry throughout the war illustrates the political 
force of German Zionism. Moreover, German Jews, especially Zionists, achieved success in 
another form: institutional. They gained unprecedented political representation in 1918 when 
the German Foreign Ministry established a Jewish Affairs section headed by another member 
of the KfdO, Moritz Sobernheim. This section became especially important for German 
foreign policy during the Weimar Republic as 'World Jewry [was recognised] as an important 
protagonist in international relations'.12 
 
 
I. From Stuttgart to Berlin: the diplomatic work of Max Bodenheimer 
(Max) Isidor Bodenheimer13 was born in Stuttgart on the 21 March 1865.14 As was typical for 
many German Jews, the Bodenheimer family defined their Judaism in religious not national 
terms.15 Despite his acculturated upbringing, and six years before Theodor Herzl's famous 
pamphlet on the necessity of a Jewish state, Bodenheimer reached the same conclusion.16 
Bodenheimer was asked frequently, how as an assimilated German Jew he could arrive at the 
concept of Zionism. Yet, rather than one event, a series of instances marked gradual discord 
in the 'strong patriotic feelings'17 of his youth, not least antisemitism at university,18 and the 
arrival, in Stuttgart, of Russian Jews fleeing from pogroms. In 1891, at the age of twenty-six, 
a year after he completed his training as a lawyer and moved to Cologne to practice law, 
Bodenheimer wrote his first Zionist article, Sind die russischen Juden eine Nation?   
 This paper was the first of a series of articles where Bodenheimer outlined his views 
on the future of the Jewish diaspora and the organisation of international Jewry. It was 
through common interests that Bodenheimer became acquainted with David Wolffsohn, and 
together they founded the National-Jewish Federation (National-Juedische Vereinigung) in 
Cologne in 1894. Only three years later, the National-Jewish Federation for Germany 
 
12 Nicosia, ‘Jewish Affairs and German Foreign Policy During the Weimar Republic’, 261. 
13 Isidor was Bodenheimer's given name after his maternal grandfather Isaac. The name caused him much 
annoyance and as his friends called him Max, he came to use this name. Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel, 36. 
14 It appears that the birth date of Max I. Bodenheimer is often confused with the 12 March, as listed on the 
website of the 'Society for the Commemoration of Max I. Bodenheimer and Hannah Henriette Bodenheimer', 
[https://bit.ly/2Y6B7J4, accessed 8/10/2018]. This date differs from that given by Bodenheimer in his 
memoirs, see Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel, 29. 
15 Ibid, 39. 
16 Ibid, 12. 
17 Ibid, 33. For a description of the impression the Franco-German war had on Bodenheimer see also, 29-35.  
18 Ibid, 35-36. 
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(National-Juedische Vereinigung für Deutschland) was established, renamed the Zionist 
Federation for Germany, which was presided over by Bodenheimer as Chairman until 1910.  
Bodenheimer also held a number of other positions in organisations supporting Jewish 
national aspirations including the Zionist General Council (1897-1921) and the Jewish 
Colonial Trust (1899-1940). In 1907, he was appointed the first Chairman of the Jewish 
National Fund (JNF). Of interest for this paper, however, was Bodenheimer's diplomatic work 
alongside that of Theodor Herzl, the man generally viewed as the founder of Zionism.  
 Bodenheimer's diplomatic work began in the autumn of 1898 as part of the Zionist 
Delegation to Jerusalem led by Herzl.19 Two years earlier, when Herzl published Der 
Judenstaat, he had outlined how Zionism could benefit colonial aspirations in the Middle East. 
In return for Palestine, Herzl offered the Jews as financiers of Turkey for His Majesty the 
Sultan.20 As European allies, Jews in Palestine would become 'an outpost of civilisation' 
against barbarism, gatekeepers to Asia, and guardians of the holy places of Christendom.21 
Before any large-scale immigration and colonisation of Palestine, however, Herzl wanted to 
secure the minimum guarantee of protection from a sovereign power, ideally from not just 
one, but several.22  
 Lobbying for the support of Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II was not only practical, 
but also tactical.23 The German Empire had entered the race for colonies significantly later 
than its European rivals and was strongly in favour of securing influence in the politically 
unstable Ottoman Empire. In addition, the German Empire had already begun to exert its 
authority in the region through the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Express.24  
 In 1897, just following the first Zionist Congress, Herzl secured a meeting with a close 
relative of the Kaiser, the Grand Duke Friedrich von Baden, whom he was able to convince of 
the Zionist cause. Herzl received assurances from the Duke that the Kaiser was prepared to 
supervise the protectorate of the Jewish state.25 Several other meetings with the Chancellor 
Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst and Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Bernard von 
 
19 Other members of the delegation included Theodor Herzl, with whom Bodenheimer had established 
correspondence in 1896, David Wolffsohn, Joseph Seidener and Moses T. Schnirer.  
20 Herzl, The Jewish State, 30. 
21 From the outset Herzl framed the Jewish connection to Palestine in historical terms rather than religious. 
Ibid, 30. 
22 Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, 122. 
23 Appealing to Germany was practical due to the communication opportunities offered. In addition, Herzl's 
first followers were from the German-speaking world and many saw themselves as leaders of the Zionist 
movement. Many American upper-class Jews also originated from Germany and thus could easily rally behind 
support for an alliance with Germany. See Klaus Polkehn, ‘Zionism and Kaiser Wilhelm’, Journal of Palestine 
Studies 4, no. 2 (1975): 77. 
24 Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
25 Max Bodenheimer, 'Ein Erinnerungsblatt', in Herzl and Bodenheimer, Im Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung, 
109. See also Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel, 115. 
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Bülow, convinced Herzl that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine under a German 
protectorate was within reach.26 When the Kaiser announced his expedition to the Middle 
East, Herzl swiftly began making arrangements for a Zionist Delegation to travel to 
Jerusalem to coincide with the Kaiser's visit.  
 
The enthusiasm of the Zionist Delegation was swiftly dampened in the course of the 
excursion.27 During the first short encounter with the Kaiser in Constantinople, Herzl 
received only a general assurance that the Kaiser would consult the Sultan on the Zionist 
proposition. The second meeting in Palestine, some days later resulted similarly. The Kaiser 
declared that he had no intention of announcing an open alliance with the Zionists, which 
could upset German Christians as well as relations with the Sultan.28 The practice of Zionism 
was recognised, namely Jewish settlement activity (which the Sultan had not opposed29) but 
the Kaiser would not support its politics: a Jewish state.  
 In spite of any tangible success Herzl, Wolffsohn30 and Bodenheimer clung on to the 
hope of securing international, Great Power, support for the Zionist movement and did not 
concede to the growing demand within Zionist circles to prioritise practical settlement 
initiatives in Palestine. On returning from Constantinople, Bodenheimer met with Under 
Secretary of State Oswald von Richthofen with whom he discussed Jewish colonial work and 
its advantages for Germany. It was in this meeting that Bodenheimer first voiced an idea, 
which would later form the basis of his wartime memorandum. Bodenheimer suggested a 
means by which to divert East European Jewish migration away from Germany and, at the 
same time, aid the Empire's colonial ambitions. He presented East European Jews as mediators 
of German interests in the Middle East, given that this group was not only sympathetic 
towards Germany but also spoke a language similar to German. Richthofen, however, 
displayed little interest in the proposal.  
 
26 The Duke had informed Herzl that the Kaiser was enthusiastic, but Herzl confessed to Bodenheimer that 
Bülow and Hohenlohe gave less 'gratifying impressions'. See Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel, 116.  
27 The excursion took the delegation to Constantinople, Smyrna and Palestine (Jerusalem, Motza, Jaffa).  
28 In a meeting with the Grand Duke of Baden which took place sometime later, Max Bodenheimer wrote in his 
memoirs that the Duke recounted that the Kaiser had approached the Sultan twice concerning Zionist 
ambitions. As the Sultan was not wholly aware of this movement he offered no clear reply, which the Kaiser 
took as a dismissal of the proposal. Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel, 148.  
29 In meeting with the Turkish Ambassador to Germany, Bodenheimer noted that the Turkish did not oppose 
scattered Jewish settlements but rather an autonomous state. Ibid, 143.   
30 Wolffsohn travelled twice more to Constantinople to no avail. On the 25 October 1907, after correspondence 
with Turkish officials, Wolffsohn travelled to Constantinople to present his plan for the establishment of a 
Zionist agency in Constantinople, under the guise of a bank. Nothing came of the negotiations. He was also 
active in meeting government ministers in Austro-Hungary and Russia where he promoted Zionist aims.  
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 In one of the last attempts at colonial diplomacy with the German Empire, in 1902 
Herzl requested that Bodenheimer write a memorandum to the Foreign Office outlining the 
aims of the Zionist movement. In this memorandum Bodenheimer built on his conversation 
with Richthofen years prior, sculpting his thoughts into a detailed plan of action. The 
memorandum began by stressing that Zionism was the 'only possible solution of the Jewish 
Question' and offered a way to resolve the problem of East European Jewish immigration to 
Germany.31 The 'significant advantages' for Germany lay in the sphere of economic and trade 
policy. Describing Yiddish as a 'German Volksdialekt', Bodenheimer stressed the kinship in 
language. With the relationship to the 'Occident' and tribal affinity with the 'Orient', 
Bodenheimer described the 'Jewish element' as a 'living bridge', between Germany and the 
Middle East, thus ensuring that the German language and culture would dominate in the 
region. Bodenheimer contrasted German Zionist work with that of the Hilfsverein der deutschen 
Juden, a liberal Jewish aid organisation, to argue that it was more advantageous to cooperate 
with Zionism. The Hilfsverein actively pursued 'Germanness', which might incite opposition 
from those with anti-German sentiments. Whereas Zionism was influenced by German 
culture and language as a result of the background of its founders (the First Zionist Congress 
was held in German). Importantly, however, Bodenheimer stressed that Zionism was 'not a 
German state project'.32 Thus, the German leadership could capitalise on this fortunate 
German bias without any political consequences.33 'Never have German political interests 
been offered such a fine opportunity' boasted Bodenheimer.34  
 The proposal submitted by Bodenheimer was well-received and even read by the 
Kaiser.35 However, what Herzl described as a Meisterwerk36 did not precipitate any immediate 
political consequences in his lifetime. Herzl died only two years later. It would take the 
outbreak of world war for Bodenheimer's ideas to garner support in the German High 
Command and to see their, albeit partial and brief, practical manifestation.  
 
 
31 'Denkschrift über die gegenwärtig in der deutschen Judenheit herrschenden Zustände und die durch den 
Zionismus angebahnte Lösung der damit im Zusammenhang stehenden Frage' in Herzl and Bodenheimer, Im 
Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung, 221. 
32 Ibid, 225–26. 
33 Elias Auerbach (1882-1971) writing in 1903 explored the relationship between Zionism and Germanness to 
conclude that one does not negate the other. This was a frequent topic of discussion within Zionist circles. See 
Elias Auerbach, 'Deutsche Kultur in Zionismus', Jüdische Rundschau VIII, no. 7 (13 Februar 1903): 49-51 in 
Reinharz, Dokumente zur Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus 1882-1933, 68–69. 
34 Herzl and Bodenheimer, Im Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung, 223. 
35 In his memoirs Bodenheimer wrote that he was informed a few years later (after Herzl's death) by Hermann 
von Lucanus, Head of the Kaiser's Cabinet, that the Kaiser had been aware of the memorandum and that the 
Kaiser continued to look on the Zionist movement with great favour. Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel, 147.  
36 Herzl and Bodenheimer, Im Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung, 218. 
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II. Planning the Zwischenreich: Bodenheimer's memorandum 
Bodenheimer resolutely believed that only a victory by the Central Powers could ensure a 
political renewal for Russian Jews. Unlike Jews living in America, Western and Central 
Europe, on the eve of the First World War, only Jewish communities in the Kingdom of 
Romania and the Russian Empire had not been granted legal equality.37 Throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, European countries had gradually granted emancipation.38  
In contrast, the Russian Empire - in the same period - implemented a series of increasingly 
restrictive laws, confining the Jewish population to an area known as the Pale Settlement. 
This area, to the west of the Russian Empire, extended over present-day Lithuania, Poland, 
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldovia. Jews in the Russian Empire numbered approximately five 
million at the turn of the century and around 95% lived in this region.39 These restrictive 
decrees culminated in the infamous May Laws of 1882, under Tsar Alexander III. Whilst 
these restrictions were implemented as temporary measures they continued until 1917.40 
 Throughout this period the laws were continually revised as Jews were subjected to 
increasing restrictions. These included, but were not limited to, the right to settle anew, own 
property, conduct business transactions on Sundays, sell alcohol, adopt a Christian name and 
participate in local elections. Mass deportations took place within the Empire as Jewish 
communities were forced to relocate to the Pale Settlement. The restrictions, combined with 
large-scale pogroms erupting in the summer of 1881, sparked one of the largest ever migration 
movements as over two million Jews left the Russian Empire.41 Whilst the majority of Russian 
Jews continued their journey beyond Germany (two thirds travelled to the United States of 
America), with its access to the sea, it became an important transit country on the migration 
route.  
 Against this backdrop Bodenheimer wrote his article, Ein neuer Staatenbund und das 
Ostjudenproblem.42 The title encapsulated Bodenheimer's two-fold purpose. As witness to the 
plight of Russian Jews escaping pogroms, and as a Zionist, Bodenheimer was committed to 
liberating these Jews. However, he was also aware of the mounting fear within Germany of 
the mass immigration of East European Jews, the so-called Ostjudenproblem. With Germany's 
declaration of war on Russia, Bodenheimer recognised an opportune moment to alleviate the 
 
37 Mahler, Jewish Emancipation, 62. 
38 For a global history of emancipation in decrees and edicts see ibid, 9-72.  
39 Richard H. Rowland, ‘Geographical Patterns of the Jewish Population in the Pale of Settlement in Late 
Nineteenth Century Russia’, Jewish Social Studies 48, no. 3 (1986): 207–8. 
40 Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1986), 144. 
41 Ibid, 178. 
42 Bodmer, ‘Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem', 5-36. 
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concerns of both of these groups. Writing to a fellow Zionist in November 1914, Bodenheimer 
revealed, 'I feel that in this war the interests of Russian Jews and those of the German Reich 
are identical'. 43  
 As with many German Zionists, Bodenheimer was convinced that only a victory by 
the Central Powers, and an alliance between the Russian Jews and Germany, would offer a 
viable future for Eastern European Jewry. His plan at once aligned his views as a German 
citizen and Jewish national, as he expressed in the same letter to his friend Warburg, 
'Although I am convinced that the Zionist Organisation has a paramount interest in this 
question, I undertook my task simply as a German patriot and as a Jew out of sympathy for 
my people and national solidarity'.44 
 The aforementioned article, Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem, was 
published by Bodenheimer under the pseudonym M. I. Bodmer in 1916 in a collection of 
political writings on the 'German War' edited by Ernst Jäckh.45 In the article, Bodenheimer 
outlined in detail ideas that he had originally articulated in several memorandums to the 
Foreign Office including one sent on the 4 August 1914 entitled, 'Memorandum on Russian 
Jews in the case of the occupation of West Russian territory by German and Austrian forces' 
of which only a brief memo remains.46 For this reason, Bodenheimer's published article offers 
the most detailed account of his proposed German foreign policy plan in the east.47  
 
In the article Bodenheimer presented three possible outcomes in West Russia. The first 
proposed annexation, the second, a Polish state in union with Austria-Hungary and the third, 
the creation of a liberated, multi-ethnic, East European Federation. Bodenheimer dismissed 
the first two outcomes, annexation would produce hostility between ethnic tribes and 
Germans, a Polish state might cause renewed tensions between Germany and Russia and 
settled on the third: a multi-ethnic federation.  
 
43 Bodenheimer, Prelude to Israel, 231. 
44 Ibid, 231–33. Bodenheimer was bound to German national feeling and interests, as well as his Jewish 'kin 
people' (Stammesgenossen). He suggested a commitment to two peoples, the Germans and the Jews and 
described this in visual language as two circles: the first was the Zionist aspiration for a national Jewish 
homeland in Palestine, the other German patriotism.  
45 As Professor of Turkish History at the University of Berlin, during the First World War, Jäckh was a strong 
advocate of the German-Turkish alliance. In the Weimar Republic he founded a liberal think tank called the 
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. Under the Nazis, Jäckh left Germany first to Britain where he became the 
International Director of the New Commonwealth Society and later to America where as a Professor at 
Colombia he founded the Middle East Institute in 1948.  
46 See CZA, A15/VIII 10/720, Max Bodenheimer, Zur Lage der Russischen Juden (undated).  
47 Ironically at the time of publishing, the Central Powers had elected to create an independent Polish state. 
According to Henriette H. Bodenheimer, Max Bodenheimer published the article after his return from Lodz, 
Poland in the summer of 1915 where he had travelled to enter negotiations with the Polish Club. Bodenheimer, 
Max Bodenheimer, 77. 
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 The federation that Bodenheimer proposed would run from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 
It would consist of a multi-ethnic population enjoying national autonomy. The Poles would 
be the largest national group, numbering twelve million,48 but their dominance would be 
balanced by Ukrainians, 'White Russians' (Belarussians), Lithuanians, Latvians and 
Estonians.49 Overall, this constellation would weaken Russian influence, reducing its 
population by sixty-five million, thus ensuring a long-lasting peace.50  
 Rather than a Polish 'buffer state' Bodenheimer envisioned a multi-ethnic 
Zwischenreich.51 Four ethnic areas (Volksgebiete) would make up the federal states in the new 
commonwealth (Gemeinwesen). The Baltic Sea provinces and Lithuanians would together form 
one of the ethnic areas. Each state would have a special governor from the Austrian or German 
ruling dynasty. Unlike the other ethnic communities, Jews and Germans would be spread out 
throughout these states, existing as separate elements. For this reason, Bodenheimer stressed, 
the cultural autonomy of individual peoples (Völker) would have to be constitutionally 
guaranteed. Thus, crucial for German influence in this federation would be the population 
(Volkselemente) of 'seven million' Jews.52 If these Jews were to align with the German minority 
population of around two million, they would balance Polish dominance.  
 Russian Jews were bound to the Germans through language, observed Bodenheimer. 
Of the Jews in the region, 96% spoke the national dialect (Volksdialekt), Yiddish.53 If left in 
their Slavic environment, Bodenheimer warned that through the 'natural process of 
assimilation', Yiddish would cease to be a language. Framing the issue as part of the possible 
decline of German elements in the region, Bodenheimer argued that much of the region 
consisted of areas where the German language and culture thrived. This had to be protected 
against Slavic elements (slawisierenden).54 Not only German culture, but German commerce 
and industry would also find a permanent home and thrive in the region. As Herzl had earlier 
 
48 Unlike Bodenheimer, Friedmann lists this figure as eight million, meaning that the German-Jewish alliance 
would have been about equal to the number of Poles at almost eight million (six million Jews and just under 
two million Germans, 1.8m). He lists the other population figures as follows, Ukrainians (five million), White 
Russians or Belarussians (four million), Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians (three and a half million). See 
Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, 231. 
49 Bodmer, ‘Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem', 6. 
50 Ibid, 24. 
51 Ibid, 20. 
52 Seven million is the figure given by M. Bodenheimer. This figure most likely included all Jews living in 
Congress Poland (two million), the Pale Settlement (four million) and in Austro-Hungary, specifically Galicia 
(one million). Ibid, 6.  
53 Ibid, 6. 
54 Ibid, 25. 
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offered the Jews as accountants for the Sultan, gatekeepers for Christians of the holy sites, in 
Bodenheimer's plan they could act as bastions of Deutschtum.55 
 Bodenheimer blamed the lack of the cultural development of Russian Jews on the 
absence of civil equality and national self-administration, which, once enabled, would allow 
these Jews to fulfil the 'cultural duties of the developed nations'.56 Although Bodenheimer's 
blueprint was intended for after the war with a victory by the Central Powers, he urged that 
these developments should start to take place during the war. And to an extent they did. 
During the German occupation the draconian, discriminatory restrictions on the Jews, 
imposed by the Russian Empire were removed. The Germans fully restored the civil rights of 
Jews and they were allowed the autonomy to continue operating their cultural, educational 
and political organisations.57 Although the Jews were not granted national status by the 
German authorities, they were given fair representation in municipal councils. Compared to 
the reign of the Tsar, for many Jews, the occupation by the Central Powers was a welcome 
respite. One contemporary announced that they 'suddenly, as if by magic, ceased to feel like a 
pariah'.58 
 Bodenheimer framed the existence of national minorities as the 'fateful question' (die 
schicksalsschwere Frage) threatening Europe.59 'How was it possible for different tribes with 
different languages and cultures to live together and build peace?' wrote Bodenheimer 'Austria 
has tried to find a solution,' he continued, 'Switzerland has practically solved it' and he 
challenged Germany to be 'ground-breaking' in this regard as well. Compared to some of its 
neighbours, in Germany national minorities were not numerically significant. On the basis of 
language, of a total German population of forty-one million, over three million were non-
German speaking.60 Danes resided in the area of North Schleswig,61 Alsatians in the South 
 
55 Both Herzl and Bodenheimer clung to the view that Ostjuden embodied German culture, however, this was a 
projection of their hopes and desires rather than grounded in reality. David Goldberg writes that 'German 
Jewry's most persistent delusion [was] that there was a natural symbiosis between Teutonic values and 
Judaism's teachings'. David Goldberg, 'A dream world', The Guardian, 3 May 2008 [https://bit.ly/2R5sUBj, 
accessed 19/12/2018].  
56 Bodmer, ‘Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem', 25. 
57 Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland, 68. 
58 W. Kaplun-Kogan, Der Krieg: Eine Schicksalsstunde des jüdischen Volkes (Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Webers Verlag, 
1915), 19. Quoted in Prusin, 68. 
59 Bodmer, ‘Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem', 21. 
60 In order of demography, the Poles living in Prussia were the largest minority followed by Danes, French, 
Lithuanians, Wends and Czechs. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume II, xii. 
61 In 1866 Schleswig-Holstein was annexed, which consisted of a population of 401, 925 inhabitants of which 
36% (142, 940) spoke Danish. For more information on the 'Danish Question' see ibid, 114–17. 
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West.62 Prussia was host to several minority groups including Poles,63 Kashubians, 
Masurians,64 Lithuanians, Wends and Czechs.65 The larger of these minority groups, the 
Poles, Danes and Alsatians, each had their own political party.66 Another minority, though 
not defined on the basis of language, were the Jews.67 In Germany, the Jewish minority was 
recognised as a religious community. It was only as a result of the army's eastern expansion 
that the German authorities acknowledged that Jews were a minority group displaying 
peculiar national characteristics.  
 
Whilst Bodenheimer's memorandum was one of the first to directly relate to German foreign 
policy, the conceptual origins upon which it was based, were not novel. Deconstructing the 
practical idea of an East European Federation and exposing its conceptual origins, reveals that 
Bodenheimer, in essence, was challenging the notion that political citizenship and personal 
nationality needed to align within a polity. In offering a practical solution to the 
Ostjudenproblem and the occupation of West Russia, although not intended as such, 
Bodenheimer's memorandum also presented a critique of the nation-state principle. It was this 
conceptual basis of the memorandum, I wish to argue, that was indebted to the lawyer, Austro-
Marxist and later Chancellor of the First Republic of Austria, Karl Renner.68  
 The parallels between Bodenheimer and Renner's position on the nationality question 
merits a brief excursion into Renner's background and his political writings, which I suggest 
help us to understand the conceptual background to Bodenheimer's memorandum. In a section 
 
62 Alsace-Lorraine was annexed in 1871. Its population numbered 1, 549, 600 of which 12% (185, 000) spoke 
French. Many residents were, however, bilingual. Importantly, despite speaking German, the majority of the 
inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine were opposed to German rule. After two centuries of French rule and the 
revolution, their loyalties surpassed any ethnic ties. Ibid, 117–26. 
63 The Polish minority was the largest minority in Germany, consisting of three million Poles in the east, and 
four-hundred thousand in the Ruhr area. See Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 110–17. 
64 The Kashubians are an ethnically Slavic group closely related to the Poles, historically stemming from 
Pomerania. The Masuria is a region in northern Poland where the residents speak a Masurian dialect of Polish. 
In the German Reich, this area was inhabited by Baltic Prussians.  
65 In 1861 the Prussian population included 2, 265, 042 Poles, 139, 428 Lithuanians, 83, 443 Wends and 59, 
850 Czechs. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume II, 106. 
66 All three parties shared the same fate, after the war as North Schleswig became part of Denmark, Alsace, 
France, and an independent Polish nation was created, the Danish, Alsace-Lorraine and Polish party all ceased 
to exist in Germany. McHale, Political Parties of Europe, 415–28.  
67 Demographics on Masurians and Kashubians are difficult to locate. The number of Jews in the German 
Reich was 521, 153 in 1871 and increased to 615, 021 by 1910. However, as a result of apostacy and mixed 
marriages the percentage of Jews in the population decreased between 1871 and 1914 from 1.25% to 0.95%, see 
Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 102–9. 
68 Robert Wistrich writes that whilst Karl Renner and Otto Bauer (both Austro-Marxists) favoured a policy of 
the cultural individuality of nationalities they excluded Jews from this programme. In this section I do not 
claim that Renner's personality principle was devised with the Jews in mind, but rather that both Bodenheimer 
and Lucien Wolf applied these ideas to the case of East European Jews. See Robert S. Wistrich, Socialism and 
the Jews: The Dilemmas of Assimilation in Germany and Austria-Hungary (London; East Brunswick, N.J.: 
Associated University Presses, 1982), 353. 
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on the voting system in Bodenheimer's article, he briefly mentioned the 'well-known national 
economist Renner' who he noted had written extensively on the system of national registries 
and electoral curia.69 Yet rather than Renner's position on the voting system, I argue that 
Bodenheimer was indebted to Renner's notion of the personality principle, which he developed 
as a theoretical solution to the nationality question in Staat und Nation. Staatrechtliche Unter-
suchung über die möglichen Principien einer Lösung und die juristischen Voraussetzungen eines 
Nationalitätengesetzes written in 1899.70     
 Renner was born in 1870 into an impoverished family of German wine-growers. As a 
result of his exceptional intelligence, he financed his tuition fees through tutoring and 
scholarships, graduating, at the age of twenty-six, from the University of Vienna in Law.71 
The same year, Renner joined the Social Democratic Party and commenced work as a research 
assistant in the library of the Austrian parliament. During this time Renner began to interest 
himself in politics, in particular the nationality question.   
 It was under the pseudonym, 'Synopticus' that Renner published his first political 
work, Staat und Nation. Renner tasked himself with answering how multi-ethnic groups could 
peacefully coexist in the same territory. To this end, he argued for the organisation of groups 
along supra-territorial, national laws rather than the laws of the state. Regardless of where a 
citizen resided, they would be bound to the laws of their autonomous national association. 
What Renner envisioned was that minority populations living within ethnically homogenous 
geographic areas, would not be constrained by the laws and regulations of the majority group. 
Rejecting the territorial principle, Renner argued that rather than defining a group by place 
of residence, a community should instead constitute a legal entity according to its national 
identity, defined by language and culture.  
 Renner appreciated the practical advantages of the nation-state. He acknowledged it 
was a political structure with the least internal friction. However, he concluded that it would 
not suffice in multi-ethnic territories. Drawing on historical precedent, Renner praised what 
he termed the 'personality principle' in the Carolingian Empire. The Empire united 
linguistically diverse tribes under the governance of landed proprietors, allowing each tribe 
 
69 Bodmer, ‘Ein neuer Staatenbund und das Ostjudenproblem', 22. 
70 Synopticus [Karl Renner], Staat und Nation. Staatsrechtliche Unter-suchung über die möglichen Principien einer 
Lösung und die juristische Voraussetzung eines Nationalitätengesetzes (Wien: Dietl., 1899).  
71 For an overview of Renner's childhood and political career see Jamie Bulloch, Karl Renner: Austria (London: 
Haus Publishing, 2011). 
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to retain its unique legal code. Rather than language, culture or territory, the question used 
to determine nationality was, 'Under which law do you live? (Quo jure visis?)72  
 For Renner, the problem of the modern state was that the territorial principle had 
replaced this 'personality principle'. The territorial principle was not an expression of the 
equality of rights, but dominion, over the minority, by the majority. The paradox, Renner 
opined, was that 'the territorial principle [...] combines the national concept with patrimonial 
ideas and thus becomes in many ways anti-national'. From his experience living in a multi-
ethnic Empire, Renner recognised that internal migration and economic relations meant that 
'no nation can limit itself to specific, narrowly defined territories'.73 He envisioned rescuing 
the modern state through the nation, concluding that 'the personality rather than the 
territorial principle should form the basis of regulation; the nations should be constituted not 
as territorial entities but as personal associations, not as states but as peoples, not according 
to age-old constitutional laws, but according to living national laws'.74  
 Despite his commitment to the personality principle, Renner accepted why, in the 
realm of international affairs, the territorial principle was supported. It clearly demarcated 
relations between states. Dating back to the Treaty of Westphalia, sovereign integrity was 
embedded within international affairs. As the First World War broke up Empires and saw the 
restructuring of the world order, it is not surprising that the nation-state model - as the 
smallest common denominator enabling the smooth conduct of international governance - 
was adopted. Renner confronted this reality in his own country, when he signed the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain on the 10 September 1919 which - much to his dismay - prohibited the creation 
of German Austria (Deutsch-Österreich) heralding, instead, the First Austrian Republic.  
 Before continuing to trace the intellectual afterlife of Renner's concept of the 
personality principle, I will first examine the transfer of ideas into practice, in other words, 
how Bodenheimer's memorandum was received in the German Foreign Ministry.  
 
 
III. Ideas into practice? Eastern European Jews as mediators of German interests 
A week after submitting his proposal, Bodenheimer received a telegram inviting him to Berlin 
'as a matter of urgency' for a consultation with Count Bogdan Franz Servatius von Hutten-
 
72 Karl Renner, ‘State and Nation (1899)’, in National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics, ed. 
Ephraim Nimni, trans. Joseph O’Donnell, Routledge Innovations in Political Theory 16 (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 27. 
73 Ibid, 28. 
74 Ibid, 29. 
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Czapsky,75 Political Director of the General Staff who introduced him to Baron Diego von 
Bergen,76 Head of Polish Affairs.77 Bodenheimer's memorandum was unexpectedly well-timed. 
In the years preceding the outbreak of war, the Franco-Russian Alliance meant that in the 
eventuality of war, the German Reich knew that it would have to fight on two fronts. This 
inevitability led to the Schlieffen plan, which aimed for a quick victory over France via 
Belgium, to then open the war on the Eastern Front with the Russian Empire.  
 In the summer of 1914, in the office of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
ideas had begun circulating to use the opportunity presented by the outbreak of war to pursue 
an expansionist geopolitical agenda of Lebensraum.78  The so-called September Programme, 
outlined large-scale annexations in Western Europe, continued colonisation of Africa and an 
economic union to stabilise German economic dominance in Europe.79 If achieved Germany 
would have secured a position as a hegemonic power.80  
 In the east, the German leadership had not only military but also political objectives 
in mind. To avoid future Russian aggression, the Germans planned for the construction of a 
'Frontier Strip' with national elements, loyal to Germany. The German border would be 
extended to include Warsaw, and Poles and Jews living in Poznan would be transferred to a 
new semi-autonomous Polish state under German jurisdiction. Even further east, a buffer zone 
would secure Germany's new border against Russia. As the army advanced into this territory 
 
75 Count Bogdan Franz Servatius von Hutten-Czapsky (1861-1937) was a member of the Prussian Upper 
House in Poznan and Head of the Political Department of the German General Staff. In 1918 he became 
German Commissar to the Kaiser in the Polish royal government.  
76 Baron Diego von Bergen (1872-1944), Prussian and later German Emissary to the Vatican.  
77 Szajkowski writes that he was head of the Eastern European Affairs Division. Zosa Szajkowski, ‘The 
Komitee für den Osten and Zionism’, in Herzl Year Book, ed. Raphael Patai (New York: Herzl Press, 1971), 206. 
Bodenheimer writes that he was Head of the Polish Affairs, Bodenheimer, Max Bodenheimer, 73. 
78 Lebensraum emerged at the turn of the century from the concept of Drang nach Osten, which was cultivated 
under Bismarck's Chancellorship as he sought to expand German influence after unification. In the years 
preceding the First World War, there was a growing consensus amongst Germany's political leadership that 
'Germany's frontiers were simply too narrow, and in order for the nation to survive they had to be expanded'. 
Norrell, ‘Shattered Communities’, 108. 
79 Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg, ‘Das September-Memorandum’, Bundesarchiv-Lichterfelde, Reichskanzlei, 
Grosses Hauptquartier 21, Nr. 24769, September 1914 [https://bit.ly/2xRDMaE, accessed 12/10/2018]. 
Also translated into English and re-printed in full in Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, 103–
4.  
80 Historians debate the intentionality of the September Programme. Fischer argued that the Chancellor had a 
clearly devised war-aim programme and believed in an imminent victory over France. Other historians, such as 
Wayne C. Thompson argue that the author of the document, Kurt Riezler (Bethmann-Hollweg's assistant) had 
not previously written about expansionist foreign policy but was responding to changing conditions in the war. 
See Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, 103 ff.; Wayne C. Thompson, ‘The September 
Program: Reflections on the Evidence’, Central European History 11, no. 04 (1978): 348-354. For a detailed 
overview of the historical debate on Germany's aims in the First World War and the role of Bethmann-
Hollweg and the September Programme within this, see Gerald D. Feldman, German Imperialism 1914-1918: 
The Development of a Historical Debate (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1972), 141–95.  
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the policy also detailed plans to secure seaports, develop agricultural areas of Ukraine, whilst 
protecting the industrial region of Upper Silesia.81 
 For the Reich, the east was seen as a site for settlement and colonisation.82 It was 
viewed as a long-term project that the leadership could mould in their image, building a region 
sympathetic to, and based on, Germany. In this Kulturpolitik strategy, the Germans aimed to 
propel a civilising image of German work in the region and particular emphasis was placed on 
the administration of cultural activities.83 The timing of Bodenheimer's memorandum could 
not have been more ideal as the plan on how to shape the region, was still subject to discussion.  
 Bodenheimer's memorandum not only offered a blueprint for an extended area of 
German influence in the east, including a buffer zone with Russia, but, in addition, it proposed 
Jews as mediators of these interests, a strategy that the German Army quickly realised could 
work in their favour. As war on the Eastern Front progressed, it quickly became apparent that 
the Jews were the most receptive population in the region and would become the army's only 
ally.84 Years of repression, violence and antisemitism meant that Russian Jews had no loyalty 
to the Tsar, as predicted by Bodenheimer. As the Russian Chief of General Staff professed in 
the Russian retreat of 1915, 'the complete hostility of the entire Jewish population towards 
the Russian army is well established'.85 General Ludendorff acknowledged that the Jews were 
crucial for the occupation of Poland and expressed his intention to use them as mediators.86 
 Enmity towards the Russian Empire, as well as language similarities helped the 
Germans build a relationship with the Jewish population in the east. In preparation for war 
with Russia, the General Staff had emphasised the study of all derivations of the Russian 
language, without heeding Yiddish. 87 Yiddish, however, the language spoken by Russian and 
Polish Jews had German rather than Slavic etymological roots. When the German army began 
their occupation of the Polish lands and the Pale Settlement, they soon realised that they were 
able to communicate with the Ostjuden. Given their multilingualism, they became essential 
middle-men.88 However, perhaps the most compelling reason why Bodenheimer received an 
 
81 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, 113–17. 
82 In the 1920s, parliamentary debates on Eastern Europe were framed in colonial language. This framing 
continued under Hitler during his expansion eastwards. See Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘The Birth of the Ostland out of 
the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination’, 
Patterns of Prejudice 39, no. 2 (2005): 201. 
83 On this approach see Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, 126–36. 
84 In his seminal account of German Jews in the First World War, Egmont Zechlin emphasised the potential 
offered by Ostjuden in Germany’s occupation of Poland. Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten 
Weltkrieg. 
85 Hew Strachan, The First World War, 3rd ed. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 144. 
86 See Erich Ludendorff, The General Staff and Its Problems, trans. F. A. Holt (New York: EP Dutton and 
Company, 1920), 158.  
87 Bodenheimer, Max Bodenheimer, 73. 
88 Ludendorff, My War Memories, 1914-1918, 2nd ed., vol. I & II (London: Hutschinson & Co., 1923), 188. 
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invitation to the Foreign Office was because it was in the process of drafting an appeal to 
Polish Jews.  
 
As a result of his successful consultations in the Foreign Ministry, Bodenheimer contacted his 
friend Franz Oppenheimer and together they decided to form a committee with a dual 
objective: to safeguard the national rights of East European Jews and help disseminate pro-
German propaganda.89 In attendance at the meeting on the 17 August, which founded the 
German Committee for the Liberation of Russian Jews (Deutsches Comité für die Befreiung der 
russischen Juden), were other members of the Zionist Federation (such as Adolf Friedemann, 
Alfred Klee and Hermann Struck), representatives of the Zionists Inner Actions Committee 
and the Mannesmann Comité. The latter committee was organised by the prominent German 
industrialist Reinhart Mannesmann and his partners, for the purpose of using their foreign 
business contacts, and access to influential German officials, to promote propaganda activities 
in favour of the Central Powers.90  
 Although the committee was established by Zionists, it was not an official Zionist 
organisation. When first established it received the support of prominent Zionists, such as 
Otto Warburg91 and David Wolffsohn, due to its objective to safeguard the rights of Eastern 
European Jews. Within three months, however, the Zionist Executive withdrew all support 
from the committee, aligning with the call by the Zionist Actions Committee for all Zionist 
institutions and affiliated members to remain neutral for the duration of the war.92 
 Prior to the committee, the German government had only conducted consultations on 
Jewish affairs with religious leaders and organisations. The committee was the first 
organisation to consult with the German government on affairs pertaining to Jewish national-
cultural rather than civil-religious rights. Not only did the German Foreign Ministry 
acknowledge the value of collaborating with an organisation with Zionist aims, but for the 
first time ever, German Jews became key assets in the German army as mediators and 
interlocutors of occupied lands.  
 Acting on behalf of the German Foreign Office, the first activity of the Committee for 
the East was meant to involve the dissemination of propaganda pamphlets to the Jewish 
 
89 The committee was formed on the 17 August 1914 at the Eden Hotel in Berlin. It was initially called, 
Oppenheimer Comité but the name was quickly changed to Deutsches Comité für die Befreiung der russischen Juden. 
In early November it was changed again to the more neutral, Comité für den Osten also often spelt as Komitee für 
den Osten. See Szajkowski, ‘The Komitee für den Osten and Zionism', 206. 
90 Ibid, 210. 
91 Otto Warburg (1859-1938) was a botanist. From 1911 to 1920, he was the President of the World Zionist 
Congress.  




population in Congress Poland, the historically Polish lands of the Russian Empire. Shortly 
following the declaration of war, the Central Powers had begun their advancement into 
Congress Poland. Under an order from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the army was 
instructed to enact a harsh treatment on the Russian population but exclude the Jews with 
whom they intended to collaborate.93 In September 1914 leaflets were distributed in Galicia 
and Poland targeted at the resident Jewish population. To Bodenheimer's dismay, the leaflets 
that were distributed were militaristic and aggressive in content. They had been written by 
the Polish noble and close aide to the Kaiser, Count Bogdan Hutten-Czapski and the Head of 
the East German Information Office Georg Cleinow and approved by the German and 
Austrian High Command, without prior consultation with Bodenheimer.  
 Rather than detailing the dire legal status of the Jews in Russia, an issue that 
Bodenheimer had wanted to include, the leaflets circulated in Galicia called on Jews to 'rise!' 
and 'take up arms!'.94 The leaflets read, 'we your friends, are approaching' and juxtaposed 
German occupation to the 'barbaric foreign rule' of Russia, spurring suspicion on the loyalty 
of Polish Jews to an independent Polish state.95 Fears amongst German Zionists mounted as 
the pamphlets elicited accusations of Jewish espionage and provided Russian authorities with 
a motive for mass Jewish deportations, which became part of official policy the following 
year.96 
The intention behind the leaflets was evident, the Foreign Ministry, wanted to use the 
Jews as a fifth column in the army; the enemy within. This, in spite of the great risk for the   
resident Jewish population. The incident illustrated the limited influence the Committee for 
the East yielded over Germany's eastern policy. Rather than building an alliance or 
collaborating with the Russian Jews, as Bodenheimer had envisioned, the German High 
Command had instead attempted to instrumentalise the Jewish population for military ends. 
This would become further evident in late 1916, when the Germans became involved in the 
creation of a Polish state despite warnings that this would be detrimental for the Polish Jewish 
population.  
 Frustrated that he had not been consulted, Bodenheimer submitted another 
memorandum to the Foreign Office, once again outlining his plan for a federation and an 
extended area of German influence.97 This time, Bodenheimer and Oppenheimer were invited 
directly to Random, the Head Quarters of the Eastern Command (Ober-Ost), where they met 
 
93 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (London: Penguin, 1998), 82. 
94 Quoted and trans. in Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, 232. 
95 Anon., 'An die Juden in Polen', Berliner Tageblatt 43, no. 442 (1 September 1914): 2.   
96 Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, 235.  
97 Ibid, 233. 
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with the Commander in the East, Erich Ludendorff, and subsequently dined with Chief of 
General Staff, Paul von Hindenburg.98 Ludendorff expressed his appreciation of 
Bodenheimer's memorandum and encouraged the KfdO to send emissaries to the occupied 
territories to discuss the plan with the local Jewish population. On their departure the men 
were handed a written confirmation from von Hindenburg certifying his 'benevolent interest' 
in the efforts of the KfdO and that he was 'ready to advance their aims'.99 
 The confirmation reinvigorated the activity of the KfdO. It revived the possibility of 
an East European Federation recognising Jewish national autonomy. This euphoria did not 
last long. Just over ten days later, the Russian forces pushed the Central Powers out of the 
southern territory of Congress Poland.100 As the Germans were forced into retreat, the 
promises made to the KfdO lost their relevance. 'Our forward-looking political plan for 
establishing a national federation from the Baltic to the Black Sea had to be postponed' wrote 
Bodenheimer.101 Little did he realise at the time, that on the part of the Germans, the plan for 
an East European Federation was over. In official correspondence, it was not mentioned 
again.102 Over the course of two years, the German Reich's approach to the future of Polish 
lands would change three-fold.  
 The retreat of German troops also shifted the goals of the KfdO. As the blueprint for 
an East European Federation was shelved, the organisation turned its focus to securing 
cultural autonomy for Galician Jews. And it was this focus, on the cultural autonomous rights 
of Ostjuden, that would come to define the legacy of the Committee for the East. 
 
 
IV. All noise on the Eastern Front: Congress Poland and Jewish cultural autonomy 
1915 was marked by a series of military successes for the Central Powers on the Eastern 
Front. By the summer, they had under their control Lithuania, Latvia, Congress Poland and 
parts of Galicia. In contrast to the first advancement eastwards, where the Central Powers 
encountered a population of two million Jews, they now occupied an area with around six 
million Jews. Now, more than ever, the Ostjuden became crucial agents in the war effort.103 
With the re-occupation of Congress Poland, the KfdO became politically relevant once again.  
 
98 Bodenheimer, Max Bodenheimer, 75. 
99 Hindenburg to Bodenheimer and Oppenheimer, 15 October 1914. Quoted in ibid, 75. 
100 Stone, The Eastern Front, 199. 
101 Cited in Norrell, For the Honor of Our Fatherland, 21. 
102 Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, 233. 
103 Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, 138–43. 
 92 
 
 When the German Reich entered into negotiations with the Polish national leadership 
in early 1915 on the subject of the future of Poland, members of the Committee for the East 
were invited to the table. In attendance was Bodenheimer, who had been invited to lead the 
negotiations, Oppenheimer, Friedmann and Sobernheim.104 Following the wishes of the KfdO, 
during the negotiations, the Germans offered their full support for granting Polish Jews 
cultural autonomy, announcing that 'the Jew [will have the] full possibility of self-
preservation and development of his language and his special culture'.105  
 The meeting concluded that in the eventuality of a 'Greater Poland', the constitution 
would have to enshrine the right to autonomy for individual nationalities.106 Echoing the 
September Programme, the Germans envisioned that was that each of these national groups 
would 'become part of the German Reich and must become a rich part of the German 
community'.107 To safeguard German dominance, 'high German language and culture' would 
be required in Galicia, but Yiddish, would 'be allowed as a German dialect', thus yielding more 
than the Polish leaders had conceded to.108 One of the Polish representatives Wojciech 
Korfanty,109 in a prior meeting, had suggested that whilst he was ready to recognise the 
cultural autonomy of Jews, he refused to accept Yiddish as a language equal in legal status to 
Polish, even in cities with a majority Jewish population.110 The recognition of Yiddish by the 
Germans not only resonated with the aims of the committee but it was also a clear step in the 
direction of awarding Polish Jews the status of an autonomous cultural community.  
 By the spring of 1915, in another round of meetings in Poland, the KfdO received the 
assurance from the Polish Council that Jews would be awarded the equivalent of national 
rights.111 They would have educational and linguistic autonomy, and an electoral structure 
based on a national cadastre.112 In return, the Polish Council requested that the Committee 
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for the East lobby German officials on the Austro-Polish solution.113 The origins of this 
solution dated back to the Congress of Vienna when the Kingdom of Poland was created 
within the Russian Empire. Shortly after the outbreak of First World War it was proposed 
once again by the Austrians who wanted Poland to join a Danubian Monarchy under the 
Kingship of an Austrian Archduke.114  
 Upholding their side of the agreement with the Polish national leadership, the 
Committee for the East began lobbying German officials. Arguments from Bodenheimer's 
memorandum were recycled, namely that if Jews were to receive national minority rights in 
an Austro-Polish solution, the Germans - by working with the Jews - would have indirect 
control over Poland and Galicia.115 This alliance, the KfdO stressed, would also weaken Slavic 
influence in the Austrian Empire, and thus minimise the threat to German dominance.116 
Unbeknownst to the Committee for the East, their interests were entirely in line with those 
of the Foreign Office, which not only had already opened negotiations with the Austrians on 
this solution but was also aware that the KfdO had entered into unauthorised discussions with 
the Polish Council.117   
 The following year plans regarding the future of Poland changed once again. The 
Germans now proposed 'a Polish entity with truncated borders and sovereignty, functioning 
as a German satellite'.118 In contrast to the successes on the Eastern Front, in 1916, exhausted 
by the war, the German army experienced a downturn, further precipitated in December when 
the Empire faced its worst ever food shortages, and famine.119 To garner manpower for the 
war effort, General Hans Hartwig von Beseler, Governor of General Government of Warsaw, 
suggested appealing to Polish volunteers by offering them an independent Polish state. On 
the 5 November 1916, this plan was put into action with the announcement of the Two 
Emperor's Manifesto. The manifesto proposed a Polish state with an independent army, which 
would function as a protectorate of the Central Powers after the war.120 The intention behind 
the manifesto quickly became apparent when, shortly after its release an appeal was issued for 
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enlistment in the German army.121 The plan was a failure. The Poles remained distrustful of 
the Germans and only twenty Gentile Poles enlisted. The remaining three hundred and fifty 
Polish volunteers that enlisted were Jewish.122 
 Despite the continued loyalty displayed by Polish Jews, the German army was no 
longer interested in collaborating with them. The Two Emperor's Manifesto was a blow to 
the work of the KdfO and disappointed Bodenheimer. Already prior to the Two Emperor's 
Manifesto, on advice from the Committee for the East, specifically Adolf Friedmann, General 
Beseler had warned the German Foreign Office of the negative effects that German 
intervention in Polish independence would have on the local Jewish population. Beseler's letter 
read, 'the Jews, whose fears are probably correct, believe a German intervention will only 
compound the differences [between Jews and Poles] by our intervention we are running the 
risk of injury and massively affecting the [local political] agenda'.123 This information was, 
however, disregarded.124 
 As the KfdO was facing increasing detachment and disinterest from the Foreign Office, 
Bodenheimer resigned in late 1916. The committee turned away from all diplomatic activity 
and instead concentrated on its philanthropic initiatives. Ludwig Haas, Head of the Jewish 
Affairs section of the German civil administration of Poland, a once staunch anti-Zionist, felt 
sympathy for the Zionist cause after the Emperors' Manifesto revealed to him that Polish Jews 
had no future in Poland, nor could they rely on protection from the German government.125 
For Haas, the Emperors' proclamation was a gleich Null in that it undermined all previous 
efforts to build loyalty amongst Polish Jews towards Germany.126 
 
Late 1916 marked the beginning of the end for German-Ostjuden relations. The German lower 
administration authorities began to disregard the original principle of treating all populations 
equally and antisemitic prejudices became more apparent, evidenced - in part - by a decree 
issued by the Minister of War to count all the Jews serving on the front lines.127 By the middle 
of the following year, the German military authorities handed over control to the local Polish 
authorities. All initiatives which had granted Jews greater cultural autonomy such as allowing 
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Yiddish and Hebrew to receive equal status in schools to Polish, were halted.128 Jews began 
to be discriminated against in social and economic spheres. Polish nationalists, such as Roman 
Dmowski, saw part of the mission of Polish nationhood as removing the Jewish 'alien'129 from 
the economic and social sphere of Poland causing a mass emigration which was hoped to solve 
the 'Jewish question'.130 The Central Powers ignored complaints of discrimination against 
Jews and no longer allocated resources to resolving them. 
 The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed in February 1918, which granted Germany 
dominion over the Baltic states and northern Polish territory, ceding the remaining provinces 
to an independent Ukrainian National Republic, further heightened ethnic tensions.131 The 
source of outrage for Poles was that the area of Congress Poland was not mentioned in the 
treaty.132 Jews were blamed by the Poles for their pro-Habsburg and German sentiments 
leading to the eruption of anti-Jewish riots across Polish lands, which had to be contained by 
Austro-Hungarian forces. Tensions mounted when in October 1918 the newly formed 
Ukrainian National Council recognised Jews as a distinct nationality, a status the Polish 
Council had been reluctant to grant.133 Unlike in 1915, the situation for the Ostjuden under the 
Central Powers was vastly different. The continuously changing plans on the future of West 
Russian territory, amplified by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, only served to sharpen the 
antagonisms between resident ethnic groups as each struggled to shape their own political 
future. However, not only did relations deteriorate in Eastern Europe but also in Palestine 
where another Zionist, Richard Lichtheim, had, as Bodenheimer, lobbied the Foreign Office 
on German-Jewish collaboration.  
 
 
V. Richard Lichtheim and German-Jewish collaboration in the Middle East  
During the First World War the Committee for the East under Bodenheimer was focused on 
recognising Jews as one of several national ethnic minorities within an East European 
Federation. Nevertheless, the KfdO never abandoned the prospect of a establishing a Jewish 
state in Palestine. The individual behind the scenes who took on this diplomatic work was 
another member of the Committee for the East, Richard Lichtheim. In 1913 Lichtheim was 
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posted to Constantinople, in the Ottoman Empire, as a representative of the Zionist 
Organisation. When the war broke out, Lichtheim remained in Constantinople and built close 
and valuable relationships with several Foreign Ministry officials who worked to ensure that 
Zionist activity during the war could continue without obstruction.  
 The KfdO was not the only Jewish organisation to secure support from the German 
Foreign Office. The Aid Association of German Jews founded in 1901 by Paul Nathan134 with 
the support of James Simon,135 who was a personal friend of the Kaiser, was far more successful 
in receiving approval for their philanthropic work especially in the area of education. With 
the support of Under Secretary of State Richthofen the Aid Association established the 
German School Association for Jews of the Orient (Der deutsche Schulverein für die Juden des 
Orients) in 1898 and in 1912 the Technological College of Haifa. Working to promote German 
influence, the Aid Association ensured Prussian Kultur was encouraged in schools in favour of 
Hebrew.136  
 With the outbreak of the First World War, in light of the alliance between Germany 
and the Ottoman Empire, German industry and trade began to take a stronghold in the region. 
Moreover, the war precipitated a marked increase in the immigration of Russian and Polish 
Jews to Palestine and these new migrants preferred the German language and to work in 
German commerce. For years, the international Jewish organisation Alliance Israélite 
Universelle, founded in France, had held a monopoly over Jewish education in the Ottoman 
Empire.137 The war offered the Aid Association the opportunity to upset this French 
dominance over Jewish education. Just as for the Committee for the East, for the Aid 
Association, Russian Jews could ensure that German surpassed French as the dominant 
language, culture in the Jewish 'colony'. Whilst the Aid Association was successful in receiving 
approval for their educational projects and encouraged the German authorities to support 
Russian Jewish settlement, the following section concentrates on the activities of the 
Committee for the East which presented the German government with political answers to a 
practical Jewish Question.  
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The person promoting the interests of the KfdO in the Middle East was Richard Lichtheim. 
Lichtheim was born in Berlin in 1885 into a secular Jewish family. At the age of twenty-four, 
following his father's death, Lichtheim stopped his studies and began working for the Zionist 
Organisation.138 In 1913, Lichtheim moved to Constantinople to take over Victor Jacobson's 
position as representative of the Zionist Organisation.139 Tasked with overseeing and 
reporting on the distribution of Jewish funds to Palestine, Lichtheim took it upon himself to 
restore contact with the German Embassy and establish a working relationship with the 
German Foreign Office, which the Zionist Inner Actions Committee had struggled to 
secure.140   
 During his time in Constantinople, Lichtheim engaged in numerous diplomatic 
meetings with German Foreign Office officials and received several unofficial assurances of 
support for the Zionist cause in Palestine. One high-ranking official was the Ambassador to 
Constantinople, Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim. Just before the outbreak of the war, 
Lichtheim had a meeting with Wangenheim who, after revealing his sympathy towards the 
Zionists, assured Lichtheim that although the German government was not in a position to 
declare any political commitment to the Zionist cause, Wangenheim was 'unofficially' 
prepared to offer his support.141  
 Shortly following the outbreak of the First World War, just like Bodenheimer, 
Lichtheim drafted a memorandum for the German Foreign Office on the benefits of Jewish 
colonial activity for the economic development of the Ottoman Empire.142 On the 3 November 
1914, before his return to Constantinople, Lichtheim visited the Foreign Office in Berlin 
where he presented his memorandum to the Director of the Balkans and Orient Section, Baron 
Friedrich Hans von Rosenberg, who was later appointed Foreign Minister in the Weimar 
Republic from 1922 to 1923. Aware of Germany's colonial ambitions in the Middle East, 
Lichtheim advised that the Empire should support Zionist aspirations in the region. Large-
scale Jewish colonisation would open up new and valuable economic markets. In the same vein 
as Bodenheimer's 1902 memorandum, Lichtheim presented the utility of Jews as agents of 
German interests in Palestine. The proposal was well received. The Director assured 
Lichtheim that he would contact the German Embassy in Constantinople to report on the 
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meeting. No further promises were offered.143 When Lichtheim received the official reply to 
his memorandum it read that 'as far as possible and according to the merit of each case, the 
Ambassador in Constantinople would take an interest in the Zionist movement'. Based on the 
international character of Zionism and the mistrust of the Turkish authorities towards the 
movement, the reply concluded that these factors 'imposed certain limitations' on German 
actions.144  
 
Lichtheim, and Bodenheimer were not alone in their views on the advantages of collaborating 
with Jews in the Middle East. This position was also held by a cross-section of prominent 
individuals in German high society. Heinrich Class (leader of the Pan-Germans) and Friedrich 
von Schwerin (District President in Frankfurt-on-Oder) both expressed a desire for Polish 
Jews to voluntarily immigrate to Palestine after the war.145 Werner Sombart in his 1911 
lecture series similarly spoke positively about Jewish national regeneration in Palestine.146  
The following year, Professor Martin Hartmann published a series of articles in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung highlighting the importance for German interests of Jewish colonial work 
in Palestine.147 That Germany could benefit from Jewish colonisation in its Oriental policy 
complemented an idea that found expression in a term coined in 1915, Mitteleuropa.148 
Semantically versatile, Mitteleuropa became associated with the broad idea of controlling the 
European continent from a dominant German centre.149 Mitteleuropa also, however, became 
associated with German actions outside of Europe (Drang nach Osten, Berlin-Bagdad) and was 
associated with 'militarism, aggression, Prussianism, conquest, Kaiserism, oppression and 
annexation'.150 Friedrich Naumann, a liberal politician, established the parameters to the term 
Mitteleuropa in a book by that title published in October 1915.151 He described modern war as 
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submitting to contemporary trends of large-scale industrialisation and supra-national 
organisation. Naumann envisioned that the war would divide the world into several large 
areas. During the war, as Europe faced the prospect of dividing, Naumann advocated for a 
Mitteleuropa consisting of Austria-Hungary and Germany. After the war he hoped that it 
would expand to form 'a new community of existence'.152 
 Another prominent advocate of Mitteleuropa, who was also part of the Naumann circle, 
was Paul Rohrbach, Director of the German Foreign Information Service. In 1902 he 
published a book entitled Die Bagdadbahn in which he encouraged building a strong alliance 
with Turkey in order to strengthen German presence in the Middle East. Rohrbach saw the 
Middle East as a crucial region for German colonisation.153 In 1915, Rohrbach delivered the 
first of a series of lectures to the Prussian parliament on the subject of Zionism and German 
foreign policy.154 He argued that only the Zionist movement and the prospect of Palestine 
could divert the migration of Jewish masses from Europe.155 He emphasised that the Jewish 
national body in Palestine was not a threat to Germany's colonial ambitions as Jewish and 
German interests aligned. Moreover, the Jews would help promote German Kultur and 
commerce.156  
 Other speakers in the lecture series (Vortrageszyklus) to the Prussian parliament 
included Martin Buber, a prominent intellectual in the cultural Zionist movement, who 
lectured on Jewish nationalism. Ernst Jäckh, founder of the German-Turkish Union, 
concluded that whilst Germans would be unsuitable settlers, Jews and Armenians would be 
viable candidates for settlement in the Ottoman Empire as 'Jews could represent a permanent 
link between Orient and Occident'.157 In the last lecture of the series, Alfons Paquet, a poet 
and travel writer, spoke on 'experiences in Jewish colonies'. He observed that both Russia and 
the United Kingdom had tried to exert their influence over Palestine but only German Zionist 
efforts were of any value. Moreover, the Germans, according to Paquet, were ideally placed 
to help advance Zionist aims.158  According to a Jewish newspaper report, the lecture cycle 
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was 'one of the most meaningful Zionist events witnessed in Berlin as of late'.159 The lecture 
series in the Prussian parliament revealed that there was a clear political interest on how 
Jewish colonial activity and Zionism could benefit Germany's colonial expansion in the Middle 
East. The contributors to the lecture series stressed the importance of the Zionist movement 
for German war aims. Zionist activities aligned with Mitteleuropa ideas and could guarantee 
German dominance, both culturally and linguistically, in the Middle East. A stronger German 
influence would destabilise the French and English stronghold in the region.160 
 The subject of Zionism and German foreign policy in the Middle East, also became a 
lively public debate through the journal, Das grössere Deutschland, co-edited by Rohrbach and 
Jäckh, which saw contributions from prominent politicians and public figures.161 The 
prestigious journal, the Prussian Yearbooks also featured an article on the topic in its autumn 
1915 edition, Der Zionismus: Eine Frage der deutschen Orientpolitik written by the Secretary of 
the Zionist Federation, Kurt Blumenfeld. The article reached the hands of the Under Secretary 
of State Arthur Zimmerman, who, although still wary of supporting a Jewish state, was 
impressed with its argument.162  
 
While German officials remained bound by the shackles of Realpolitik, protecting their alliance 
with the Ottoman Empire, they met the constant lobbying by Zionist individuals and 
organisations with sympathy. Jewish policy proposals may not have translated into practical 
actions, but their public prominence testifies to the relevance of Jewish Questions in German 
political discourse during the war. And although no official assurances were given, during the 
war the Foreign Ministry worked tirelessly to ensure the activities of Zionists continued 
unhindered.  
 During the war, the Foreign Office issued several exemptions of military service to 
senior members of the World Zionist Organisation and Zionist Federation enabling them to 
continue their work for the movement.163 Transit visas and residency permits were also issued 
to non-German nationals of the Zionist Executive. Victor Jacobson, Head of the Zionist 
Executive, was given German diplomatic documents to travel freely between Berlin and 
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Constantinople. The motivation for the German government supporting Zionist wartime 
activity is best encapsulated in one of the exemption letters to the General Headquarters. 
Written by Foreign Secretary Alfred Zimmermann it read,   
 
In view of the influence of international Jewry on public opinion and the press in neutral 
countries, especially in the United States, it would be in Germany's political interest to 
show, during the war, an accommodating attitude towards Zionism which is the most 
widespread and best-organised international organisation. It seems, therefore, 
desirable that the leadership of the Zionist Organisation should centre in Germany, 
giving thus a greater guarantee that Jewish circles outside Germany are influenced in 
a pro-German direction.164  
 
German support for the Zionist Executive was extended even further when in early 1915 the 
Foreign Ministry endorsed the establishment of the Zionist Bureau in Copenhagen. This move 
was favourable to the Germans as it enabled the Zionist Executive in Berlin to 'keep the 
policies of the national organisations in neutral and Entente countries in line with German 
and Turkish interests'.165 As intended, the Bureau was vital in promoting positive attitudes 
on Germany internationally. Its success even led to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, then Envoy 
to Copenhagen, going to great lengths to ensure the continued functioning of this 'essential' 
Bureau.166  
 In Constantinople, the German Ambassador Wangenheim interceded a number of 
times on behalf of the Zionists and in the Jewish interest. Early on in the war, Lichtheim 
reported that newly settled Russian Jews might be expelled from Turkey should Russia enter 
the war. Wangenheim responded by guaranteeing the protection of resident Russian Jews.167 
This prediction proved true when in the winter of 1914 the Turkish authorities commenced 
the expulsion of Russian Jews, moving them to Egypt.168 Lichtheim appealed to the German 
authorities who intervened. The Germans helped halt the crisis and in the aftermath, 
reiterated the promise to safeguard the Jews of Palestine. 169 Despite these interventions (of 
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Richard Lichtheim in Den Botschaften Konstantinopels (1913−1917)’, Naharaim 9, no. 1–2 (2015): 128–50. 
168 Another deportation order for the Jews in Jaffa was issued by Djemal Pasha in 1917. For details on the 
German intervention in both 1914 and 1917 see Isaiah Friedman, ‘German Intervention on Behalf of the 
Yishuv, 1917’, Jewish Social Studies 33, no. 1 (1971): 23–43. 
169 Important officials in Constantinople that supported Zionist interests were Wangenheim, Mutius, 
Kühlmann and the First Dragoman, Weber. Another important personality aiding the Jews in Palestine, 
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which there were others170), and the unofficial support for the Zionist cause, Lichtheim was 
under no illusion that Germany would 'revoke her alliance with Turkey for our sake' as 
'Zionism is not her first priority'.171  
 
The Foreign Office's position on Zionism is best surmised in a memorandum written by the 
Consul in Jaffa, Heinrich Brode and submitted on 26 August 1915. Brode was requested to 
present a coherent review of Zionist activities during the First World War and their 
advantages for Germany, given the competing views on this subject. In the memorandum 
titled, Zionismus und Weltkrieg, Brode made a sharp distinction between German Jews, whom 
he commended for their patriotism and fulfilling their military obligations, and Russian 
Zionists, who had been afforded protection in Palestine, whose pro-German attitude he 
distrusted.172 On this basis, he advised the government to postpone any commitment to the 
Zionist cause until after the war. Despite this advice, Brode detailed the overwhelming benefits 
of Zionism for Germany, framing them in light of the 'Jewish Question'.173 
 Brode's report echoed arguments made by Zionists, Bodenheimer and Lichtheim, on 
the advantages of Zionism for Germany. He began by outlining the 'tremendous' economic 
potential of Jewish colonisation for German merchandise. The international character of 
Zionism meant that the German protection of Jews in Palestine created sympathy amongst 
international Jewry, especially in America, for Germany. Moreover, Brode saw in Zionism the 
potential to ensure that the effects of the war on Russian Jews would not lead to a 'flood to the 
West' but rather their immigration to Palestine.174 For Bode, the Zionist movement could 
make 'a substantial contribution to the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany'.175  
 Whilst praising Zionist activities, one cannot ignore that Brode's support for Zionism 
was linked to his recognition of the Jews as a foreign element within Germany. Quoting a 
speech in the Reichstag by General von Herbert who described the Jews as a 'foreign body in 
the German national entity', Brode concurred that, although 'tactless', the speech was 'to the 
 
sometimes in cooperation with the Germans, was the American Ambassador to Constantinople Morgenthau 
who early on in the war had been encouraged by U.S. President Wilson to help his 'co-religionists'. 
170 See Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, 241–88. 
171 CZA, L 6/45 Lichtheim to Straus, 6 July 1915. Cited and trans. in ibid, 242. 
172 This of course is in stark contrast to the actions taken by the Minister of War only a year later to question 
the military service of Jews on the front lines. See chapter three.  
173 AA, Türkei 195, K177300-46, 'Memorandum über den Zionismus und Weltkrieg' (confidential), 'Geheime 
Bemerkungen zu dem Memorandum', no. 76/1278. Summarised in Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, 
255. 
174 It is worth noting that he did acknowledge that it was unlikely German Jews would leave their Fatherland. 
Like Bodenheimer, he saw Zionism as a means to mitigate the Ostjudenproblem in Germany. 




point'. Brode questioned whether 'our Volkstum' was able to integrate 'Jewish characteristics' 
without 'impairing [Germany's] innate Wesen'. He saw Zionism as a way in which to 'preserve 
our people from the excessive penetration of Oriental blood'. In spite of his appreciation of 
Jewish military duty he also confessed that the 'very idea that a Jew as a senior officer, or 
administrative official, might represent the authority of the state is somewhat repellent to our 
national feeling'.176  
 The German Empire had to carefully balance its approach towards Zionism. As an ally 
of the Ottoman Empire it did not want to destabilise the region by supporting the growth of 
a Jewish majority in Palestine. On the other hand, given the likelihood that the Jewish 
colonisation of Palestine would continue after the war, which Brode described as 'a justified 
historical necessity', the German authorities had to ensure they maintained a relationship with 
leaders of the Zionist movement.177 
 Whilst the war offered the political Zionists renewed hope of a political answer to the 
Jewish Question events proceeded as they had at the turn of the century. The Zionists received 
only informal assurances. The German government unofficially encouraged Zionist 
settlement initiatives, but this was not reflected by any official action or declaration of support. 
Underlying Germany's limited scope of action was its alliance to the Ottoman Empire, which 
increased in dependency during the war. In as much as the Zionists were unable to rally the 
Sultan behind their cause, they had little chance at acquiring any official guarantee from the 
Kaiser. By the winter of 1916 as relations with the Committee for the East began to worsen, 
as did those between Lichtheim and the German Embassy in Constantinople. The following 
year, coinciding with the entry of the United States of America into the war, Lichtheim was 
accused of conspiring with the Americans and forced to leave Turkey.178 In Constantinople 
the Zionists had lost their vital contact.  
 The final nail in the coffin for the political German Zionists was the announcement of 
a Jewish homeland in Palestine by the British, rather than the German government. As 
Zionists, they rejoiced. As German Zionists, the Balfour Declaration marked an inconclusive 
end to over two decades of diplomatic work. On the 5 January 1918 members of the Zionist 
Action Committee (Otto Warburg and Arthur Hantke) and the Committee for the East (Franz 
Oppenheimer and Moritz Sobernheim) received letters from the Under Secretary of the 
Foreign Ministry Freiherr Axel von dem Bussche-Haddenhaufen.179 The letter announced 
 
176 Ibid, 258.  
177 Ibid.  
178 Vogt, ‘The First World War, German Nationalism, and The Transformation of German Zionism’, 275. 
179 Anon., 'Die Reichsregierung und die Bestrebungen der Zionisten', Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 57, no. 10 
(6 Januar 1918).  
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German support for 'a flourishing Jewish settlement in Palestine' but did not concede more 
than had already been granted by the Turkish government.180 The same German foreign 
policy towards the Jewish state, dating back to 1898, remained in place.181 German Zionists 
were unable to secure a Jewish state under a German protectorate. Nevertheless, the 'huge 
frequency of communications tens of thousands of dispatches, cables exchanged between 




VI. The Committee for the East and the afterlife of its policies  
With the defeat of the Central Powers in the First World War, the objectives of the German 
political Zionists were never put into practice, nor are they well known today.  However, the 
little recognised achievements of these individuals were no small matter. Whilst the 
Committee for the East did not secure a commitment from the German government on par 
with the Balfour Declaration, they had two enduring successes: ideational and institutional.  
 The Committee for the East was never officially recognised by the German 
government. Nonetheless, it exerted a significant amount of political influence both during 
the war and after. Early on in the war, in late December 1914, the importance of collaborating 
with the Jewish population led the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Office to employ Nahum 
Goldmann, who later founded the World Jewish Congress, to investigate Jewish life and 
activities in Eastern Europe.183 By the following year, a Jewish Affairs section was opened in 
the German administration of Warsaw. Ludwig Haas, a non-Zionist liberal Jew and Reichstag 
Deputy of the Progressive Party, was invited as an expert consultant to oversee the 
department. In 1917, a similar position was created in the political section of the Eastern 
Command, headed by Hermann Struck,184 one of the original fifteen members of the 
Committee for the East.185 The representation of Jewish affairs in German administrative 
 
180 Martin Sicker, Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831-1922 (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 134. 
181 Stefan Vogt, ‘The First World War, German Nationalism, and The Transformation of German Zionism’, 
Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 57 (11 July 2012): 247. 
182 Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, viii. 
183 Raphael Patai, Nahum Goldmann: His Missions to the Gentiles (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
2003), 45-54.  
184 Struck volunteered to serve in the German army. He was sent to the Eastern Front where he worked in the 
press office of the Ober-Ost due to his ability to speak and translate Yiddish. Struck was a political Zionist like 
Bodenheimer and Oppenheimer, and Orthodox. During the war Struck received the Iron Cross 1st Class and 
was promoted to the rank of officer.  
185 Gilya Gerda Schmidt, The Art and Artists of the Fifth Zionist Congress, 1901: Heralds of a New Age (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2003), 109.  
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divisions continued even after the war when in November 1918, an office for Jewish Affairs 
was established in the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin. Directing it was Moritz 
Sobernheim who, like Struck, was one of the original founding members of the KfdO. 
Officially, the Committee for the East ended all activities with the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles in June 1919, and yet its last vestiges continued through the work of Sobernheim.186  
 Turning to Bodenheimer and the KfdO's ideational legacy, whilst the idea of an East 
European Federation recognising Jewish national rights never materialised during the First 
World War, the idea was once again adopted by the Anglo-Jewish diplomat, Lucien Wolf in 
1917. Building on Renner, Wolf published an article in the Edinburgh Review in which he 
argued in support of Jewish national rights for Eastern European Jewry, despite being an 
ardent anti-Zionist. Like Renner and Bodenheimer, he envisioned the recognition of Jewish 
rights in a future Austrian-Hungarian polity following the structure of a federalised state, 
with a decentralised system of national diets.187 As the Empire was split into several of 
ethnically homogenous nation-states and Austria became a Republic, the federalised state 
system, never found favour.  
 Nevertheless, the idea espoused by Bodenheimer and the Committee for the East, 
supporting the recognition of cultural autonomous rights for Jews, endured. The international 
Zionist movement adopted it as one of the clauses of the Copenhagen manifesto in 1918 and 
it was campaigned for by the International Worker's Union.188 Most significantly, the idea 
became embedded within the concept of minority rights and was enshrined in the Minority 
Treaty in 1919.189 In the Paris Peace Conferences, minority rights were removed from an 
internal concern of states and elevated to the level of international law, under the jurisdiction 
of the League of Nations.190 Renner's notion of the personality principle, which I have 
suggested inspired the idea of cultural autonomy advocated by Bodenheimer, came to form 
one foundational pillar of the concept of minority rights. Where prior to the war, individuals 
had been granted equal citizenship on the basis of civil and religious freedom, in the Minority 
Treaty they were granted the additional right to cultural and/or ethnic distinctions within 
the state. Renner and Bodenheimer fought for the practical and political recognition of the 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic distinctions of minority communities within a given territory. And 
 
186 For a detailed account of Sobernheim's work in the Jewish Affairs department see Nicosia, ‘Jewish Affairs 
and German Foreign Policy during the Weimar Republic’. 
187 Mark Levene, ‘Nationalism and Its Alternatives in the International Arena: The Jewish Question at Paris, 
1919’, Journal of Contemporary History 28, no. 3 (July 1993): 520. 
188 Bodenheimer, Max Bodenheimer, 77. 
189 The Congress of American Jews came out in support of national rights for Jews where they were 
guaranteed for other nationalities. Jewish minority rights were campaigned for by representatives in the Comité 
des Delegations Juifs’ in Geneva. See ibid, 77. 
190 See chapter five for more on this subject.  
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despite the short-lived practical political manifestations of their solution to the nationality 
question, the conceptual legacy of their ideas lived on.  
 Social Democratic Member of Parliament, Ludwig Quessel in his article written in 
April 1918, a few months before the end of the war, perhaps most accurately summarised the 
union of Renner's and Bodenheimer's ideas in the German occupation of Eastern Europe and 
the confrontation with a practical Jewish Question. Two facts allowed non-Jewish observers 
to view the Jewish Question in a new light, began Quessel. The emancipation of the Jews in 
Eastern Europe, and the Jewish right, ‘recognised by nearly the entirety of mankind’, to the 
closed settlement of Palestine.191 Central to this new conception of the Jewish Question was 
the understanding that, 'in the east the Jewish Question was always not only a social, but also, 
a national problem'. 192 This became apparent only as a consequence of the war, which revealed 
the existence of a new nation (culturally and linguistically unique) of 'six to seven million, 
living in territory expanding from Riga to Odessa'. On this basis, Quessel stressed the 
importance, for Eastern European Jews, of the protection of national minority rights through 
an international treaty. Referencing Renner's concept of the personality principle in the 
context of minority rights, Quessel remarked that 'like other national minorities in the east, 
East European Jewry will also have to strive to protect its nationality on the basis of the 
personality principle' (Personalitätsprinzips).193 
 During the occupation of West Russia, as the German army faced a practical Jewish 
Question, debates that were previously confined to Zionist circles on Jewish nationalism, 
cultural autonomy and minority rights were propelled into mainstream discourse and became 
a factor for consideration in German foreign policy decisions. Speaking at his trial, in March 
1924, on his involvement in the Munich Putsch, General Erich Ludendorff reflected on how 
he had made an 'acquaintance during the war' with the 'Jewish question'.194 Ludendorff was 
referring to his time as Commander of the East where the Central Powers had encountered a 
population of approximately six million Yiddish-speaking Jews. This encounter raised 
significant questions pertaining not only to the understanding within Germany of Jewish 
identity as not just a community of faith but importantly, the German state. Answers initially 
conceived in response to Jewish questions had a longer legacy within discussions about the 
modern state in Germany. Jewish questions produced queries and answers that were more 
 
191 Ludwig Quessel, ‘Die Judenfrage als nationales Problem’, 299.   
192 Ibid.   
193 Ibid, 300.  
194 Anon., 'Ludendorff assails Jews, Pope and Catholic Clergy', Jewish Telegraphic Agency (1 March 1924) 
[https://goo.gl/JScRtR, accessed 12/12/18]. Referenced in Giuseppe Motta, The Great War against Eastern 
European Jewry, 1914-1920 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 90. 
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widely relevant to a catalogue of problems facing Germany that, as the following chapters will 













Constitutionalism and secularism in the Jewish census of 1916 
 
'I know parties no longer, I know only Germans' pronounced Kaiser Wilhelm II in his 
opening speech to parliament on Tuesday 4 August 1914, the day following the German 
advance into Belgium and the opening of the Western Front.1 This would mark the end of 
'party differences', (Parteiunterschiede), of 'differences in ethnicity' (Stammesunterschiede) and  
'confessional differences' (Konfessionsunterschiede) the Kaiser announced. The meaning of the 
speech was clear. The Kaiser had announced a civic truce (Burgfrieden) within the German 
Empire, intended to unify the citizens of the still young nation to sacrifice their lives, as 
brothers in arms, for the Fatherland. Just as the rallying cry of the Wars of Liberation united 
the German states to fight off Napoleon, the First World War offered a similar opportunity 
to bring together the disparate German-speaking citizens of the Empire, for the first time on 
a global stage.  
 Whilst the Kaiser's speech advocated solidarity, it highlighted the disunity within the 
Empire hinting at the long struggle for unification, which had culminated in an Empire with 
distinct regional, tribal (Stammes) and confessional identities. In the same parliamentary 
session, the Chancellor Theodor Bethmann-Hollweg similarly addressed the session as the 
'people and kinsmen (Stämme) of the German Empire'.2 The common cause presented by the 
outbreak of the First World War was a unique and opportune moment for the forty-three-
year-old Empire, which had not fought a war since unification. Not only did the German 
leadership embrace this opportunity, stoking up military fervour, but moreover the chance to 
fight for the German Empire was seized upon by Germany's minority Jewish population.3 
 German Jews enthusiastically joined in the in the national impetus afforded by the call 
to arms. Just under 2% of the total population of Jews within Germany (which included those 
unable to serve such as women, children and the elderly) enlisted to volunteer at the start of 
the war.4 As the war fired up nationalist sentiments, tellingly Jews (and even Zionists) served 
in the national armies of which they saw themselves a part, 'for us in this war the Jews fighting 
 
1 ‘Eröffnungsitzung, 4 August 1914’, Verhandlung Des Reichstag, Band 306, 1916 1914, 2 
[https://bit.ly/2NETflP, accessed 06/12/2019]. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Unlike German Jews, the German population on the whole was less enthusiastic about the war than 
previously thought. For an account on the myth of the 'spirit of 1914' in Germany see Jeffrey Verhey, The 
Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 




alongside us are simply Germans and the Jews in enemy armies are French or English'.5 The 
patriotism of German Jews cut across community divides as both liberal Jewish associations 
and the Zionist Federation, urged Jews to enlist in the army. The organ of the Zionist 
Federation came out in public support for the war, declaring 'at this hour it is time for us to 
show again that we, proud Jewish kinsmen [stammesstolzen Juden], belong to the best sons of 
the Fatherland'.6 Another pamphlet similarly displayed the dedication of Jews to the 'spirit of 
1914': Glaubensstark und voller Weihe ist des Juden Kaisertreue.7  
 Prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, unbaptised Jews were continually denied 
promotion to reserve officer status despite their legal right to equality, which was enshrined 
in the 1871 constitution of the German Empire.8 For many Jews serving was a matter of 
honour and dignity Heerendiest was Ehrendienst.9 This slight, though one of many grievances 
suffered by Jews, was repeatedly raised by Jewish politicians and associations who demanded 
denominational equality. The outbreak of war, which already by the summer of 1914 saw the 
removal of these discriminations by the military leadership marked an important shift in 
German-Jewish relations. For the first time, Jewish specialists from the finance sector, 
education and science were invited by the War Ministry to partake in the war effort. Coupled 
with the Burgfrieden, the moment signalled that the political and civic rights, which had been 
legally granted to Jews in 1871, would finally be exercised in practice.10 
 The claim that Jews had shirked their wartime duty dealt a serious blow to German 
Jews. The accusation was propagated by Alfred Roth, writing under a pseudonym Otto Armin, 
in 1919 when he published a pamphlet on Jews in the army, which was subtitled, 'A statistical 
survey based on official sources'.11 Roth claimed that only 10% of the Jewish population served 
as opposed to 20% of the German population, based on the supposed official figures collected 
by the War Ministry in October 1916, which had never been publicly disclosed.12  
 Alfred Roth at the time of writing was known for his antisemitism and membership of 
the Pan-German League and had intended through his pamphlet to discredit the loyalty of 
 
5 Anon., 'Der Weltkrieg und die Judenfrage Rezension', Im deutschen Reich 11-12 (November 1916): 282.  
6 Anon., Jüdische Rundschau 19, no. 32 (7 August 1914): 343 in Reinharz, Dokumente zur Geschichte des deutschen 
Zionismus 1882-1933, 145. 
7 Jonas Kreppel, Der Weltkrieg und die Judenfrage (Wien: Verlag Redaktion ‘Der Tag’, 1915). 
8 Werner T. Angress, ‘Prussia’s Army and the Jewish Reserve Officer: Controversy before World War I’, Leo 
Baeck Institute Year Book 17, no. 1 (1972): 19. 
9 Ibid, 30. 
10 The German Diplomat, Graf Bernstorff was quoted to have said that after the war Jewish hatred in Germany 
would disappear. See Max Simon, Der Weltkrieg und die Judenfrage (Leipzig und Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1916), 
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11 Otto Armin, Die Juden Im Heere. Eine Statistische Untersuchung Nach Amtlichen Quellen (München: Deutscher 
Volks-Verlag, 1919) [https://bit.ly/2Mw08aj, accessed 06/08/17]. 
12 Roth attempted to refute a figure given by a Jewish source on the number of Jews that served and used the 
'official statistics' from the War Ministry census of October 1916 to prove his argument. Ibid, 18. 
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Jews to the German state. The publication unleashed a heated and lengthy debate concerning 
the exact numbers of Jews that had served in the war. This debate came to be known as the 
Statistikstreit. Beyond this immediate discussion, the legacy of these accusations continued 
throughout the years of the Weimar Republic where antisemites used the claim that Jews had 
shirked their war duty to perpetuate the notion that it was the Jews who had stabbed Germany 
in the back on the home front which had led to Germany's defeat in the First World War.   
 The statistics used by Alfred Roth in his pamphlet were collected by the War Ministry, 
ostensibly to dispel antisemitic accusations of Jewish war-shirking, in an event which became 
known as the Jew census (Judenzählung).13 The census was comparatively short-lived. It was 
initiated on the 11 October 1916 by a decree authorised by the War Minister, Adolf Wild von 
Hohenborn.14 A little over three months later, it was ground to a halt and declared a closed 
case by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. And yet, despite this short time span 
the event had an enduring legacy.  
 The Judenzählung has received extensive attention in the literature and for this reason, 
my chapter does not intend to re-examine the census itself, nor the extent to which it affected 
German Jews and German-Jewish relations.15 Rather, it will investigate the Judenzählung as 
an episode which exposed the challenges faced by the young German nation-state as it 
considered its national homogeneity two years after the Kaiser's civic truce. Advocating in 
principle equality and toleration through the constitution, and unity (Einheit) through the 
Burgfrieden, the singling out of the Jewish population raised questions about the integrity of 
German institutions and the commitment to upholding these principles.16  
 
13 Rosenthal writes that the Judenzählung was a term given retrospectively to the census whereas shortly after 
the census the term was used in an article in the Berliner Tagesblatt, (4 November 1916): 3. See Rosenthal, Die 
Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten, 12. 
14 In January 1915 Adolf Wild von Hohenborn replaced General Falkenhayn as War Minister. The Chancellor 
had objected to Falkenhayn holding both the position as Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff. At the 
start of the war Hohenborn remained on the front-lines whilst General von Wandel was appointed as acting 
War Minister. Hohenborn was recalled to Berlin in September 1916.  
15 See Michael Geheran, ‘Rethinking Jewish Front Experiences’, in Beyond Inclusion and Exclusion: Jewish 
Experiences of the First World War in Central Europe, ed. Jason Crouthamel, Tim Grady, and Julia Barbara Köhne 
(New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 111–43; Hans-Joachim Becker, Von der konfessionellen 
Militärstatistik zur "Judenzählung" (1916): eine Neubewertung (Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz, 2016); Peter 
Appelbaum, Loyal Sons: Jews in the German Army in the Great War (London & Portland: Valentine Mitchell, 
2015); Ulrike Heikaus and Julia Köhne, eds., Krieg! Juden Zwischen Den Fronten, 1914-1918 (Berlin: Hentich & 
Hentich Verlag, 2014); David J. Fine, ‘Jewish Integration in the German Army in the First World War’ (Berlin 
& Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012); Tim Grady, ‘Creating Difference: The Racialization of Germany’s Jewish 
Soldiers after the First World War’, Patterns of Prejudice 46, no. 3–4 (2012): 318–38; Derek Penslar, ‘The 
German-Jewish Soldier: From Participant to Victim’, German History 29, no. 3 (2011): 423–44; Gregory A. 
Caplan, Wicked Sons, German Heroes: Jewish Soldiers, Veterans, and Memories of World War I in Germany 
(Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2008); Rosenthal, Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten; Werner T. Angress, ‘The 
German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916: Genesis – Consequences – Significance’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year 
Book 23, no. 1 (1978): 117–38.  
16 It is significant that the decree came from the War Ministry, a department that was still answerable to the 
Reichstag, and that it was not raised in parliament before its authorisation.  
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 Gathering statistical data, even based on confession, was not what caused most outrage 
for many German Jews. Recording confessional status was standard practice in the enlistment 
questionnaire in Bavaria, for example.17 Rather it was by the specific targeting of only Jews 
serving in the military that the War Ministry undermined all claims to inclusivity heralded 
by the 'spirit of 1914'.18 The census signalled the desire to exert control over a minority group 
(consisting of less than 1% of the German population) who, in the final count, served in equal 
measure to their fellow Gentiles and of whom 10% that served, gave their lives to the 
Empire.19 
 This chapter will focus on the debate that erupted over the idea of a confessional survey 
in the Budget Committee meeting in late October and how its continuation in parliament a 
few weeks later descended into a debate specifically about the War Ministry's decree. It will 
reveal how Jewish questions became a crystallisation point for controversies about equality 
before the law, constitutionalism and secularism. The chapter will situate the Judenzählung 
within the turn in Germany towards a bureaucratic state apparatus and the involvement by 
the Jewish community in statistical data gathering. It will trace the sequence of events which 
initially led to the authorisation of a decree and subsequently those which led to its closure. 
Finally, it will turn to the aftermath of the Judenzählung and its legacy within antisemitic 
circles arguing how it was not the act of a census itself that outraged the Jewish community 
but rather how the event was poorly conducted and subsequently instrumentalised by the far-
right to fuel antisemitic propaganda.   
 The significance of the census was that it exposed the disconnect between law and 
practice in the German Empire. In the course of the debates, the speakers challenged whether 
Germany would continue to prevail in its past prejudices or support a future embodied by 
unity, solidarity and (religious) tolerance. The First World War and the Jewish questions that 
were catalysed by the Judenzählung provide a unique lens through which to examine the 





17 Fine, ‘Jewish Integration in the German Army in the First World War’, 16. 
18 In a letter to the War Ministry Cassel wrote that he could comprehend a decree to count soldiers serving. 
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I. Facts behind the figures: the origins of the census  
The declaration of war and the call to arms was shortly followed by a surge in antisemitic 
propaganda, which charged Jews with 'war-shirking'.20 Already in August 1914 a Pan-German 
League called the Reichshammerbund21 began to circulate pamphlets requesting an 
investigation into Jewish participation in the war.22 The following month, the Central 
Association sent a letter to the Chancellery highlighting the ubiquity of allegations in 
newspaper articles and policy reports that Jews were committing unpatriotic crimes, including 
spying. Right-wing groups and individuals accused Jews of 'not fighting in sufficient numbers 
and, instead, of profiteering from the nation’s war-time struggle'.23  
 In spite of the high volume of antisemitic material received by the War Ministry 
publications containing offensive allegations were censored.24 This changed in 1916 when the 
War Ministry decided to react to complaints of Jews shirking their military duty. On the 11 
October, War Minister Adolf Wild von Hohenborn authorised a decree to have all military 
and red cross units count and record all Jews in service.25 The introduction to the decree was 
revealing of the justification given by the Ministry to issue a survey,  
 
the War Ministry is continuously receiving complaints from the population that a 
disproportionate number of eligible members of the Israelite faith are being made 
exempt or evading their obligation to serve under every imaginable pretext.26 
 
What then marked the shift in attitude and authorisation of a decree? Only a few months 
earlier the War Ministry had dismissed a complaint from the General Staff of the Stettin Army 
Corps that Jews who were liable for service had been freed from duty. The Ministry had 
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unverhältnismäßig große Anzahl wehrpflichtiger Angehörige des israelitischen Glaubens vom Heerensdienst 
befreit sei oder sich von diesem unter allen nur möglichen Vorwänden drücke'. Wild von Hohenborn, 'Erlass', 




responded by stressing that 'German Jewish citizens [were] doing their duty to the same 
degree as their non-Jewish counterparts'.27  
 Only a month before the census Walther Rathenau had predicted that these 
accusations were an inevitable consequence of the war. He declared, 'the more Jews fall in this 
war, the more enduring their opponents will show that they will have sat behind the front and 
profited from the war. The hate will double and treble'.28 More likely, however, the pandering 
to accusations of Jewish war-shirking was a result of two changes in leadership. The first were 
the appointments in the Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung) of General Paul von 
Hindenburg as Chief of General Staff and Erich Ludendorff as First Quartermaster General 
on 29 August. After a series of successive military failures in the spring of 1916, Hindenburg 
replaced General Erich von Falkenhayn in an attempt to turn the war in Germany's favour. 
The second leadership change occurred on the 27 September when on the request of 
Hindenburg, Deputy War Minister General Franz Gustav von Wandel stepped down and his 
superior Lieutenant General Adolf Wild von Hohenborn resumed command.  
 
Already at the start of the year in January, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and 
the Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Erich von Falkenhayn agreed it was a matter 
of extreme urgency to end the war before the winter of 1916/17 as the combined level of raw 
materials was at its lowest figures.29 Coupled with this shortage of raw materials, devastating 
campaigns on the Western Front in Verdun and the Somme (the failure of Falkenhayn's 'small' 
offensives strategy) meant that Germany was also suffering from a critical shortage of 
manpower. The tipping point came in August when Romania entered the war contrary to 
Falkenhayn's predictions, leading to his replacement.30  
 At this critical moment in the war the Kaiser, under pressure, began devolving his 
authority as Supreme Warlord to Hindenburg and Ludendorff awarding them with almost 
complete control over military but also political and economic matters. In this 'first crisis of 
authority' emanating from a 'military-civilian dualism' General Hindenburg and Ludendorff 
were posited against the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and the Reichstag. The Empire was 
straddled between becoming an Obrigkeitstaat (authoritarian state) and upholding 
parliamentary democracy with a total war economy.31 'The German's response to the 
 
27 Appelbaum, Loyal Sons, 249. 
28 Ibid, 245. 
29 'Aufzeichnung Bethmann Hollwegs', AA, Die Weltkrieg 18, Band 1. Translated excerpt available online 
[https://bit.ly/2SHiG6Y, accessed 14/02/17].   
30 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 67–72. 
31 McElligott, Rethinking the Weimar Republic: Authority and Authoritarianism, 4. 
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campaigns of 1916 was the total mobilisation of resources, cost what it might'.32 It was in this 
spirit that Ludendorff transformed the economy into one of total war through the 
implementation of the Hindenburg Programme. National service was expanded to include 
seventeen to sixty year-old men and passed as law in December under the Patriotic Auxiliary 
Service Law (Hilfsdienstgesetz).33 Skilled workers were released from their duty on the front 
lines and those that had not yet been conscripted were made exempt and sent to work on the 
production of armaments. The programme had the overall effect of placing a larger strain on 
the German economy and causing food shortages across the country. Ludendorff's production 
goals had been unrealistic, and yet after the war, the military leadership shifted the 
responsibility of Germany’s defeat to civilians who had been involved in economic 
production.34   
 As Hindenburg and Ludendorff assumed control, they reordered the command 
structures in the War Ministry by forcing Wandel into early retirement and recalling his 
superior, the Minister of War, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn to Berlin to supervise the 
Hindenburg Programme.35 Whilst Wandel's 'default approach' had been to either ignore the 
far-right's attack on Jews or respond with evasive replies, his successor took a radically 
different approach.36 Only a few weeks into this appointment Hohenborn authorised a decree 
to count the number of German Jews serving in the military.  
 Whilst Hohenborn's name appeared on the order, the 'spiritual father' behind the 
decree was most likely the Director of the General War Department, Colonel Ernst von 
Wrisberg.37 Wrisberg was in charge of briefing Hohenborn upon his return and would likely 
have informed the Deputy about the complaints received by the War Ministry.38 He was also 
the officer in charge of handling the details of implementing the census.39 Moreover, it was 
Wrisberg who provided Alfred Roth with the classified statistical data which he used in his 
 
32 Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 78. 
33 Rüdiger vom Bruch and Björn Hofmeister, eds., Kaiserreich Und Erster Weltkrieg 1871-1918., vol. 8, Deutsche 
Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellung (Stuttgart: P. Reclam, 2000), 402–4. Excerpt available online 
[https://bit.ly/2SL9i28, accessed 13 February 2017].  
34 William Astore and Dennis Showalter, Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2005), 41. 
35 Gerald D. Feldman, ‘The Political and Social Foundations of Germany’s Economic Mobilization, 1914-1916’, 
Armed Forces and Society 3, no. 1 (1976): 135. 
36 Timothy L. Grady, A Deadly Legacy: German Jews and the Great War (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2017), 139; Rosenthal, Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten, 16; Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” 
of 1916’, 122.  
37 See Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’, 124. Historians remain unsure about the exact 
origins of the census and more recent works have decided to not focus on this question. See Geheran, 
‘Rethinking Jewish Front Experiences’; Grady, A Deadly Legacy. 
38 Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’, 123–24; Brian Crim, ‘Jew Census (1916)’, in 
Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution, ed. Richard S. Levy, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, 
California: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 371. 
39 Crim, ‘Jew Census (1916), 371. 
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pamphlet alleging that Jews shirked their war duty. Wrisberg later published these statistical 
findings in his own memoir.40 It was also Wrisberg who in June 1916 had to represent Wandel 
at a high-level staff meeting in order to refute accusations that a large number of Jews were 
evading their military duty, and thus as Angress writes, 'if one proceeds from the question: cui 
bono?, Wrisberg may well have been the spiritual father of the Erlass of 11 October 1916'.41 
After the census was halted and declared closed, a parliamentary session was held on whether 
the census had been linked to antisemitism. Wrisberg was called forward to refute this 
connection, indicating that he had been one of the main figures involved.42 
 Whilst Wrisberg was likely involved in the decision to count the number of Jews 
serving, it was Hohenborn who authored the decree (Erlass), issued on the 11 October 1916. 
The language of the decree was telling and reveals the particular mentalities of Gentile 
Germans, suggesting a prejudice towards Jews and a growing discontent and disillusionment 
with the war. Creating a distancing effect between Jews and Gentiles the decree semitised 
German Jews, apportioning them to the Middle East, as it singled out those, 'belonging to the 
Israelite faith' (Angehöriger des israelitischen Glaubens).43  
 Explaining the purpose behind the census, the decree read that the War Ministry had 
been receiving complaints that a large number of Jews were evading service and in particular 
front line duty. In order to 'verify' these complaints and 'if necessary' (gegebenenfalls) to counter 
them, the decree requested that two surveys be carried out by military units and returned 
within under two months. The first questionnaire demanded statistics on Jews serving on the 
front line and the second on those in administrative duty. Additional information was also 
required on the number of Jewish volunteers and officers, and Jews decorated with the Iron 
Cross.   
 What the actual intention behind the decree was, is difficult to infer. Certainly, it was 
far more nuanced than simply being an outright antisemitic act as claimed by several 
historians.44 More recent accounts have contextualised the census in a larger transnational 
history. David Fine argues that the treatment of Jews in the German army was not unique, as 
segregationist policies were being enforced in the US army with its African American soldiers 
 
40 Ernst von Wrisberg, Erinnerungen an die Kriegsjahre im königlich-preussischen Kriegsministerium, II: Heer und 
Heimat, 1914-1918 (Leipzig: Verlag K.F. Koehler, 1921), 93–95. A year following this publication Franz 
Oppenheimer published a brochure in a series called Fragen unserer Zeit on the Judenzählung and the antisemitic 
bias in Wrisberg's memoirs. See Franz Oppenheimer, Die Judenstatistik des preußischen Kriegsministeriums 
(München: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1922). 
41Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’, 124.  
42 Crim, ‘Jew Census (1916)’, 372. 
43 Hohenborn, 'Erlass', 160.  
44 For a useful overview of the historiography of Judenzählung and which scholars concluded it was driven by 
antisemitism see Appelbaum, Loyal Sons, 297-300. 
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and officers. He also highlights that, another minority, Alsatians were particularly mistrusted 
and transferred away from front-line duty whilst German Jews were never segregated from 
the army.45 The gathering of statistical data was also increasingly becoming standard practice, 
both in a bureaucratising German state but also within the Jewish community.46 Internal 
correspondence within the War Ministry, reveals that the authorisation of the statistical 
inquiry was to collect data - 'similar to that of the "Jewish Committee" [the Committee for 
War Statistics]' - in order to counter complaints that Jews had shirked their war duty. From 
the start, it was, supposedly, intended to remain an internal matter.47 Nevertheless, if the 
decree was issued as part of a wider trend within the German state towards surveillance and 
centralisation of power by gathering information to gain more control over the population, 
why were the Jews singled out? As Matthias Erzberger suggested in the Reichstag, why did 
the War Ministry not decide to conduct a larger census, including a section on confession, on 
all soldiers in active service?  
 
 
II. Do not count on us: the public response to the census  
Whilst the idea of authorising a census on the number of Jews in the army was raised and 
dismissed in the Austrian parliament, this discussion never reached the floor of the German 
parliament.48 The absence of a parliamentary discussion on whether or not to authorise a 
decree to count the number of Jews serving in the war was controversial. Unlike the Supreme 
Command, the War Ministry was an institution partially accountable to the Reichstag.49 The 
Reichstag Budget Committee session of the 19 October 1916 revealed how a petition for a 
census might have been received, had it been discussed in parliament. In this session, Matthias 
Erzberger, a Catholic Centre politician and later Reich Minister of Finance in the first cabinet 
 
45 Fine, ‘Jewish Integration in the German Army in the First World War’, 16. Dreyfus was singled out for his 
possible dual loyalty as a result of his Alsatian background in the Dreyfus Affair, which proved inconclusive. 
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46 Adam Tooze writes about the increasing interest in statistical data gathering and how it formed part of 
Germany's transformation into a modern state. Nicolas Berg looks at the turn towards statistical data 
collection within the Jewish community at the turn of the century. See J. Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German 
State, 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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und Statistik der Juden” (1905)’, in Kopf oder Zahl: Die Quantifizierung von allem im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Matthias 
Winzen and Wagner (Baden-Baden: Ausstellungs-katalog des Museums für Kunst und Technik des 19. 
Jahrhunderts in Baden-Baden, 2011), 257–75. 
47 HASt, Anon., 'Vorgeschichte der Judenstatistik', (20.1.1917), No.33-34.  
48 Rosenthal, Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten, 92–95. A much larger number of Jews fought in the Austro-
Hungarian army, approximately 300, 000 of which 30, 000 died.   
49 On the relationship between the General Staff and the (Prussian) War Ministry see Robert T. Foley, 
‘Prussia: Army 1815-1914’, in Reader’s Guide to Military History, ed. Charles Messenger (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 477–78; Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry and Labour in Germany, 1914-1918 (London: 
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of the Weimar Republic, petitioned for a survey, that would be published, on all persons in 
war agencies listed by sex, age, salary and religious denomination.50 The reaction to the 
survey divided parliament. The Catholic Centre, the Conservatives and the National Liberals 
approved of Erzberger’s petition. The Progressives and Social Democrats were outraged. 
Whilst the petition was never set in motion, it was picked up by the press and unleashed a 
heated public debate on the intention behind the survey and the focus on religious 
denomination. Notably, whilst the minutes of the session did not mention any specific 
confessional group, the dispute pivoted specifically around Jews. The importance of the debate 
lies in the fact that it went beyond the petition for a survey. It concerned the not yet publicly 
announced 'Jew census' (Judenstatistik). Participants of the debate questioned the necessity and 
desired outcome of a confessional census. More importantly, the discussion opened up a Jewish 
Question, which catalysed a debate on unity and the place of religion in the Empire.  
 
Surveying the German press in this period reveals that following the Budget Commission 
meeting on the 19 October, it was public knowledge that the War Ministry had issued a decree 
for a Jew census. The reason given: to dispel antisemitic accusations. Yet the authenticity of 
this intention was viewed with scepticism. In response to an article in the Deutsche Kurier 
defending the National Liberal support for a confessional survey on the grounds that it would 
help protect their ‘fellow Jewish citizens,’ the Berliner Tageblatt cast doubt on this motivation 
and hinted at the antisemitic propensities of members of the Reichstag.51 
 An exchange in the Frankfurter Zeitung was a telling example of the type of debate that 
had been set in motion, namely one concerning national unity. The newspaper received a letter 
from the National Liberal Gustav Stresemann who defended his silent agreement with the 
petition in the Budget Commission meeting. A respondent to Stresemann’s letter declared 
that the census challenged unity within the Empire asking, 'what does confession have to do 
with the war?'. Alluding to the civic truce (Burgfrieden), the author questioned if uniting under 
the flag was not part of 'overcoming differences between Protestants, Catholics, Jews and 
Agnostics?'52 
 
50 Historians debate Erzberger's actions. Angress suggests he raised the subject to reveal this knowledge to 
parliament of the census. Rosenthal argues that Erzberger was antisemitic and says the whole session was 
prejudiced. In the years preceding the war, the Catholic Centre Party regularly protested the Prussian's army 
discriminatory laws against denomination, so I believe it is more likely Erzberger was attempting to provoke a 
response from the War Ministry on the Jew census. See Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten 
Weltkrieg, 525–27; Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’, 125; Rosenthal, Die Ehre des 
jüdischen Soldaten, 55.  
51 Anon., 'Eine merkwürdige Statistik’, Berliner Tageblatt, Morgenblatt (20 Oktober 1916): 3.  
52 Quoted in Rosenthal, Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten, 55. 
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 One of the most vocal critics of the survey was the Social Democrat Philip 
Scheidemann. In an article in the organ of the Social Democratic Party, Vorwärts he challenged 
the purpose behind the survey. He suggested its origins could be traced back to 'the thought 
processes of the gentlemen, to whom the so-called Jewish Question is the alpha and omega 
[das A und O] of genuine German politics'.53 Scheidemann's statement brought the Jewish 
Question into the centrefold of the debate. The singling out of Jews, insinuating that they 
were not loyal citizens to the state and neglecting their patriotic duty, suggested a definitive 
answer to the question of who was, and who was not, respected and protected as a German 
citizen. This scathing comment also illuminated how the Jewish Question revealed ideological 
fault lines amongst the political elite.  
 The debate on the census did not address the question of German national unity alone. 
It also touched on the secular foundations of the German Empire, and the role of religion 
within the state. Scheidemann called the survey 'a monstrous violation of [...] the principles 
of a denominationally neutral state system' (konfessionell neutrales Staatswesen).54 Needing to 
reiterate that the Empire upheld religious equality suggested that Jewish questions brought 
to light the inconsistencies between the constitution and the application of its articles.  
 Social Democrat Daniel Stücklen55 similarly appealed to the constitution, using the 
language of equality and citizenship to protest indirectly against the Jew census. He did this 
in his speech to parliament on the army’s policy to not promote agnostics (Dissidenten) to the 
rank of officer. The implication of Stücklen's speech was clear. The following day in parliament 
the War Ministry officially admitted to issuing a census to count the number of Jews serving 
on the front lines.  
 During his speech, Stücklen reminded the audience of previous debates on religious 
discrimination in the army in order to appeal to a future where constitutional equality would 
be upheld and violations punished. He began by underscoring that the 'the constitution grants 
religious freedom'56 further clarifying that it 'does not allow anyone to be treated worse off for 
their religion than any other citizen'.57 Stücklen argued that excluding individuals based on 
their religion and degrading them to the level of 'second-class citizens' was a violation of the 
constitution. A violation that Stücklen declared 'parliament needs to take a stance against'.58  
 
53 Anon., ‘Die Woche, Berlin den 24. Oktober 1916.’ Allegemeine Zeitung des Judenthums 43 (27 Oktober 1916): 
508.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Daniel Stücklen (1869-1945), journalist and politician. Representative of the Social Democrats. See the 
Bundesarchiv online files [https://bit.ly/2EJNxe9, accessed 05/03/19].  
56 ‘72. Sitzung, 2 November 1916’, Verhandlungen Des Reichstags, Band 308, 1916, 2009–10. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.  
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 Stücklen was alluding to the fact that Jews who decided to not take to the baptismal 
front had been continually denied their legal right of promotion to reserve officer, which was 
enshrined within the Prussian constitution of 1848 and the constitution of the Empire in 
1871.59 For years Jewish parliamentarians had petitioned in Reichstag sessions against the 
discrimination of religious denomination in the Prussian army. Stücklen called the audience's 
attention to these past 'intense' (heftige) parliamentary debates between Gothein and the 
Minister of War concerning the appointment of Jews to the rank of officer.  
 According to Stücklen, these debates involved repeated futile requests by Gothein for 
statistics from the Ministry on the number of Jews that had been promoted to the rank of 
officer. What remains unclear was whether or not the statistics had ever been collected by the 
War Ministry. If they had, it opens another question as to why these statistics had been 
withheld despite requests from Gothein. One likely reason might have been that the Ministry 
did not want to reveal that Jews were doing their duty but denied promotion. The Prussian 
Minister of War Josias von Heeringen confessed as much when he admitted that Jews in 
principle could become officers but that in practice, the officer corps did not elect Jews to 
become officers. He conceded that this was a 'violation of the constitution and of the civic 
principle of equality' but that the Ministry was 'powerless' on the matter. 60 
 Appealing to a future German Empire, Stücklen stressed that differences in politics 
and religious views should not be grounds for exclusion from the army declaring that 'war 
and religion are concepts that should not be so closely related'.61 Comparing the years 
preceding the outbreak of the First World War, where 'only a Christian can be a good soldier' 
and the years since the outbreak of World War One where 'we are fighting shoulder to 
shoulder with the Turks whose bravery is recognised in the German army' Stücklen argued 
that the notion that only Christians can be good soldiers could 'no longer be upheld'. He 
warned the parliament of not returning to the old military ways of Kasten- und Klassengeist 
that had prevailed before the war.62  
 For Stücklen, the census had singled out Jews on a denominal basis. He did not 
mention Stamm, race or ethnicity. His argument followed that of previous parliamentary 
sessions whereby both Jewish and Catholic politicians had protested about the Prussian army's 
treatment of non-Protestants recruits. It was on this basis that Stücklen equated the 'decree 
of General Wild von Hohenborn' with being a 'specifically Prussian achievement'. The 
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political response to the Jew census was fundamental, for Stücklen, to ensuring Germany did 
not return to the ways of the old Empire declaring, 'I have already said that the Reichstag 
must take a clear stance against this constitutional violation'. In his closing lines, Stücklen 
made clear that his speech on agnostics in the army had been made in reference to the War 
Ministry’s decree to count Jews serving in the army and demanded from the Ministry a 
justification for the authorisation of this decree.63 
 The following day, and over three weeks since the census had been commissioned, the 
Deputy War Minister von Wrisberg responded to Stücklen. He assured Stücklen that the 
Ministry would review the question of agnostics and take the opportunity to clarify the qualm 
(Zweifel) over the order issued by the War Ministry. What had started as a not wholly 
uncommon administrative procedure triggered an unprecedented political knock-on effect. 
The language evoked only days prior in media outlets now reached the floor of the Reichstag.  
 
 
III. A constitutional violation? The avowal of the census   
In the parliamentary sitting of the 3 November the discussion on agnostics in the army which 
had taken place in the Budget Committee meeting was scheduled to be discussed again. 
Speaking on behalf of the Ministry of War was Ernst von Wrisberg. Rather than couching 
the census in the language of a confessional survey, as other speakers had done, Wrisberg 
announced that the War Ministry had decreed that 'the number of Jews in the army and their 
duties' had to be established.64 He clarified that the purpose of the decree had been to 'collect 
statistical material' and 'investigate allegations [Vorwürfe] made against Jews'. 'Antisemitic 
intentions' were not behind the decree and he admitted that action had already been taken, 
before the matter had been put forth for a discussion in parliament. 65   
 Several parliamentarians engaged in what one speaker termed, the 'the talk of the day 
[...] this new Judenzählung in the army', moving interchangeably in their speeches from the 
general (religious discrimination in the army) to the particular (the singling out of the Jews 
in a census).66  A theme that emerged in the course of the sitting was reflecting on the census 
as evidence that past prejudices in Germany and hierarchical forms of citizenship continued 
to exist, whilst appealing for a reformed, future German Empire guided by unity and national 
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and religious tolerance.67 Very few of the speakers in the debate protested the authorisation 
of a census, two speakers even admitted that the actions of the War Ministry might have been 
well intended, but all complained that it had been poorly executed. They emphasised the 
consequences of the census for German Jews but more importantly, for the German Empire.  
 Whilst neither the Progressive politician Ludwig Haas68 nor the Social Democrat 
Wolfgang Heine protested the authorisation of a census. Both concurred that the 
administration of the survey was badly conducted. Heine focused on the effect of the statistic, 
which he professed would make Jews look like cowards as the figures would not reveal a 
complete picture of events. In making this argument, however, Heine succumbed to 
antisemitic stereotypes of Jews as 'suffering bodily damage' from the experience of the ghetto, 
which made them less capable to serve and thus appear to be shirking front line duty.69 'It is 
not possible that this race on the basis of bodily strength and health can compete with a 
Pomeranian farmer or Upper Bavarian woodworker' Heine declared. He lamented the 
prevalence of antisemitism in the army despite efforts by the War Ministry to remove these 
tendencies. In particular, he emphasised how Jews who served dutifully alongside Gentiles, 
were often still labelled a 'foreign body' (Fremdkörper).70 
 Haas agreed with Heine that the execution of the survey had been 'clumsy' (ungeschickt). 
He complained that the decree had discredited the honour of Jewish soldiers and purposefully 
intended to 'undermine the authority of Jewish supervisors'. He disagreed, however, that the 
statistics would reveal Jews to be less represented in front line duty as a result of their 
physique. Eighty years of emancipation had eradicated these differences, according to Haas. 
Haas was more concerned with how the data was being collected. He worried that it was 
focused on military units rather than on the involvement by Jews in the total war effort 
especially in sectors such as heavy industry, agriculture, the postal service, the transport 
system and administration.71 
 The Social Democrat Max Quarck similarly highlighted how poorly the census had 
been administrated. Speaking from personal experience in the XVIII Army Corps, he 
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recounted how Jews were 'periodically removed' from their posts for the period of the census, 
resulting in a statistically lower number of Jews serving. Moreover, each state command had 
conducted the census in a different manner. In Bavaria, the census was not even being carried 
out. In Prussia, the command was torn between statistical and practical duties as it maintained, 
with a certain antisemitic prejudice, that Jews were best suited to run the finances rather than 
serve on the front. In Frankfurt, with its large Jewish population, the authorities objected to 
the premise of the census as they did not wish for Jews in their units to appear as shirkers or 
suggest that they received preferential treatment in (administrative) duties. In a sarcastic tone, 
Quarck commented that this was how these 'statistical "truths" materialised' and concluded 
that the outcome of these 'conflicting facts' resulted in an 'ambivalent attitude towards the 
statistic'. Neither had the census produced accurate statistics, nor had it identified 'actual 
shirkers in every confession'.72  
 Aside from the how badly the census had been handled, parliamentarians also criticised 
the War Ministry for violating the constitution, specifically the article on religious tolerance. 
For the speakers, this violation tainted Germany's status internationally and necessitated 
reform. Adolf Neumann-Hofer of the Progressive Party called the decree a 'scandal' that 
'without doubt stands in contradiction to the Prussian constitution' citing the law of the 3 July 
1869, on religious tolerance.73 He used the same argument as Stücklen, demonstrating the 
discrepancy between the constitution and its practice that needed to be overcome in 
Germany.74 Using Universalist language Haas appealed to the prospect of the Empire 
securing its position as a Great Power after the war. Yet, vital for this engagement in world 
politics, Haas stressed, would be 'national and religious tolerance'. He reminded the audience 
of the accusation that was frequently assigned to Germans that 'true tolerance cannot be found 
within the German people'. Asserting that whilst this was unjustified, the decree fell into this 
aforementioned category.75 
 A letter sent to the War Minister by a member of the Prussia Diet, Felix Waldstein, 
after the census had officially been closed down used similar language. Waldstein wrote that 
the census had put 'confessional freedom [...] in danger' and that 'equality has been harmed'. 
The trust that the military was no longer 'party oriented', Waldstein continued, had 
disappeared. Highlighting the importance of Jewish relations for German foreign policy, 
 
72 Ibid, 2053. 
73 Ibid, 2037.  
74 This disconnect was also highlighted in a letter sent by Oskar Cassel from the VdJ to the War Ministry on 
the 29 December. Cassel argued that the order went against the constitutional equality of military duty for all 
confessions. He also quoted Kaiser Wilhelm's Burgfrieden speech to evidence how the census went against the 
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Waldstein noted that the Judenzählung was harming German interests abroad in the 'neutral 
countries' and in particular America. 76 
 Heine urged the audience to consider that should no changes be made with regard to 
the 'poor treatment of Jews and agnostics' Germany's international status would be debased. 
He implored the audience to look towards France as an ideal model where 'no differences exist 
between Jews and Christians' where there was 'no discord', only a 'French people' and a 
'French will'. He suggested that reform within Germany would require a united concerted 
effort. One 'cannot assume that this good future will be gifted to us' declared Heine, 'the people 
must work for this [future]'. Part of this project for unity required the overcoming of 
intolerance and the 'belief in a future of justice and freedom within Germany'. For Heine, it 
was bound into the greater German war effort, 'precisely because the Fatherland and its future 
are sacred to us, we cannot tolerate that through the injustice and inability to learn new things 
[...] the unanimous German will to victory [will be] destroyed'.77  
 
The Judenzählung revealed that the German Empire was at a critical juncture. This became a 
theme that ran throughout the debate. The speakers raised the issue of past prejudices within 
the Empire including the class-based forms of citizenship and used the war as a framing device 
to urge for greater unity and not division. Neumann-Hofer termed the decree a 'medieval 
blunder' (mittelaterlichen Blunder) and rhetorically asked if these dispositions 
(gesinnungsschnüffelei) on 'race, class, faith and convictions' could just be 'thrown overboard' as 
they 'do not belong to our current times'.78 Heine lamented antisemitism in the army 
professing that 'it is miserable when one comrade insults another comrade based on his faith 
or race in a time of the highest exaltation, in a time when the coming together demands all of 
one’s energy, when everyone should only think of unity, of mutual loyalty'. Addressing 
German Jews, Haas similarly announced that 'the war has not suddenly dispelled age-old 
prejudices ... the fight against antisemitism will continue to be necessary'.79  
 Heine warned that Germany was already facing a great danger and should not also 
succumb to internal frictions. 'This feeling of unity' (Einheitsgefühl), he stressed was 
endangered by 'occurrences such as the disregard [...] of Jews'.80 Like other speakers, Heine 
spoke to past mistakes in Germany and to a reformed future. He suggested that it was as if 
Germany had not learnt any lessons from its past. The existence of a hierarchical, class-
 
76 HASt, David Felix Waldstein to Hermann von Stein, (30.08.1917), No. 16-18. 
77 ‘73. Sitzung, 3 November 1916’, 2050. 
78 Ibid, 2038. 
79 Ibid, 2053. 
80 Ibid, 2050. 
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oriented, citizenship meant that whilst everyone might perceive themselves to be on equal 
standing, some were treated with less rights and less honour than others. 
 Similar to Heine, Haas invoked the war to bring the house together. He drew on the 
battle of the Somme to stress that what had been achieved was only possible through a people's 
army (Volksheer) and received an uproarious response from members of the left and right in 
the sitting. 'This can only be achieved' Haas stated, 'when men stand [together] not as 
subordinates [...] but as German soldiers and as German citizens'. He emphasised how the 
decree had caused alienation outside of German Jewish circles at a time when 'inner unity' and 
'inner togetherness' (Geschlossenheit) was urgently required. He pleaded for unity in the Empire 
for now and after the war, 'no more agitation, [...] no in-fighting, now above all unity and 
solidarity in the interest of the Fatherland!'81  
 The speakers concluded the session by imploring the War Ministry to halt the Jew 
census. Neumann-Hofer appealed to the Minister of War and asked him to ensure that the 
improper treatment of subordinates would continue to decrease in order to show that 'our 
army is truly the people in arms and that any supervisor that insults a subordinate is insulting 
the German people'.82 Heine asked the 'Gentlemen of the War Ministry' to take action to 
'remedy all these evils'. And Quarck advised the Ministry to abandon the whole project rather 
than utilise figures collected under dubious circumstances. He reassured the War Ministry 
that the Reichstag fully supported singling out war-shirkers but 'no one can throw, nor wants 
to throw accusations against a confessional group'.83  
 Whilst the language of the decree issued by the War Ministry, which termed Jews, 
Israelites (Israeliten) racialised their identity, all contributors to the debate focused on the Jews 
(Juden) as a group facing religious discrimination.84 Neumann-Hofer did not name the Jewish 
population but rather made reference to a 'religious community' (Religionsgemeinschaft). 
Dressed in his grey Captain’s uniform adorned with the Iron Cross First Class, Haas 
announced that he wished to say a few words on the census because 'I am a Jew'. He described 
himself as a member of a 'community of faith' (Glaubensgemeinschaft).85 Similarly, Heine 
protested against religious intolerance towards a 'state-recognised religious community' 
 
81 Ibid, 2053. 
82 Ibid, 2038. 
83 Ibid. 
84 The word Israeliten suggests national roots and illustrates the complexity of these debates.  However, 
according to Professor Sharon Gillerman, this term was traditionally used in Germany to refer to Jews and had 
more religious rather than national connotations at the time. 
85 This was the same language used by Oskar Cassel in his correspondence with the War Ministry. He did not 
refer to the Jews as an ethnicity or race but rather as fellow members of a faith (Glaubengenossen). The 
correspondence can be found in the following file, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart: Judenstatistik aus dem Jahre 1916, 
M 738, Bü 46. 
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(staatlich anerkannte Religionsgemeinschaft) and yet he was the only speaker to also refer to the 
Jews as a race.86 He argued that less Jews were serving on the front because of their 'bodily 
differences', which were a result of 'race and history'.87 Describing the Jews as a race was in 
contrast to Haas and Quarck who were of Jewish descent and presumably, as liberal Jews, 
would have wanted to avoid ascribing any additional attributes that could single out Jews as 
not belonging to the national unifying elements of the Empire.  
 
The debate in the 73 Sitting was the last dedicated discussion to take place on the 
Judenzählung.88 The absence of a longer follow-up discussion was either the result of pressure 
from Jewish representatives to stop the census or on a practical level because after the final 
session of the year on the 12 December the parliament only reconvened on the 22 February 
1917 already one month after the census was declared a closed case. As Germany was on the 
brink of famine, food supplies dominated parliamentary discussions. Similarly, the 
Judenzählung did not feature extensively in the press, such that it had after the Reichstag 
Budget Committee meeting. Only three short articles mentioned the census. They focused on 
where it was had been conducted and what had been said in parliament.89 No further 
contributions on the subject of the Judenzählung appeared in the Berliner Tageblatt, not even 
after the official acknowledgment that the census was a closed case. The reason for this, one 
may speculate, was due to the wartime censorship promulgated in the spirit of the Burgfrieden. 
Part of the civic truce was ensuring that all news relating to Germany depicted the country 
as a united front to not enable the enemy to know and seize upon any weaknesses in domestic 
politics.90  
 The outbreak of the war in 1914 was a caesura in the history of the German Empire, a 
moment when German citizens took up arms and sacrificed their lives for the Fatherland. 
Whilst the war heralded unity and solidarity, the Judenzählung pulled back this facade and 
exposed the Empire's past prejudices. The census revealed an Empire at crossroads between 
 
86 ‘73. Sitzung, 3 November 1916’, 2048. 
87 Ibid, 2049. 
88 The Judenzählung was invoked by a minister (Henke) on the 30 November. He used it as an example of 
previous discriminations and injustices in an argument about increasing worker's rights. See ‘77. Sitzung, 30 
November 1916’, Verhandlungen Des Reichstags, Band 308, (1916), 2228. The Judenstatistik was also very briefly 
brought up in a discussion on the 12 June 1918 concerning why the highest number of conscripts came from 
lower classes see '173. Sitzung, 12 Juni 1918', Verhandlungen Des Reichstags, Band 313, (1918), 5441. 
89 Anon., 'Judenzählung” beim Roten Kreuz ', Berliner Tagesblatt, Morgenblatt, (4 November 1916), 3; Anon., ‘Die 
“konfessioneele Zählung” im Heere und der Reichstag’, Berliner Tagesblatt, Abendblatt (4 November 1916), 3; 
Anon., 'Zur Judenstatistik in der Armee', Berliner Tageblatt, (5 November 1916), 3.  
90 The justification used for censoring Vorwärts and the Berliner Tageblatt was that they violated the Burgfrieden 
by reporting critically on matters of domestic politics. This discussion is important in that it illustrates how 
the German nation was negotiating freedom of the press. See ‘70. Sitzung, 30 October 1916’, Verhandlungen Des 
Reichstags, Band 308, (1916), 1913. 
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its past tainted by constitutional inequality and a future, necessitated by the war, of unity and 
tolerance. How the Empire would respond was crucial. Much like the authorisation of the 
decree itself, the census was declared a closed case with good intentions. However, the ways 
in which the case was closed was poorly conducted and as a consequence would have fatal 
repercussions. The aftermath of the parliamentary debate signalled the practical end to a 
survey on Jewish participation in the army and yet, it marked the beginning of a much longer 
legacy of the Judenzählung.  
 
 
IV. Not adding up: inconsistencies and the conclusion of the Jew census    
The day after the parliamentary session featuring Wrisberg's official admission of a census,  
Oscar Cassel, a member of the Progressive Party and representative of the Alliance of German 
Jews (Verband der deutschen Juden, VdJ) visited Colonel Ulrich Hoffmann, Head of the War 
Ministry Central Department91 in which he called the decree a ‘grave injustice’, which had 
caused sentiments of ‘indignation and uneasiness’ in the Jewish community.92 The decree had 
led to the transferral of Jews away from administrative posts to front line duty, as Quarck had 
explained in his speech to the Reichstag on the 3 November. Cassel demanded that the War 
Ministry inform unit commanders that they did not have the right to authorise these transfers 
simply on the grounds that these servicemen were Jewish. Cassel also requested a formal 
clarification from the Ministry that the census had been authorised in order to dispel 
accusations levelled against Jews. In the previous parliamentary debate, Quarck had similarly 
queried the contradiction between the document received by his army corps, which called the 
accusations against Jews 'unjustified' and the explanation for the decree given by Wrisberg, 
which was vague on whether the complaints were baseless.93  
 A week following the meeting, the new War Minister General Hermann von Stein 
issued a supplementary order to the decree clarifying that it had been issued to collect 
statistical material for charges against Jews and did not warrant the transferal of soldiers from 
their current assignments.94 Hermann von Stein had replaced Adolf Wild von Hohenborn as 
War Minister on the 29 October, just ten days after the subject of a Jew census first reached 
the floor of the Reichstag and was hotly contested in the press. The replacement of 
Hohenborn, a highly respected Lieutenant General, only thirty-two days after his 
 
91 This meeting is referenced by Alfred Roth.   
92 Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’, 128.  
93 ‘73. Sitzung, 3 November 1916’, 2053. 
94 Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’, 128.  
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appointment suggests that perhaps the Ministry acknowledged that the census had been a 
blunder and attempted to minimise the damage through internal restructuring.95  
  
Acting on his own initiative, the prominent Hamburger banker Max Warburg took on his 
own defence of Jewish rights. He lobbied at a higher-level of political command than Cassel, 
the Chancellery. In an essay entitled Die Judenfrage im Rahmen der deutschen Gesamtpolitik first 
written in the summer of 1916, Warburg expressed his disappointment with the false 
pretences of the ‘spirit of 1914’. This spirit, embodied in the civic truce, had not heralded the 
removal of discriminatory practices against German Jews in the public service nor in the army. 
When in October, Warburg became aware of the Jew census, he had copies of his essay sent 
to the War Minister von Stein, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and to the Director of the 
Chancellery, Under Secretary Arnold Wahnschaffe, with whom he was on good terms.96 In 
response to the census, Warburg requested a public declaration, which he would eventually 
receive, explaining that German Jews had fulfilled their patriotic duty to the same degree as 
their Christian comrades.97  
 Throughout the winter of 1916 Warburg maintained both a regular correspondence 
and met frequently with Wahnschaffe to little success. Tensions were high in the winter of 
1916 between the Chancellery, the Supreme Army Command and the War Ministry as 
Germany was confronted with several crucial developments in the war including a shortage 
of raw materials on the home front, a proposal to open peace negotiations and the question of 
an independent Poland. Whilst the Chancellery continued to express sympathy for Warburg's 
cause and the Chancellor was notably embarrassed by the War Ministry's decree, its actions 
were limited. Moreover, it did not want to cause any further additional friction to the 
structures of authority.98 
 Once aware of the constraints and unwillingness of the Chancellery to take action, 
Warburg changed his approach. Going on the offensive, Warburg sent a threatening letter to 
the Reichsbank official, Oskar Schmiedecke warning him that the census 'might well have 
unfortunate consequences for the impending sixth war-loan drive because the Jews, and in 
particular the bankers amongst them who had given very generously in the past, were now 
 
95 Feldman writes that Hohenborn was removed by Bethmann-Hollweg and Ludendorff because he disagreed 
with the decisions being made in the Supreme Army Command. He was instead replaced by the more 'tractable' 
Hermann von Stein. However, Feldman does not explicitly mention whether or not this transfer had anything 
to do with the Judenzählung as it is not the focus of his article. See Feldman, ‘The Political and Social 
Foundations of Germany’s Economic Mobilization, 1914-1916’, 135–36. 
96 Max Waburg, 'Die Judenfrage im Rahmen der deutschen Gesamtpolitik', Bundesarchiv Koblenz, No. 110, 
(1916), 106-110. Cited in Angress, ‘The German Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’, 129. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid, 130.  
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bound to be less inclined to exert themselves'.99 Only a few days prior, the Chief of Police in 
Frankfurt am Main had sent a letter to Wahnschaffe reporting that well-known Jews involved 
in commerce and banking had felt alienated by the census. The Chief of Police had expressed 
his concern for the impending war-loan drive, which was due the following spring.100 
 Independent of whether or not the letter had a decisive impact on the decision of the 
War Ministry to stop the census, it certainly had its desired effect. On the 20 January, Cassel 
received a letter from the War Minister von Stein which reiterated that the census had been 
conducted to provide evidence that would disprove the allegations that Jews were serving in 
smaller numbers on the front lines. The letter, however, was not apologetic. The disorganised 
implementation of the census was blamed on the size of the army. In an army of a 'million 
men', the letter read that it was 'no wonder' the census had been badly managed. The letter 
concluded by confirming that the 'the conduct of Jewish soldiers and fellow citizens during 
the war has not been the cause that prompted the order of my predecessors, and therefore 
cannot be associated with it'.101 The War Minister never made a public statement. The last 
few lines of the letter were instead made public by Oskar Cassel who published them in the 
Allgemeine Zeitung des Judenthums.102 
 Only four months after the decree had been issued, it was declared a closed case. On 
the 22 January the War Minister von Stein informed Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg that no 
further action regarding the Judenzählung would be taken.103 Whilst officially the census was 
at an end, unjustified transferals of Jewish soldiers continued to take place in the last years of 
the war.104  
 The figures collected by the War Ministry were never officially published.105 The 
justification given was that they had been collected for internal use only.106 As the statistics 
were never published, it left open the possibility for the official figures to be disputed. The 
exact numbers of Jews that served on the front lines during the war became a heated topic 
shortly after the end of the war.  The debate, which took place over several years, was 
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retrospectively called the 'statistical dispute' (Statistikerstreit). Rather than serving to counter 
antisemitic claims, which had been more successfully achieved through the War Ministry's 
censorship policy, the census commissioned to dispel myths, perpetuated them. 
 
 
V. 1919 and still counting, the legacy of the Judenzählung 
Three years after a decree had first been authorised to count Jews in the army, Alfred Roth, 
writing under the pseudonym Otto Armin published a pamphlet entitled Die Juden im Heere. 
Allegedly using 'official statistical data' the pamphlet demonstrated that Jews had served and 
died in comparatively smaller numbers to Gentiles during the war.107 For every Jewish soldier 
killed, Roth professed that over three hundred Gentiles had died. On this basis, he concluded 
that Jews had not scarified their lives in equal measure to Gentiles for the Fatherland.108 As 
early as March 1916, Alfred Roth and Theodore Fritsch, members of a Pan-German League, 
the Reichshammerbund, had written to the Kaiser, Reichstag delegates and prominent 
individuals claiming that the Jews were responsible for the 'psychological collapse of the 
German nation and of German commercial life by the system of Ballin and Rathenau'.109  They 
had pleaded the Kaiser to announce an end to the Burgfrieden and punish the Jews. Alfred 
Roth's antisemitic views were well known. His pamphlet on the participation of Jews in the 
German army was published by the Munich-based antisemitic publishing house Deutscher 
Volksverlag. The intentions behind Roth's pamphlet were clear. He had aimed to discredit the 
Jewish community by suggesting they were complicit in the defeat of the German army, thus 
shifting blame away from the faults of the military command. 'The notion of selfless devotion 
to the people and the Fatherland has no place among them' wrote Roth, 'because they want to 
be foreigners'.110 
 Antisemitic pamphlets on Jews in the army were not uncommon and yet Roth's 
pamphlet created a stir.111 One reason for this was because Roth purposefully disputed 
statistics published in a pamphlet entitled 'Truth and Justice' by Rabbi Leopold Rosenak. 
Rosenak had suggested that 20% of the Jewish population had served in the war (100, 000 out 
of 500, 000, according to Rosenak). Secondly, Roth's pamphlet was attacked because it claimed 
to be using statistics from 'official sources'. The sources that Roth was referring to were 
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confidential and had never been published. According to Roth, the statistics had been leaked 
to him by the Deputy War Minister, Wrisberg as early as 1917. Using these 'official' statistics, 
Roth suggested Rosenak's figure, that 100, 000 Jews had served in the war, was impossible. 
According to Roth, this number would have constituted a fifth of the Jewish population.112 His 
assessment was, however, inaccurate as it would have constituted a sixth, of the Jewish 
population.113 Instead, Roth listed that 62, 515 Jewish soldiers had served in the army of which 
only half, he claimed, had served on the more perilous front lines.114  
 That Jewish soldiers had shirked their war duty on the front lines was a central 
contention in the Jew census. This idea was perpetuated by a comment by Graf von Westarp 
in a parliamentary sitting on the 3 November, when he highlighted that the accusations 
against Jews involved the concern that they were overwhelmingly represented in the war 
corporations (Kriegsgesellschaft) on the home front.115 Only a year following Roth's pamphlet, 
another was published by Hans Friedrich, which also alleged that Jews had evaded their 
military duties and cited the same statistics as Roth.116  
 
In 1921, the Statistikerstreit, which had lain dormant for a year, erupted once again. The 
classified statistical data collected by the War Ministry that both Alfred Roth and Hans 
Friedrich had cited appeared once again in print, in the memoirs of General Erich von 
Wrisberg.117 In response to the another publication which suggested that Jews had not served 
on the front lines, the sociologist and Chairman of the Committee for War Statistics (Ausschuß 
für Kriegsstatistik) Jacob Segall published an alternative set of figures on Jewish war-time 
participation. The committee was founded in the spring of 1915 by several Jewish 
organisations and coordinated by the director of the Berlin Office for Statistics, Professor 
Heinrich Silbergleit. It collected data on all Jewish soldiers that were serving.118 Using this 
data, in his pamphlet entitled Die deutschen Juden als Soldaten im Kriege, Segall documented 
that 100, 000 Jews had fought in the war, 80, 000 had served on the front lines and 12, 000 
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had died serving.119 In publishing these figures Segall hoped to bring the statistical pamphlet 
war, which had reached its third year, to an irrefutable end.  
 The work conducted by the Committee for War Statistics was part of a growing trend 
amongst German-Jewish organisations to collect statistical data on the community in order 
to dispel antisemitic attacks. Some smaller Jewish communities, for example in Würzburg, 
even began to collect their own local wartime statistics.120 The methodology outlined by the 
committee was precise. A single formula was used to collect material based on draft status, 
age, profession, birthplace and it varied according to the size of cities. The compilation of data 
relied on the collective cooperation of individual researchers who travelled door-to-door as 
well as on the goodwill of rabbis, teachers and civil servants who sifted through official news 
reports on wartime statistics.121 Statistical data collecting was not, however, supported by all 
German Jewish associations. The Zionist Federation, for instance, thought it was 'ludicrous' 
to use the same methods as antisemites.122 
 Whilst intending to bring the statistical dispute to a conclusion, Segall's pamphlet did 
little to deter antisemitic agitation. Shortly following its publication, the Statistikerstreit took 
on a different quality as it descended into a technical debate on statistical analysis, specifically 
methods of data collection and statistical bias. Supporting Roth, Wrisberg claimed that the 
War Ministry had withheld the results of the census in order to avoid them being used by 
antisemites. Wrisberg implied that the figures would have been unfavourable towards Jews 
and might have spurred antisemitic attacks.123 Like Segall, Franz Oppenheimer challenged 
the methodology of the Judenzählung, describing it as ‘the greatest statistical obscenity 
perpetrated by any authority’.124 Oppenheimer who had worked as Wrisberg's subordinate for 
a number of years in the War Ministry, directly responded to Wrisberg's memoirs in a 
pamphlet on the Judenstatistik published in 1922 where he stressed the bias in Wrisberg’s 
interpretation of the statistics.125  
 
The dispute over Jewish participation and the legacy of the Judenzählung was not only 
confined to the Statistikerstreit and the written word. The myth of Jewish war shirking was 
also discussed in a court case in 1921. The case involved Dietrich Eckart, editor of Auf Gut 
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Deutsch and founder of the German Worker's Party (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, DAP), and Rabbi 
Samuel Freund in what came to be known as the 'Eckhart Affair'. Eckhart had offered a prize 
of 1,000 Reichsmarks to anyone that could name one Jewish family whose sons had served on 
the front lines for longer than three weeks. When Rabbi Freund sent Eckart a list of twenty 
families, and Eckart refused to pay, he sued him. After providing evidence of a further fifty 
families who had lost multiple sons in the war, Freud won the court case and was financially 
compensated.126 The court case reveals the different legacies of the Judenzählung. It shows 
how Jews fought for their rights in court127 and how whilst the census was issued to dispel 
accusations, the aftermath only served to amplify allegations of Jewish war-shirking. 
 The subject of the Judenzählung arose once again in February 1924 in a Reichstag sub-
committee meeting, which had been convened in order to examine the reasons for Germany’s 
defeat in the war. In a discussion on shirkers, Albrecht Philipp, minister of the German 
National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) claimed that the Judenzählung 
had occurred at the command of the Jews and that the results had been kept secret following 
pressure from pro-Jewish groups. Julius Moses of the Social Democratic Party dismissed his 
claim citing both the results published by Segall as well as the Freud vs. Eckart court case.128 
The significance of the event lies in the perpetuation of the accusation that Jews did not serve 
in equal measure in the war and ultimately were responsible for the army’s defeat. Whilst the 
Jews were not explicitly mentioned in General Ludendorff's speech to the new government 
where he pronounced that the German army had been stabbed-in-the-back,129 their 
involvement in the disarming of the 'unconquered' German army became part of the 
Dolchstoßlegende.130 This claim would continue to flourish within far-right circles throughout 
the Weimar Republic and into the Third Reich.131 
 In 1932, the Reich Federation of Jewish Front-Line Soldiers (Reichsbund Jüdischer 
Frontsoldaten) published a memorial book listing the names of approximately 10, 000 Jewish 
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soldiers that had died during the First World War.132 The memorial book was published as 
evidence against continued virulent antisemitic accusations that Jews had not seen battle and 
was one of several commemorative initiatives by the Reichsbund.133 The federation placed 
particular importance on front-line service to the extent that members were required to have 
served in a combat unit and it could not have been for only a temporary period.134 The Reich 
Federation was founded in the first months of 1919 by Reserve Captain Leo Loewenstein 
when soldiers were returning from the front. It sought to defend the honour of Jewish veterans 
against antisemitism.135  By 1926, its membership reached almost 40, 000 making it the second 
largest Jewish association in Germany after the Central Association.136 The federation 
published several books including Kriegsbriefe gefallener deutscher Juden, which in 1961 was re-
printed with a preface written by the West German Defence Minister, Franz Josef Strauß. 
The legacy of Judenzälung was evidenced in the preface where Strauß recognised that,  
 
100, 000 men of the Jewish faith and Jewish ethnicity wore the grey uniform of 
the German Empire, more than a third of them were decorated, over 2, 000 were 
officers and 1, 200 medics. 12, 000 Jewish soldiers fell in struggle and good faith 
for their Fatherland.137  
 
 Whilst these figures, mirroring those collected by the Committee for War Statistics 
and not the classified data leaked by Wrisberg, suggest that the Jewish community had 
triumphed in the Statistikerstreit, the exact numbers will most likely never be known.138 As the 
military archives were destroyed in the Allied bombing campaign over Berlin and Potsdam in 
the Second World War it is impossible to ascertain what the results of the surveys received 
by the War Ministry revealed. More significant than the exact figures, however, was the 
persistence with which they continued to be disputed. It demonstrates how the short-lived 
 
132 Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten, Die jüdischen gefallenen des deutschen Heeres, der deutschen Marine und der 
deutschen Schutztruppen 1914-1918. Ein Gedenkbuch. (Berlin: Verlag Der Schild, 1932). 
133 The Federation was involved in the erection of several permanent war memorials and often planned 
commemorative events at the local and national level. See Grady, The German-Jewish Soldiers of the First World 
War in History and Memory, 4. 
134 Tim Grady, ‘Fighting a Lost Battle: The Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten and the Rise of National 
Socialism’, German History 28, no. 1 (2010): 4. 
135 Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten, 1919–1938: Geschichte eines jüdischen Abwehrvereins 
(Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1977). 
136 Grady, ‘Fighting a Lost Battle: The Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten and the Rise of National 
Socialism’, 3. 
137 Reichsbund Jüdischer Frontsoldaten, Kriegsbriefe gefallener deutscher Juden. Quoted and trans. in Fine, ‘Jewish 
Integration in the German Army in the First World War’, 17.  
138 Most historians have accepted Jacob Segall's figures as the most accurate. See Brian E. Crim, Antisemitism in 




census had an unprecedented legacy as it was manipulated and instrumentalised to promote a 
virulent antisemitism.  
 Historians have tended to focus on the significance of the Judenzählung for Jews on the 
front lines and in the larger narrative of German-Jewish relations, often examining the role 
that institutional antisemitism played in the events surrounding the census.139 Although this 
was not the immediate focus of this chapter, it has contextualised the census within the trend 
towards statistical data collection in the German state apparatus and the Jewish community. 
I have shown how assessing whether the census was governed by antisemitism alone requires 
a far more nuanced examination than providing a definitive answer. Intentions aside, this 
chapter has shown how it was the conduct and aftermath of the census that incensed the public 
and members of parliament. Michael Geheran summarises the consequences of the census 
accurately when he writes that, 'although allegations of Jewish cowardice and indifference to 
the Fatherland had been prevalent before the First World War, they were given new life after 
1918. The Jew Count gave these accusations a veneer of credibility. It generated ambivalence, 
uncertainty and reasonable doubt'.140  
 The main focus of this chapter, however, was to illustrate how the decree to conduct a 
statistical survey on the Jewish contribution in the army, crystallised a discourse on equality 
before the law, religious tolerance and unity in the German Empire. The summer of 1916 was 
a critical time for the German Empire.  Almost complete authority was devolved to the 
Supreme Army Command under Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff in a last effort to turn 
the war in Germany's favour. By the time the Jewish census was issued, the Empire was on 
the brink between descending into an Obrigskeitstaat (authoritarian state) and upholding a 
semblance of parliamentary democracy as it embraced a total war economy. The Judenzählung 
exposed the Empire at a critical juncture. Jewish questions, as such, provide a lens through 
which to examine this transitional moment as Germany negotiated its path towards a modern 







139 Appelbaum and Rosenthal argue that it was a critical milestone in the rise of the National Socialists, whilst 
Angress and more recent accounts (Fine, Grady) concur that it was not a watershed moment that severed 
German-Jewish relations. See Appelbaum, Loyal Sons; Rosenthal, Die Ehre des jüdischen Soldaten; Grady, A 
Deadly Legacy; Fine, ‘Jewish Integration in the German Army in the First World War’; Angress, ‘The German 
Army’s “Judenzählung” of 1916’. 





'Article 113 leads into the deepest questions of the concept of nationality’: minority 
rights in the Weimar constitution 
 
1916 was a turning point in the First World War for the Central Powers and for German-
Jewish relations. As outlined in chapter two, in October 1916 the War Ministry issued an 
official decree to count the number of Jews serving on the front lines. Known as the 
Judenzählung the event undermined Kaiser Wilhelm's famous 1914 declaration of a civic truce, 
Burgfrieden. For the first time since the outbreak of war, antisemitic views had found 
institutional validation in Germany. Framed within parliamentary sessions as a 'Jewish 
Question' the debate on the census brought forth questions about the future of the post-war 
modern German state and in particular the place of religion. The final two years of the war 
for Germany were defined by the misplaced hubris of the German military leadership and a 
disconnect with sentiments on the home front where an anti-war attitude was gaining 
momentum. Despite heavy losses in 1916 and the worst winter of the war, which caused a 
famine across the country, by the following year, the tide turned, albeit briefly, in favour of 
the Central Powers on the Eastern Front as the Russian Empire collapsed. The Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, signed in March 1918, temporarily boosted moral.1 In an attempt to end the 
war before the involvement of the United States of America, the Central Powers rapidly 
launched the Kaiser's Battle (Kaiserschlacht), a series of quick offensives on the Western Front. 
Crucially, however, Germany lacked the weapons and the manpower. New German recruits 
were exhausted by the war and revolutionary feelings were rife.  
 By autumn, the Supreme Army Command confessed to Kaiser Wilhelm and the 
government that they could no longer hold the lines on the Western Front and that an 
armistice had to be negotiated immediately. Chancellor Georg von Hertling resigned along 
with his cabinet. The new Chancellor Prince Max von Baden took on the bitter task of 
arranging peace negotiations with the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson.  
 A series of political and constitutional reforms towards the parliamentarisation of the 
Empire headed by Max von Baden did little to quell the revolutionary fervour or satisfy 
Woodrow Wilson's armistice demands.2 In early November 1918, a major mutiny involving 
 
1 On Germany's experience on the Eastern Front see Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front; Stone, The 
Eastern Front. 
2 On Max von Baden's constitutional reforms see Lothar Machtan, Prinz Max von Baden der letzte Kanzler des 
Kaisers: eine Biographie, 1. Auflage (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013), 405–14. 
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tens of thousands of sailors took place in Kiel. As the civil unrest spread across the country a 
number of workers and soldiers’ councils were formed. By the 7 November the revolution had 
reached Munich where the Monarch Ludwig III of Bavaria was deposed. On the 8 November, 
the People's Free State of Bavaria was declared. The next day Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated, and 
the German Republic was announced.3 At this critical juncture in Germany's political 
development another practical Jewish Question arose.  
 On the 9 November a political vacuum had opened in Germany. At stake were two 
central questions: what institutions would fill this void and how would these institutions be 
governed? In an attempt to fill the space and tame the revolution, several bodies sprung up 
all vying for political power and dominance. By November the newly appointed Chancellor 
Friedrich Ebert helped establish a provisional government, the Council of People’s 
Representatives,4 consisting of a coalition between the Social Democrats and Independent 
Socialists (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, USPD). The provisional 
government set in motion the drafting of a new constitution and fixed the date for the election 
of the new government to January 1919. The German-Jewish lawyer Hugo Preuss was elected 
to draft the constitution of the Republic, which was ratified on the 11 August 1919. Over the 
course of only eight months the constitution was drafted, revised and redrafted five times. 
Within this scope of only a few months, a series of extensive debates took place on the wording 
of each clause in the constitution. In the discussions on the wording of Article 113, Germany's 
policy on minority rights, a Jewish Question resurfaced.  
 The wording of Article 113, Germany’s policy on minority rights, as it was debated in 
the two institutions tasked with drafting the constitution, namely the National Assembly5  and 
the Eighth Committee or Constitutional Committee (Achte Ausschuß),6 will be the main focus 
of this chapter.7 I will demonstrate how debates over how to define minorities, delved into the 
 
3 For a recent account on the German revolution see Mark Jones, Founding Weimar: Violence and the German 
Revolution of 1918-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
4 The council included Friedrich Ebert, Philip Scheidemann, Otto Landsberg of the Social Democratic Party 
and Hugo Haase, Wilhelm Dittmann and Emil Barth of the Independent Socialists. A third of the council were 
of Jewish descent. The council gave up power on the 13 February 1919.  
5 In 1919 the National Assembly had 421 members, of which eight were listed as of the Jewish confession (2%). 
This figure excludes any members who did not list their confession or converted.  
6 The Achter Ausschuß had thirteen members: Benerle, Delbrück, Düringer, Gröber, Hautzmann, Kahl, 
Katzenstein, Koch, Mausbach, Quarck, Sinzheimer, Spahn and Weitz. 
7 A survey of the minutes of the Council of People’s Representatives (14 November 1918 to 8 February 1919) 
reveals that Jewish questions related to minority rights, citizenship or secularism were not a subject of 
discussion. Rather the Council was preoccupied with the armistice, the retreat of the army especially from the 
Eastern Front, the Bolshevist threat and the use of violence by the state. For this reason, whilst the Council 
was the governing institution that administered the drafting of the constitution it was not the political body 
that drafted and ratified it, and thus will not be the focus of this chapter. For the translated minutes of the 
Council see Charles B. Burdick and Ralph H. Lutz, eds., The Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 1918-
1919 (Stanford, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), 65-209. 
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heart of the so-called ‘Jewish Question’. Out of the discussions emerged a Jewish Question. 
Asked both of Jews with regard to their rights in the constitution and by Jews as they 
tentatively negotiated questions regarding their social, legal and political status in light of the 
gradual emergence, and international recognition, of ethnically homogenous nation-states. 
 Germans of Jewish descent played an active role in post-war political processes and 
many welcomed the new constitution, which marked the zenith in the struggle for full 
emancipation.8 Referring to the continued discriminations against Jews in Germany despite 
the emancipation act of 1871 one commentator wrote, ‘it is only with the establishment of the 
[Weimar] Republic that in principle these hindrances appear at least to no longer exist'.9 In 
the delegation sent to negotiate peace in Versailles two of the six were of Jewish descent, 
Minister of Justice Otto Landsberg and Chairman of the German Democratic Party, Carl 
Melchior. Germans Jews were similarly represented in the committee founded to oversee the 
drafting of the constitution, whereby three of the thirteen members, 23% were listed as of the 
Jewish confession.10 One of the most important figures in these constitutional discussions was 
the author of the document, Hugo Preuss who was himself Jewish. Of the interlocutors 
involved in the sittings on minority rights, the majority were listed as Jewish and whilst not 
all Jews were interested in debating minority rights, as Marcus Kirchhoff writes, 'the 
particular virulence of these layers of debates, from within and without, lay in the fact that 
they involved questions of their own collective status and their own political self-
understanding’.11  
 Focusing on these constitutional debates reveals that the discussion of Article 113 on 
minority rights opened up a debate on the Jewish Question, which in turn provoked more 
profound enquiries into the concept of national identity and the secular state in this crucial 
moment in German history. As Oskar Cohn stated in the course of the debates, ‘our petition 
and Article 113 leads into the deepest questions of the concept of nationality’.12 
 
 
8 On the role of Jews in nation-building in the German Empire and Weimar Republic, especially their 
involvement in 'constitution-making' see Peter Pulzer, ‘Jews and Nation-Building in Germany, 1815-1918’, Leo 
Baeck Institute Year Book 41 (1996): 199–214. 
9 The document is anonymous however it is probable that Moritz Sobernheim wrote this record as the expert 
on Jewish Affairs in the Foreign Ministry. See R19605 AA, ‘K181838, Internationale Angelegenheiten Nr. 3: Die 
Juden, Band 1 (1918-1919), März 1919, 1.   
10 Of the information available I can infer that three were of Jewish descent (Katzenstein, Quarck and 
Sinzheimer). See Verhandlungen der verfassunggebenden deutschen Nationalversammlung, Band 336, Nr. 391, 
(Berlin: Julius Sittenfeld, 1920), 1.  
11 Markus Kirchhoff, ‘Between Weimar and Paris - German Jewry and the Minority Question, 1919’ (Draft 
conference paper for Columbia University, New York, 2012), 2.   




The chapter will begin by introducing its protagonists, the drafter of the constitution Hugo 
Preuss and the only Member of Parliament to challenge his wording on Article 113, the 
Independent Socialist politician and Zionist, Oskar Cohn. Despite their seminal contributions 
to German democracy, minority rights and the constitution, both continue to be lesser-known 
figures in the cannon of Weimar political thinkers.13 This chapter seeks to rescue these 
thinkers from obscurity by examining one particular debate in which the policy on minority 
rights (Article 113) opened a Jewish Question, which, in turn, catalysed a discussion on the 
foundations of the German nation-state.  
 The significance of these debates is that they re-opened a nineteenth century debate 
on ideas of the nation, evoking the language of Moritz Lazarus and Ernest Renan as the 
French model of the political nation was proposed as an alternative to the German cultural 
nation. This moment of decisive change opened a window of opportunity to challenge 
preconceptions on the concept of nationhood and statehood as the German Empire became a 
Republic. Focusing on the so-called Jewish Question, which wedged open German 
conceptions of nationhood, statehood, citizenship and secularism offers a unique perspective 
on how ideas about the modern state were conceptualised, challenged and constructed.  
 
 
I. The protagonists: Hugo Preuss and Oskar Cohn  
As the drafter of the constitution Hugo Preuss’s classification of minority groups as ‘foreign-
speaking parts of the population' (fremdsprachliche Volksteile) cemented the wording of Article 
113 within the criteria of language. In Preuss's personal position on Jewry, he maintained that 
Jews were one of several religious groups in a multi-confessional Germany and saw no need 
to grant them any minority rights concessions.14 Nearly all contributors to the debate 
supported Preuss's wording. Only one representative challenged Preuss’s terminology – but 
stood alone in this assertion. Over the course of six months Cohn petitioned several times to 
alter the wording to ‘national minorities’ (nationale Minderheiten), to no avail. Despite his 
failure, Cohn brought Jewish questions to the heart of political theoretical discourse on the 
modern nation-state. Before turning to the debate on Article 113, the following section will 
start by briefly introducing the two protagonists of this chapter.  
 
13 In a recent article Caldwell contends that the reception of Weimar political thought in the Anglo-Saxon 
world is still dominated by Carl Schmidt. See Peter C. Caldwell, ‘Hugo Preuss’s Concept of the Volk: Critical 
Confusion or Sophisticated Conception?’, University of Toronto Law Journal 63, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 1. 
14 In private correspondence to his sons, Preuss complained about antisemitism. He commented on how idiotic 
and irrational it was and how it was taking away his Germanness. Günther Gillessen, Hugo Preuss: Studien zur 
Ideen- und Verfassungsgeschichte der Weimarer Republik, Erstveröffentlichung der Dissertation von 1955, 
Schriften zur Verfassungsgeschichte, Band 60 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2000). 
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 On the 14 November 1918 an article appeared in the popular newspaper the Berliner 
Tagesblatt titled Volksstaat oder verkehrter Obrigkeitsstaat? Published just under a week after the 
events of the November revolution and collapse of the Monarchy, the article warned of the 
challenges facing the new Republic.15 The day after its publication, the author of the article, 
Hugo Preuss, was appointed Minister of the Interior by the Chairman of the Council of 
People's Deputies, and later President of the Republic, Friedrich Ebert who tasked Preuss 
with drafting a democratic constitution.16  
 Born on 28 October 1860 in the west of Berlin to Jewish parents of the liberal 
bourgeois milieu, Hugo Preuss studied law and governance at the universities of Berlin and 
Heidelberg.17 At the age of twenty-six he stopped work as a legal trainee electing instead an 
academic career. By twenty-nine his thesis on Gemeinde, Staat Reich als Gebietskörperschaften 
secured him a position as a private tutor at the University of Berlin.18 Owing to factors 
unrelated to the quality or output of his academic work (Preuss had become an authority on 
constitutional law and had an extensive list of publications), not least his left liberal political 
views and Jewish background, he was never offered a professorship at the University of 
Berlin.19 In 1906, aged forty-six, Preuss finally attained a professorship in Public Law at the 
newly founded private school, the Berlin College of Commerce, a notably less prestigious 
institution. Hamburger writes that 'Preuss was deeply hurt by the slight, though he rarely 
talked about it'. 20  
 Although Preuss's talents lay in academia, he attempted several times to become 
politically active combining writing political commentaries in the radical journal Die Nation 
(edited by Paul Nathan21) with serving in Berlin municipal politics. Preuss's successes in local 
politics led to his election as honorary member of the magistracy. 22 Peter Stirk writes that it 
 
15 Hugo Preuss, 'Volksstaat oder verkehrter Obrigkeitsstaat?' Berliner Tageblatt (14 November 1918). Cited in 
Christoph Schoenberger, ‘Hugo Preuss’, in Weimar A Jurisprudence of Crisis, ed. Arthur J. Jacobson and 
Bernhard Schlink (Berkeley Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 110. 
16 On other lawyers of Jewish descent who were selected to draft the new state constitutions see Ernest 
Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuß: Scholar and Statesman’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 20, no. 1 (1975): 179. 
17 For years Hugo Preuss's work on democracy and constitutional theory was not recognised alongside that of 
his contemporaries (Max Weber, Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen). This led the German parliament to financially 
support publishing Preuss's collected works, Hugo Preuss, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Detlef Lehnert and 
Christopher Müller, 5 vols (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). For a list of the literature on Preuss see, 
Schoenberger, ‘Hugo Preuss’, 115.  
18 Peter M. R. Stirk, ‘Hugo Preuss, German Political Thought and the Weimar Constitution’, History of 
Political Thought 23, no. 3 (2002): 498. 
19 Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuß: Scholar and Statesman’, 182. 
20 Ibid. Preuss was not financially disadvantaged by this career hinderance as a result of his book royalties and 
marriage to Else Liebermann, who came from a wealthy Berlin Jewish family, the same as that of the famous 
painter Max Liebermann.   
21 Paul Nathan (1857-1927) served as editor until 1907. Nathan was influential in liberal political circles and 
was notable within the Jewish community for founding the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden. For Nathan's role in 
the Hilfsverein see chapter two.  
22 Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuß: Scholar and Statesman’, 182–86. 
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was during this time that Preuss became an advocate of municipal socialism and a critic of the 
authoritarian state (Obrigkeitsstaat), a term he coined. 'Looking back on this he took pride in 
having been "more anti-capitalist" than the social democrats'.23 
 Officially, however, Preuss was not associated with the socialist party. In local politics 
Preuss was a representative of the Progressive People's Party (Fortschrittliche Volkspartei, FV) 
and in November 1918 founded, alongside other members of the FV leadership, the German 
Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP). Membership of the German 
Democrats included notable public figures such as the Protestant pastor Friedrich Naumann, 
the publicist Theodor Wolff, and Professors Max Weber, Alfred Weber, Albert Einstein and 
later Foreign Minister, Walther Rathenau. During the Weimar Republic, the German 
Democratic Party become known for their commitment to maintaining parliamentary 
democracy whilst upholding individual freedom and social responsibility. Members of the 
German Democrats were in close contact with the Central Association and as a result of the 
party's official support for minorities, the German Democratic Party swiftly became the party 
receiving the highest proportion of Jewish votes. This trend did not go unnoticed by 
antisemites who termed it the Judenpartei. The success of the newly founded German 
Democrats was such that in the January 1919 elections for the National Assembly they 
received 18.5% of the vote which behind the Social Democratic Party and Catholic Centre 
Party made them the third largest party. 24 
 Preuss sat on the left of the German Democrats and had become known as 'the most 
left leaning scholar of the law of the state in Germany'.25 That Preuss held liberal-socialist 
views and applied them to his theories on state law was notable.  During the German Empire, 
a professor of law with social democratic views or affiliations would have struggled to receive 
an appointment or position of authority.26 Moreover, in the heat of the revolutionary moment 
Preuss was 'one of the few informed voices calling for democratisation through legal means'.27 
These qualities did not go unnoticed by Friedrich Ebert. As one contemporary observed, 
Preuss was appointed to draft the constitution not only because he was a radical democrat 
with academic credibility but also because he was 'a bridge to the liberal camp in Germany'.28 
Certainly, Preuss's legal expertise combined with his political views made him an ideal 
 
23 Stirk, ‘Hugo Preuss, German Political Thought and the Weimar Constitution’, 499. 
24 Dan Diner, ed., Enzyklopädie jüdischer Geschichte und Kultur (Stuttgart, Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2015), 
143. 
25 Schoenberger, ‘Hugo Preuss’, 110. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Caldwell, ‘Hugo Preuss’s Concept of the Volk’, 359. 
28 Walter Jellinek, ‘Insbesondere: Entstehung und Ausbau der Weimarer Reichsverfassung’. Cited in Stirk, 
‘Hugo Preuss, German Political Thought and the Weimar Constitution’, 500. 
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candidate to navigate the grievances of the Social Democrats with those of the liberal 
bourgeois middle class to write a representative, democratic constitution.  
 However, when the constitution was finally ratified, having undergone eight months 
of debate and revision, it differed substantially from Preuss’s initial draft. Nonetheless, core 
principles were embedded within the constitution marking Preuss's enduring legacy. He 
secured that authority in the Republic belonged to the people and that the Republic would be 
based on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) within an international community.29 Until his death 
Preuss was devoted to resolutely defending the Republic and its democratic process.30 He was 
particularly distraught by allegations that the constitution was 'un-German' and as a result of 
his Jewishness was not spared the accompanying antisemitic attacks on his character.31 
Fortunately, Preuss never witnessed the subversion of the constitution he authored as he died 
in 1925 at the age of sixty-four.  
 
Pitted against Hugo Preuss and his supporters in the debate on Article 113 was Oskar Cohn, 
the only elected Zionist in the Reichstag. Born on the 15 October 1869 in the town of 
Guttenberg in Upper Silesia, Cohn died in 1934, having lived through three Germanys - 
Empire, Republic, and albeit briefly, Dictatorship. Cohn was a member of the Reichstag for 
six years and during the period of the National Assembly, sat as representative of the 
Independent Socialists.  
 It was in this capacity that Cohn was actively involved in the Weimar constitutional 
debates. Specifically, Cohn petitioned several times to change the wording of Article 113, 
Germany's policy on minority rights. The issues raised by Cohn in the debate were central to 
his life work. In addressing them, Cohn ignited a much larger discussion on the foundations 
of the German nation-state and its future as a Republic. Whilst Cohn's lasting effect on the 
Weimar constitution was neither visible nor tangible, nonetheless, he left behind a legacy. 
This was a man who fought throughout his life for the democratic ideals in which he believed: 
equal rights, representation and toleration.  
 Oskar Cohn is an elusive figure in Anglophone, but also German scholarship. The 
single most comprehensive, and often cited, biography on Oskar Cohn remains Ludger Heid's 
book published in 2002.32 Scholars have struggled to piece Cohn's life and career together, due 
to the lack of remaining documentation. Shortly after Cohn fled Germany, in the summer of 
 
29 Caldwell, ‘Hugo Preuss’s Concept of the Volk’, 358. 
30 See Hugo Preuss, Gesammelte Schriften Vierter Band: Politik und Verfassung in der Weimarer Republik, ed. Detlef 
Lehnert (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). 
31 Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuß: Scholar and Statesman’, 202; Schoenberger, ‘Hugo Preuss’, 110–15. 
32 Heid, Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik.  
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1933 Storm Troopers (Sturmabteilung, SA) broke into his home destroying his personal 
documents. Cohn left behind almost no written work. Instead, the sources available are 
stenographic reports on his prolific speeches.  
 Although secular himself, Cohn was brought up in a religious household as the 
youngest of eleven children. After a short dabble in medicine, Cohn graduated in Berlin with 
a doctorate in law. At the age of thirty, having finished his clerkship, Cohn and his close friend 
Karl Liebknecht (who later co-founded the Spartacist League with Rosa Luxemburg) opened 
their own legal practice in Berlin. Alongside the Liebknechts the Cohn family also counted 
Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring33 in their social circle, both of whom were close friends 
of Cohn's wife, Sophie.  
 Cohn's socialist views were not only reflected in his friendships; he also put his politics 
to practice. This began in 1909 when, at the age of forty, Cohn started work, similarly to 
Preuss, as a municipal councillor in Berlin. Only three years later Cohn, representing the 
Social Democratic Party, won the seat of Nordhausen, in the Prussian province of Saxony 
(Sachsen), and became a member of the parliament, a position he retained until the end of the 
First World War. 34 
 Despite his later fervent anti-militarism, in 1895 Cohn completed his three years of 
military service and during the First World War served for just over two years as a sentry in 
various prisoner of war camps mostly in the occupied territories, where like many other 
German Jewish soldiers, he came into contact with the plight of Eastern European Jews. Cohn 
was a strong sympathizer of Soviet Russia under the Bolsheviks. Nearing the end of the war 
he was involved in the revolutionary government, the Council of People's Deputies working 
as Undersecretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice.35  
 During his time in the National Assembly, Cohn represented the left-wing 
Independent Socialists and was active in the drafting of the Weimar constitution. Cohn was 
also a member of the Investigation Committee (Untersuchungsausschuß) established in August 
1919 to assess the events surrounding the outbreak and prolonging of the war, a position that 
did him no favours in the eyes of a divided public.36 
 
33 Franz Mehring (1846-1919) was a social democrat, well-known parliamentary reporter and correspondent 
for a number of newspapers. He was one of the founders, alongside Liebknecht and Luxemburg, of the 
Spartacus League.  
34 Oskar Cohn's parliamentary profile is available online [https://bit.ly/2GHJQrj, accessed 8/08/18].  
35 Heid, Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik, 10. 
36 A twenty-eight-member committee established in August 1919. It was tasked to examine the role of the 
political, economic and military leadership in prolonging the war and what the chances of an earlier peace 
settlement were. The first Chairman was Fritz Warmuth (German National People's Party) who withdrew 
from this function just before committee started investigating Hindenburg. Georg Gothein (German 




 July 1920 marked the end of Cohn's career in national politics. Cohn turned instead to 
state politics, where he served as a member of the Prussian Landtag until 1924. For reasons 
unknown, although scholars speculate antisemitism might have played a role, Cohn began his 
move away from party politics and towards a more active engagement in Jewish community 
politics, specifically Poale-Zion, a radical, left-wing socialist Zionist fraction.37 
 With Germany's descent into dictatorship, as a socialist, member of the League for 
Human Rights and as a Jew, Cohn knew his days were numbered. The night following the 
burning of the Reichstag (27 February 1933), Cohn fled Berlin into exile. In the summer of 
1934, whilst living in Paris, Cohn began to prepare for settlement in Palestine to join his son, 
Reinhold who had settled there in 1925. In the same year, he passed away from lung cancer in 
Geneva where he had travelled to attend the Jewish World Congress.38   
 Cohn was unique because he combined his various identities seamlessly, seeing no 
contradictions between them, and defying the majority identity of the groups of which he was 
a part. Of his family background he once stated, 'I come from a strongly emphasised religious 
family, politically liberal, and for a long time Germanized'.39 Like his parents, Cohn strongly 
identified as German, but also fully embraced his Jewish heritage, seeing the latter as 
‘simultaneous and equal' to his socialism. Not just a socialist, Cohn was also a Zionist because 
for him, ‘Zionism was the most direct route to the rule of socialism in Jewish life.’40  
 Unlike his parents, however, Cohn was secular which led him to resolutely differentiate 
between the ‘Jewish religion’ and ‘Jewish nationality’. He maintained that 'national 
movements cannot, should not, be religious. The nation, so to say, takes the place of religion. 
Religion is a private matter.' Here lay the essence of the Jewish ‘dilemma’ for Cohn. For Jews, 
religion was not a private affair but a ‘matter for everyone’.41 Disentangling the political 
complexity of Jewish identity was part of Cohn’s life project as he fought throughout his career 
for the recognition of Jewish national rights and supported a Jewish state.42 This devotion was 
tied to an even greater commitment to halting oppression, representing the voiceless and 
building a socialist democracy.  
 It was this set of values, which also saw Cohn becoming involved in the debate on 
Germany's policy on minority rights. These debates unfolded over the course of six months 
in the National Assembly and the Constitutional Committee. The central argument in the 
 
37 Poale Zion was founded by Jewish workers in Europe and the Russian Empire in the early twentieth century.  
38 Heid, Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik, 43.  
39 Ibid, 3. 
40 Ibid, 17.  
41 Ibid, 11. 
42 Cohn continued to fight for the recognition of national minority rights in Germany. In 1920 he tabled his 
petition in the Prussian Diet, which was once again rejected. Ibid, 107.  
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debate revolved around the criteria for the classification of minority communities in Germany. 
The article would either recognise minority groups along linguistic, or as Cohn would 
petition, national lines.  
 Before turning to the centrality of Jewish questions within this debate I will outline 
Preuss’s reasoning behind Article 113, to illustrate how language triumphed over national 
criteria in Germany, and the consequences of this for German national self-understanding. 
 
 
II. 'On a practical level it will always be about language': the wording of Article 113 
From the start Preuss did not want a separate bill of rights. As early as 1917, he advised 
against a catalogue of fundamental basic rights such as those conferred in the 1849 Paulskirche 
constitution.43 Preuss envisioned that basic rights would be bestowed in the constitution and 
feared that a separate bill would lead to contestation on the extent and limits of these rights 
as it had in 1849. He also maintained that the fundamental rights of 1849 had already become 
embedded within 'the law of the land'.44 As such, in the first draft of 3 January 1919, Preuss 
included clauses on fundamental rights within the constitution. Clauses 18 and 19 granted 
that all Germans were equal before the law and were entitled to freedom of religion and 
freedom of conscience. The clause on minority rights came under section 21 and afforded 
'foreign-speakers' the legal guarantee of the protection of their cultural-traditional 
(volkstümlich) development within the Reich, in particular the right to use their mother tongue 
as a language of instruction and for administrative purposes.45  
 Contrary to Preuss's position on the matter, Friedrich Ebert insisted that he draft a 
catalogue of fundamental rights to signal the distinctive and new form of governance in 
Germany.46 Tasked with having to draft a section on fundamental rights and duties, two 
factors decisively influenced Preuss’s approach to the protection of minorities. Firstly, he saw 
language as central to national understanding and for this reason of practical importance. 
Secondly, despite the fact that Article 113 protected minorities within Germany, Preuss was 
more concerned with protecting German minorities abroad, and hoped for an international 
 
43 Hugo Preuss, Gesammelte Schriften Dritter Band: Das Verfassungswerk von Weimar, ed. Detlef Lehnert, 
Christopher Müller, and Dian Schefold (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 88. 
44 Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuß: Scholar and Statesman’, 195. 
45 [23] Vorentwurf/Entwurf I der WRV: Entwurf des allgemeinen Teils der künftigen Reichsverfassung (3. 
Januar 1919), Preuss, Gesammelte Schriften Dritter Band: Das Verfassungswerk von Weimar, 2015, 535. 
46 Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuß: Scholar and Statesman’, 195. For more information on why Ebert demanded this 
catalogue see Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, eds., Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragten 1918/19 
(Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1969), 240, 247. 
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policy of ‘reciprocity’.47  
 In the first draft of the constitution dated 3 January 1919, the clause referring to the 
rights of minority communities, read as follows,  
 
The foreign-speaking parts of the population [fremdsprachige Volksteile] within the Reich 
may not be hindered in their particular traditional [volkstümlich] development, 
specifically the use of their native language in education as well as in matters of 
administration and the judiciary system within the confines of their region, through 
legislation or national administration. 48 
 
Preuss's definition for minority rights was rooted in a linguistic notion of national 
understanding, defining the minority as groups whose mother tongue differed from that of 
the majority. This first draft of the clause resonated word for word from an earlier document 
Preuss had written in 1917 entitled, Vorschläge zur Abänderung der Verfassung des Reichs und 
Preußens.49 Notably, Preuss's premise, that the rights of 'foreign-speaking' groups should be 
legally guaranteed, outlined in 1917 and reiterated in 1919, remained unchanged in the 
constitution, though not uncontested. A central feature of the debate over how to define the 
minority in Germany, delved into the historical consciousness of German national 
development. 
 Preuss was acutely aware of the history of German national identity based on cultural-
linguistic lines as well as the fraught development of German liberalism, having written 
critically on these subjects in various journals.50 He defended the centrality of language to 
German national understanding demonstrating in the course of the debates an awareness that 
the attempts in the last century to transform Germany from a ‘cultural nation’ (Kulturnation) 
into a ‘state nation’ (Staatsnation) had fallen short.51 Scholars debate Preuss's indebtedness to 
the constitutional law scholar Robert Redslob and author of Die parlamentarische Regierung in 
ihrer wahren und in ihrer unechten Form. The debate questions the extent to which Preuss's 
constitutional ideas were bound to a pre-1914 German political thought tradition of national 
unity and authoritarianism.52 In the case of Article 113 and with respect to his position on 
 
47 ‘32. Sitzung, 28 Mai 1919’, Verhandlungen Der Verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung, Band 336, 
(1920), 375. 
48 ‘Die fremdsprachlichen Volksteile innerhalb des Reiches dürfen durch die Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung 
nicht in der ihnen eigenen, volkstümlichen Entwicklung beeinträchtigt werden, insbesondere nicht im 
Gebrauch ihrer Muttersprache beim Unterrichte sowie bei der inneren Verwaltung und der Rechtspflege 
innerhalb der von ihnen bewohnten Landesteile.’ Hugo Preuss, Gesammelte Schriften Dritter Band: Das 
Verfassungswerk von Weimar (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 533. 
49 Ibid, 89. 
50 Ernest Hamburger, ‘Hugo Preuß: Scholar and Statesman',182–185. 
51 For a comprehensive and accessible account of this national project see Peter Pulzer, Germany, 1870-1945: 
Politics, State Formation and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3-15. 
52 For this debate see, Stirk, ‘Hugo Preuss, German Political Thought and the Weimar Constitution’, 497 ff. 
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minority rights, national unity featured prominently in his wording of the clause. In Article 
113 Preuss institutionalised the designation of the majority and minority as rooted in the 
unifying principles, typical within German tradition: language and culture.53  
 Preuss saw the merit of focusing on language from a practical point of view.  In one of 
the sittings on Article 113, Preuss purported that, ‘on a practical level it will always be about 
language’.54 This comment echoed an argument made by another speaker who reasoned that 
language was central to a group’s cultural development and identity. Language was also noted 
for being a more practical criteria for legal, administrative and educational purposes.55 On the 
basis of linguistic criteria, Preuss was strongly opposed to the Triple Entente’s ban on the 
incorporation of German-speaking Austrians into Germany. He claimed it violated the 
principle of self-determination and thus disregarded Woodrow Wilson's fourteen-point 
programme.56 In the course of the debates in a rhetorically shrewd attack, one speaker 
juxtaposed Cohn’s focus on national criteria to the practicality of language as he claimed, aside 
from language ‘all else is rather theoretical’.57 
 Alongside the implicit assumption of a language-based conception of national identity 
and the simple practicality of focusing on language, Preuss’s wording of Article 113 also 
stemmed from the importance he saw in protecting the rights of Germans living abroad. 
Parallel to drawing up a new constitution, a German delegation was negotiating peace terms 
in Paris. The specific concern that directly impacted the protection of minorities was the 
question: what form would Germany’s post-war borders take? Tied to this was the question 
of how many minority groups would still live in German territory and, more pressingly, how 
many Germans would now reside in foreign territory as minorities.   
 The second debate on Article 113 held in the special committee illustrates that despite 
Cohn’s second petition, the wording of Article 113 remained firmly rooted in the criteria of 
language. For Preuss, the developments of the peace negotiations, would in fact give further 
support to focusing on language. Preuss did not shy away from expressing his opinion on 
them as he lamented, ‘unfortunately, in the future more Germans will live under foreign rule 
rather than foreign-speakers under German rule’.58 Ensuring the ‘protection of the German-
speaking parts of the population' (deutschsprachige Volksteile) was thus of central importance to 
 
53 For an overview of this tradition and its legacy in Germany see Kremer, ‘Transitions of a Myth? The Idea of 
a Language-Defined Kulturnation in Germany’. 
54 ‘32. Sitzung, 28 Mai 1919’, 375. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Anon., ‘Preuss Denounces Demand of Allies’, The New York Times (14 September 1919) 
[https://nyti.ms/2GboC6v, accessed 5/02/19]. 
57 ‘32. Sitzung, 28 Mai 1919’, 375. 
58 Ibid.  
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Preuss who empathised openly with the ‘fate of our poor country-men’.59 Preuss’s so-called 
foreign policy plan, enacted through the provision on minority rights in the constitution, was 
to lead by example through ‘the idea of reciprocity’. Through a policy of reciprocity that was 
‘noble’ and ‘wise’, Preuss anticipated that, ‘if we lead by example and appeal to international 
public opinion, then other countries will act similarly’.60 Regaining prestige for Germany on 
the international stage was at the forefront of Preuss's reasoning on Article 113.  
 Whilst reciprocity for Preuss was a matter of the respectful treatment and protection 
of minorities in Germany so that this would be modelled abroad, it was also connected to his 
desire for the international recognition of minority rights based on language. This is 
demonstrated in a debate on the 16 June in which Preuss professed that had it not been for 
Cohn’s intervention the draft sent by the German delegation to the Allies would have 
recognised minorities as ‘foreign-speakers’ (Anderssprachige).61  
 For Preuss, the most prominent minority needing protection were Poles living in 
eastern Germany and Germans living in the territory of independent Poland, in what he 
termed the ‘Polish Question’ (Polenfrage).62 In statistical terms, the Polish minority was the 
largest minority group in Germany.63 Preuss's position on German Jews throughout the 
debates was unfaltering; they were neither a national group nor a community that needed 
special minority rights protection in Germany. This was exemplified when one of Preuss’s 
supporters, the Catholic Centre politician Adolf Gröber stated, ‘also, the Israelites themselves 
are of divided opinion, the large majority do not want any sort of exceptional status, but rather 
want to be recognised, and treated, as fully German’.64 On this basis, merely looking at the 
final constitution and at Preuss as the main figure in this legislative process, a common trait 
of the secondary literature on the constitution, would neglect how Jewish questions featured 
prominently in the German post-war state building process.   
 
Convinced that a Judenfrage existed in Germany, Cohn petitioned to change the wording of 
Article 113. Cohn’s counter argument brought Jewish questions to the heart of minority rights 
protection. In challenging the criteria of who to define as a minority, Cohn made explicit the 
need to evaluate the national understanding of the majority. Moreover, whilst the 
 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 ‘40. Sitzung, 16 Juni 1919’, Verhandlungen Der Verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung, Band 336, 
1920, 500. 
62 ‘32. Sitzung, 28 Mai 1919’, 375. 
63 In the German Empire the Poles were the largest minority, representing around 8% of the population in 
1871. In the same year, Jews made up 1.25%. Berghahn, Imperial Germany, 110–17. 
64 ‘32. Sitzung, 28 Mai 1919’, 375. 
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developments at the Paris Peace Conference – in the eyes of Preuss and his supporters – gave 
further credence to their position, Cohn in turn used them to advance his criticism. The 
international discussion on whether to recognise Jewish national or autonomous rights 
equipped Cohn with moralistic arguments on the absurd inconsistency should Germany's 
minority rights policy not align with emerging international principles.  
 In his first petition to change the wording of Article 113 Cohn challenged the premise 
of focusing on language by referencing groups within Germany that use German as their 
mother tongue but nonetheless remain a ‘foreign-national part of the 
population’ (fremdnationaler Volksteil).65 Cohn implied that even if a minority group spoke 
German, they could still remain foreigners in Germany. He pointed out the possibly 
intractable problem at the core of German national identity. Thus, whilst Preuss’s wording 
illustrated a historical understanding of the German Kulturnation, Cohn’s counter-response 
equally exhibited an astute awareness of the exclusiveness of this conception of nationhood 
and its implications for German-speaking minority groups. Cohn used the example of second 
or third generation Poles or the Wends. Yet what concerned him the most was, ‘the very 
important question of […] Jewish nationality' (jüdischen Nationalität).66 
 Cohn’s decision to focus on Jewish minority rights in Germany was not only a result 
of his Zionist convictions. Rather, he sought to align the Weimar constitution with what he 
thought, or more accurately hoped, was soon to be internationally recognised: Jewish national 
rights and a Jewish state. Cohn maintained that Jews constituted a nationality in their own 
right, thereby rejecting Preuss’s fundamental premise that they were part of the German 
nation, proclaiming, ‘in the peace conference, the Jewish people [jüdisches Volk] will be 
recognised as an independent [selbständige] Nation’.67 Arguing that Jewish national rights 
should similarly be protected in the constitution, Cohn critiqued the idea that Germany had 
no Jewish Question.  
 ‘The Ladies and Gentlemen who maintain that in Germany there is no national “Jewish 
Question”' Cohn announced, 'would not want to provide national rights for the Jewish 
population [...] but this viewpoint is not uncontested, and I for one, see it as false’.68 The 
Judenfrage posed in this instance challenged German and Jewish conceptions of national 
identity. By drawing on it, Cohn reopened the political theoretical discussion on the German 
nation-state. Namely, what makes a German national? Are Jews a national or religious group 
 







and what rights should they be conferred in Germany? Exhibiting his awareness of the 
significance of the constitutional discussions, Cohn stated, ‘our petition and Article 113 leads 
into the deepest questions of the concept of nationality’.69 
 Cohn pushed the discussion to a profound level of analysis by implying that Germany 
should rethink its national understanding and compared the German Empire to the Third 
Republic.70 Drawing on the French model of the political nation (Staatsnation) Cohn illustrated 
how a country of ‘linguistic diversity’ could maintain a unique national identity by instead 
relying on ‘whether someone professes to belong to a nation, whether he wants to profess his 
will' to the nation.71 Cohn stressed the need to abandon the focus on language in Germany, 
what he saw as a negative 'Prussian state practice', alluding to the linguistic Germanisation 
policies under Bismarck during the Kulturkampf from the early 1870s to mid-1880s.  
 Cohn reminded the Assembly of the German draft sent to the League of Nations on 
minorities where the attendees had been in agreement that 'speaking a foreign language 
should not be a necessary criterion to constitute a national minority'.72 Using moralistic 
language Cohn stressed the dishonesty and detrimental consequences should Germany pursue 
a different domestic policy to the international community, especially in the need to guarantee 
a sense of belonging and togetherness to Germans living in new states. 73 Precisely on the 
strength of the 'will' to remain German, Cohn claimed that Germans living abroad would 
retain a sense of German national belonging.  
 By invoking the language of will, namely consenting to be part of the nation, Cohn 
drew on ideas from the French philosopher and historian Ernest Renan's famous lecture at 
the Sorbonne in March 1882, entitled 'What is a nation?'. For Renan neither race, language, 
religious affinity, geography bound a nation together. Rather he described the nation as a 'soul' 
united by a spiritual principle comprising of memory of the past and the desire to live in the 
present.74 Cohn, however, was not the first to apply these ideas to the German context. The 
Jewish scholar and contemporary of Renan, Moritz Lazarus made an almost identical 
 
69 ‘57. Sitzung, 15 Juli 1919’, Verhandlungen Der Verfassunggebenden Deutschen Nationalversammlung, Band 326, 
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argument two years prior to Renan's lecture in response to an article by Heinrich von 
Treitschke which argued that the 'Jews are our misfortune' as they undermined the formation 
of a unified national culture in Germany. Using the example of Germany as consisting of 
multiple identities from Polish Germans to Catholic, Protestant, Jewish Germans, Lazarus 
argued that nationality could be constructed in heterogeneity underpinned by the will to 
belong to the nation.75  
 Already from his opening speech to the assembly Cohn had set the tone of his petition 
as part of a more profound attempt to renew the concept of the nation in Germany and 
transform it into a socialist democracy. Aware on a personal level of the sacrifices of Jews 
during the war and inferring Renan's notion of shared glories and sacrifice, Cohn believed that 
unity would come through reforming national understanding on the basis of a renewed 
commitment to belong to the German nation and partake in its future.  
 For this reason, Cohn appealed to the greater purpose of the constitution as ‘an 
important tool […] for the renewal of the German nation in its politics and ethics’. He 
stressed the ‘renewal of its soul' (seelische Erneuerung), which would take place, according to 
Cohn, with the ‘creation of another state and national ethos' (Staats – und Volksgesinnung). 
Vocalising his political views, Cohn stated that, ‘socialism is above all also an ethos in which, 
everyone sees themselves as part of the whole, as not only entitled but duty bound to their 
people’. And for Cohn, only when this ethos was not hindered could the constitution truly be 
the 'product' that the German people had demanded.76 For Cohn it was of the utmost necessity 
that Article 113 recognised national minorities as he tied this recognition into his greater plan 
for the renewal of the German nation as a socialist state.77 Cohn's political convictions and 
Zionism were intimately bound to one another.78  
 
Yet perhaps by demanding a socialist state, Cohn’s arguments did not sway his opponents. 
Cohn’s petition was regarded as Zionist and dismissed for having no place in German politics. 
The debate on Article 113 became a microcosm of the rifts within the German Jewish 
community between liberal Jews and a minority faction of Zionists on the subject of German 
Jewish identity and the post-war future of the diaspora.  
 In one of the sessions, the speaker, a Catholic Centre politician, Konrad Beyerle, opened 
 
75 The Antisemitism Dispute and Lazarus's ideas are discussed at greater length in chapter one.  
76 ‘17. Sitzung, 28. Februar 1919’, 406. 
77 This argument resonates from a previous debate in the Reichstag on the Judenzählung when speakers 
appealed to the kind of nation that Germany should aspire to be in the future, namely truly secular and without 
religious discrimination. For these discussions see chapter three.  
78 For Cohn Zionism was the most direct way for the dominance (Herrschaft) of socialism in Jewish life. Heid, 
Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik, 18. 
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the sitting by summarising the previous debates on Article 113. Despite the fact that Cohn 
had listed a number of national groups that would be affected by the article (Wends, Sorbs, 
Kashubians, Masurians), the speaker only mentioned the Jews and foregrounded the Zionist 
movement as being at the heart of the petition. Beyerle announced that it was the Zionist 
movement that was requiring the Jewish population to heed its national character although it 
was not a foreign-speaking group. 79   
 Preuss allied with the position of the Catholic Centre Party, specifically that of the 
parliamentarian Adolf Gröber, and announced that he agreed that he had no intention of 
showing any consideration to Zionism and would remain committed to the term 'foreign-
speaking' (fremdsprachigen) and not 'national' (national). The position of the Catholic Centre 
party was to maintain that Judaism was a confession, a position supported by the majority of 
the liberal German Jewish community. 'Cohn's petition was essentially motivated by Zionism', 
concluded Preuss.80 Heid writes that members of Poale-Zion encouraged Cohn to submit the 
petition and thus Cohn did not represent even a majority Zionist position, a point to which I 
will return.81  
 Defending his position against the criticism that it was a Zionist petition; Cohn 
reiterated his previous arguments. He outlined that his motion was not novel as the German 
Empire had adopted this position on minority rights internationally.82 He explained once 
again that his petition was not for Zionists but applied to a number of groups within Germany, 
who would still be considered ‘foreign’ despite speaking German. Cohn stressed that he had 
deliberately not focused on the Zionist movement and this should not be grounds for 
dismissing his petition. 83  
 Cohn did highlight the existence, to an increasing degree, of a national movement of 
German Jews. A movement that, according to Cohn, had been noticed by the League of 
Nations as well as the German government who had recognised it by ‘the well-known 
declaration on the establishment of a national homeland in Palestine’.84 Here Cohn was 
referencing the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, a policy which was officially 
supported by the German Foreign Ministry in an announcement on the 5 January 1918. Not 
unsurprisingly Cohn was predicting the international recognition at the Paris Peace 
 
79 ‘32. Sitzung, 28 Mai 1919’, 375. 
80 Ibid, 376.  
81 Heid, Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik, 106. 
82 In official proclamations the German Empire supported Jewish self-determination in Eastern Europe writes 
Matthäus. See Jürgen Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung: Judenfrage: A German Debate in the Early Stages of the 
Weimar Republic’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 48, no. 1 (2003): 88.  
83 ‘40. Sitzung, 16 Juni 1919’, 500. 
84 Ibid.  
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Conference of the national status of Jewry and he believed this same recognition would be 
vital within Germany.  
 As Preuss himself had done, Cohn also emphasised the detrimental consequences of 
not recognising the unique attributes of German-speaking national minorities in Germany. 
He recognised the significance of theory, or concepts, on practice and political action, stating, 
'all these [attributes] will be eliminated by the concept of foreign-speaking Volksteile'.85  
 Despite his array of arguments which mounted a critique on the Kulturnation and the 
centrality of language to national understanding, it is telling that all three speakers reduced 
Cohn to pushing a Zionist agenda. This is particularly interesting given that for the majority 
of the debate in Weimar on Article 113 at the Paris Peace Conference discussions were still 
ongoing on whether to recognise national minority rights or cultural autonomous rights for 
Jews. Cohn's petition for Germany's policy on minority rights to align with international 
developments was thus not unfounded. The majority of the constitutional debates on Article 
113 took place before autonomous cultural rights for Jews were legally enshrined in the 
Minority Treaty on the 28 June 1919. On the one hand then, at the core of the debate was 
what it meant to be Jewish with differing perspectives between Preuss, representing the liberal 
Jewish camp, and Cohn, representing Zionists. One speaker succinctly captured this difference 
in a comment directed at Cohn when he stated, 'your feelings cannot be taken away from you, 
but so long as they are not of a religious nature, I do not know them'. 86  
 On the other hand, the debate concerned the future of the German nation-state and its 
position internationally, which the two men differed on. At the forefront of Preuss's reasoning 
was the importance of Germany regaining international prestige and protecting the minority 
rights of Germans abroad. Preuss sought to use the constitution's minority rights policy as a 
signal to the international community to reciprocate and respect the rights of Germans in the 
post-war new states. Moreover, as Preuss had hoped, in 1926 Germany took a decisive step 
towards its international rehabilitation as it was invited to a seat at the League of Nations, in 
part due to a policy enacted by the Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann who championed 
Germany as a defender of minority rights.87 In this sense then, 'the situation of German Jews 
was paradoxically fairly similar to that of other "ethnic" Germans'.88 
 Contrary to Preuss, Cohn was less concerned about prestige and more about the 




87 See Carole Fink, ‘Defender of Minorities: Germany in the League of Nations, 1926-1933’, Central European 
History 5, no. 4 (1972): 330–57. 
88 Mark Mazower, ‘Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe’, Daedalus 126, no. 2 (1997): 52. 
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international principles. Cohn observed the gradual international recognition of (ethnic) 
national groups as an opportunity to both recognise national rights for Jews and combine this 
with the renewal and rebirth of the German nation. For Cohn, this entailed reframing the 
concept of the nation not along cultural-linguistic lines but rather based on the will to remain 
German. In an era of the collapse of Empires and the rebirth of old countries along new 
territorial boundaries, Cohn envisioned that national understandings would be redefined and 
that the choice, desire or will to be part of a nation-state would govern the post-war 
restructuring of the world map.89  
 
Despite Cohn’s arguments highlighting the growing national sentiments of the German-
Jewish youth, the international recognition of autonomous rights for East European Jews, and 
the limited perspective of classifying national identity as based merely on linguistic 
homogeneity, his petitions received no supporting votes. In the concluding session of the 
debates, one SPD representative,90 jibed that should German Zionists embrace Hebrew as 
their language, then they would qualify for minority rights in Germany as a foreign-speaking 
group.91  
 Where on the one hand the debate on Article 113 concerned the exact wording of 
Germany’s policy on minority rights, significantly, in reviewing the classification of minority 
groups in Germany, the negotiations threw into relief considerations as to what defined the 
national identity of the majority. Moreover, the debate took on a political theoretical 
dimension as it delved into the depths of the concept of the nation and national identity within 
Germany. Whilst the article concerned numerous minority groups within Germany including 
the Poles, Danes and Wends amongst others, as the German borders constricted and former 
minorities (re)joined their nations, the debates became most consequential for the rights and 
identity of Jews within Germany.92 
 This is demonstrated in a parallel debate which took place outside of the chamber of 
the National Assembly involving the liberal German Jewish organisation, the Alliance of 
German Jews who sought to confirm that German Jews did not wish to be granted national 
 
89 Whilst Cohn did not use the language of self-determination his ideas on the concept of the nation align 
closely with those who advocated for the right to self-determination.  
90 This representative was Simon Katzenstein, an SPD politician who held the portfolio on education. His 
profile is available online through the database of the German parliament [https://bit.ly/2YCv8If, accessed 
30/1/19].  
91 ‘40. Sitzung, 16 Juni 1919’, 500. 
92 As the Treaty of Versailles did not contain minority obligations towards Jews, and in Germany Jews were 
not recognised as a minority, during the 1930s the League of Nations could not intervene to halt the Nazis 
antisemitic persecution and violence. See Mark Mazower, 'The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950', 
The Historical Journal 47, no. 2 (2004): 383.  
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rights in spite of any international discussions regarding the demand for, and possible 
recognition of, these rights. The episode ensured that within the Foreign Ministry Jewish 
questions remained a prominent feature of political affairs and further illustrated that minority 
rights became a concern which most acutely affected the German-Jewish population.  
 
 
III. Vying for influence: German-Jewish organisations and Article 113  
As the debate on minority rights in parliamentary sessions delved into Jewish questions, 
German-Jewish organisations felt compelled to respond to ensure their demands would be 
heard. Whilst the Central Association, representing the largest percentage of the German-
Jewish community used their popular organ, Im deutschen Reich to reaffirm their position that 
they were Germans of the Jewish faith, two other associations, the  Alliance of German Jews 
and the Zionist Federation for Germany, deployed a different tactic: political lobbying. In the 
battle for the support of their position from the German government, despite representing a 
fraction of all Jews in Germany, the Zionists emerged as a political force to contend with. 
Zionist representatives, although ultimately unsuccessful in changing the wording of Article 
113, consistently lobbied ministers in the highest levels of government and were able to find 
an audience for their views.  
 Early on in the debate the Central Association representing approximately 10% of the 
German Jewish community, published an official statement distancing the organisation from 
Cohn's petition. In order to do so, they qualified their position on the concept of nationality 
within Germany. The article read,   
 
[for us] Germaness is nation [Nation] and people [Volk], Judaism is faith [Glauben] 
and kinship [Stamm], but [this] faith and kinship does not separate us from the ethnic 
[völkisch] Germans, we are not Jewish-national, but a Jewish religious community and 
not a Jewish people [Volk], least of all in Germany...93 
 
Notably, the Central Association deployed the language of Stamm, a discourse that at once 
enabled a sense of belonging to the many Stämme of Germany whilst also remaining sensitive 
to the unique identity of Jews. Using the language of Stamm gained increasing popularity 
within the German Jewish community in the mid-nineteenth century when the centrality of 
 
93 '[...] dass uns das Deutschtum Nation und Volk, das Judentum Glauben und Stamm ist, dass uns die 
Glaubens- und Stammest aber nicht völkisch von den Deutschen absondert, dass wir nicht jüdisch-national, 
sondern jüdische Religionsgemeinschaft und kein jüdisches Volk, am allerwenigsten in Deutschland sind…', Im 
deutschen Reich 4, (April 1919), 188. Quoted in Heid, Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer 
Republik, 106.  
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religion began to decline, and new visions of community were sought out.94 Stamm signalled 
a shared descent, avoiding the contentious notion of race or ethnicity and suited the German-
speaking context, whereby the term was often used to differentiate between regional identities. 
As the First World War pried the Pandora's box of nationalism open even further, the answer 
to the question of what constituted Jewish identity was pluralised. For the Central Association, 
which endeavoured to straddle these various identities the concept of Stamm was vague and 
yet distinct enough to capture these distinctions whilst also legitimate the status of Jews as 
German national citizens.  
 Re-affirming the view of the Central Association, on the 3 August 1919 the German 
Foreign Ministry, the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior all received a letter from 
the liberal German-Jewish organisation, the Alliance of German Jews. The purpose of the 
letter was to enquire on the official position within Germany on the rights of national 
minorities, given, the letter read, 'the recent inclusion of this principle in the League of 
Nation’s draft treaty', which the letter continued, 'would also include provisions concerning 
Jews'.95 
 The letter suggests that it was unbeknown to the Alliance that by August 1919 the 
wording of Article 113 in the constitution would no longer be changed. The constitution 
awarded minority rights to foreign-speaking groups and the petition to replace the wording 
with ‘national minorities’ received no supporting votes. This was a fact which the Zionist 
Central Bureau was already aware of, having received a letter on the 1 August stating that 
their petition to change the wording of Article 113 had been rejected.96  
 The letter sent by the Alliance illustrates the complex nature of the debate on minority 
rights in Germany and abroad and how within the Foreign Ministry it was tied into Jewish 
affairs. The episode became an epitome of divisions within the German Jewish community 
between the traditional liberal, and majority, Jewish perspective that Judaism was a 
confession, and the view, influenced by the experience of Russian Jews that Judaism was a 
nationality. It was precisely this distinction that the Alliance addressed in their letter to the 
Foreign Ministry.  
 The author of the letter argued that it was of no concern to the Alliance if Jews living 
in 'states outside of Germany' (ausserdeutsche Ländern) due to differences in language or culture 
should be, or want to be, set apart as 'special national groups' (nationale Sondergruppen). 97 
 
94 See Rahden, ‘Germans of the Jewish Stamm: Visions of Community between Nationalism and Particularism, 
1850 to 1933’, 30 ff. 
95 R19605 AA, ‘K181999’, Internationale Angelegenheiten Nr. 3: Die Juden, Band 1 (1918-1919), 3 August 1919. 
96 Ibid, ‘K181953’, 1 August 1919. 
97 Ibid, ‘K181999’, 3 August 1919, 2. 
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However, they pleaded that any settlements affecting German Jews would be discussed with 
their organisation.98 The letter continued that the Alliance saw it as their ‘urgent duty’ to 
ensure the Foreign Ministry was aware that, ‘German Jews, in their masses, feel only as a 
special religious community within the heterodox majority of the German population’.99 
 The sentiments expressed by the Alliance went beyond the mere institutional 
parameters of being classified a citizen of the German nation. They assuredly distanced their 
position from the possibility of Jews being seen as ‘a special national group within the German 
nation'. Rather they emphasised their belonging to a German people, participants in the social-
cultural identity of being German, with the same experience of German ‘origin [Geburt], 
language, education, culture and feeling [Gefühl]'. 100 Thus, as Cohn had mounted a critique 
on the principles of the Kulturnation, the Alliance evidenced the Jewish belonging to it.  
 Supporting their position, the letter noted that the Alliance of German Jews along with 
other Jewish organisations represented the ‘majority of the Jewish communities of Germany 
of which approximately 200, 000 Germans of the Jewish faith are members’.101 To ensure that 
there was no misunderstanding on the collective position of German Jewry, the letter also 
referenced a declaration written in November 1918 signed by several Jewish organisations. 
Alongside the Alliance of German Jews, represented by ‘Privy Councillor Oskar Cassel’, 
representatives of two other major liberal-leaning German Jewish interest groups signed the 
petition. These included Professor Salomon Kalischer102 from the Union of German-Jewish 
Communities103 (Deutsch-Israelitischer Gemeindebund) and ‘Privy Councillor Dr Eugen Fuchs’ 
of the Central Association.104  
 The declaration stressed that in contrast to a Zionist ‘fraction’, the overwhelming 
majority of German Jews felt themselves to be an ‘inseparable, integral part of the German 
people' (Volk). The importance of this majority opinion was emphasised once again as the 
declaration continued, ‘German Jews are a religious community [Glaubensgemeinschaft] and 
 
98 Presumably a civil servant from the Foreign Ministry drew a line on the side of the letter to highlight this 
section.  
99 The underling is replicated from the original document. See R19605 AA, ‘K181999’, 3 August 1919, 2. 
100 Ibid.  
101 The figure given represents a third of the total Jewish community in the Weimar Republic, which numbered 
approximately 600, 000 not including those that renounced their religion. For more on Jewish demographics in 
the Weimar Republic see Donald L. Niewyk, ‘The Economic and Cultural Role of the Jews in the Weimar 
Republic’, Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 16, no. 1 (1971): 163.  
102 Whilst in the declaration Kalischer’s first name was not mentioned, it can be assumed that this was Salomon 
Kalischer one of the board members of the Union. See Eugen Täubler and Selma Stern, Aufsätze zur Problematik 
jüdischer Geschichtsschreibung 1908-1950 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1977), 1.  
103 This organisation was an association of Jewish corporations in Germany, founded on 3 July 1869. It 
promoted the common interests of German Jews and directed much attention to education and charity 
initiatives.  
104 R19605 AA, ‘K182002’, November 1918. 
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not a Jewish people [Volk] in Germany’.105 The use of language, carefully selected, ‘integral 
part' (Bestandteil), ‘community' (Gemeinschaft), and the distancing from the use of the word for 
‘nation’ or ‘people’ (Volk) to refer to their Jewish heritage, as was often done at the time (even 
before the Zionist movement gained in momentum) was vital to the German Jewish liberal 
cause, distancing them also semantically from Zionists. 
 The declaration from November noted the presence of a Zionist fraction in the 
German-Jewish community. A letter to the Foreign Ministry sent by the Alliance elaborated 
on this further and qualified that not all Zionists supported Jewish national minority rights. 
Instead the letter stressed, this was the position taken by an extreme fraction of Zionists.106 
The Alliance warned, that should the Foreign Ministry concede to this movement, which had 
always been involved in 'reactionary circles', it would send out the wrong signal, both 
domestically and internationally.107    
 The Alliance of German Jews saw it as their duty to intervene in the debate on Article 
113 to guarantee that Jews would continue to be recognised as a religious community in a 
multi-confessional Germany. Like the interlocutors in the parliamentary debate, the Alliance 
also stressed that the petition was supported by a minority, reactionary fraction of extremist 
Zionists. The letter sent by the Alliance once again illustrates how the debate on minority 
rights became a Jewish question that in turn catalysed iterations of German national 
understanding. In the case of this particular episode, by rejecting the petition for national 
rights, the Alliance not only outlined the parameters of German Jewish identity, but also had 
to justify how these fitted into German understandings of national identity. It offers a lens 
through which to scrutinise the complex nature of these political ideas and how Jews 
appropriated and contested these concepts in the process of navigating their political identity 
in a changing political environment.  
 
As illustrated above, according to the Alliance the majority of Zionists did not support Cohn’s 
proposal. Ludger Heid, biographer of Cohn, writes that the Zionists saw the petition as 'futile' 
and thought it would damage the Zionist cause in Germany rather than supporting it, in spite 
of Cohn's announcement in the National Assembly that his petition was supported by the 
Zionist Federation.108 According to the letter from the Alliance, and Heid, Cohn was prompted 
 
105 Ibid.  
106 Heid says that not all Zionists demanded the recognition of national rights in Germany as they were aware 
of how unpopular it was. He argues that Cohn was part of a small group of Poale Zion that pushed for them. 
Heid, Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik, 106. 
107 R19605 AA, ‘K181999’, 3 August 1919, 3.  
108 Heid, Ein Sozialist und Zionist im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik, 106. 
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to submit his petition by members of Poale Zion several of whom were from Eastern Europe 
where Jewish communities exhibited national tendencies.109 However, in contrast to Heid, 
several documents suggest that the Zionist Federation was in fact active in using diplomatic 
channels to lobby for the recognition of Jewish national rights.  
 Furthermore, whilst representing a minority within the Jewish community the 
following events reveal that the Zionists showed themselves to be a force to contend with, as 
they lobbied with more persistence and in higher levels of government than liberal German 
Jewish associations. Zionists in Germany were in a minority and yet the decisive and 
persistent action taken by their representatives to change the wording of Article 113 could 
have convinced spectators that they were lobbying on behalf of a majority view.110  
 Only a few days before the letter from the Alliance of German Jews the Foreign 
Ministry received internal correspondence stating that there was no interest in using the 
proposed changes to Article 113111 sent in by the Zionists.112 Written in Weimar, the seat of 
the National Assembly, the transcript was dated 30 July 1919 and addressed to the Privy 
Councillor for Legation Otto Göppert113  and signed by Albert Saunier, the Office Manager 
to the Legation Council of Hermann Müller, Reich Minister of the Foreign Office during the 
Gustav Bauer cabinet. Saunier explained that he had presented the Zionist request to change 
Article 113 in the constitution to the ‘Herr Minister’ (presumably Hermann Müller) who 
responded that, ‘we have no interest in implementing the wishes of the Zionists’.114 The 
transcript continued underscoring that Privy Councillor Nelcken, who worked on 
‘constitutional questions of section III’,115 responded similarly, because of his conviction that 
‘the overwhelming majority of German Jews would not approve of the proposal’. As such, 
Saunier wrote that he had refrained from contacting other ministers on the matter.116  
 The significance of this correspondence amongst ministers in the highest level of 
 
109 Ibid.  
110 Paying members of the Zionist Federation (6, 200) represented approximately 1% of the German-Jewish 
population in 1910. In 1913 membership increased (9, 000) increasing Zionist representation to 1.5% of the 
total German-Jewish population. See Lavsky, Before Catastrophe, 22-23; Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German 
Anti-Semitism, 119. 
111 In the transcript the article was listed as 112, although it referred to Article 113, Germany's minority right 
policy.  
112 R19605 AA, ‘K181952’, 30 July 1919. 
113 Otto Göppert’s parliamentary profile is available online [https://bit.ly/2Jz6mnZ, accessed 8/11/19].  
114 R19605 AA, ‘K181952’, 30 July 1919. 
115 Reviewing all five drafts of the constitution reveals that the article on minority rights was never included in 
section III. In the first draft it was listed under section I: Das Reich und die deutschen Freistaaten. By the second 
draft it was already listed under section II: Die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes where it remained until the final 
draft when it came under section II: Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Deutschen, sub-section I: Die 
Einzelperson. See Hugo Preuss, Gesammelte Schriften Dritter Band, 533-593. Given this, I am not sure why 
Nelcken would have been responsible for this subject unless he was working on section II and the transcript 
was mistyped.  
116 R19605 AA, ‘K181952’, 30 July 1919. 
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political counselling, the Privy Council, is illustrative of the seriousness with which the Zionist 
proposal was both dealt and decided upon. That no other minister was consulted on the matter 
following Minister Müller and Nelcken’s decision suggests that it was after the 30 July that 
the final wording of Article 113 was decided upon, and that this decision went beyond the 
decision-making powers of the drafter of the constitution and the Reichstag alone.  
 Two days later, on the 1 August a transcript from the office of the Privy Councillor 
Otto Göppert sent to Victor Jacobson from the Zionist Central Bureau was filed in the Foreign 
Ministry.117 The transcript provides an insight into the lobbying of the Zionist Central Bureau 
on what we can assume was the article in the constitution on minority rights.118 On the 28 
July, after Cohn’s final speech in the National Assembly where he referred to a Zionist petition, 
which argued that language was not criteria enough to define a minority group, Victor 
Jacobson of the Zionist Central Bureau sent a letter to Göppert. The same evening Göppert 
forwarded this letter to Weimar where the National Assembly had convened since the 
elections. According to Göppert, after a more detailed consultation, it was decided that no 
action on this proposal would be taken because, reiterating word for word from Saunier’s 
correspondence, the overwhelming majority of German Jews would not agree with the 
proposed changes.119    
 In the transcript, the Privy Councillor explained that ‘due to the imminence of a final 
decision on the draft constitution, another attempt to win over the dissenting partners to the 
amendment would have no longer been possible either way’. Whilst the transcript appeared 
to suggest that any future lobbying on Article 113 would have been ineffective, the 
Councillor’s last comment left more open for interpretation. Directly translated the last 
sentence read, ‘a rejection of the petition by the National Assembly would have drawn the 
attention of foreign countries onto this issue and made a very unfavourable impression’.120 It 
is not entirely certain what Göppert intended to convey. On the 15 July Cohn’s petition, 
backed by the Zionists, had been raised in the National Assembly and rejected due to the fact 
that it did not receive enough supporting votes. Thus, there are a few reasons he might have 
written this.  
 
117 Ibid, ‘K181953’, 1 August 1919. 
118 In the transcript, the article is recorded as Article 118. On surveying this article in drafts of the constitution 
it never relates to minority rights but rather marriage rights. We can thus assume that perhaps this transcript 
mistyped the article number.  
119 Whilst it is difficult to infer who was present at this consultation, we can assume the participants were 
ministers of the Privy Council and not the constitutional committee (Achter Ausschuß) whose meeting 
transcripts do not record any further mention of Article 113 [112] after 28 May 1919.  
120 ‘Eine Ablehnung des Antrags durch die Nationalversammlung würde aber die Aufmerksamkeit des 
Auslandes besonders auf deisen Punkt gelenkt und einen sehr ungünstigen Eindruck gemacht haben’. R19605 
AA, ‘K181953’, 1 August 1919. 
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 Firstly, it could indicate that Göppert was unaware of the National Assembly session 
and its outcome. Alternatively, he could have been hinting that, as the constitution was not 
yet in its final reading, the Zionists should petition once again in the Assembly, and even if 
the motion were rejected, it would direct international attention onto the Zionist cause. Lastly, 
he might have been suggesting that the rejection had roused international interest and for this 
very reason, the Zionist clause still had political clout. Namely, it would imply support for the 
Zionist cause by a Privy Councillor and thus more support for Cohn’s petition than evidenced 
in the National Assembly, and eighth committee sessions.  
 These transcripts indicate that German Zionists, despite representing a minority 
faction, were able to exert a significant influence on constitutional debates. Even after the 
rejection of Cohn’s petition in the National Assembly session of 15 July, the Zionist Central 
Bureau kept the proposal active, circulating it to ministers with influence in the chain of 
political decision-making. The Zionists did not have the majority support of the German 
Jewish community, and yet nevertheless they lobbied far more extensively than the Alliance 
for German Jews, acting as if they did have it and with relative success. In the battle for 
recognition, the Zionist Federation championed.121  
 
 
IV. Language triumphs  
During the drafting of the Weimar constitution the debate on Article 113, Germany's policy 
on minority rights delved into the Jewish Question. In the final sitting it was decided that 
minorities within Germany would be defined on the basis of linguistic criteria rather than 
national. According to the wording of this policy, German Jews were not recognised as 
minorities within Germany. Internationally, however, Jews were for the first time recognised 
as a distinct minority group deserving of cultural autonomous rights. At the Paris Peace 
Conference, as chapter five will examine, Germany became the only country to sign a peace 
treaty which did not guarantee minority protections.  
 The importance of the debates in the National Assembly and constitutional committee 
on minority rights was that they triggered conceptual discussions on the German state in a 
two-fold process. On the one hand, Oskar Cohn’s petition caused an unintentional 
conversation on Jewish identity within Germany. The debate clearly pitted the left-liberal 
Hugo Preuss and his mainly liberal Jewish supporters122 against the Zionist Cohn revealing 
larger questions confronting the German Jewish community on their confessional or national 
 
121 On the support for Zionism amongst personnel in the Foreign Ministry see chapter two.  




 On the other hand, the Jewish Question raised by Cohn challenged the concept of 
German nationhood. The discussion highlighted the rootedness of German national 
understanding in ideas of culture, language and descent and exposed the challenge that despite 
speaking German, minority groups would still remain foreigners (Fremde) within Germany. 
Whilst the German national project since the nineteenth century had sought to transform the 
German Kulturnation into a Staatsnation the debate on minority rights called into question the 






'Tagesordnung: Judenfrage': a German (Jewish) united front at Paris 
 
On the 26 March Otto Göppert, one of the members of the German Delegation to Paris, and 
later Chairman of the Peace Delegation, received a telegram inviting him to a meeting at 21 
Behrenstrasse in Berlin, the Offices for Peace Negotiations. The agenda of the meeting: the 
Jewish Question.1 Convening the meeting was the German Ambassador to the United States 
of America, Johann Heinrich Graf von Bernstorff2 who, in his opening speech, clarified the 
purpose of the meeting,  
 
Gentlemen, although it is not yet certain whether the Jewish Question will be 
discussed at the preliminary peace conference, it is still desirable that we express our 
views on this issue, especially since this is one of the questions where we might be 
in a position [...] to face our enemies with a positive programme in hand, a 
programme that will solve the problem in principle, through which we will regain 
world-wide sympathy, and which will prove that a new spirit is at large in Germany.3 
 
Alike to the debate on the Judenzählung, which revealed the German Empire at a critical 
juncture between past and future, the suggestion by Graf von Bernstorff that forming a 
position on the Jewish Question would show a 'new spirit' in Germany once again revealed 
the unique function of the Jewish Question as a spotlight on Germany's difficult transition 
between Empire and Republic, caught between war and peace. Where the previous chapter 
focused on the Jewish Question in domestic debates on minority rights in the Weimar 
constitution, this chapter turns to the larger international dynamics governing the debate on 
minority rights, focusing in particular on the German delegations’ preparations for the Paris 
Peace Conference.  
 In what follows I will firstly trace the German deliberations on minority protections 
leading up to the Paris Peace Conference which began in March 1919 firstly in the Cabinet, 
then in the Office for Peace Negotiations (also known as Pax Konferenz) and finally in 
Versailles itself. The events reveal that the German government struggled with how best to 
define minority protections in light of minorities within Germany but crucially also with 
 
1 Göppert's letter invited him to attend a meeting on Judenfragen. The minutes of the meeting described the 
agenda as the Judenfrage. R19605 AA, ‘K181842’, 26 March 1919.  
2 Graf von Bernstorff (1862-1939) served as the German Ambassador to the United States from 1908 to 1917 
and Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire for the last year of the war. He was one of the founding members of 
the German Democratic Party and later became Chairman of the German Pro-Palestine Committee.   
3 The conference record has been translated and published in Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 91-110. 
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German minorities abroad in mind. The differing minority existence for Jews in Germany 
(who did not want to be considered a nation) and Germans in new states (who did) coupled 
with the fixation on the notion of reciprocity meant that the authorities struggled to formulate 
a decisive policy on minority protections for the peace negotiations.  
 Significantly, in preparation for Paris a meeting was convened on Jewish questions. 
The Foreign Ministry recognised that this was one of the few issues where Germany could 
present a 'positive programme' and in doing so, 'regain word-wide sympathy'.4 By May the 
German delegation realised that the peace conference would not involve negotiations and that 
the extensive preparations by the Pax Konferenz had been in vain. In Versailles, unlike in 
Weimar, the minority in focus were Germans in new states. National minority protections 
were embedded within the Minority Treaty and Jews were awarded cultural autonomous 
rights. The course of events, unfolding in under a year, from the drafting of the Weimar 
constitution to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the Minority Treaty, reveals how 
the Jewish Question was not 'solved' as Graf Bernstorff had hoped. Rather in 1919 it became 
even more inextricably bound to the international system, the structure of modern nation-
state and the German Question.5  
 
 
I. Preparing for Paris: the German delegation and minority protections 
On the morning of the 21 March 1919, at 9:30am the Cabinet6 convened in the Reich 
Chancellery to discuss a completed draft peace treaty that, the German government had 
received word, was due to be sent by the Allies. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau remarked that the 
draft diverged widely from the Wilson programme, which the Germans had initially clung 
onto during the agreements for armistice. Predicting a harsh outcome for Germany, should 
the peace terms be dictated by the European powers, the Germans welcomed the Wilson 
programme, which had excluded questions on freedom of the seas, the matter of Schleswig in 
the north and a possible German-Austrian union. However, the draft treaty prepared by the 
Allies diverged widely from Wilson’s initial programme and directly confronted the 
aforementioned questions.  
 During the Reich Ministry meeting, in order to prepare for the draft treaty and decide 
 
4 Opening speech by the Chairman Graf Bernstorff in the meeting on Judenfragen. See Matthäus, 91. 
5 As Aschheim writes, in Paris, 'Germany’s concern for the Jews of the east was made into an issue'. The 
Germans hoped that the loyalty of Eastern European Jews could help Germany retain its eastern borders. 
Aschheim, Brothers and Strangers, 139–41. 
6 The Cabinet was the direct continuation of the Cabinet of the Council of People’s Commissars. The first 
meeting was held on the 11 March 1919. The minutes of this meeting are online as part of the files of the Reich 
Chancellery of the Weimar Republic [https://goo.gl/inztSS, accessed 11/12/17].  
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upon Germany’s negotiating strategy, the Foreign Minister separated the peace treaty into 
ten subsections. The protection of minorities was the second point of order, after territorial 
questions. In the ensuing meeting, out of the four ministers to make a statement on Germany’s 
position, three of these happened to be ministers of Jewish descent.7 That these ministers, 
whose portfolios do not suggest any expertise on the subject, spoke on the matter suggests a 
concern for minority rights amongst Jewish politicians even if not all minority rights issues 
concerned Jews.  
 Each minister adopted a slightly different position on what Germany’s approach 
towards minority rights should be in the negotiations, but all largely agreed that it would be 
vital to secure the rights of German nationals in foreign territory. Reich Minister Georg 
Gothein suggested that Germany should not stress particular German interests but instead 
'advocate protection of national minorities on general principle’.8 This was a policy also 
supported by the Zionists, although there is nothing that suggests Gothein was a Zionist.9 
Gothein was more likely advocating that Germany should not fall out of favour in the 
negotiations on this policy by making specific German demands.  
 Reich Minister Erzberger10 believed that minority rights should be limited to 
inhabitants, not temporary residents, whilst Reich Finance Minister Schiffer pointed at 
implementing similar guarantees to Austria. These included granting citizenship to Germans 
resident outside the country, a descent and language-oriented policy that would later be 
ratified in the constitution. State Under Secretary Lewald noted that the incorporation of ‘far-
reaching regulations for the protection of national minorities in the constitution’ needed to be 
stressed in the discussions.11 The fact that he would make this comment when little to no 
regulations protecting national minorities were being incorporated into the constitution 
suggests that perhaps the Under Secretary was misinformed, or that Cohn’s petition had a 
wider support base than that which was represented in the National Assembly and 
constitutional committee sessions.  
 Thus, by the 21 March the German government felt that they would soon be 
 
7 These included Schiffer (Finance Minister), Gothein (Reichsschatzminister) and Lewald (State Undersecretary).  
8 R19605 AA, ‘K182002’, November 1918. 
9 Gothein was Protestant and of Jewish descent. Politically he was always a member of liberal parties, the 
Progressive Party and later the German Democratic Party. There is no biographical information to suggest he 
might have been Zionist. His profile can be found online in the Deutsche Biographie [https://bit.ly/2KdZtJi, 
accessed 14/12/17] and Reich Chancellery archives [https://bit.ly/2ZnP8iW, accessed 14/12/17].  
10 In the first cabinet under Chancellor Scheidemann, Matthias Erzberger from the Catholic Centre Party did 
not have an official ministerial portfolio.  
11 'Meeting of the Reich Ministry, March 21, 1919, 9:30am in the Reich Chancellery' in Burdick and Lutz, The 
Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 268-274, especially 271. 
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confronted with a ‘take it or leave it’12 situation put forth by the Allies. When it came to the 
position on minority rights, the Cabinet lacked consensus especially given that the policy 
aimed at minority groups living in Germany might also apply for Germans living abroad.  
 
Just five days later, on the 26 March 1919, Otto Göppert in the Foreign Ministry received a 
telegram from the Secretariat of the Offices for the Peace Negotiations (Geschäftsstelle für die 
Friedensverhandlungen Sekretariat) inviting him to a meeting on 'Jewish questions'.13 The 
Offices for the Peace Negotiations, was the first official organisation founded on the mandate 
to prepare for future peace negotiations.14 The necessity of planning for a future peace deal 
was first realised by Chancellor Hertling who on the 4 December 1917 requested Karl 
Helfferich15 to gather information on economic questions, which would have to be negotiated 
in a future peace treaty with Russia.16 It was Helfferich who first conceived of the strategy to 
invite private experts to assist in this preparatory work largely by offering advice and issuing 
questionnaires to high-level individuals in industry, commerce, banking and agriculture. Yet 
it was Bernstorff17 who would, almost a year later in October 1918, put these ideas into 
practice as head of the organisation Pax Konferenz, after being ordered by State Secretary 
Wilhelm Solf to prepare for an imminent peace deal.18   
  
 The work of the Pax Konferenz consisted of preparing memoranda for the peace 
conference, as the Germans were convinced that the Allies would invite them to face-to-face 
negotiations.19 The organisation consisted of a core of forty civil servants but invited hundreds 
of experts and government officials to attend meetings to help advise on the specific clauses 
of each memorandum. Meetings often followed the same structure. Apart from the relevant 
civil servants and ministers one of two groups of private experts would be invited to 
participate. The first group consisted of thirty-eight experts selected from industry, banking 
 
12 Count Brockdorff-Rantzau used this expression to describe the draft of the Treaty of Versailles. The 
Germans did not receive the completed draft until the 7 May 1919. Ibid, 269.  
13 R19605 AA, ‘K181842’, 26 March 1919.  
14 The second official organisation was the Committee for Peace Negotiations in the National Assembly, 
founded on 10 April 1919. The only unofficial, yet still influential, body that also started preparations for 
future peace negotiations was the Association for Policy of Justice, also known as the Heidelberg Association 
(Heidlberger Vereinigung).  
15 Karl Helfferich (1871-1924) was a member of the German People’s Party. His profile is online in the Deutsche 
Biographie [https://bit.ly/2LWXhrr, accessed 12/05/18].  
16 Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 2nd ed. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), 
28. 
17 Count Bernstorff was serving in Constantinople at the time but was called back to Berlin to take up this 
position.  
18 Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 29. 
19 Ibid.   
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and agriculture. They were called upon to actively participate in drafting memoranda. At the 
time of the Paris Peace Conference, some of these experts were called upon to advise the 
German delegation. The second group was unlimited in number and tasked to provide 
information when necessary.20  
 By March these meetings took place virtually daily as civil servants, experts and 
government officials assembled to predict which problems could be expected to arise in the 
upcoming negotiations in Paris. In the few months before the German government was 
invited to send a delegation to Paris, the Pax Konferenz had prepared over fifty-one files on 
issues they thought might arise in the peace negotiations, which they had inferred from 
reading Allied newspaper reports.21  It was against this backdrop of preparation for the Paris 
Peace Conference that Göppert, one of the members of the German Delegation to Paris, and 
later Chairman of the Peace Delegation, received a telegram inviting him to a meeting to 
discuss ‘Jewish questions’ (Judenfragen) in the Offices for Peace Negotiations at 21 
Behrenstrasse, Berlin on Monday 31 March 1919. 22 
 Convening the 11:30 am meeting at Behrenstrasse was the diplomat Graf von 
Bernstorff. In attendance were high-ranking Foreign Office ministers, including the future 
Foreign Minister Walter Simons, civil servants from the Office for Peace Negotiations and an 
expert commission for Jewish affairs (Sachverständigenkommission für jüdische Angelegenheiten).23 
Moritz Sobernheim was in attendance in his capacity as the Jewish Affairs Expert in the 
Foreign Ministry. Joining him was Eugen Fuchs, Director of the Central Association, Richard 
Lichtheim, representative of the Zionist Federation, Hermann Struck, who headed the Jewish 
Affairs section in the Ober-Ost, Eduard Bernstein, the Social Democratic politician, James 
Simon, from the Aid Association of German Jews, Oskar Cohn, Independent Social 
Democratic politician, and Walther Rathenau, industrialist and future Foreign Minister.24  
 The meeting on Jewish questions was significant for a number of reasons. On the part 
of Jewish representation it illustrated that despite political and religious differences within the 
Jewish community, the attendees were able to organise a united front to present their 
expectations for the peace negotiations.25 On the part of the German government the 
organisation of a meeting on Jewish questions signified that it was in the German interest to 
 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid, 30-31. 
22 R19605 AA, ‘K181842’. 
23 Ibid, ‘K181845’, 1 April 1919. 
24 Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 87. 
25 The conflict between the Central Association and Zionist Federation had reached its zenith in 1912 and yet 
at this meeting a cross-section of the Jewish community was represented. On the tensions between Jewish 
organisations see Lamberti, ‘From Coexistence to Conflict’; Jehuda Reinharz, ‘Advocacy and History: The Case 
of the Centralverein and Zionists’, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 33, no. 1 (1988): 113–22.  
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respond to Jewish questions which were tied into Germany's  future, internationally. For Graf 
Bernstorff the Judenfrage was Germany's entry ticket back into the international community. 
Bernstorff hoped that it would help 'regain world-wide sympathy' for Germany and 'prove 
that a new spirit is at large in Germany'.26 The language of a 'new spirit' featured prominently 
in the sitting.  
 
Even before the meeting on the 31 March, the German government unofficially encouraged 
devising a position on the Jewish Question for the peace negotiations. The Jewish Question 
was recognised as a topic that would be on the post-war international agenda. On the 30 
January 1919 the morning edition of the Deutsche Allegemeine Zeitung (DAZ), the unofficial 
organ of the Foreign Ministry,27 ran an article entitled, Die Judenfrage auf der 
Friedenskonferenz.28 The article began by reporting that a Jewish representation would be 
present at the peace conference and that the United Kingdom had invited Zionists to a seat at 
the League of Nations table. This information would have piqued the attention of the German 
delegation who strongly supported the League of Nations project and might have provided 
the impetus for organising a meeting on Judenfragen. The Germans calculated that building 
closer ties with Jewish representatives would be instrumental to regaining Germany's 
international prestige.  As Graf Bernstorff noted in the meeting on the 31 March, it was one 
of the few issue areas where Germany was in the position to 'face our enemies with a positive 
programme in hand'.29 This was recognised by the author of the article in the DAZ who urged 
that given Allied recognition of Jewish issues, Jewish demands would need to be taken into 
account.  
 When placed next to Jewish demands, German demands did not differ greatly wrote 
the anonymous author of the article on 'The Jewish Question at the Peace Conference'. 30 The 
author stressed that Jews would be imperative for post-war German foreign relations, in both 
a regional context and a colonial one. The article acknowledged the developments in war on 
the Eastern Front where the German leadership had confronted a practical Jewish Question, 
as examined in chapter two. To the east, the article stressed, the most important task for 
 
26 Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 91. 
27 For the history of the NAZ/DAZ and its rise and fall as an organ of the Foreign Ministry from Bismarck to 
Hitler see Heinz-Dietrich Fischer, ‘The “Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung” (1861-1945)’, Gazette (Leiden 
Netherlands) 13, no. 1 (1967): 35–46. See also Bernard Fulda, Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 22-26.  
28 R19605 AA, ‘K181762’, 30 January 1919. 
29 Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 91. 
30 Whilst it is not clear from this article what these Jewish demands were, one can infer that they were closely 




German politics would be to encourage national autonomy for the Jews, guaranteeing order 
in the region. In the Middle East, 'Palestine could solve the difficult Jewish Question’.31 Given 
the affinity between Jewish and German language and culture, an East European Jewish 
presence, the author suggested, would help secure a German gateway for oriental expansion. 
As chapter two has shown, using the Jews as mediators of German interests was a policy first 
suggested to the Foreign Ministry by the Committee for the East in August 1914. Whilst 
these plans were put on hold as a result of the retreat of the Central Powers and their eventual 
defeat, the article suggests that these ideas were still in circulation within the Foreign Office, 
even after the war.  
 
The interest amongst the German authorities in Jewish political affairs is also seen in the 
founding of the German Pro-Palestine Committee (Deutsches Komitee Pro-Palästina). The 
committee was first established in 1918 and re-founded in 1926. It received support from 
prominent individuals in government and industry, including Matthias Erzberger, Philip 
Scheidemann, Werner Sombart, Alfred and Max Weber, Hans Delbrück, Gustav Noske and 
Major Franz Carl Endres. 32 When the first committee was established on the 25 April 1918 
a series of articles were published on the benefits of the Jewish Palestine movement for the 
'expansion of German culture and economic relations in the Far East'.33 Winning back the 
sympathies of Eastern European Jews, which they had lost by the end of the war, in order to 
advance German interests ran through the Foreign Office's deliberations on preparing for the 
peace conference. However, as the Germans were not invited to negotiate peace with the 
Allies, as their borders were reduced and colonies were taken away, the German delegation 
had no power to dictate the future outcome of international affairs neither beyond German 
borders nor in the Middle East.  
 It is undeniable that Jewish questions were on the minds of the German leadership 
both during as well as at the end of the war. During the war, the German army had confronted 
a practical Jewish Question on the Eastern Front, and in Palestine. Bodenheimer of the 
Committee for the East had proposed using Russian Jews as mediators of German interests in 
return for German protection. After the war, the Foreign Ministry realised once again that 
 
31 The ‘east’ the article referred to most likely entailed the area where the Ober-Ost command had been 
stationed. This included modern day Lithuania, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Here the army had come into 
contact with East European Jews. With the help of German Jews, they worked closely with Russian Jews due 
to the linguistic similarities between Yiddish and German. By 1917 the Ober-Ost had created a position in their 
political office to deal specifically with Jewish affairs. It was headed by Hermann Struck.  
32 For the first committee in 1918 see Anon., Judische Rundschau XVIII, no. 21 (3 Mai 1918):133-34; Zechlin, 
Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg, 413–48. For the second committee from 1926 to 1933 see, 
Walk, ‘Das “Deutsche Komitee Pro Palästina”’. 
33 Walk, ‘Das “Deutsche Komitee Pro Palästina”’, 162. 
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supporting Jewish affairs would aid German interests. This time, however, it would involve 
backing German Jewish demands internationally to, in turn, restore Germany's position in 
the international community. Of the whole host of issues that the First World War threw into 
relief it is extraordinary that Jewish questions even featured on the agenda of the German 
Foreign Ministry. And yet, quite remarkably the German government recognised that the 
Jewish Question was their key to the door of the international club.  
 
 
II. Formulating a position on the Jewish Question for Paris 
The minutes of the meeting (Niederschrift einer Besprechung über Judenfragen) and a memo 
recording the Jewish demands (Aufzeichnung zu den jüdischen Forderungen für die 
Friedenskonferenz) are the two remaining documents on the meeting of the 31 March 1919. Of 
interest are the differences between these two documents. The memo is a summary of the 
demands with a brief explanation of each and roughly follows Sobernheim's account from the 
minutes of the meeting although no quotations marks were used, and the document is 
anonymised.34  Most likely this memo is a copy of Sobernheim's point by point report to the 
meeting with slight modifications. The minutes, however, present a wholly different picture 
of what transpired. They reveal how the discussion of the demands descended into a lively 
debate. The discussion concerned distrust in the German authorities because of antisemitic 
policies, the fears of Ostjuden immigration, the recognition of Eastern European Jews as a 
nation or cultural community and the international ramifications of this decision for other 
(national) minorities.  
 An underlying theme in the minutes of the meeting was that it was in Germany's 
interest to support Jewish demands as it would signal the heralding of a truly 'new spirit' in 
the Weimar Republic. The Germans also hoped that by rekindling the support they had 
received from Eastern European Jews during the war it would possibly help secure German 
dominion over their former Eastern borders.35 And yet, in the course of the meeting, the 
Jewish representatives continuously reminded the German officials that relations with 
Eastern Jews had disintegrated and particularly nearing the end of the war Polish Jews had 
lost complete trust in the German authorities.36 
 
34 R19605 AA, ‘K181838’, March 1919. 
35 Aschheim, Brothers and Strangers, 139–41. 
36 Fuchs explained in the meeting, 'I do not know if you are sufficiently familiar with history to know that in 
1914 and 1915 the Polish Jews saw the Germans as liberators, going over to the German camp with drums 
beating and banners flying high, but that they later said: rather [be] Russian than German- Prussian'. 
Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 98. 
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 The episode brings to light the complexity of the Jewish Question in the post-war 
context as the DAZ reported, the ‘Jewish Question has undergone significant development 
during the war, and this has given the right to anyone interested, to discuss it'.37 Moreover, it 
reveals that the Jewish Question was one significant component in the deliberations on how 
best to redraw global borders whether by: self-determination, ethnic-national or cultural-
national homogeneity or history.38  
 A total of six demands for the peace negotiations were made by the Jewish expert 
commission during the meeting on Judenfragen. The first two were for equal rights 
(Gleichberechtigung) and equality (Gleichstellung) for Jews and Jewry in all countries of the 
world as well as the abolition of all laws, regulations, and decrees that only discriminated 
against Jews. Sobernheim began by highlighting the continued gap between law and practice. 
He explained that 'whilst equal rights for Jews living in the West were anchored in the 
respective constitutions, in spite of this, until recently, the Jews of Germany were not equal 
to other citizens and various career paths were closed to them'.39 In principle, the emancipation 
act of 1871 had removed all discriminations against German Jews and yet in practice several 
career paths remained restricted. In public professions in Germany traditional customs 
prevailed over a meritocratic system of admission. This was particularly evident in the career 
pathways into the army and higher education, where appointment was still based on personal 
recommendations and contacts.40 
 Sobernheim emphasised how legal discriminations still prevailed pointing to 'former 
Russia' (Poland in the recording) and Romania where 'genuine equality for Jews [has] not yet 
started' but also in Prussia which, during the war, banned Jewish immigration. 'In Prussia' 
Sobernheim reminded the audience, 'as well as in other countries, such prohibitions [towards 
Jews] existed either openly or clandestinely during the war'.41 Sobernheim was referring to 
the Prussian Einwanderungsverbot which came into effect on the 24 April 1918 and was directed 
only at Jewish workers from Congress Poland.42 The subject sparked a heated debate at the 
meeting and dominated the conference proceedings. Whilst it began as a discussion between 
Sobernheim, Lenz (Prussian Minister of the Interior) and Eugen Fuchs on the decree, it 
 
37 R19605, AA, ‘K181762’. 
38 On the use and importance of history at the Paris Peace Conference see Margaret MacMillan and Patrick 
Quinton-Brown, ‘The Uses of History in International Society: From the Paris Peace Conference to the 
Present’, International Affairs 95, no. 1 (2019): 181–200. 
39 R19605, AA, ‘K181838’, 1. See also, Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 92. 
40 Whenever a discussion in the Reichstag was raised on military finances, Cohn and Bernstein repeatedly 
raised the issue that Jews continued to be denied promotion to officer status. For more on the eventual removal 
of discriminations against Jews in the army see chapter three on the Judenzählung. 
41 Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 92. 
42 The Political Archives of the German Foreign Office contains a file with numerous documents on this 
decree. See, for example, R19605 AA, Internationale Angelegenheiten Nr. 3: Die Juden, Band 1&2.  
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opened up into a larger discussion on Jewish national understandings, the implication of the 
ban for Germany and on Germany's position on Jewish questions internationally.  
 Before continuing onto the list of demands made by the Jewish expert commission, a 
brief detour into this exchange on the Einwanderungsverbot offers a wholly unique perspective 
on a dialogue between liberal, secular, national Jews and German officials on the Jewish 
Question. It offers a microcosmic study of larger trends within the debate on the Jewish 
Question. Whereby when arguing against anti-Jewish discriminations, individuals would 
elevate the issue to a matter concerning humanity. In contrast, the official response from the 
government instead tried to circumvent the antisemitic implication of the decree and offer 
logical justifications for why it was enacted. 
 
Regarding the April 1918 Prussian decree to ban Jewish immigration, Lenz explained that the 
order was 'an [unforeseen] consequence of a measure taken by the German administration in 
Warsaw', which prohibited Jews from working in Germany because it was medically assessed 
that the Jewish community were the 'inhabitants most likely to increase the danger of typhoid 
[infection]'. This point was confirmed by his colleague Hering who claimed it was instituted 
out of 'practical experience'.43  
 On the basis of the decree Fuchs, who described himself as 'representative of the 
nationaldeutsche44 Jews' throughout, declared that as 'we do not have the necessary trust in how 
the authorities have acted up to now' it was even more imperative that Point 245 was presented 
at the peace conference.46 Sobernheim requested that countries wishing to 'prohibit 
immigration for economic reasons' should have to seek approval from the League of Nations.47 
Markedly, the Jewish experts kept affirming that the immigration of Ostjuden was a case of 
economic migration and an issue affecting not just Jews but also Germans who might be 
'forced to emigrate' given the state of the post-war economy.48 They also noted the economic 
successes of Jews in America declaring 'there can be no talk of danger when you obtain a work 
 
43 Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 93. 
44 At the time this word was not used to denote party-political affiliation. Rather it was frequently deployed by 
the Central Association in contradistinction to jüdisch-national. For the misinterpretation of this term especially 
when used by the Central Association see Arnold Paucker, ‘Zur Problematik einer jüdischen Abwehrstrategie 
in der deutschen Gesellschaft’, in Juden in Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890-1914, ed. Werner E. Mosse, 2nd ed. 
(Tübingen: Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 33, 1998), 526. 
45 Point 2 read: 'Abolition and prohibition of all laws, decrees and regulations containing restrictive measures 
applicable exclusively to Jews, especially bans on immigration and the closing of borders to Jews'. Matthäus, 
‘Tagesordnung’, 91. 
46 Ibid, 98. 
47 This was, as Sobernheim explained, a demand made at the International Socialist conference. Ibid, 92.  
48 Ibid, 95. 
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force'. 49  
 In response, Hering cautioned against the immigration of Ostjuden to Germany 'in the 
interest of preserving the culture of its own [the German] people' against a people 'who have 
sunk to a great extent to an extremely low cultural level'.50 Hering's language epitomised that 
of an institution locked in its national-cultural tradition in contradistinction to the Jewish 
representatives who continuously moved between the particular, that the targeting of Jews 
was antisemitic, and the general that these acts violated 'human rights' and were 'not in 
keeping with humanity'.51 The Jewish population was not considered 'unclean' by nature of 
being Jewish as Lenz had suggested, Bernstein pointed out. Whilst Fuchs noted that it was 
unlikely that typhoid would only affect Jewish inhabitants.52  
 The third demand that was made concerned the recognition of national and cultural 
autonomy in the newly formed states 'to the extent demanded by the majority of Jews', 
underpinned by the right to self-determination and of concern only for 'states which have yet 
to be established'. Cohn explained that the demand had been included on the basis that the 
commission decided that 'the German delegation must somehow take a position on Jewish 
questions outside of Palestine'.53 Although directed at the new states, the discussion was also 
revealing for the future status of German Jews given the possible international recognition of 
Jewry as a national-cultural community.  
 Sobernheim elaborated that national autonomy depended upon the ‘principle of the 
right to self-determination', which he accredited not to Woodrow Wilson but rather Karl 
Renner.54 Whilst Renner's nationality principle was devised with the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire in mind, it was quickly picked up by Jewish intellectuals who applied it to the situation 
of Jews in Eastern Europe. When the German army entered West Russian territory in 1914, 
Max Bodenheimer presented a blueprint of an East European Federation recognising Jewish 
nationality, inspired by Renner's writings.55 From 1914 to 1919 the legacy of this concept can 
be traced to the peace conference where it was advocated by the British Jewish diplomat, 
Lucien Wolf who was not a Zionist himself but supported national Jewish rights. As a result 
of the war liberal Jews became aware of the existence of Jews living in Russia as national, 
 
49 Ibid, 101. 
50 From 1895 to 1905 Prussia wanted to transform into a state of immigration. From 1909 to 1911, on average 
8, 984 migrants per year were naturalised. See Daniela L. Caglioti, ‘Subjects, Citizens, and Aliens in a Time of 
Upheaval: Naturalizing and Denaturalizing in Europe during the First World War’, The Journal of Modern 
History 89, no. 3 (September 2017): 511. 
51 Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 94. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid, 107. 
54 R19605, AA, ‘K181838’; Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 101. 
55 This is the subject of chapter two where it is explained in greater depth.  
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culturally autonomous communities. They began to support national rights but only for these 
eastern 'national and religious communities', not for all Jews generally.56 
 Written in 1917, Lucien Wolf argued for (Jewish) national rights in Eastern Europe 
within the framework of a federation of nationalities. 57 His article, 'The Jewish National 
Movement’ was indebted to ideas expressed by Karl Renner in his ‘The Struggle of the 
Austrian Nations for the State’ written in 1902. Drawing on Renner, Wolf envisioned a 
federalised state structure of groups sharing political citizenship but not personal nationality. 
In other words, Wolf advocated a modernised political structure similar to that of the former 
Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires.58 It was this structure, indebted to Renner but applied to 
Eastern European Jews that the Jewish expert commission demanded in point three. The 
paradox of the third demand was that it was in the moment when the nation-state ideal was 
taking hold that Jews began to appreciate that their rights would best be secured under a 
'federal, decentralised model'.59 
 Following this strand of thought, advocated by Renner and Wolf, the expert 
commission requested the recognition of the Jewish minority as a nation in its own right (als 
eigene Nation). Alike, Sobernheim explained, to the German minorities in Hungary and 
Bohemia. This meant, he continued, that they would be allowed political representation,60 the 
recognition of their minority language, the right to language interpretation in courts and the 
appointment of Jewish judges in civil courts. Cultural autonomy would involve freedom in all 
cultural domains, especially schools, the deduction of cultural tax from state tax and the 
freedom to observe the Sabbath. The latter was requested to be considered in 'Poland, 
German-Austria (Deutsch-Österreich), Czecheslovakia and Yugoslavia', four out of the twelve 
new states that were founded after the war. The Jewish representatives, however, clearly 
stressed that this would not be applied to Jews living in Germany.  
 On the subject of German Jews, Fuchs intervened to ensure it was made clear that 
 
56 Term used by Eugen Fuchs to describe Eastern Jews in the Judenfragen meeting. Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 
99. 
57 Lucien Wolf, 'The Jewish National Movement’, Edinburgh Review, 1917. Cited in Mark Levene, ‘Nationalism 
and Its Alternatives in the International Arena: The Jewish Question at Paris, 1919’, Journal of Contemporary 
History 28, no. 3 (July 1993): 520. 
58 In the peace negotiations Wolf vowed by the ‘Renner principle’ as a possible system to implement in the new 
Eastern European states in particular, Ukraine where the Jewish minority was already operating on a semi-
autonomous level. See ibid.  
59 Simon Rabinovitch, Jewish Rights, National Rites: Nationalism and Autonomy in Late Imperial and Revolutionary 
Russia, Stanford Studies in Jewish History and Culture (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014), 
258. 
60 'That means they would have their own election register for the legislative authorities and for the local 
government administration, with the number of seats being in proportion to their percentage in the population 




German Jews were 'German nationals' (deutschnational) that they 'belong to the German 
nation' and 'are part of the German people' (deutschvölkisch).61 Making a theoretical 
observation, Fuchs used ideas espoused by Lazarus to argue that German Jews belonged to 
the German nation, declaring, 'the decisive concept of nationality in my opinion, is will, 
putting aside the objective aspects of language, history and baptism of blood on the battlefields 
[...] roughly calculated, 500,000 Jews have the will to belong to Germany [Deutschtum] as a 
people'.62  
 Fuchs clearly differentiated between German Jews and Jews living in Eastern Europe 
whom he acknowledged had a 'kind of nationality'. Fuchs based this observation on the fact 
that Eastern European Jews spoke a different language, had a unique, distinctive culture and 
lived in a closed 'ghetto-like manner'. These conditions, for Fuchs, designated that Eastern 
European Jews could be characterised as a cultural nation. Should 'Polish Jews achieve 
recognition as a nation according to the law of self-determination' Fuchs commented, 'I will 
be happy'.63 Building on an idea formulated by Max Bodenheimer in August 1914, Fuchs 
argued that should Polish Jews become a nation and not succumb to becoming Polonised, they 
would offer a buffer for the Germans against the Poles. 64 
 Deploying a rational, humanitarian argument the representative of the Zionist 
Federation Richard Lichtheim advised that it would not harm German interests to support 
this third demand on the grounds of 'general humanitarian principles, on the idea of freedom'. 
Lichtheim was the only Jewish representative to describe Jews in ethnic terms, as a 'national 
race [nationale Rasse] or religion', but wanted to avoid this discussion of Jewish identity all 
together. Instead, Lichtheim acknowledged the dangers involved in granting autonomous 
rights to a smaller national group (Volksgruppe). He recognised that it could lead to 'economic 
exclusion and cultural alienation' but he reminded the attendees of the situation: 'we are 
confronted by the fact that six million Eastern European Jews demand national or cultural or 
national-cultural autonomy'. 65 
 Contrary to the liberal Jewish position of Fuchs and the Zionist stance of Lichtheim, 
Walther Rathenau warned of the 'grave international questions' that would arise should the 
German authorities support this demand. 'At the peace conference we should try to prevent 
any precedent that could be used against us', advised Rathenau echoing Preuss's position 
during the constitutional debates. Reciprocity featured centrally in the Foreign Ministry's 
 
61 Ibid, 99. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid, 105. 
64 Ibid, 104. 
65 Ibid, 106. 
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position on minority protections and Rathenau was of the same opinion,  
 
At the moment when the government of the German Reich interferes with the self-
determination of other nationalities, we have to expect reciprocity as a matter of 
course. If we advocate that a part of the population in certain states receives 
autonomy, then we have opened the door to the same claim by minorities on us.66  
 
Rathenau also argued that it was important to not 'single out the Jews' but rather advocate 
for the rights of other minorities. Fuchs's response, however, clearly explained why this 
demand had been included. Germany 'no longer occupied a dominant position in the east', 
Fuchs observed, and as such would have little influence over deciding upon minority rights 
provisions.   
 Having lost the war, Germany lost all claims to influencing the future of Eastern 
European affairs. The Germans also lost the support of a valuable ally: Russian Jews who had 
initially welcomed the German occupation in 1914. Aware of the current state of affairs, the 
Jewish representatives urged that it was imperative that Germany support the proposals they 
had listed. Supporting these Jewish demands would signal that the Republic truly embodied 
the 'new spirt' Graf Bernstorff had alluded to in his opening speech. Moreover, offering this 
support would not be difficult given that the 'well-understood interests of Germanness 
[Deutschtum] have never excluded the justified claims of the Jews'. 67 As Pick (Head of the 
Lodz Police Force and Deputy Director of the Press Department) explained, 
 
What purpose might our conclusions have? They are to show the world that our former 
policies regarding the Jewish Question, how it has been dealt with in Germany so far, 
has not been right, and that Germany has learned to mend its ways. We regard it as an 
essential task for Germany to show the world that the old ways have gone. And they 
have to go with regard to the Jews as well.68 
 
After the war, the treatment of German Jews and the rights of Jews internationally was bound 
into the heralding of a 'new spirit' in Germany.  
 The fourth point in the Jewish demands concerned the 'Palestine question'. As the 
demand for a Jewish commonwealth (Gemeinwesen) had already been accepted by the Council 
for Ten,69 Sobernheim clarified that the German Jewish addition to this would be that ‘no Jew, 
whichever state he belongs to, is excluded from working, visiting or emigrating to the 
 
66 Ibid, 105. 
67 Ibid, 104. 
68 Ibid, 100. 
69 By March the Council of Ten was reduced to the Council of Four, the latter included the representatives of 
United Kingdom, United States of America, France and Italy.  
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settlement of Palestine’.70 The commission clarified that it took a distinctly more neutral and 
moderate position on Palestine as compared to the Zionist Federation and the Copenhagen 
Manifesto by not terming it a 'homeland' for the Jewish people but rather a 'commonwealth'.  
 The penultimate demand requested compensation for victims of pogroms 'by the state 
concerned'. The wave of violence and pogroms against Jews in the lands of the former Russian 
Empire including Romania and Ukraine in the spring of 1919 had not gone unnoticed 
internationally.71 Reports on these pogroms were often censored to avoid anti-pogrom 
propaganda affecting the international status of new states.72 Nonetheless, at the grassroots 
level, anti-pogrom marches were held in Britain, the Netherlands and America.73 At the peace 
negotiations in Paris, the Council of Four was aware of the  gravity of the situation. The 
subject of antisemitism in Poland was raised by both Woodrow Wilson, the President of the 
United States, and Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. They agreed that 
legal and political guarantees would have to be included in the peace treaty with the new states 
to control against antisemitism.74 Ensuring Jewish questions became humanitarian concerns, 
as the expert commission had done, successfully tied Jewish affairs into the international 
minorities system.  
 The sixth and last proposal requested the establishment of an international committee 
to monitor all outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference concerning Jews. It was envisioned that 
the committee could aid in protecting Eastern European Jews who would soon reside as 
minorities in the newly created states. Describing the Jewish Question in universalist 
language and evoking Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen-point programme, as in the penultimate 
demand, the treatment of Jews was elevated to a level of international, humanitarian 
proportions. It was described not only as a question for the Jews but as a universal 
humanitarian concern (allweltliche Menschheitsfrage), ‘which accordingly has to be solved by all 
people collectively’.75 By framing the Jewish Question as above national politics and in 
humanitarian terms, the Jewish expert commission, was careful to avoid accusations that their 
 
70 R19605, AA, ‘K181838’, 181838; Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 108. 
71 Levene suggests that the scale and dimension of anti-Jewish pogroms in the Ukraine ‘invite comparison with 
Hitler’s 1941 invasion’. Levene, ‘Nationalism and Its Alternatives in the International Arena: The Jewish 
Question at Paris, 1919’, July 1993, 526. In December 1918 the Jüdisch-Politische Nachrichten reported that 
ritual murders against Jews were still taking place in the Russian Empire. See R19606, AA, 'K182192'.  
72 A telegram was sent to the Foreign Office to report that in Ukraine Jewish massacres were being hushed to 
avoid bad press. See R19605, AA, 'K181943', 20 Juni 1919. Between November to June 1919 around 197 
instances of pogroms in Poland were reported. See ibid, 'K181976', 27 July 1919.  
73 Ibid, 'K181948', 28 Juli 1919. See also ibid, 'K182003', 4 August 1919.  
74 Paris Peace Conference, The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919): Notes of the Official 
Interpreter, Paul Mantoux, Supplementary Volumes to The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 88, 427. 
75 R19605, AA, K181838, 4. 
 177 
 
proposal meddled with the internal affairs of states.  
 The session concluded with the indication that further discussions would take place. 
Graf Bernstorff beseeched the ministry representatives to issue a verbal or oral response on 
the meeting. Unfortunately, the responses by the ministries, which were not given in the 
meeting itself are a matter of speculation as no further documents remain on the meeting or 
its outcome. In all likelihood the records were destroyed or lost. However, it is also possible 
that further meetings on Judenfragen did not take place given that by May the Allies presented 
the Germans with the terms for peace.  
 Whilst the meeting did not 'solve the problem in principle' of the Jewish Question as 
Graf Bernstorff had hoped, it certainly revealed the centrality of Jewish questions in the peace 
negotiations and the ramifications of these issues internationally. Most importantly, this 
meeting, which has been buried in obscurity, revealed the 'German's state attitude towards 
the Jews [and the] general perspective of German-Jewish functionaries regarding a traumatic 
past and an uncertain future'.76 
 
 
III. The German delegation and the Treaty of Versailles   
All the time and energy spent by the Foreign Office, the Pax Konferenz and the Committee for 
Peace Negotiations in preparing for the Paris Peace Conference unfortunately amounted to 
little practical use. The one-hundred-and-eighty-person German envoy equipped with 
thousands of preparatory documents for peace was not even invited to negotiate with the 
Allies. On the second, and last, formal occasion when the delegation came face-to-face with 
the Allies they were handed the draft of the Treaty of Versailles and given a maximum of 
fifteen days to supply a written commentary on its clauses.77  
 The extent to which the reams of memoranda that had been meticulously prepared 
were used in practice is debatable.78 As the German delegation was excluded from 
negotiations, they were afforded no input on the Jewish Question at Paris. And yet, the 
Germans had prepared for a discussion on Jewish questions. An orthodox Zionist, Hermann 
Struck, was selected to join the peace envoy to represent Jewish matters alongside a Catholic 
 
76 Matthäus, ‘Tagesordnung’, 87. 
77 Prior to this, the only time the plenipotentiaries were officially face-to-face was at the very beginning of the 
conference when they had to briefly exchange credentials. Apart from this formality they did not meet to 
discuss the treaty. All diplomacy was conducted in written form. Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference, 62. 
78 This is inferred by research conducted by Alma Luckau in the form of testimonies from delegates who were 
present. Some mentioned seeing the sheets of memoranda lying around, others say they were not used. Ibid, 39.  
 178 
 
and Protestant representative.79 Within the six-person delegation itself, two of the delegates 
selected happened to be of Jewish descent (Otto Landsberg and Carl Melchior). Moreover, the 
German delegation, in one of the few meetings with the Allies, protested the anti-Jewish 
pogroms by Poles, in order to place doubt on the creation of an independent Poland. Both in 
the preparation and practical arrangements for Paris, Jewish affairs had been considered by 
the Germans.  
 In what follows, I will examine the members of the German delegation, specifically the 
Zionist representative Hermann Struck, and demonstrate how in Paris the German delegation 
used Jewish questions strategically. They protested Polish pogroms to in turn demand 
minority protections for Germans. In Paris, minority rights became first and foremost tied 
into the German, not Jewish, question. In the final treaty with Germany, the Council of Four 
decided that Jewish rights was a 'contentious' subject and excluded it from the peace treaty. 
Aware of the importance of Jewish rights, a special Committee was established and tasked to 
draft a separate treaty focusing on minority rights. This will be the focus of the final section.  
 
On 18 April 1919, the German Foreign Office received news that they had to send a peace 
delegation to Paris to ‘receive’, rather than as they had hoped to negotiate, the treaty. In 
preparation for this invitation, by late March the National Assembly had already selected six 
delegates who would represent German interests in the peace negotiations.80 In a democratic 
process, each party of the coalition was allowed to put forward a delegate. They were allocated 
according to the representation of their party in government. For this reason, the Majority 
Social Democrats put forward a third of the total delegates, Otto Landsberg (Minister of 
Justice) and Robert Leinert (President of the Prussian Diet). Johann Giesberts (Postmaster 
General) represented the Catholic Centre Party, and Carl Melchior (Chairman of the DDP) 
the German Democrats. The final two delegates were selected based on their expertise. This 
included Walter Schücking (Professor of International Law) and Count Ulrich von 
Brockdorff-Rantzau (Minister of Foreign Affairs), the latter of whom headed the delegation.81 
This list was formally compiled and sent to the Allies after the 26 April, just a few days before 
 
79 In a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Jewish orthodox organisation based in Frankfurt the 
organisation praised the selection of Hermann Struck to represent Jewish interests at the peace negotiations. 
See R19605, AA, 'K181877', 17 April 1919.  
80 Luckau writes that on the 22 March the government selected the delegates for Paris. Yet, according to the 
minutes of the Cabinet meetings, it was only on the 25 March that the Germans received an Allied note that 
requested six delegates to be sent to Versailles. See Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 
54; 'Meeting of the Reich Ministry, March 25, 1919, 3:00pm at Weimar Castle' in Burdick and Lutz, The 
Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 279-280, especially 279.  
81 See Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 54; 'Meeting of the Reich Ministry, 
Wednesday, March 12, 1919, 4:00pm, in the small committee room of the National Assembly' in Burdick and 
Lutz, The Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 257-259, especially 258.  
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the arrival of the delegation in Paris.82  
 Aiding the six delegates was a staff of experts. These experts were divided into two 
lists. List A contained the names of twenty-three experts83 who were invited to accompany 
the delegation to the negotiations in Paris. Notable Jewish names in the first list included 
Wilhelm Cuno (Chairman of the Hamburg-America Line), Carl Legien (General Secretary of 
the Trade Unions), Walther Rathenau (Board Member of the General Electricity Company, 
AEG) and Max Warburg84 (a prominent banker). List B was much longer with eighty-three 
names of experts with relevant areas of expertise in agriculture, transport, unions, industry 
and banking who would remain in Berlin at the disposal of the peace delegation.85 
 On the 18 March the Cabinet decided to add several additional names to List A on the 
grounds that these 'men of world renown' could facilitate the 'renewal of international 
contacts' and whose presence could 'prevent degrading treatment'.86 The preoccupation with 
humiliation evidenced in the inclusion of these candidates once again reflected the theme 
which ran through the Pax Konferenz on Judenfragen, namely the prioritisation of actions that 
would enable Germany to regain international prestige. Accordingly, List A was extended to 
include 'persons of international repute' including amongst others, Professors Max Weber and 
Moritz Julius Bonn,87 the Jewish Social Democratic politician who was present at the 
Judenfragen meeting, Edward Bernstein as well as representatives of the Catholic Church, 
Protestant Church and the Zionist organisation. Of the latter organisation, Alfred Klee was 
first suggested, before being replaced by Hermann Struck.88 
 What is notable about the lists of representatives sent to negotiate peace both as 
delegates and as experts is the presence of a significant number of Germans of Jewish descent. 
Of the six delegates sent to Paris, one third, were of Jewish descent. These were Otto 
Landsberg and Carl Melchior both of whom were experts in the field of law and finance 
 
82 'Meeting of the Reich Ministry, April 25, 1919, 11:00am, at the Reich Chancellery' in Burdick and Lutz, The 
Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 281.  
83 For a list of these names see 'Meeting of the Reich Ministry, Tuesday, March 18, 1919, 12:00 noon' in ibid, 
264-266, especially 265.  
84 Melchior replaced Warburg, who declined, for the peace delegation, ibid, 264. Warburg attended the peace 
conference as an expert see 'Document 17: Preliminary List of the German Peace Delegation at Versailles, as of 
May 1, 1919' in Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 188-190.  
85 'Appendix 3, March 17, 1919 Meeting: List A Experts' in Burdick and Lutz, The Political Institutions of the 
German Revolution, 263-264. 
86 Ibid, 264.  
87 Moritz Julius Bonn (1873-1965), Professor of the Munich Commercial College was included in the 
delegation as a financial expert. On the relationship between 'Jewishness and liberalism' in the Weimar 
Republic in the works of Moritz Julius Bonn, Hermann Heller and Felix Weltsch see, Jens Hacke, ‘Jewish 
Liberalism in the Weimar Republic? Reconsidering a Key Element of Political Culture in the Interwar Era’, in 
The German-Jewish Experience Reconsidered: Contested Interpretations and Conflicting Perceptions, ed. Steven E. 
Aschheim and Vivian Liska (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2015), 155–70. 
88 This was decided in a Cabinet sitting held on Tuesday, 18 March 1919. The minutes of this meeting are 
available in the online files of the Reich Chancellery [https://bit.ly/2DACRhm, accessed 12/02/19].  
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respectively. Other notable figures included the influential banker Max Warburg, Eduard 
Bernstein and Walter Rathenau. However, none of these men went to Paris with a portfolio 
to represent or even discuss (German) Jewish questions, as discussed in the Foreign Office 
meeting on the 31 March. One individual was designated to accompany the delegation as the 
‘Expert on the Jewish Question’, Hermann Struck.89   
 
A lithographer by trade, by the end of the First World War Struck had built a reputation as a 
spokesman for Jewish affairs. Born in Berlin in 1876, Struck who was training to become a 
Rabbi elected instead to pursue art.90 Enrolling in the Berlin Academy of Fine Arts, Struck 
specialised in etching and engraving and became actively involved in the progressive Berlin 
Sezession movement, which sought to break from conservative art organisations in Germany.91 
Graduating in 1900, aged twenty-four, only three years later, Struck reached acclaim for his 
art with his etching of Theodor Herzl. Other prominent figures who sat for Struck included 
Hermann Cohen, Oscar Wilde, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Henrik Ibsen and Albert 
Einstein.92 Amongst his apprentices Struck counted the famous Jewish artists, Marc Chagall, 
Max Liebermann, Lesser Ury, Josef Budko and Jakob Steinhardt.93  
 Despite not following the path to become a Rabbi, Struck remained devoted to 
studying the Talmud. When the Zionist Federation was established in Germany, Struck 
joined with enthusiasm. In 1902 Struck was able to combine his religious views with his 
political views when he co-founded the Mizrachi movement (merkaz ruchani meaning spiritual 
centre), an extreme orthodox wing of Zionism.94  
 When the First World War broke out, Struck, in an act demonstrative of his patriotism 
for Germany, voluntarily enlisted in the infantry and following training, was sent to the 
Eastern Front. Committed to alleviating the plight of East European Jews, Struck was one of 
the fifteen original members of the Committee for the East.95 Whilst in the east, Struck 
completed a study on the language and culture of Jews living in Poland in which he 
demonstrated the close connections between German and Yiddish. The book became an 
important document for relations between the German authorities and the local Polish Jewish 
 
89 CZA, A124/123, 'An Interview with Hermann Struck', The Hebrew Standard, 1920.  
90 The only biography on Hermann Struck that I have been able to locate is Jane Rusel, Hermann Struck (1876-
1944): das Leben und das graphische Werk eines jüdischen Künstlers, Judentum und Umwelt; Band 66 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 1997). 
91 Schmidt, The Art and Artists of the Fifth Zionist Congress, 89. 
92 Nathan A. Bernstein, a descendant of Hermann Struck, owns one of the largest private collections of Struck's 
work [https://bit.ly/2TJZqXW, accessed 12/02/19].  
93 Schmidt, The Art and Artists of the Fifth Zionist Congress, 90. 
94 After the Fifth Zionist Congress (December 1901) stated that Zionist educational programmes would not be 
based on religion, the Mizrachi movement was founded. Ibid, 94–96. 
95 Nicosia, ‘Jewish Affairs and German Foreign Policy during the Weimar Republic’, 262. 
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communities and drew the attention of the German leadership towards Struck's talents.96  
 When in 1915 the Supreme Army Command for the East (Ober-Ost) established a press 
office to control the flow of information in the region, Hermann Struck was brought in as 
translator of Yiddish. Within two years, Struck had earned an Iron Cross First Class and been 
promoted to Officer. Based on these merits he was selected by Wilhelm Freiherr von Gayl 
(Political Director of the Ober-Ost) to head the newly created office for Jewish Affairs (Dezernat 
für jüdische Angelegenheiten) in the political division of the Ober-Ost.97 The establishment of 
Jewish Affairs offices in the Ober-Ost began in August 1915 when Ludwig Haas, a Progressive 
member of the Reichstag, was selected to head the section in Poland. In an interview in 1920, 
reflecting on this experience Struck framed the appointment as being asked by the 'German 
Government to take charge of the department dealing with the Jewish question in Oberost'. 98   
 With his extensive experience on the affairs of Eastern European Jews, Struck was 
appointed as the Zionist representative of the German peace delegation. It is particularly 
noteworthy that the German delegation elected alongside a representative from the Catholic 
and Protestant Church a representative from the Zionist organisation, rather than a Rabbi or 
spokesperson of the Central Association, the largest German-Jewish association. There are 
several reasons why a Zionist was selected; a Zionist rather than Struck specifically as the 
initial selection had been for Alfred Klee, a German Zionist of the first-generation and close 
friend of Theodor Herzl.  
 Firstly, during the war, German Zionists had proven the strategic importance for the 
Germans of collaboration with Zionists and Eastern European Jews. Moreover, the success of 
Zionist activities towards other Great Powers meant that after the war, Zionism emerged as 
a significant and coherent international movement. As the Germans hoped to reignite 
German-Russian Jewish wartime collaboration to secure their eastern borders, having a 
Zionist rather than liberal Jewish representative was more fitting as East European Jews 
strongly identified as a national-cultural group in line with Zionist attitudes. As Aschheim 
writes, 'as the war unfolded it became evident that the Eastern Jew increasingly symbolized 
the greater, more general Jewish question'.99 Speaking on the subject in an interview, Struck 
revealed that he had been tasked by the German government with 'questions of minority 
rights of the Jews in those lands where they live in great masses' in other words, Eastern 
 
96 Hermann L. Struck, Jüdischdeutsche Texte. Lesebuch zur Einführung in Denken, Leben und Sprache der 
Osteuropäischen Juden (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich’sche Buchhandlung, 1917). Cited in Norrell, ‘Shattered 
Communities, 103. 
97 Schmidt, The Art and Artists of the Fifth Zionist Congress, 109.  
98 CZA, A124/123 'An Interview with Hermann Struck'.  
99 Aschheim, Brothers and Strangers, 142. 
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Europe. He maintained that his position on this had not waivered and that he continued to 
defend Jewish national rights. Yet asked if his proposals were included in the peace treaty, 
Struck preferred not to comment. 100   
 Whilst the Germans thought they would be invited to discuss the post-war policy on 
Eastern Europe in actuality, they were not. Of the extensive notes and counter-proposals by 
the German delegation at Versailles there was no mention of Eastern European Jews as the 
delegation had not been invited to comment on the subject. As the German government ruled 
that it would not be possible for Struck to meet the Jewish representatives of Allied countries, 
he did not attend the peace conference, although provisions for his arrival had been made.101 
In spite of the selection of a German Zionist representative for Paris and the meeting on 
Judenfragen in the peace preparations in Berlin, there was no expert on Jewish affairs in Paris 
to represent German interests in the Jewish organisations, or with the Allies.  
 
 
IV. National minority rights and the German Question 
The reality that unfolded in the Paris Peace Conference differed vastly from the German 
delegation’s expectation of the peace negotiations. For one they were not negotiations. 
Additionally, in as much as Jewish questions were raised by the German delegation in Paris, 
Jewish affairs were used strategically, as an instrument to juxtapose the civility of the 
Germans with the barbarity of the Polish. Then, in turn to demand national minority 
protections for Germans in an independent Poland. An additional approach pursued by the 
Germans was to demand protections by assuring the Allies that these would be reciprocated 
in Germany. However, whilst a limited number of cultural rights were granted to Germany's 
minorities, as seen in the Weimar constitutional debates, these did not extend to national 
groups. Thus, Germany did pursue an inconsistent policy with regard to minority protections, 
as highlighted by Oskar Cohn. Ultimately, contrary to Weimar where minority rights opened 
up a Jewish Question, in Paris, minority protections were awarded as a means to answer the 
German Question. 
 Simply put, the absence of any extensive discussion on Germany's position on 
Judenfragen was because the draft peace treaty presented by the President of the Conference 
Clémenceau to the Germans not only demanded a written response in a fortnight but also did 
not mention minority protections on the list of topics that the Germans were invited to reply 
 
100 CZA, A124/123 'An Interview with Hermann Struck'.  




to.102 Only four days earlier on the 3 May, the Council of Four had decided that the question 
of the protection of minorities, 'so far as it affects the Jews in Poland', was 'so contentious and 
difficult' that it was decided no conclusions would be reached until after the treaty with 
Germany was signed.103  
 Around the same time as the meeting on Judenfragen, the Pax Konferenz compiled a 
memorandum on 'draft proposals' outlining Germany's position on minority protections under 
a clause concerning the eventuality of an independent Poland. The document read that care 
should be taken to ensure ‘national and religious minorities be guaranteed an honourable 
existence within their own borders’.104 Whilst the German leadership may have had the 
(religious) Polish Jewish minority in mind when drafting this section, the minority requiring 
(national) protection that was at the forefront of the Foreign Office's negotiation strategy was 
Germans. In a follow-up document handed to the German plenipotentiaries of peace, an entire 
section was dedicated to ‘The Protection of National Minorities.’105 Reminiscent of Hugo 
Preuss's insistence that Germany pursue a policy of reciprocity with respect to minority 
protections the document concluded that the Germans would ‘try to effect further cultural 
autonomy based on records in national registry offices.’106 
 In Paris the German delegation was insistent on national minority protection. When, 
on the 7 May, they were presented with the draft Treaty of Versailles which did not mention 
minorities protections, the German delegation added it into their counter-proposal to the 
Allies, which they handed over on the 29 May. Listed under part two entitled 'Territorial 
Questions', sub-section, ‘right of self-determination’ the delegation demanded cultural 
autonomy for Germans and guaranteed this autonomy for minorities within Germany.107 The 
reciprocal approach advocated by the German delegation, was more tactical than anything 
else. Most importantly for the Germans minority rights was a territorial question concerning 
the vast swaths of land to the east that were no longer under German dominion. During the 
inter-war years the Germans were the largest ethnic minority living within the new states of 
 
102 See ‘Document 30: Speech of President Clemenceau on May 7, 1919, at the Trianon Palace Hotel, Versailles’ 
in Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 223-224. 
103 Oscar Isaiah Janowsky, The Jews and Minority Rights (1898-1919) (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1933), 344. 
104 See ‘Document 20: Memorandum: Foreign Office Draft Proposals’ in Luckau, The German Delegation at the 
Paris Peace Conference, 195-199, especially 198. 
105 In Paris in the Legal Division of the German Peace Delegation the protection of minorities was listed as a 
point to discuss under the section on International Law. See ‘Document 19’ in ibid, 193-4.  
106 Germany’s Jewish population would not have been in the national registry and thus not a ‘national minority’ 
according to the Foreign Office. See ‘Document 21: Instructions given to the German plenipotentiaries of 
peace’ in ibid, 199-208, especially 202. 
107 See ‘Document 57: German Counterproposals of May 29, 1919’ in ibid, 324. 
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Eastern Europe including Greece and the Baltic states.108 The Germans supported the right 
to self-determination hoping that their scattered national populations would choose to remain 
German, thus possibly resulting in the acquisition of eastern territory.109 Not just the German 
delegation but also German Jews were predominately concerned with the outcome of the war 
on Germany, in particular Germany's territorial ambitions and the stability of post-war 
German society. 110 During the Weimar Republic German and Jewish lobby groups worked 
together closely in the European Congress of Nationalities as they fought for minority 
guarantees.111  
 Making a case against a large independent Poland (which would include West Prussia 
and create a corridor in East Prussia), the German delegation interrogated the concept of 
nationality by attempting to minimise the importance of language and instead stress the 
significance of descent. The counter-proposal to the Allies outlined that in many of the areas 
being granted to independent Poland the populations were German by nationality, even if the 
German language was not always the most dominant one. ‘The circumstance that, in isolated 
regions, a non-German language has survived, is in itself of no moment, for, even in the oldest 
homogenous States, this condition may be observed; the Bretons, Welsh, Basques may be 
mentioned in this connection’.112  
 Echoing the German delegation’s counter-proposal, in the constitutional committee 
sitting of the 16 June Cohn used the example of France to argue that despite the existence of 
different language groups in France (‘the Basques, Bretons of the North and the Southerners’), 
the will to be French united these groups and suggested this conception of the nation, not 
based on language, should be pursued in Germany.113 Building on unfolding events in Paris, 
Cohn highlighted how the German delegation supported 'national minority rights' whilst in 
the constitutional discussions in Weimar these rights were not being recognised.  
 Abroad then, Germany was driving a policy of national minority rights protection, as 
announced in the counter-proposal to the Allies.114 In a meeting on the 3 June in the Office for 
 
108 Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights', 383. 
109 The German Empire supported self-determination for Jews in the east, presumably on the basis that they 
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drafted before being sent to the German government. This also might also account for the differences in dates 
such that the counter-proposal was given to the Allies on the 29 May but it was only on the 3 June that Cohn 
mentions a meeting took place discussing the various articles. See ‘57. Sitzung, 15 Juli 1919’, 1572. 
 185 
 
the Peace Negotiations the position of the German authorities with regard to national 
minorities protection was discussed in the form of two proposals. The first proposal offered a 
clear definition on what a minority group entailed, ‘a minority […] is a nationally defined 
group, which is willing and able, based on its size and culture, to lead an independent national 
existence’.115 The consensus was that foreign-speaking was an  unnecessary criteria for the 
concept of ‘national minority’. The second proposal suggested that in countries where national 
minorities reside, ‘minority communities’ would be founded and that this would similarly 
apply to Jews as long as they demanded a national independent existence.  
 For Cohn, Germany was being ‘dishonest’ by pursuing a foreign policy that was 
not aligned to its domestic policy and yet crucially Cohn's argument rested on the basis that 
Jews would be recognised internationally as a national minority. Using moralistic language 
Cohn argued that ‘under no circumstances could Germany award their own national minority 
groups less rights than that which is granted by the Allies in Paris, and eventually the League 
of Nations’.116 Yet in Paris, the Jews were not on the forefront of the German delegation's 
mind. In the twenty-two notes sent by the German delegation to the Allies as well as in the 
counter-proposal, Jews were only mentioned once. Under a section discussing the guarantees 
to be given to Germany in the ceded eastern districts, the German delegation warned that the 
Poles had not shown that they could be trusted as ‘protectors of the rights of national religious 
minorities', referring to the anti-Jewish massacres which had broken out on armistice day.117  
 The German delegation used the violence against Jews as an instrument to demand 
that minority guarantees be enforced in the ‘new state’ of Poland, thus also ensuring 
protection for German minority populations. The counter-proposal went as far as to claim 
that if an independent Poland were to be established without ‘guarantees for the minority 
peoples being accurately established at the same time’ (in other words suggesting a Minority 
Treaty, which the Allies had in fact authorised to be drafted on the 1 May) then this would 
result in the ‘advancement of the pogrom limit far towards the west’. 118 This was not the first 
time members of the German authority had singled out the barbarity of the Poles (and 
Romanians) towards the Jews. It was a recurrent theme in parliamentary sittings from 
October 1918 through to August 1919. In the end, despite suggesting a willingness to 
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reciprocate international minority protections within Germany, the Allies did not include a 
clause on minority protections in the Treaty of Versailles, much to the disappointment of the 
Polish delegate Paderewski.119 The absence of an obligation to protect minorities in the peace 
treaty with Germany would prove detrimental in the inter-wars. The League was powerless 
to take action against the Nazis violent treatment of German Jews.120 
 
 
V. Setting a double standard? Minority obligations in the Treaty of Versailles  
Over the course of four months with an average of approximately two meetings per day 
between the Council of Four, only a few brief discussions took place on issues concerning Jews 
in the peace negotiations.121 When they did take place, they concerned the question of 
(national) minority rights in the ‘new states’, mostly referring to Poland. On 1 May, in one of 
his regular private meetings with Georges Clémenceau and Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson 
first raised the subject of minority rights in the treaty with Germany.122  
 The urgency Wilson saw in securing minority protection one could assume came from 
his observation that, ‘one of the things that troubles the peace of the world is the persecution 
of the Jews’.123 Following this statement, Wilson proposed to insert two clauses into the peace 
treaty with Germany that would also apply to Poland, 'Bohemia' as well as other 'new states'. 
The first clause was to ‘grant all racial and national minorities the same treatment in the law 
[…] to the majority’. The second stated to ‘place no obstacle in the way of the practice of 
religion’.124 Yet whilst the manner in which the conversation initially unfolded suggests that 
Wilson, through these clauses, had given implicit support to the Jewish ‘nationalist’ cause, as 
he clarified in the meeting, what he most desired was for the inclusion of ‘general provisions’ 
in the treaty with Germany on the basis that ‘several million’ Germans would soon reside in 
Polish territory.125  
 Wilson was in fact sceptical of using the term ‘national minority’ to describe European 
Jewry. He commented, in reference to a draft on the status of Polish citizens, that what he did 
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not like was ‘that a sort of autonomy is required for national minorities’, to which Lloyd 
George replied, ‘this is a claim of the Jews, who wish to form a kind of state within a state. 
Nothing could be more dangerous’.126  
 To deal with the specific concern of (Jewish) minority protections, the Allies decided 
to establish a separate committee to draft a peace treaty. After a brief discussion between Lloyd 
George and Woodrow Wilson on the loyalty of Polish Jews in the war and the need to ‘bring 
them [Jews] back everywhere under the terms of the law of the land’, Wilson proposed to 
establish a committee of experts to ‘settle that question’ in Poland.127 This committee was the 
Committee on New States and for the Protection of Minorities, which prepared the Minority 
Treaty that became the template for the peace treaties of the new states.128 The Council of 
Four discussion ended inconclusively on the subject of which peace treaty to include minority 
guarantees in. Wilson thought either the treaty with Germany or Poland, whereas George 
insisted on the former. The Council also disagreed on the extent of these guarantees, Lloyd 
George wanted to impose the same ‘international obligations […] as civilised countries’, 
which Wilson thought too expansive.129  
 Only a few days later on the 3 May in a meeting between the Council of Four, attended 
by experts from the Committee on New States, it was decided to not include a guarantee on 
the protection of minorities in the Treaty of Versailles. The Council was informed by the 
experts that the question ‘in particular so far as it affects the Jews in Poland is so contentious 
and difficult’130 that it could not be resolved in time for the presentation of the draft Treaty of 
Versailles, which had been scheduled to take place in four days. Instead it was agreed that the 
treaty with Germany would include an Annex A, which would state that ‘Poland will sign 
treaties with the Principle Allied Powers to protect ethnic and religious minorities.’131   
 The Treaty of Versailles was unique in not including minority protections. Germany 
was the only country to not have any clauses on obligations towards its minorities embedded 
within its peace treaty with the Allies. This would prove detrimental for German Jews during 
the latter half of inter-war years. In 1933, when the Nazis began to enact increasing violence 
against the Jewish population, the League of Nations was powerless to take action.132 No 
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minority protections were included in the peace treaty with Germany because the Allies were 
more concerned about Germans, the largest post-war ethnic minority, residing in the new 
states and thus enshrined guarantees in the peace treaties with this minority in mind. 
Deliberations by the Council of Four revealed that the question of whether or not to include 
national minority protections in the Treaty of Versailles were conceived with the Germans in 
mind. In contrast, the Committee on New States, which authored the Minority Treaty, was 
established with Polish Jews in mind.133 Historians debate the extent to which the Jewish 
representations in Paris influenced the formulation of the Minority Treaty and yet, as will be 
seen below, whilst the Jewish representations ultimately did not command an overwhelming 
authority on events, they did bring Jewish questions to the international arena and ensured 
they remained on the agenda.134 
 
 
VI. Jewish rights and the Minority Treaty 
This final section of the chapter turns to the specific debates on the wording of minority 
protections before they were enshrined in the Minority Treaty signed on the 28 June 1919. I 
pay particular attention to the position held by the different Jewish representations at the 
Paris Peace Conference. Beginning with the League of Nations Covenant where Wilson first 
advocated for a legally binding clause on minority rights protections, the section subsequently 
turns to the views articulated on these protections by the Jewish representations in Paris. I 
specifically turn my attention to the Jewish anti-nationalists, the American Jewish Congress 
and the Committee of Jewish Delegations. The final section re-examines the Treaty of 
Versailles, now from the perspective of the Allies. On the same day the Treaty of Versailles 
was signed, the Minority Treaty was drafted and signed by the Polish delegation. It was used 
as a means by which to satisfy the German (and British) delegation who otherwise objected to 
a greater independent Poland. Ultimately, Jews were afforded cultural autonomous rights not 
national rights in the Minority Treaty, the consequences of which I will examine below. Just 
as the Jews had been one of the minority groups, along with Armenians, at the 'nodal point' of 
the emerging system in 1878, when in the Berlin Treaty their protection became a 'constituent 
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element of the international system', once again in the Minority Treaty their fate was bound 
to the new ordering of states along the 'ideal of state sovereignty rooted in national 
homogeneity'.135 
 
American President Woodrow Wilson first conceived of the idea of a League of Nations in a 
speech to Congress where he formulated his famous fourteen-point programme envisioning a 
future world order.136 The second draft of the League of Nations covenant on the 10 January 
1919 that included a distinct article on minorities. It read,  
 
The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as a condition 
precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous States, to accord to all 
racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same 
treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that it accorded the racial or national 
majority of their people.137   
 
Whilst this first clause would not have applied to a country such as Germany, on the 20 
January it was re-drafted to extend to all ‘recognised sovereignties’ when seeking admission 
to the League of Nations. The new draft also added a line prohibiting religious discrimination.  
 Following Wilson's fourteen-point programme, the wording on the protection of 
minorities in the covenant defined minorities as racial or national, rather than religious, 
foreign-speaking or culturally autonomous. It is curious as to why Wilson included racial 
equality as one of the cornerstones of the new supra-national organisation dedicated to peace, 
when this equality was not present in his own country.138 This double standard, however, 
became a feature not only of the League of Nations, but of the post-war international system 
that was created during the Paris Peace Conferences. As Mazower writes,  
 
Although organisationally the League was a radical departure from the past, in other 
ways it fitted squarely into an earlier Victorian tradition of Great Power paternalism, 
a paternalism that coexisted comfortably with both liberal Christianity and racism.139  
 
The response to including minority protection in the League of Nations Covenant was 
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overwhelming negative. The British thought this clause should be included in the territorial 
treaties, not the League of Nations. Neither did the French want to ‘encumber’ the covenant 
with this. Wilson’s advisor David Hunter Miller thought that if a clause were to be included 
it needed even more specific provisions. When the League of Nations Committee convened on 
the 3 February, most of the clause had been removed, except for the section on religious 
liberty. By the 13 February, however, this was also dropped as the Committee was unable to 
reach consensus. The Japanese delegate had introduced an amendment to include racial 
equality as well as religious equality and refused to accept the former if the latter was not also 
guaranteed. The major powers were unwilling to concede to any obligation on racial equality 
and thus the whole article on minority protections was dropped from the League covenant.140  
 Jewish representatives played a significant role in Paris and advocated on behalf of 
guarantees for the protection of minorities. The representatives present, however, differed on 
the criteria for defining the minority.  Jewish rights would have been on Wilson’s mind when 
he arrived in Paris for the peace negotiations. Prior to which, he had met with representatives 
from the American Jewish Congress. As early as mid-February Jewish representatives sent 
their first formal appeal for Jewish rights.141  
 
The first appeals142 for Jewish rights to be included in the peace treaties came from the ‘anti-
nationalist camp’ of Jewish representatives, namely British and French Jews, represented 
respectively by the Joint Foreign Committee, Lucien Wolf was secretary and the most active 
member in Paris, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, whose Chairman was Eugene See. The 
anti-nationalists, also termed the ‘assimilationists’ by their critics sought to secure ‘civil and 
political equality’ for Jews and purposefully did not mention the word ‘national’. Their petition 
was for the full emancipation of Jews in Eastern Europe following the terms of Western 
European emancipation acts.143 
 Two petitions were submitted by the Joint Committee and Alliance Israélite. One 
demanded that the peace treaties include clauses ensuring that citizens ‘shall enjoy equal 
political and civil rights without distinction of race, language or religion’. Notably, the petition 
appealed for more than just minority rights for Jews but was framed in universalist language 
as a demand for ‘religious, cultural and educational autonomy [without] distinction of creed, 
race or language [on a] footing of perfect equality’. 144 
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 The other petition made explicit that it concerned Jewish minorities, and specifically 
Romanian Jewry. The context to this petition dated back to the Treaty of Berlin signed on the 
13 July in 1878 which recognised Romania as an independent state. Embedded within this was 
a provision that the Romanian government would refrain from the discrimination of religious 
minorities and grant full civil and political rights to inhabitants. These clauses were 
disregarded and when the First World War broke out, Romania and the Russian Empire were 
the only European states not to have signed emancipation acts.145 The memory of 1878 and 
the treatment of the Jewish population featured prominently in the deliberations of the Council 
of Four in the decision on affording minority protections.146 
 As of January 1919, the Romanian government had declared to the Allies that the 
‘Jewish Question’ had been ‘solved’ in Romania by a decree of naturalisation. The decree had 
been issued in December 1918 enabling Jews to enrol in a new process of naturalisation. 
However, the process was not binding until ratified and essentially Jews still remained exempt 
from full citizenship, which the petition by the anti-nationalists hastened to illustrate to the 
Allies.147    
 
Alongside the appeal from the anti-nationalists, the American Jewish Congress also attempted 
to influence the decision on minority rights. The American Jewish Congress was the most 
influential Jewish representation in Paris, largely because it had a direct line to Wilson 
through Louis D. Brandeis, a U.S. Supreme Court Judge, close associate of the President and 
supporter of the Congress. Moreover, as the Congress represented the full spectrum of Jewish 
opinion from the ‘anti-nationalist’ through to the ‘nationalist’ camp it became the mediating 
body in Paris.  
 Willing to take an active stance on Jewish affairs at the Paris Peace Conference, in 
preparation the Congress met in December 1918 and prepared expert reports on all countries 
with Jewish populations. When Woodrow Wilson returned for a short trip back to the United 
States (between 24 February to 5 March) the American Jewish Congress seized upon the 
opportunity to appeal to Wilson for Jewish rights in Eastern Europe and for the recognition 
of Palestine.  
 Whilst the Congress employed similar terminology in its communications with 
Wilson, requesting ‘full civil, religious, political and national rights’, they carefully outlined 
the understanding of the latter term. The Congress differentiated between understanding of 
 
145 Mahler, Jewish Emancipation, 62. 
146 Paris Peace Conference, The Deliberations of the Council of Four, 473. 
147 Janowsky, The Jews and Minority Rights, 323. 
 192 
 
a nation in Western and Eastern states. In Western states, nation denoted a homogenous 
political entity. In Eastern states, given the heterogeneous nature of states, nation signified 
an ethnic unit. Thus, the Congress demanded that national rights be awarded in accordance 
with the individual case and its context. Whilst Wilson was unwilling to provide any certainty 
about a clause on ‘national’ minority rights, according to the Congress representatives, he did 
reassure them on the recognition of Palestine.148 
 Despite the initial successes of the Congress, over the course of the Paris Peace 
Conference it was unable to unite all the Jewish representations into a single delegation. This 
was due to fundamentally different and unalterable understandings of Jewry as either a 
singularly religious or also national group. Unable to find a consensus, the American Jewish 
Congress abandoned its all-inclusive programme. Instead it formed a united front with the 
East European Jewish representatives called the Committee of Jewish Delegations, thereby 
excluding the British and French Jewish representatives.149  
 
By April 1919 the Allies were meeting frequently to negotiate on the peace treaties. Since the 
rejection of Wilson’s clause in the League of Nations Committee meeting in February, 
however, the Allies had not discussed minority protection.150 In these three months, agitation 
on the part of Jewish representatives continued and was largely conducted using diplomatic 
back channels. In April the first public and large-scale petitions for Jewish rights were 
conducted by the Committee of Jewish Delegations.151  
 The Committee demanded the recognition of national autonomy on the basis that 
Jewish communities in the emerging new states were already on route to achieving forms of 
autonomy. These 'bold if brief experiments in Jewish national autonomy' such as the 
establishment of Jewish national councils were taking place in Ukraine and Lithuania. Jewish 
nationality was also recognised in the new state of Czechoslovakia.152 Backing the Committee 
was the World Zionist Organisation, which sought to guide the multifarious eastern 
nationalist movements towards a collective goal. Prominent figures of the WZO included 
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Nahum Sokolow and Chaim Weizmann, both of whom later became Presidents of the World 
Zionist Congress. The goal advanced by the Committee echoed that of the Copenhagen 
manifesto written by the Zionist World leadership at the end of the war in October 1918. The 
manifesto called for (1) the full equality of rights for Jews in all countries, (2) national, political 
and cultural autonomy in countries where the Jewish population demanded it, (3) admission 
into the League of Nations as a ‘Jewish Nation’ and (4) the recognition of Palestine as the 
national home for the Jewish people.153 
 The Committee campaigned successfully on the importance of securing rights for Jews,  
framing it as an issue affecting not only Jews but the larger question of nationality.154 Two 
American representatives, Julian Mack and Louis Mashall, attempted to petition the U.S. 
delegate Lansing to establish a special commission to ‘deal with the Jewish question’ after they 
discovered that one had not been set up. However, after consultations, Lansing informed the 
Committee that their proposal had been decided against.155 Whilst the Committee also 
submitted a clause on minority guarantees exactly the day before Wilson raised the subject in 
the Council of Four meeting, it is difficult to ascertain how much these actions dictated the 
deliberations and decisions of the Allies.  In spite of the polarising views amongst the Jewish 
representations on Jewish nationalism the majority of Jewish delegates, excluding the French, 
were able to agree on legally enshrining Jewish autonomy into the peace treaties with new 
states.156  
 
On the 28 June 1919 as members of the German delegation, Müller and Bell, signed the Treaty 
of Versailles in the hall of mirrors in the Palace of Versailles, Paderewski, the Polish delegate, 
entered an adjacent room to sign the Minority Treaty. The Minority Treaty went much 
further than just including articles on the protection of national and religious minorities, as 
had been discussed for the Treaty of Versailles. Rather, the treaty contained specific 
protections, which applied only to the Jewish minority in Poland. Precisely because of the 
complex status of Jewry, as not part of a nation, but neither just a religious group, the members 
of the Committee of New States decided to mention the Jewish minority in the treaty to ensure 
it was protected. This was a lesson learned from the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.157 Memories of 
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Romania disregarding the stipulations concerning the recognition of Jews as citizens, leading 
to large scale anti-Jewish discrimination and violence, guided the decisions of the Allies in the 
negotiations.158 In one meeting on the wording of the Minority Treaty, Headlam-Morley 
noted that it was preferable to use the word 'inhabitants' over 'citizens' as the use of the latter 
term had enabled the Romanians to exclude the Jews.159 
 In the meetings preceding the treaty, Jews featured several times in the discussion on 
the treaty with Poland as the Committee on New States and the Allies balanced an awareness 
of the danger of antisemitism and the necessity to protect Jews, with the fear of creating 
separate legal (national) corporate entities within the new states. As such, they uniformly 
decided to not recognise the Jews as a nation, wanting to avoid encouraging any form of 
'aggressive nationalism'. Awarding Jews national rights was perceived as a possible threat to 
national unity within Poland as Lloyd George commented in one meeting, 'our desire to 
protect the Jews doesn't have to go so far as to make them into a state within a state'.160 
Balfour, who was also in attendance, similarly opined that 'establishing a Jewish nation within 
Poland is very dangerous', also remarking 'I greatly fear that the Jewish problem will become 
one of the most serious in the future'.161  
 In the Minority Treaty, general articles on the guarantee of religious, national freedom 
were included as well as two articles (10 and 11), which only concerned the Jewish population. 
Article 2 outlined the 'general provisions' for an independent Poland, namely 'protection of 
life […] without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion' as well as the 'free 
exercise […] of any creed, religion or belief'.162 Article 8 secured the rights of 'racial, religious, 
or linguistic minorities' to 'establish, manage and control […] charitable, religious and social 
institutions, schools and other educational establishments'. Article 9 complemented Article 8 
and gave linguistic minorities, such as White Russians, Germans and Ruthenians, the freedom 
and financial support to instruct their children in primary schools in their own language. 
Whilst the above articles all applied to Jews, specific provisions for them were written into 
Articles 10 and 11.  
 Article 10 enabled the Jewish community to appoint representatives to educational 
committees, and specifically outlined that the share of funds, mentioned in Article 9 would 
also be allocated proportionally to Jewish schools. Article 11, which had troubled the Allies, 
compelled the Polish state to not require its Jewish citizens to perform any acts that may 
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violate their holy day on Saturday, the Sabbath, although this did not apply to Jews in military 
service.163 The article also guaranteed that in Poland elections would not be held on Saturday. 
The clause essentially delegated more freedom to the Jewish population than other religious 
groups in Poland, such as Catholics who would be required to vote on Sunday if necessary.164  
 The Minority Treaty was used as a model for the additional fourteen peace treaties 
that were signed with the new states. The clauses specifically stipulating provisions for Jews, 
however, were only repeated in some of the treaties. Articles 10 and 11 were included in the 
‘Declaration of Lithuania’ and the treaty with Greece, with minor modifications.165 The treaty 
with Turkey used Article 43 to mirror Article 11 but applied it more broadly to all 'non-
Muslim minorities'. The Romanian treaty was carefully presided over to avoid a repetition of 
the Treaty of Berlin and thus also explicitly mentioned the Jews, requiring for them ipso facto 
to be recognized as Romanian nationals, 'who do not possess another nationality'.166 As Jewish 
populations were accordingly granted cultural autonomous rights, the question of whether 
the Jews were a nation, state, religion or tribe would continue into the following decade.  
 The paradox of the new state peace treaties was that precedence was given to the 
nation-state ideal alongside the endorsement of autonomous Jewish communal rights which 
threatened to undermine the national homogeneity of new states. The double standards of the 
Great Powers permeated the treaties as neither the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Italy nor Germany were bound by these provisions. Moreover, as the new states sought to 
unify their states, they simultaneously had to guarantee the cultural, linguistic and educational 
diversity of their minority populations. By the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 the principle of 
national homogeneity was legally enshrined thus providing official legitimation for the forced 
deportations of peoples, which came to define the inter-war years.167 
 
 
VII. Jewish questions, German questions 
Through the particular case of German and Jewish questions this chapter has demonstrated 
how the constitutions, treaties and principles on minority rights which emerged after the First 
World War were riddled with inconsistencies and paradoxes. On the international stage, 
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Germany having lost much of its territory in the north to Denmark, the west to France and 
the east to Poland and Czechoslovakia was confronted with a more homogenous population 
than before the war. Thus, when it came to minority protections in Paris, at the top of the 
German's delegation's agenda were the rights of German nationals, resident in the new states 
of Poland, Czechoslovakia but also the Baltic states and even Greece. In the peace negotiations 
amongst the Allies this also became a central concern as minority rights became part and 
parcel of the German Question.  
 Jewish questions, however, were not entirely absent in Paris. The German delegation, 
committed to presenting a 'positive programme' to the Allies, and saw in the Jewish Question 
their key to regaining international prestige and a signal that a 'new spirit' had entered 
Germany. In preparation, a meeting on Jewish questions was organised by the Office for Peace 
Negotiations and the Orthodox Zionist Hermann Struck was selected as a German-Jewish 
representative to accompany the peace envoy. As the German delegation was not invited to 
negotiations, they were unable to present their position on the rights for Eastern European 
Jews and Palestine. Jewish affairs were, however, raised by the delegation and used 
strategically as a means to highlight Polish barbarity and stress the necessary inclusion of 
national minority protections in the peace treaty with Poland.  
 In the Paris Peace Conference, the Jewish Question, as in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, 
once again became a constituent part of the emerging international system. As a distinct 
minority living over dispersed territories, how to ensure the protection of Jews against 
discrimination and violence led the Allies to establish a Committee on New States. Jewish 
representations in Paris petitioned actively for the specific inclusion of provisions for Jews. 
Whilst they were not decisive in shaping the wording of the Minority Treaty, they 
successfully ensured Jewish rights remained on the international agenda. In the Minority 
Treaty, which provided the template for minority guarantees in the peace treaties of the new 
states, two articles specifically mentioned the Jewish population and awarded them cultural 
autonomous rights in religious practice and education.  
 In the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference, Germany pioneered as a defender of 
minority rights for all those 'ethnic minorities who felt disadvantaged by the peace treaties 
and the selective implementation of national self-determination'.168 German and Jewish lobby 
groups worked together in the European Congress of Nationalities to ensure the League of 
Nation was fulfilling its obligations towards protecting minorities.169 After the war, ensuring 
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the international guarantee of minority rights became a integral component of both Jewish 







Jewish questions exposed a number of critical junctures in the political development of the 
German Empire. They revealed the prospects and apprehensions on Germany's path from the 
more monolithic, authoritarian structures of the Wilhelmine Empire to the more liberal, 
pluralist ones of the Weimar Republic in the liminal period of 1914 to 1919. Jewish questions 
became debates about the German state, pertaining to rights, religious freedom, equality 
before the law and national identity. As Peter Pulzer wrote, 'the Jewish Question in Germany 
was a function of the German concepts of nation and of political rule'.1 Whilst often viewed as 
the projection of a myth, I have shown that Jewish questions had distinct practical political 
ramifications. Rather than merely addressing the Jewish Question, I have sought to 
disentangle the term to reveal that it was multivalent and contingent. In doing so, I have 
moved beyond the prevalent assumption made within the modern scholarly literature of 
viewing the Jewish Question as solely an antisemitic phenomenon.  
 Starting in 1842 when the Jewish Question emerged as a popular catchword in Prussia, 
chapter one has shown that discussions about the Jewish Question did not follow a continuous 
narrative but rather erupted at particular moments in time. Both Gentiles and Jews 
contributed in equal part to these discussions, employing similar vocabulary despite their 
different political and ideological agendas. Notably, the debates reveal that the Jewish 
Question was always a reflection on the health of the German state.   
 Chapter one focused on six publications between 1842 and 1914 concerning the Jewish 
Question that sparked heated debates on the German state, specifically the separation of the 
church and state, cultural homogeneity, the relationship between citizenship and nationality, 
the differences in national versus patriotic allegiance and multiculturalism. These debates 
revealed that the Jewish Question was symptomatic of an underlying issue in Germany: the 
need for political and national-cultural reform. A homogenous national culture was not the 
issue at stake but rather how it was being conceived in Christian terms, excluding both Jewish 
contributions to German culture and hindering their integration.  
 Debates on Jewish questions exposed the challenges faced in the process of 
modernisation towards a secular, liberal, pluralist state on the one hand, and the desire to 
maintain a comprehensive, homogenous national identity, on the other. These earlier 
theoretical debates involving public intellectuals became practically relevant during and after 
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the First World War. As chapters two to four demonstrated, the terminology and ideas 
invoked in discussions on the Jewish Question were appropriated from these earlier debates. 
 The outbreak of the First World War presented an opportune moment for German-
Jewish collaboration. The desire for unity necessitated by the war brought with it the removal 
of discriminations against Jews in the army. Kaiser Wilhelm's declaration of a civic truce 
(Burgfrieden) implied that the German Empire had entered a new epoch. He suggested that 
the German people had become the embodiment of political, religious and ethnic 
heterogeneity. German Jews took up the call to arms with enthusiasm, seizing the chance to 
join the army and fulfil their patriotic duty. For the first time ever, unbaptised Jews were 
promoted to the rank of Officer. Putting their differences aside, both liberal and Zionist 
organisations encouraged German Jews to volunteer to fight for the Fatherland.  
 The first years of the war witnessed unprecedented collaboration between the German 
Foreign Office and German Jewish organisations. Members of the Committee for the East, 
Max Bodenheimer and Franz Oppenheimer, were invited into meetings with high-ranking 
diplomats and military Generals, where they participated in discussions on Germany's 
geopolitical interests and future as a colonial power. Chapter two demonstrated how otherwise 
theoretical Jewish questions became practically relevant when the Central Powers gained 
control over West Russia, a territory that extended across the Baltic states, Poland and 
Belarus. During the occupation, a practical Jewish Question arose when the Central Powers 
were faced with the jurisdiction over approximately six million Jews.  
 The encounter with a population of Eastern European Jews raised unparalleled 
questions about Jewish communal identity and rights but also about the future of the German 
Empire. As the army was faced, for the first time, with a Jewish population exhibiting national 
characteristics they were forced to decide on whether or not to support not only religious 
autonomy for the Jewish population but also cultural rights, such as allowing Polish Jews 
access to education in Yiddish. These discussions on the Jewish Question, on the subject of 
cultural national consciousness, had reached maturity in Zionist circles at the turn of the 
century, as illustrated in chapter one. They revealed an internal dynamic to the Jewish 
Question; one with Jewish agency and a political answer that with the outbreak of world war, 
was thought achievable. By 1914 the ideas and vocabulary from Zionist debates about the 
Jewish Question had entered mainstream discourse on Germany's foreign policy, with 
practical implications.  
 The occupation of West Russia not only challenged understandings of Jewish 
communal identity but also German national belonging. The language affinity between 
Yiddish-speaking Russian and Polish Jews to German enabled closer collaboration than with 
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other local groups such that Jews were used as translators for the German army. As the 
Supreme Army Command exerted their authority over the region, establishing schools and 
administrative departments, the occupation also raised practical questions pertaining to the 
future of the German polity, both in terms of the structure of Germany's external borders, but 
also the categorisation of German nationality, based historically on its development as a 
Kulturnation.  
 When in August 1914 Max Bodenheimer from the Committee for the East submitted 
a memorandum, which proposed extending Germany's sphere of influence and colonial 
outreach in Eastern Europe and Palestine by using Jews as mediators of German interests, 
the moment could not have been more auspicious. Building on Karl Renner's notion of the 
personality principle, Bodenheimer suggested the creation of an Eastern European Federation 
(ein osteuropäischer Staatenbund) from the Baltic to the Black Sea of autonomous national 
communities, loyal to Germany. Whilst Bodenheimer's federation was never realised, chapters 
two and five revealed how his ideas on Jewish cultural autonomy had a longer legacy in the 
Minority Treaties signed during the Paris Peace Conference. Bodenheimer's success was also 
institutional. After the war a department for Jewish Affairs was established in the German 
Foreign Office headed by a former member of the Committee for the East, Moritz Sobernheim. 
In 1916, however, the war began to take a turn for the worse for the German army. Relations 
between the Committee for the East and the Supreme Army Command and Foreign Office 
began to deteriorate and Bodenheimer's blueprint for an extended area of German influence 
using Jews as mediators was forgotten.  
 In the summer of 1916, the German Empire found itself in crisis: militarily and 
politically. With the battle of Verdun at an impasse, on the 1 July the German Army was 
drawn into the battle of the Somme where they faced stalemate. These battles, some of the 
longest of the war, raged on until the end of the year.2 The Central Powers were no more 
successful on the Eastern Front. Beginning in June, an unexpectedly powerful Russian 
offensive destroyed the Central Powers' defensive lines forcing them into retreat. The Russian 
Empire managed to regain almost all the southwest territory it had lost during the summer 
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of 1915.3 Further blows included Italy's defection in April and the Kingdom of Romania's 
decision to join the war on the side of the Allies in August.4  
 The cumulative military failures began to stir discontent within leadership circles. 
Intending to turn the tide in Germany's favour, General Paul von Hindenburg took over 
control of the Supreme Army Command, replacing General Erich von Falkenhayn. Under 
Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the Supreme Army Command began to challenge the 
authority of the civilian government by intervening in political and economic affairs. They 
implemented the Hindenburg Programme, which established a total war economy in 
Germany. This crisis of authority reached its zenith in July 1917 when a parliamentary 
majority demanded to open peace negotiations against the decision of the military leadership 
to secure peace through victory. Parliament lost as Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-
Hollweg was forced into resignation and the Supreme Army Command assumed de facto 
control over the last years of the German war effort.5 
 In October 1916 against the backdrop of military failures and a change in leadership, 
as chapter two has shown, a practical Jewish Question resurfaced. Once again, whilst focused 
on the Jewish minority, it concerned the German state more broadly. A Jewish Question arose 
in parliamentary debates in the context of a decree issued by the War Ministry to count the 
number of Jews serving on the front lines. The authorisation of a census singling out German 
Jews stood in stark contrast to the mutually beneficial relationship German-Jewish 
organisations and the German authorities had shared in the first years of the war. The 
parliamentary and public debate on the 'Jew census' (Judenzählung) which ensued challenged 
the necessity of the decree but more importantly opened up a discussion on equality before the 
law, constitutionalism and secularism. 
 Whilst the war heralded unity and solidarity, the Judenzählung pulled down this facade 
and exposed the Empire's past prejudices. The debate highlighted an Empire caught between 
a quasi-military dictatorship under the Supreme Army Command and a civilian-
parliamentarian government. Gathering statistical data, even based on confession, was not 
what caused most outrage for many German Jews, it was the specific targeting of Jews that 
undermined the 'spirit of 1914'. The census signalled the intent to exert control over a 
minority group that represented less than 1% of the German population. In the final count, 
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Jews were shown to have served on the front lines in equal measure to their fellow Gentile 
Germans.  
 The census highlighted the dualism of Germany's political development. The desire to 
collect statistical data, on the one hand, was tied into the process of modernisation towards a 
more bureaucratic state. On the other hand, the targeting of a numerically negligible minority 
group, raised questions about the integrity of German institutions and the commitment to 
upholding the principles of equality enshrined in the constitution.  
 The Judenzählung shed an important light on Germany's political culture, specifically 
the informal powers of parliament against the backdrop of the increasing militarisation of the 
Empire. In the Reichstag ministers used the Jewish Question to demand redress of the 
military's constitutional transgressions. Combined with the public outrage over the census 
and the diplomatic pressure exerted by politically and economically influential German-
Jewish representatives, after only three months, the decree was declared closed. In this 
instance, normative pressures exerted by parliament and German-Jewish representatives had 
triumphed.  
 In the last two years of the war, the practical Jewish questions that had surfaced in 
1914 and 1916, were no longer on the political agenda as the German Empire was faced with 
an increasing prospect of defeat and a war-weary population where revolutionary feelings 
were rife. By autumn 1918, the Supreme Army Command confessed that an armistice had to 
be negotiated immediately. Chancellor Georg von Hertling and his cabinet resigned, and the 
new Chancellor Prince Max von Baden took on the bitter task of arranging peace negotiations 
with the President of the United States Woodrow Wilson. A series of political and 
constitutional reforms towards the parliamentarisation of the Empire headed by Max von 
Baden did little to quell the revolutionary fervour or satisfy Woodrow Wilson's armistice 
demands.6 Starting with a small revolt, only a few days later a major mutiny involving tens of 
thousands of sailors took place in Kiel. Disillusioned with the military and political leadership, 
a number of workers and soldiers’ councils were formed across the country as the civil unrest 
spread. On the 9 November, Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated, and the German Republic was 
declared.7  
 At this critical juncture in Germany's political development another practical Jewish 
Question arose during the drafting of a new constitution for the Republic. As chapter four 
illustrated, discussions on Article 113, Germany's policy on minority rights, concerning how 
to define the status of minority communities turned specifically to the Jewish Question. The 
 
6 See Machtan, Prinz Max von Baden. 
7 For a recent informative account on the German revolution see Mark Jones, Founding Weimar. 
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debate was triggered by the Independent Socialist member of parliament, Oskar Cohn, who 
submitted a petition to change the wording of Article 113 to incorporate rights for national 
minorities. Cohn resolutely believed that Jews would soon be granted the recognition as a 
nation during the peace deliberations in Paris and insisted that the constitution reflect these 
international developments. The debate, which took place in the National Assembly and 
Constitutional Committee, pitted the left-liberal Hugo Preuss, author of the constitution, and 
his liberal supporters against the Zionist Oskar Cohn.  
 On the one hand, the discussions brought up larger questions confronting the German-
Jewish community on their confessional, cultural or national status, which reached back to 
earlier Zionist debates discussed in chapter one. During the First World War, as chapter two 
showed, these ideas had become practically relevant for Germany's geopolitical interests. 
After the war, in light of the international recognition of ethnically homogenous nation-states 
at the Paris Peace Conference the subject of Jewish minority rights took on an international 
and legal dimension, as chapter five illustrated. On the other hand, as the debate centred on 
how to define the minority it delved into the heart of how to define German nationality.  
 Comparing the French model of the Staatsnation to Germany's historical development 
as a Kulturnation, Cohn criticized the rootedness of German national understanding in ideas 
of culture, language and descent and exposed the hypocrisy that despite speaking German, 
minority groups remained foreign (fremd) within Germany. The National Assembly resolutely 
rejected Cohn's petition and the wording of Article 113 recognised only foreign-speaking 
groups as minorities. According to this criteria, German Jews were not granted any 
exceptional minority status, satisfying the position of the liberal German Jewish majority. 
Internationally at the Paris Peace Conference, however, as Cohn had underscored, Jewish 
minorities living in the new states were granted exceptional minority rights: cultural 
autonomy. The importance of the short-lived Weimar constitutional debates on Jewish 
questions was that they pertained to more fundamental questions on how to define nationality. 
These domestic debates as they related to the Paris Peace Conference expose the piecemeal 
and inconsistent way in which the post-war minority system developed and was 
institutionalised.  
 During the First World War Zionism was recognised as an influential political 
movement with global reach.8 For the first time, Jews were internationally recognised as a 
minority group deserving of exceptional rights. Moreover, the Balfour Declaration reified the 
Jewish nation by proclaiming a Jewish homeland in Palestine. As a result of these international 
 
8 For a formative account on the international recognition of Zionism during the First World War and 
Germany's relationship with Zionist organisations see Isaiah Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism. 
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developments, as chapter five has illustrated, the German Foreign Office saw it as vital that 
they formulate a position on the Jewish Question in preparation for the peace negotiations 
with the Allies in Paris. For the diplomat Graf von Bernstorff if the German delegation could 
present a positive programme on the Jewish Question it would help Germany regain its 
international prestige. By May 1919, however, the German delegation realised that it would 
not be invited into negotiations and that the extensive preparations for the peace conference 
had been in vain. Jewish affairs were raised by the German delegation not in a programmatic 
manner but rather in order to highlight the barbarity of the Poles and stress the inclusion of 
national minority protections (with German minorities in mind) in the peace treaty with 
Poland.   
 Unlike in Weimar, as chapter five revealed, in Versailles minority rights were 
conceived by the Allies, first and foremost, in light of the German Question, not the Jewish 
Question. No specific provisions were included in the Treaty of Versailles referring to the 
protection of minorities within Germany. Instead, Germany became the only country that 
signed a peace treaty without an obligation to protect its minority communities. This omission 
had violent repercussions when the League of Nations was powerless against Hitler's anti-
Jewish policies after 1933. Having dismissed a universal minority rights regime at Paris, the 
Nazis' treatment of Jews motivated the writing of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.9  
 The protection of religious and ethnic minority rights in a peace treaty with Poland 
was guaranteed in an appendix included in the Treaty of Versailles. Germans were the largest 
ethnic minority living dispersed in the new states of Eastern Europe. As such, protecting 
German minorities abroad became a cornerstone of the Republic's post-war foreign policy. 
German and Jewish lobby groups worked together in the European Congress of Nationalities 
and tried to strengthen the League's mandate to protect minorities. Leading this charge was 
the Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann who managed, on the basis of this policy, to 
successfully negotiate Germany's re-entry into the international community. In 1926 the 
German Republic secured its place at the League of Nations table.10 Like Zionists at the turn 
of the century, the German Republic grappled with the similar questions on how to nurture a 
cohesive national belonging crossing state boundaries, whilst being constrained by the 
 
9 Mark Mazower argues that the failure of the League of Nations' minority rights system played a significant 
role in the United Nations' subsequent commitment to human rights. Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of 
Human Rights'. See also Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010).  
10 On Stresemann's minority rights foreign policy see Carole Fink, ‘Defender of Minorities: Germany in the 
League of Nations, 1926-1933’, Central European History 5, no. 4 (1972): 330–57. 
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prevalent political structure of the nation-state. During the inter-war years, through the 
protection of minorities, the German and Jewish Question became further entwined.  
 In contrast to the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty with Poland, known as the 
Minority Treaty, was drafted with both German and Jewish minorities in mind. Liberal Jewish 
and Zionist representatives in Paris petitioned actively for the specific inclusion of provisions 
for Jews. Whilst they may not have been decisive in shaping the wording of the clause, they 
successfully ensured Jewish rights remained on the political agenda. Jews were explicitly 
mentioned in the Minority Treaty and specific clauses granted them cultural autonomy. This 
became the template for all subsequent new state peace treaties ensuring, for the first time, 
the international protection of Jews on the basis of their cultural minority status.  
 In 1919, like in the Berlin Treaty of 1878, the protection of Jews became a constituent 
element of the newly conceived international system. As a result of the Minority Treaty and 
their recognition as a culturally autonomous minority, their fate became bound to the new 
ordering of states according to the nation-state model, coupled with national homogeneity, 
which was enshrined in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Jewish questions were an important 
consideration in the drafting of these constitutions and international treaties. As such, they 
provide a unique vantage point from which to assess the competing ideas behind both the 
foundations of the nation-state and the post-war international order.  
 
Despite the political strains in the infancy of the new German democracy, the ideals of the 
Weimar Republic were admirable. In the words of President Friedrich Ebert in his address to 
the opening session of the assembly on the 7 February 1919, Germans had created ‘an Empire 
[Reich] of right and of righteousness, founded on the equality of everything that wears the 
form of mankind’.11 The Weimar Republic signified the pinnacle of Jewish emancipation on a 
legal and societal level. The Republic was a positive expression of all the discontents that 
Jewish questions in the First World War had thrown into relief. The constitution enshrined 
the freedom of religious expression, even greater equality was awarded through the institution 
of universal male and female suffrage. Jews embraced the Rechtsstaat and could form a 
patriotism to the constitution with its liberal democratic values. The formally militaristic state 
under Prussian hegemony was replaced by a pluralistic, majoritarian-led parliamentary 
democracy. Significantly, the liberal values of the constitution filtered down to the societal 
 
11 Friedrich Ebert, ‘Address to the Opening Session of the German Assembly on 7 February 1919’, in Source 
Records of the Great War, ed. Charles F. Horne, Vol. VII, National Alumni, 1923 [https://bit.ly/2JPitMy, 
accessed 12/06/19].  
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level as well. Discriminations against Jews in the military, politics and academia were removed 
and Jews began to participate in political life on an unprecedented level.  
 German Jews were involved in the formation of new political parties. A number of 
Jews were signatory to the founding of the German Democratic Party including Hugo Preuss, 
Paul Nathan, Carl Melchior and Albert Einstein. The newly established Communist Party of 
Germany, which split from the Independent Social Democratic Party whose Chairman was 
Hugo Haase, the Jewish lawyer, was led by Rosa Luxemburg, a Polish Jew. German Jews were 
also invited to partake in the peace process. The Minister of Justice Otto Landsberg and 
Chairman of the German Democratic Party Carl Melchior were selected for the peace 
delegation sent to Paris. German Jews also helped build the Republic. Hugo Preuss, who had 
been unable to secure a Professorship at the University of Berlin for being Jewish, was called 
upon to draft the new German constitution.12   
 A third of the elected members of the first cabinet of the new government headed by 
Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann were of Jewish descent. This included Otto Landsberg as the 
Minister of Finance, Eugen Schiffer as Minister of Justice, Georg Gothein as Minister of the 
Treasury and Eduard David who was a minister without a profile.13 In 1922, the Jewish 
industrialist Walther Rathenau became the face of the German Republic internationally when 
he was appointed to the prestigious position of Foreign Minister. The involvement of Jews in 
German politics during the Weimar Republic was representative that the grievances 
expressed through Jewish questions in the previous decades - specifically the equality before 
the law and institutional discrimination - no longer had to be raised.  
 The visibility of German Jews in political positions, however, came at a cost. The 
Weimar Republic witnessed a series of political assassinations, several of which involved 
antisemitic intent. Proportional to their representation in the German population (under 1%), 
German Jews were overrepresented in left-wing political movements.14 This trend was not 
representative of Jewish political voting behaviour. The majority of Jewish voters favoured 
the more centrist German Democratic Party. As a result of the collapse of centrist parties, 
after 1932, Jewish votes were mainly split between the Catholic Centre Party and the Social 
 
12 On the involvement of Jews in German politics during the Weimar Republic see Pulzer, Jews and the German 
State; Wolfgang Benz, Arnold Paucker, and Peter G. J. Pulzer, eds., Jüdisches Leben in der Weimarer Republik 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998); Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany. 
13 The files of the Reich Chancellery of the Weimar Republic are available online [https://bit.ly/2XVvAkF, 
accessed 24/06/2019]. 




Democratic Party, which received the majority.15 Nevertheless, Jews became increasingly 
subjected to the charge of Judeo-Bolshevism. Over the course of its five chapters, this 
dissertation focused on the positive bifurcation of the Jewish Question. In doing so, it has filled 
a gap in the literature which otherwise tends to culminate narratives on the Jewish Question 
with the Holocaust. After the end of the First World War, the positive bifurcation of the 
Jewish Question was evident, as aforementioned, in the Weimar Republic's liberal 
constitution, the removal of political discriminations against Jews and the beginning of a 
Jewish renaissance in German society.16 However, there are two sides to every coin, the seeds 
of the negative bifurcation of the Jewish Question were also sowed in the war.  
 Two of the most prominent allegations that were levelled against Jews during the 
Weimar Republic originated in the war years: the myth of 'Judeo-Bolshevism' of a fatal 'stab-
in-the-back' (Dolchstoß) that the German army was dealt by revolutionaries on the home front. 
The antisemitic trope of Judeo-Bolshevism entered Germany in around 1917 brought over by 
White Russian troops escaping the Bolshevist revolution in Russia. During parliamentary 
discussions on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when the Jewish minister Oskar Cohn had to 
outline the decision taken by the Independent Social Democrats to not accept the treaty, the 
antisemitic press used the incidence to prove that revolutionary Bolshevism had entered 
Germany.17  
 The claim of Judeo-Bolshevism gained momentum during the German revolution. In 
November 1918, the Jewish literary critic and member of the Independent Social Democrats, 
Kurt Eisner, declared Bavaria a Republic and became its President. A few months later, the 
Communist Party member Rosa Luxemburg helped organise and lead a general strike against 
the government. In April, a short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic was established with the 
Jewish playwright Ernst Toller as its Chief of Staff. Other German Jews involved in the Soviet 
Republic included the anarchists Gustav Landauer, Erich Mühsam and Eugen Leviné.18 With 
the visibility of Jews in the revolution, the trope of Judeo-Bolshevism became intertwined with 
the myth of an international Jewish world domination conspiracy which was popularised in 
 
15 A smaller percentage of Jewish votes went to the Communist Party and the Socialist Worker's Party. Pulzer 
also suggests that some strategic votes may have gone to the German National People's Party. See Pulzer, 
Jews and the German State, 287–323. 
16 On the Jewish renaissance see Michael Brenner, The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996). 
17 On Judeo-Bolshevism in Germany see Brian E. Crim, ‘“Our Most Serious Enemy”: The Specter of Judeo-
Bolshevism in the German Military Community, 1914–1923’, Central European History 44, no. 4 (2011): 624–41. 
18 See Grady, A Deadly Legacy. 
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Germany through the translation and dissemination of a Russian forgery entitled Die 
Geheimnisse der Weisen von Zion.19 
 During the period of unrest, the mounting fears of a Bolshevist revolution in Germany 
were used to legitimise antisemitic violence. For Kurt Eisner, as for Gustav Landauer and 
Rosa Luxemburg, their politics came before their Judaism. Judeo-Bolshevism, however, 
conflated the two. When Kurt Eisner was assassinated his murderer Count Anton Graf von 
Arco auf Valley justified his actions on the basis that Eisner was a Jew and that he despised 
Bolshevism. The irony of the situation was that Eisner was perceived as a Jew whilst Anton 
Graf a self-declared German nationalist who was Jewish through his mother’s line, was not.20  
Whilst Eisner's murderer had acted alone, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were both 
summarily executed after the suppression of the Spartacist uprising in January 1919 by the 
Free Corps (Freikorps), a civilian militia that the government used to help contain the 
revolutionary unrest. Gustav Landauer and Eugen Leviné were also killed by the Free Corps 
for their involvement in the Soviet Republic.21  
 
Alongside Judeo-Bolshevism another antisemitic trope that had its origins in the First World 
War was the myth that the Germany army had not been defeated. Rather, it had been stabbed-
in-the-back by elements on the home front. The Dolchstoßlegende was born.22 The blame was 
placed on those who had been involved in the revolution and armistice. As the myth gained 
traction within far-right-wing circles it was directed at Jews and the Judenrepublik they had 
created with the help of socialists and communists. The shared experience of the First World 
War for German Gentiles and Jews was replaced by myths promulgated by Generals 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff that Jews had profiteered during the war and shirked their 
military duty. As chapter three has shown, these claims were able to manifest as a result of 
the conduct of the Judenzählung.  
 
19 It was published in Germany in January 1920. By the end of the year, six editions had been published. See 
Michael Hagemeister, ‘The Protocols of the Elders of Zion: Between History and Fiction’, New German 
Critique, no. 103 (2008): 83–95. 
20 Sterling Fishman, ‘Assassination of Kurt Eisner: A Study of Identity in the German-Jewish Dialogue’, in The 
German-Jewish Dialogue Reconsidered: A Symposium in Honour of George L. Mosse, ed. Klaus L. Berghahn (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1996), 141–54. 
21 On the violent acts committed by the Freikorps during the inter-war years see Brian E. Crim, ‘Terror from 
the Right: Revolutionary Terrorism and the Failure of the Weimar Republic’, Journal of Conflict Studies 27, no. 
2 (2008): 51–63. 
22 For further reading on the Dolchstoßlegende see Michael Alme, Die Entstehung der Dolchstoßlegende nach dem 
Ersten Weltkrieg im Spiegel von Quellen und Forschung, 1. (Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag, 2016); George S. Vascik 
and Mark R. Sadler, The Stab-in-the-Back Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic: A History in Documents and 
Visual Sources (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016). 
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 In his speech to the Parliamentary Investigatory Committee on the 18 November 1919 
General Hindenburg misquoted the British general Frederick Maurice as saying that the 
German army had been stabbed-in-the-back. By February, a speech by General Ludendorff on 
the new government intensified this claim. The new government, according to Ludendorff, 
had disarmed the 'unconquered' German army to allow for the revolution. The speech made 
no reference to Jews but was directed at the ‘November Criminals’ (Novemberverbrecher) whom 
had signed the armistice to end the First World War.23 The two Generals ignored their own 
contributions to the demand for an armistice and shifted blame away from the errors of the 
Supreme Army Command.  
 As with the spectre of Judeo-Bolshevism, the implications of these myths were realised 
when words turned into deeds with the assassination of Matthias Erzberger, Reich Minister 
of Finance, in August 1921 by the ultra-nationalist Organisation Consul. His crime: he was 
one of the signatories to the Treaty of Versailles and thus a Novemberverbrecher. Erzberger's 
assassination was followed two years later by that of Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau, by 
members of the same organisation. Organisation Consul was an underground antisemitic 
organisation consisting of former members of the Marinebrigade Ehrhardt unit, which was 
attached to the Free Corps. In the same year as Rathenau's assassination the organisation was 
also responsible for throwing prussic acid at the Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann, who 
managed to escape unscathed. These negative bifurcations of the Jewish Question, which 
emerged out of the war, were factors which contributed to the National Socialist Party’s rise 
to power and the policy to exterminate European Jewry.24 
 Whilst the Jewish Question was appropriated to spread the myths of Judeo-Bolshevism 
and the Dolchstoßlegende and justify antisemitic violence, in this dissertation I have shown the 
ambivalence of Jewish questions. The inter-war years were not dominated by the negative 
bifurcation of the Jewish Question but, I suggest, remained ambivalent. The public response 
to the assassination of Walther Rathenau testifies to this as the subsequent debate erupted 
into a defence of the Republic. Supporters of the Republic used the assassination to stress the 
 
23 See Erich Ludendorff's speech, ‘Speech on the New German Government in February 1919’, in Source Records 
of the Great War, ed. Charles F. Horne, Vol. VII, National Alumni, 1923 [https://bit.ly/2JPitMy, accessed 
24/06/19].  
24 On Organisation Consul and paramilitary violence in the Weimar Republic see Robert Heynen, 'The 
German Revolution and the Radical Right' in The German Revolution and Political Theory eds. Gaard Kets and 
James Muldoon (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 45-68; Arthur D. Brenner, 'Feme Murder: 
Paramilitary "Self-Justice" in Weimar Germany' in Death Squads in Global Perspective ed. Bruce B. Campbell and 
Arthur D. Brenner (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 57-83; Martin Sabrow, Der Rathenaumord: 
Rekonstruktion einer Verschwörung gegen die Republik von Weimar, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrhefte für 
Zeitgeschichte 69 (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994); Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps 
Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969); Howard Stern, 'The 
Organisation Consul', The Journal of Modern History 35, no. 1 (1963): 20-32.  
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importance of rallying against the threats to the new regime. A number of notable figures 
came out as Vernunftrepublikaner including Thomas Mann, Friedrich Meinecke and Gustav 
Stresemann. Jewish questions had once again, as this dissertation argued, highlighted a 
significant moment in Germany's political development and the shaky ground upon which the 
Republic was built. The assassination of Walther Rathenau offers a further avenue of research 
that would build on this dissertation by identifying another moment when a Jewish Question 
catalysed a debate on the German nation-state. It would shed light on how political reform in 
Germany was an ongoing complex process.  
 My dissertation has shown how Jewish questions brought to the fore issues concerning 
minority rights, religious freedom, national identity and multiculturalism. Long after the end 
of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, these issues remain salient in the Federal 
Republic. Questions that the protagonists of my dissertation were asking in the early 
twentieth century concerning citizenship rights for minority groups, whether cultural 
homogeneity in the nation-state was important and the role of religion in the state have been 
given renewed urgency with the rise of populist movements and the reassertion of the nation-
state against the backdrop of unprecedented connectivity and increasing globalisation. This 
research will be of use to scholars interested in the continuities and discontinuities in 
understandings of the German nation-state, specifically its historical tradition of a 
Kulturnation, and the relationship between the German state and Jewish questions.  
 
Jewish questions continued to be posed in Germany long after the end of the Second World 
War. On the one hand, after the war, Jewish questions featured in the guise of antisemitism. 
Overt antisemitism combined with social amnesia of the atrocities committed towards 
European Jewry in the Second World War, evidenced in the trial of Philip Auerbach, the 
Restitution Commissioner of Bavaria, permeated German society after the end of the Second 
World War.25 A lecture given a few years later by Theodor W. Adorno made explicit the 
remnants of Nazism in the democratic Federal Republic and the necessity on an ethical-
political level for German institutions to work through the past and for Germans as 
individuals to reflect on their self-understanding in the Federal Republic.26  
 On the other hand, Germans Jews (or 'Jews in Germany' the term used by the Nazis 
and later appropriated by Jews living in the Federal Republic) played a significant role as 
 
25 Anon., ‘Philip Auerbach Commits Suicide: Act Due to Verdict of German Court’, Jewish Telegraphic Agency 
XIX:160 (18 August 1952), 3 [https://bit.ly/2LrE4hw, accessed 17/09/2019].  
26 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Was Bedeutet: Aufarbeitung Der Vergangenheit’, in Gesammelte Schriften 10.2, 
Kulturkritik Und Gesellschaft II: Eingriffe. Stichworte. (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 555–72. 
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mediators of German democracy.27 Michal Bodemann argues that Jews were vital for West 
German domestic and foreign policy as they  performed the role of 'ideological labourers'.28 
Hannah Arendt similarly studied Jews exercising this role in early capitalist Europe.29 During 
the Adenauer era, in domestic policy, Jews became a 'necessary element in German society as 
an apolitical counterbalance to Nazism'.30 After the war, German-Jewish organisations 
expressed a willingness to participate in building democratic structures in Germany and the 
United States High Commissioner for Germany, John McCloy correlated the development of 
the German Jewish community with Germany's progress as a democratic state.31 The role of 
Jewish public intellectuals in the Federal Republic, especially those within the Frankfurt 
School also testified to the importance of Jewish voices in shaping the cultural and intellectual 
life of post-war Germany.32 In the 1970s, Rainer Werner Fassbinder's 1975 play Der Müll, die 
Stadt und der Tod and the screening of the American mini-series Holocaust in 1979, provoked 
an unprecedented soul-searching in the Federal Republic about the Nazi past, antisemitism 
and German national identity.33  
 Jews played an important role not only in Germany's post-war domestic policy but 
also in its foreign policy. After the war normalising relations with Jews was perceived as 
important for fostering relations with other West European countries and the United States.34 
When the State of Israel was declared in 1948, maintaining positive relations became a 
cornerstone of German foreign policy. This attitude echoed that of the German Foreign Office 
after the First World War when formulating a positive programme on the Jewish Question 
was envisioned as Germany's ticket back into the international community and a signal that a 
new democratic spirit had taken hold in Germany. In a recent move, in May 2019, the German 
parliament ruled that the, Palestinian-led, 'Boycott, Divest and Sanctions' (B.D.S.) movement 
aimed at Israel is antisemitic.35 In the wake of the ruling, the Director of the Jewish museum 
 
27 Y. Michal Bodemann, ‘The State in the Construction of Ethnicity and Ideological Labor: The Case of 
German Jewry’, Critical Sociology 17, no. 3 (1 October 1990): 40. See also Anthony D. Kauders, Democratization 
and the Jews: Munich, 1945-1965, Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). 
28 Bodemann, ‘The State in the Construction of Ethnicity and Ideological Labor’. 
29 Ibid, 37. See also Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951). 
30 Bodemann, ‘The State in the Construction of Ethnicity and Ideological Labor’, 41. 
31 Michael Brenner, ‘In the Shadow of the Holocaust: The Changing Image of German Jewry after 1945’, 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Ina Levine Annual Lecture, 2010, 4–5 [https://bit.ly/2SuH2CJ, 
accessed 17/07/19].  
32 On the Frankfurt School see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the 
Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
33 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Frankfurt, Germans and Jews: The City, Garbage and Death’, in Fassbinder’s Germany: 
History Identity Subject (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), 175–96. 
34 Bodemann, ‘The State in the Construction of Ethnicity and Ideological Labor’, 41. 
35 Katrin Bennhold, ‘German Parliament Deems B.D.S. Movement Anti-Semitic’, The New York Times, 17 May 
2019 [https://nyti.ms/2LY8d7x, accessed 17/07/19].  
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of Berlin, having tweeted an article criticising the resolution, resigned from his post.36 
Worrying trends involving a 20% rise in antisemitic instances in Germany led, in part, to the 
anti-B.D.S. resolution. The majority of incidences reported have been committed by the far-
right. However, the political party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), 
known to express far-right views, has instrumentalised this trend to promote Islamophobia. 
The way in which Jewish questions are embedded within understandings of German 
nationhood has led to this paradox. Whereby some members of the AfD identify anti-
antisemitism as a pillar of Germany's national culture whilst promoting racism towards 
another minority group.37  
 
Jewish questions in Germany also speak to another mechanism, which goes beyond German-
Jewish relations. They reveal the dynamics of German nationhood. The notion that the 
attributes of the Kulturnation define German national unity continues to gain traction in the 
Federal Republic today.38 When Germany was reunited in 1990, under Article 35 of the 
Unification Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), art and culture were identified as the elements which preserved the unity of 
the German nation.39 Since 2015, when the Chancellor Angela Merkel announced an open-
door policy which welcomed refugees fleeing the civil war in Syria, an earlier debate on 
Leitkultur (guiding culture) was revived.40 The Leitkultur debate centres around the question 
of what German national culture is, or should be, defined by. As Jewish questions catalysed 
debates about German national identity in the Wilhelmine era, in the Federal Republic 
another religious and ethnic minority, Muslims, are at the centre of these discussions.  
 In the Federal Republic the ongoing Leitkultur debate has diverged from the first usage 
of the term by the political scientist Bassam Tibi who coined it in his 1998 book Europa ohne 
Identität.41 Tibi argued that Germany's identity should be grounded in European values rather 
 
36 Melissa Eddy, ‘Director of Berlin’s Jewish Museum Quits After Spat Over B.D.S.’, The New York Times, 14 
June 2019 [https://nyti.ms/2LsxtDh, accessed 17/07/19].  
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than oriented towards the idea of 'nation' (Volk) and 'traditions' (Gepflogenheiten).42 The values 
upon which this German identity should be based, according to Tibi, should be modelled on 
those of the liberal-democratic order: democracy, secularism, human rights and pluralism. Tibi 
saw these values as imperative for a globalised society confronted with immigration from non-
European, specifically Muslim, countries. Rather than multiculturalism, Tibi urged for 
cultural pluralism, which he understood as a society where people from different cultures and 
religions live together in a community governed by a clear system of values that are 
respected.43 Tibi outlined a model not unlike one advocated by the sociologist Werner 
Sombart in his 1911 lecture on 'The Future of the Jews'. As chapter one revealed, Sombart 
framed his answer to the Jewish Question as part of a larger claim to a multi-cultural or 
culturally pluralist German Empire.  
 The question of multiculturalism remains on the public agenda in Germany today.44  
Arguments made by advocates of a German Leitkultur resonate with Heinrich von Treitschke's 
demand for Jews to assimilate in order to ensure a homogenous Christian national culture in 
Germany. This debate erupted in 2000 against the backdrop of a discussion regarding 
revisions to Germany's nationality law. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politician 
Friedrich Merz spoke of a 'liberal German dominant culture' (Leitkultur) that needed to extend 
beyond constitutional patriotism45 (Verfassungspatriotismus) and include liberal European 
values that migrants would have to be prepared to respect.46 Since, the debate has become 
divisive in Germany and is still ongoing.47 Whilst what a German Leitkultur would look like 
remains unclear,48 the debate is split between those that believe immigrants should 'assimilate 
to a set of shared cultural values' and critics who argue that the promotion of a German 
 
42 Ibid, xvii. 
43 Ibid, 92. 
44 The Federal Office of Statistics reported that in 2017, 10.6 million foreign nationals were registered in 
Germany, which is up 5.8% from the previous year. See Statistisches Bundesamt, 'Ausländische Bevölkerung 
wächst im Jahr 2017 um 5,8%' [https://bit.ly/2RTjiYD, accessed 04/07/2019].  
45 The idea of constitutional patriotism is closely associated with the writings of Jürgen Habermas as he used it 
in order to formulate a collective identity for post-war Germany and for the European Union. See Jürgen 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1996); Jürgen Habermas The Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). More recently, Jan-
Werner Müller has built on Habermas and attempted to develop a theory of constitution patriotism. See Jan-
Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). For a useful 
introduction to constitutional patriotism see Jan-Werner Müller and Kim Lane Scheppele, 'Constitutional 
Patriotism: An introduction', International Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 1 (2008): 67-71.  
46 Friedrich Merz, ‘Einwanderung und Identität’, Die Welt, 25 October 2000 [https://bit.ly/2pNQZiV, 
accessed 04/07/2019].  
47 For a repository of recent articles on the subject of Leitkultur in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung see 
[https://bit.ly/2NxziB0, accessed 04/07/2019]; Die Zeit see [https://bit.ly/2KX5HyJ, accessed 
04/07/2019]; Presse Portal see [https://bit.ly/2XGbYov, accessed 04/07/2019].  
48 Ferda Ataman, ‘Ein Leitkultur-Leithammel für die CDU’, Spiegel, 3 November 2018 [https://bit.ly/30blflS, 
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Leitkultur would limit multiculturalism by 'rejecting those who do not succeed in 
assimilating'.49  
 Until 2000, the German nationality law adopted by the Federal Republic was based on 
the 1913 citizenship law of the German Empire that provided a unified German citizenship 
rooted in descent and ethnicity (ius sanguinis).50 This law remained in place throughout the 
Weimar Republic and was adopted again in the Basic Law of 1949. The nationality law enabled 
ethnic Germans living within the German borders of 1937 to apply for citizenship. Moreover, 
West Germany could grant citizenship to East Germans fleeing from the GDR.51 
 Rooted in descent and ethnicity, the nationality law was increasingly scrutinised after 
unification; in particular the strict naturalisation requirements for children born in Germany 
to foreign national parents.52 In 2000, the nationality law was revised to allow for territorial 
elements (ius soli). Children born to foreign parents can acquire German citizenship so long as 
one parent has been legally residing in Germany for eight years and has the right to remain. 
Dual nationality, however, is restricted under German law and at the age of eighteen children 
with dual nationality have to declare if they want to retain their German nationality. Only in 
exceptional circumstances will dual nationality be awarded.53  
 Since the introduction of ius soli criteria to the nationality law, a derogatory distinction 
has been popularised in Germany to differentiate between German citizens of ethnic German 
descent, Biodeutsche, and ethnically non-German citizens, Passdeutsche.54 The etymology of the 
term Biodeutsche relates to Leitkultur, which derives from botany and is used to refer to 
dominant plant varieties in a biotope.55 Like the word, Abstammung, this vocabulary 
concerning what constitutes a German national identity continues to originate from biological 
and descent-based terminology. Whilst the terms Biodeutsche and Passdeutsche are new and 
their intention is both exclusionary and derogatory they, nevertheless, reference similar ideas 
to those raised within Zionist circles in Germany at the turn of the century. As discussed in 
chapter one, Zionists discussed different types of national consciousness in Germany as 
 
49 Anon., ‘German Interior Minister speaks out in favor of “Leitkultur” for immigrants’, Deutsche Welle, 30 April 
2017 [https://bit.ly/2LJtcen, accessed 04/07/2019].  
50 Deutscher Bundestag, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949, trans. Christian 
Tomuschat et al. (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2018) [https://bit.ly/2uOg2nF, accessed 04/07/2019]. See 
also Kay Hailbronner, ‘EURO Citizenship Observatory. Country Report: Germany’, European University 
Institute, Florence (October 2012), 1. 
51 Ibid, 2. 
52 Ibid, 3–8. 
53 See Federal Ministry of the Interior Building and Community, 'Dual citizenship - multiple nationality' 
[https://bit.ly/2Xrg1R7, accessed 04/07/2019].  
54 Matthias Heine, ‘Deutsch ist, wer Rad fährt und im Bioladen kauft’, Welt, 30 July 2017 
[https://bit.ly/2JK36VQ, accessed 17/07/19].  
55 Kay-Alexander Scholz, ‘What is German “Leitkultur”?’ Deutsche Welle, 3 May 2017 
[https://bit.ly/2YyXlQS, accessed 04/07/2019].  
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derived either from ethnicity or place of birth. Once a central component of the German Jewish 
Question, in the Federal Republic these questions remain salient in the ongoing German 
Question.  
 Jewish questions, discussed in this dissertation, unlocked wider debates on Germany's 
political system and its national identity. They raised questions and ideas that continue to 
resonate in contemporary discussions on Germany's nationality law and the place of non-
ethnic Germans within the state. More than one hundred years after the Jewish questions 
discussed in this dissertation, similar questions remain. As this dissertation has shown, Jewish 
questions of the early twentieth century were powerful catalysts for debates about the nature 
of the German state. As the Berlin Republic faces new questions about immigration, cultural 
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